Filed 7/14/26 Moving Oxnard Forward v. City of Oxnard CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
MOVING OXNARD 2d Civ. No. B338323
FORWARD, INC., et al., (Super. Ct. No. 56-2022-
00573015-CU-JR-VTA)
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Ventura County)
v.
CITY OF OXNARD et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents;
OXNARD COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION
SUCCESSOR AGENCY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
Appellants Moving Oxnard Forward, Inc. and Aaron Starr
(collectively Appellants) appeal from the postjudgment order
awarding respondents’ (collectively the City of Oxnard or the
City) costs and denying Appellants’ motion to strike and tax
costs. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellants challenged the City of Oxnard’s approval of
lease revenue bonds to finance public capital improvements.
Following judgment in favor of the City, the City filed a
memorandum of costs, seeking $26,489.42. The costs included
attorneys and paralegals’ labor costs for preparation of the
administrative record. The City attached detailed billing records
from the law firm retained to represent the City. These records
included descriptions of tasks and dates when they were
performed, the persons who billed for the tasks, and associated
costs for each task.
Appellants moved to strike and tax costs, asserting the
City’s memorandum was untimely under California Rules of
Court, rule1 3.1700(a)(1) and that the administrative record
preparation costs were improper, excessive, or unreasonable.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied the
motion to tax costs. It found the memorandum was filed late but
found that any delay was not prejudicial and granted relief to
allow it to be filed. The court also found the preparation costs for
the administrative record were “reasonable and necessary to the
litigation of the matter.” Thus, it was reasonable for the City to
pay attorneys and paralegals their labor costs for preparing the
administrative record. The court rejected Appellants’ contention
that recovery should be limited to one dollar per page, finding
that amount “arbitrary and unrelated to the actual costs of record
1 Further unspecified rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
2
preparation.” The court awarded the City $26,489.42 in total
costs.
DISCUSSION
1. Timeliness of the memorandum of costs
Appellants contend the trial court prejudicially erred in
awarding costs because the City failed to timely file its
memorandum of costs after service of the notice of entry of
judgment pursuant to rule 3.1700(a)(1). We are not persuaded.
We review the interpretation of a rule of court de novo.
(Cabrera v. Plager (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 606, 611.) Rule
3.1700(a)(1) provides: “A prevailing party who claims costs must
serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the
date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by
the clerk . . . or the date of service of written notice of entry of
judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of
judgment, whichever is first.” The 15-day timeline for filing a
costs memorandum is not jurisdictional. (See Gunlock Corp. v.
Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1304.)
But under rule 3.1700(b)(3), the parties may agree to
extend these deadlines, or in “the absence of an agreement, the
court may extend the times for serving and filing the costs
memorandum or the notice of motion to strike or tax costs for a
period not to exceed 30 days.” “The rule does not require that the
party expressly request the extension, or that the court
specifically state that it granted the extension.” (Cardinal Health
301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116,
155 (Cardinal Health).)
Here, the notice of entry of judgment was served on March
1, 2024. The City filed its memorandum of costs 19 days later on
March 20, 2024. But even if the costs memorandum was
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untimely under rule 3.1700(a)(1), the trial court exercised its
discretion under rule 3.1700(b)(3) to extend the deadline and
accept the City’s costs memorandum filed four days late. This
extension did not exceed 30 days.
Appellants filed their motion to strike and tax costs on
April 3, 2024, and thus had the opportunity to challenge the costs
motion. Appellants do not show how a four-day extension
prejudiced them. Under these facts, there was no abuse of
discretion. (See Cardinal Health, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at
p. 155 [no abuse of discretion where the extension did not result
in prejudice]; Hoover Community Hotel Development Corp. v.
Thomson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 485, 488 [trial courts have broad
discretion in allowing relief from a late filing of a costs
memorandum where there is no prejudice].)
Appellants nonetheless contend that an extension of the
filing deadline required a showing of good cause to justify the
extension. But neither the plain text of the California Rules of
Court nor the relevant case law require a showing of good cause.
(See Cardinal Health, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) We
cannot read such a requirement into the rules of court that does
not appear therein. (Cf. DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 371, 384.) There was no error in allowing the
City to file its costs memorandum.
2. Costs for preparation of the record
Appellants also contend the costs award included attorney
and paralegal labor costs that are not allowed under Code of Civil
Procedure2 section 1094.5, subdivision (a). They also contend the
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
4
costs are unreasonable. We conclude there was no prejudicial
error.
Section 1094.5, subdivision (a) provides “[e]xcept when
otherwise prescribed by statute, the cost of preparing the record
shall be borne by the petitioner” and “[i]f the expense of
preparing all or any part of the record has been borne by the
prevailing party, the expense shall be taxable as costs.”
“Whether a particular cost to prepare an administrative record
was necessary and reasonable is an issue for the sound discretion
of the trial court. [Citations.] Discretion is abused only when, in
its exercise, the court ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.] The appellant has
the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion.” (River Valley
Preservation Project v. Metropolitan Transit Development Bd.
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 154, 181 (River Valley).)
Courts have held that the costs to prepare an
administrative record can include labor costs for attorneys and
paralegals related to preparation of the administrative record.
(The Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 60, 70–71 (Otay Ranch); No Toxic Air, Inc. v. Lehigh
Southwest Cement Co. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1142 (No Toxic
Air).) In Otay Ranch, the trial court awarded over $37,000 in
costs for preparation of an administrative record, which included
over $30,000 in labor costs for the attorneys and paralegals.
(Otay Ranch, at p. 66.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the costs
award and rejected the argument that the attorney and paralegal
labor costs constituted “attorney fees” that were not recoverable
under the statute. Because of “the history and complexity of the
project and how the documents were maintained,” Otay Ranch
concluded there was no abuse of discretion and that “the County
5
‘did not have the resources or experienced personnel to prepare
the [r]ecord,’ ” justifying the County’s retained counsel and
paralegals’ preparation of the administrative record. (Id. at p.
70.) Otay Ranch also concluded there was “no reason to
differentiate between those actual labor costs [of attorneys and
paralegals] and actual labor costs for agency staff and document
clerks to prepare an administrative record.” (Ibid.) Nor was
there a distinction between labor costs “incurred by individuals
directly employed by a public agency and those incurred by
individuals employed by a private law firm retained by the
agency, so long as . . . the labor costs were reasonably and
necessarily incurred for preparation of the administrative
record.” (Ibid.)
In No Toxic Air, the trial court found the attorneys and
paralegals’ labor costs to be reasonable and necessary, if not
“ ‘essential’ ” for an attorney to be involved in compiling the
administrative record in that case. (No Toxic Air, supra, 1
Cal.App.5th at p. 1141.) But the trial court denied recovery of
these labor costs because “there was no appellate authority
allowing the recovery.” (Id. at p. 1142.) The Court of Appeal
reversed, holding, “labor costs for attorneys and paralegals to
prepare the administrative record are recoverable as expenses
under Code [of] Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, subdivision (a).”
(Ibid.)
Like these cases, the trial court here found that attorney
and paralegal labor costs for preparing the record was
“reasonable” and “necessary.” The administrative record
consisted of seven volumes and almost 4,000 pages of documents,
which included various lease agreements, bank documents, bond
documents, resolutions, city council meeting minutes and
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agendas, and numerous emails. To assemble the administrative
record, it required the expertise of an attorney and paralegal with
specific knowledge and a comprehensive understanding of the
financing, approval, and issuance of lease revenue bonds. And it
also required legal judgment to identify responsive records,
review for privilege, organize the record, and certify its
completeness. (See Otay Ranch, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp.
65–69.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by including attorney and paralegal labor incurred in preparing
the administrative record as recoverable costs.
We also reject Appellants’ contention that the costs were
excessive, unreasonable, and unnecessary. If items on their face
appear to be proper charges, a verified memorandum of costs is
prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the
party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or
necessary. But if the items are properly objected to, they are put
in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming the
costs. (Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 765, 773–774 (Wagner Farms); Jones v. Dumrichob
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.)
Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary is a question
of fact to be decided by the trial court, and its ultimate decision to
award costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Wagner Farms,
supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) With respect to labor
performed, or professional services rendered, “[t]he ‘experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services
rendered in his court, and while [their] judgment is of course
subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” (Serrano v. Priest
(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)
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Here, the trial court reviewed the costs memorandum and
the detailed billing records supporting the City’s request for
attorney and paralegal labor costs incurred in preparing the
administrative record. The court also reviewed Appellants’
motion to strike and tax costs, including its line-by-line objections
to individual cost items. The court stated that it “considered
[Appellants’] objections to the individual items of the
memorandum” and found “each is without merit.” The court
found “the charges for preparation for the record were reasonable
and necessary to the litigation” and that the City’s evidence
“proves the actual costs incurred in preparing the record.”
To the extent Appellants challenge specific billing entries,
these challenges were raised below and rejected by the court.
The trial judge, who presided over the entire case, was in the best
position to determine whether each cost item listed in the
memorandum of costs was necessary and whether the costs were
reasonable. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
1475, 1487.)
Nor have Appellants shown an abuse of discretion. The
billing records specifically identify work performed by attorney
Tanaka and paralegal McCoy. In our view, this amount does not
reflect an amount “ ‘so large or small that it shocks the conscience
and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the
determination.’ ” (Acree v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 385, 404, quoting Akins v. Enterprise
Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) We cannot
conclude the court’s ruling exceeded the bounds of reason.
Appellants also contend the trial court erred by refusing to
consider its per-page rate to determine reasonableness. While
some courts have used a per-page cost comparison in their
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analysis (see Wagner Farms, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 775), it
is not required. In finding the City’s costs reasonable and
necessary, the court based its decision on the City’s evidence of
the actual labor costs based on time and hourly rates to complete
each task. (See River Valley, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 180–
181 [court awarded actual labor costs based on hours and hourly
rate with no mention of a per-page rate analysis].) Given the
complexity of the issues and work required to review, analyze,
organize, compile, and certify the administrative record, no abuse
of discretion has been shown.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed. Respondents shall
recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Mark S. Borrell, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Best Best & Krieger, Scott W. Ditfurth and Andrew G.
Saghian for Defendants, Respondents and Real Parties in
Interest.