Filed 11/9/26 Moran v. Ortiz CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
RACHEL MORAN, B342778
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 24STRO04498)
v.
MELANIE ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Patricia A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Melanie Ortiz, in pro. per; Law Offices of Anthony E.
Colombo and Anthony E. Colombo for Defendant and Appellant.
Rachel Moran, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Melanie Ortiz challenges a civil
harassment restraining order issued against her in favor of
plaintiff and respondent Rachel Moran following an evidentiary
hearing. The trial court found that Ortiz made a credible threat
of violence against Moran during a confrontation over a dog.
Ortiz contends clear and convincing evidence did not support that
finding, and that the court failed to make the findings Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.61 requires. Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 20, 2024, Moran had an altercation with Ortiz and
Philip Ecdao over possession of Ollie, a shepherd dog. According
to Moran, Ecdao and Ortiz attempted to retrieve the dog using
physical force or threats. Moran sought a civil harassment
restraining order against Ortiz and a domestic violence
restraining order against Ecdao.2 Moran, Ortiz, Ecdao, and
Officer Brandon Leon testified during the November 5, 2024
evidentiary hearing on both requests.
I. Testimony of Moran
Moran dated Ecdao for eight years, and they lived together.
While Moran was dating Ecdao, they both had possession of the
dog. The dog was part of Moran’s “family.”
The relationship ended in 2021 or 2022. After the breakup,
she and Ecdao alternated custody of the dog every other week for
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 Ecdao’s appeal from the domestic violence restraining order
issued against him in the same proceeding is pending as case
No. B342784. We resolve that appeal by a separate opinion.
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two and a half years. She paid $15,000 toward care of the dog. In
May 2024, after Ecdao had told Moran that he was going to move
out of state, she refused to give him the dog.
At the time of the incident, she was outside her house on
the street. She was putting the dog in the back seat of her car
using the passenger side rear door when Ortiz, Ecdao’s fiancée,
opened the driver’s side rear door. Ortiz grabbed the dog’s
harness and attempted to take him. At the same time, Ecdao,
wearing a hood over his head, came at Moran from behind. While
Ortiz and Moran were “wrestling in the back of the car,”
clutching the dog’s harness, Moran “g[o]t . . . slammed against
the car.” Moran repeatedly screamed for help. Ecdao gained
possession of the dog, after which Moran went around the car to
go after Ecdao. Ortiz cut Moran off and brandished pepper spray,
“fumbling to open it to get [Moran] to back away.” Moran then
saw that the dog had broken free and bit Ecdao in the face. She
and the dog ran back into the house and called the police.
The court asked Moran why she thought Ortiz had pepper
spray. Moran showed the court how Ortiz was holding the pepper
spray, which the court described as “hand extended out with the
index finger raised as if like the way you would press down on an
aerosol can.” Moran saw that Ortiz was holding a small canister,
the size of small pepper spray, but did not read any words on it.
Moran then presented video from a neighbor’s doorbell
camera to the court. At first, the court did not “even see
anything,” having “expect[ed] to see something obvious.” After
some explanation of the video from Moran, the court said that it
could not “even see the dog” and that the video was “not very
helpful.” After more explanation from Moran, the court explained
that the video showed Moran running, the dog running after
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Moran, and then someone in black and someone else in a black-
hooded sweatshirt running after the dog. The court admitted the
video into evidence.
Moran also presented two pictures to the court. One picture
showed bruising on her left shin, and the other showed bruising
on her left knee. The bruising occurred after “[Ecdao] came up
from behind [her],” causing her to fall. At some point while the
parties were wrestling to get the dog, Moran’s body was
“slammed into the car.” Moran took the pictures on June 23,
2024, three days after the incident. The court admitted the
pictures into evidence.
During cross-examination, Moran testified that prior to the
incident, she never had any incidents of domestic violence with
Ecdao. She also testified that Ecdao said nothing to her during
the incident. Moran indicated that to her knowledge, neither
Ecdao nor Ortiz were arrested or faced criminal charges arising
from the incident.
II. Testimony of Officer Leon
Officer Leon reported to the scene of the incident on June
20, 2024 and investigated for a possible battery. Officer Leon
testified that while there was an allegation of pepper spray, there
was no evidence of pepper spray at the scene. He did not search
Ecdao or Ortiz for pepper spray because there were no signs of
Moran having been sprayed, including red, watery eyes or the
smell of pepper spray. Although Moran claimed that Ecdao
pushed her, Officer Leon did not notice any injuries to Moran. He
only noticed that Ecdao had a bloody right lip.
Neither Ecdao nor Ortiz were arrested at the scene of the
incident. Officer Leon and his partner requested an emergency
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protective order for Moran, but the criteria for one had not been
met.
III. Testimony of Ortiz
Ortiz testified that on the night of the incident, she was
driving with Ecdao as a passenger. She and Ecdao noticed Moran
remove the harness from the dog, place him in the car using the
driver’s side front door, leave the door open, and go to the trunk
to load some items. Ortiz then pulled over, removed the harness
from the front seat, and pulled the dog out. The dog then rolled
over to Ecdao, who was standing at the driver’s side rear door a
foot apart from Ortiz.
Moran then went from the trunk to the passenger side
doors, opened the doors, and saw Ecdao putting a leash on the
dog. Moran then ran to the driver’s side rear door screaming for
help. Agitated, the dog rolled out from Ecdao’s arms and head
butted him.
The dog then ran to the sidewalk, after which Ortiz and
Moran both chased after him. The court noted that the neighbor’s
doorbell camera showed Moran running, then the dog after
Moran, then Ortiz, then Ecdao. Ortiz maintained that she never
opened any car door, she never had pepper spray, and that she
and Ecdao never talked to Moran or made any physical contact
with Moran.
IV. Testimony of Ecdao
Ecdao testified that after Ortiz parked, he followed Ortiz,
noticed Ortiz had the dog, and the dog flailed from Ortiz to him.
After the dog head butted him, Ecdao dropped the dog. Ecdao
then saw Moran running, then the dog running behind her, and
then Ortiz behind the dog, after which he ran after Ortiz. He
denied the dog bit him and attributed his lip injury to the dog’s
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head butt. Ecdao denied trying to take the dog by physical force.
He claimed there was no pepper spray and no threats.
V. Trial Court’s Orders
The trial court judge inquired about the small claims case
Ecdao had initiated to secure the return of the dog. The small
claims court held that Ecdao shall take nothing and did not grant
Ecdao ownership of the dog.
After the testimony and closing arguments, the trial court
issued a civil harassment restraining order against Ortiz. The
trial court found that Moran had met her burden of proof and
that she was credible. The trial court determined that Ortiz and
Ecdao gave “incomplete stories” of the incident and were not
credible.
Concerning Ortiz, the trial court found that she made a
credible threat of violence against Moran by “holding up
something that looks like pepper spray and acting like she was
going to spray somebody in the face.” The trial court found
Moran’s account was corroborated by Officer Leon’s testimony
that Moran accused Ortiz of threatening to use pepper spray
against her. The trial court also observed that Ortiz’s version of
events was inconsistent with the video from the doorbell camera.
The court stated that it had “no belief whatsoever that if
these two walk out they’re not going to try to do this again” and
that “[a] restraining order is what’s going to prevent them.” The
restraining order expires November 5, 2026 at 11:59 p.m.
Ortiz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
This opinion concerns the civil harassment restraining
order (CHRO) issued against Ortiz. We determine that
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding of a
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credible threat of violence from Ortiz by clear and convincing
evidence. We also find that Ortiz fails to show any legitimate
purpose which would negate the credible threat finding.
I. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
Section 527.6 allows a court to issue a restraining order if it
finds clear and convincing evidence of unlawful harassment.
(§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) “ ‘Harassment’ ” includes a “credible threat
of violence,” meaning “a knowing and willful statement or course
of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the
person’s safety . . . and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id.,
subds. (b)(2), (b)(3).) “ ‘Course of conduct’ ” is defined as “a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1).)
“The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings
(express and implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the
restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the
record.” (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) But
whether the facts, construed most favorably to the prevailing
party, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under
section 527.6 is a question of law we review de novo. (R.D. v.
P.M., at p. 188.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) We “view
the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
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the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.)
The trial court found a credible threat of violence, and we
address that prong of section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) alone.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding That
Ortiz Made a Credible Threat of Violence
Ortiz argues that the record contains no clear and
convincing evidence of unlawful harassment. We disagree. Ortiz
is correct that the clear and convincing standard bears on our
review. While the trial court had to determine whether the
issuance of a CHRO was supported by clear and convincing
evidence (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1)), our inquiry is whether the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
Here, we find that substantial evidence supported the
court’s finding of a credible threat of violence by Ortiz. Moran
testified that while she was loading the dog into the car, Ortiz
and Ecdao attempted to gain possession of the dog using physical
force. Specifically, Ortiz opened the driver’s side rear door of
Moran’s car and wrestled with Moran to grab the dog’s harness.
When Moran sought to go after Ecdao and the dog, Ortiz cut her
off and extended her hand toward her holding a small canister,
with her index finger raised as if she were going to press on an
aerosol can. Moran testified that the can resembled pepper spray.
The court found Moran’s version of events credible. On
substantial evidence review, we defer to the trial court’s findings
of credibility. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484,
498.)
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Moran’s version of events was consistent with a video from
a neighbor’s doorbell camera, which showed Moran running, the
dog running after Moran, and then Ortiz and Ecdao chasing
Moran to retrieve the dog. The court also noted that Ortiz’s
description of the incident was contradicted by the doorbell
camera video. The court further referred to Officer Leon’s
testimony that Moran reported the pepper spray threat when he
responded to the scene. That testimony showed that Moran made
substantially the same accusation shortly after the confrontation.
It did not independently establish what the object was, and the
finding does not rest on it.
Considering the entire record, substantial evidence
supported the court’s findings. Moreover, this evidence was
legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment. Crediting
Moran’s testimony and the admitted doorbell camera video, Ortiz
engaged in a course of conduct where she and Ecdao confronted
Moran with physical force to gain possession of the dog. Ortiz
escalated the confrontation by threatening to use pepper spray on
Moran. Based on the finding of credibility in favor of Moran and
against Ortiz, the court’s findings were supported by clear and
convincing evidence of a credible threat of violence by Ortiz
against Moran which would place a reasonable person in fear for
her safety.
Ortiz attempts to refute Moran’s account by pointing to
testimony indicating that Moran did not see any words on the
canister indicating that it contained pepper spray. Ortiz also
argues that Officer Leon, who was called to the scene of the
incident, did not observe any evidence of pepper spray at the
scene and made no arrests.
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Ortiz’s arguments share a premise: that the record does not
establish the canister held pepper spray. The premise is sound,
but the conclusion does not follow. Section 527.6 asks whether
the conduct “would place a reasonable person in fear for the
person’s safety.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).) The inquiry is directed to
the conduct, not to the contents of the object held. A canister
thrust toward a person’s face, with the holder’s finger raised to
depress it, would place a reasonable person in fear whether it
contained pepper spray, some other irritant, or nothing at all.
Officer Leon’s testimony is not to the contrary. He arrived after
the confrontation ended and testified to what he did not find. The
court did not find that Ortiz sprayed Moran or that she possessed
a functioning weapon. It found that she held out an object that
looked like pepper spray and acted as though she meant to use it.
To the extent this evidence conflicts with the evidence
supporting Moran, the trial court resolved the conflict in her
favor. On substantial evidence review, we do not reweigh
evidence. Instead, “[w]e resolve all factual conflicts and questions
of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the
trial court if it is supported by substantial evidence which is
reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)3
3 Even crediting the testimony of Officer Leon, an ostensibly
neutral witness, his lack of observation of pepper spray does not
conclusively establish that Ortiz never threatened to use pepper
spray against Moran. At best, Officer Leon’s testimony only
shows that pepper spray was not used, not that Ortiz never
brandished pepper spray in front of Moran.
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Ortiz also argues that the trial court issued the restraining
order without adequately making statutorily required findings,
including what conduct by Ortiz constituted unlawful
harassment, why that conduct caused substantial emotional
distress, why that conduct served no legitimate purpose, and why
a restraining order was necessary.
Section 527.6, subdivision (i) only requires the trial court to
find clear and convincing evidence of the existence of unlawful
harassment before issuing a CHRO.4 It does not require the court
to state any factual findings, and we review the findings that
support the order, express and implied. (R.D. v. P.M., supra, 202
Cal.App.4th at p. 188.) Nor does the record reflect a request for a
statement of decision. Based on Moran’s testimony, the court
found that Ortiz held pepper spray in front of Moran and acted
like she was going to spray Moran. The court reasonably issued
the CHRO based on this finding.
Based on the evidence discussed above, we determine that,
even considering the trial court’s obligation to find a credible
threat of violence by clear and convincing evidence, substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s issuance of a CHRO against
Ortiz.
4 Even if the statute required factual findings, the
requirement of section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) that the conduct
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and actually causes such distress to the petitioner, is by
its terms directed to the knowing and willful course of conduct
prong of the harassment definition. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) It does
not attach to a credible threat of violence, which is at issue here.
(Id., subd. (b)(2).)
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III. Ortiz Has Not Established That Her Conduct Served
a Legitimate Purpose
Ortiz claims that she had a legitimate purpose in
attempting to retrieve the dog because she and Ecdao had a
practice of picking up the dog after Moran watched it.
“Legitimacy of purpose negates harassment.” (Byers v. Cathcart
(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 812.)
We reject this argument. The question is not whether Ortiz
had a legitimate reason to be present, or a legitimate interest in
the dog. It is whether the conduct the trial court found to
constitute the threat served a legitimate purpose. (§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(2).) Raising a canister toward another person’s face to
make her retreat does not. (See Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248
Cal.App.4th at p. 499 [a legitimate reason to be present did not
legitimize the restrained party’s threatening conduct once there].)
A claim to disputed personal property, however strong, does
not license the threatened use of force to take it, and Ortiz cites
no authority indicating otherwise. Because the threatening
conduct served no legitimate purpose, we need not resolve the
ownership of the dog, and we do not. Ortiz fails to show any
legitimate purpose that would negate the trial court’s finding of a
credible threat of violence.5
5 In the reply, Ortiz asks this court to stay the CHRO
pending appeal and to set the matter for oral argument. The
order is a prohibitory injunction that is not subject to automatic
stay on appeal, unless the trial court issues a stay or the
appellate court issues a writ of supersedeas. (See Rubin v.
American Sportsmen Television Equity Soc. (1951)
102 Cal.App.2d 288, 290–291.) Neither of these two events has
occurred. Accordingly, the CHRO remains in force during the
appeal.
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IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding That the
Harassment Was Likely to Recur
Ortiz’s opening brief states that section 527.6 requires a
finding that unlawful harassment exists and is reasonably likely
to recur. A trial court may issue a restraining order under section
527.6 only on a finding that unlawful harassment exists and is
reasonably likely to recur. (Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 94, 103.) An injunction restraining future conduct is
authorized only when it appears that harassment is likely to
recur. (Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.)
The trial court made that finding, and substantial evidence
supports it.
The confrontation arose from an unresolved dispute over
possession of the dog. As of the hearing, Ortiz and Ecdao
continued to claim the dog, and the small claims court had
declined to award it to Ecdao. The trial court found that another
attempt was likely absent an order, stating that it had “no belief
whatsoever that if these two walk out they’re not going to try to
do this again” and that “[a] restraining order is what’s going to
prevent them.” Ortiz maintained at the hearing that she had
done nothing wrong. The circumstances that produced the
confrontation remained in place, and the court was entitled to
conclude that the harassment was reasonably likely to recur.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff Rachel
Moran.
ASHWORTH, J.*
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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