Filed 8/12/26 Morales v. Wang CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
JUAN CARLOS MORALES II et al., B346779
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV16653)
v.
HUI WANG et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Steven L. Sugars and Steven L. Sugars for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Law Offices of Jerry Wang and Jerry Wang for Plaintiff
and Appellant Melissa Morales.
The Green Firm, Noah Green; Law Office of Raymond K.
Wright and Raymond K. Wright for Defendants and
Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiffs Juan Carlos Morales II and Melissa Morales1
appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion for
attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since 2009, Defendants Hui Wang, also known as Heather
Wang, and Tie Zhang owned a condominium in Alhambra,
California (the Property).
On April 23, 2009, Defendants entered into a written lease
agreement with Juan.2 The lease contained an attorney fees
provision: “In any action or proceeding arising out of this
Agreement, the prevailing party between Landlord and Tenant
shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs . . . .”
Before moving in, Juan provided a $1,700 security deposit, the
value of approximately one month’s rent.
In 2015, Melissa moved in with Juan, but she never signed
the lease.
According to Juan, in November 2016, he and Defendants
entered into a verbal agreement whereby Juan would remodel
the Property at his own expense while Defendants would not
raise the rent for four to five years (Remodeling Agreement).
Juan further claimed that after he remodeled the Property and
incurred at least $11,674 in expenses, Defendants increased the
1 We individually refer to Plaintiffs by their first names for
clarity. We intend no disrespect.
2 Although there are several written lease agreements in the
record, we refer to them collectively as the “lease” because the
relevant provisions are identical.
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rent in violation of the Remodeling Agreement and never
compensated him for his services.
After further disputes about the rent, Wang commenced an
unlawful detainer action against Plaintiffs on July 1, 2019. On
July 26, 2019, Plaintiffs and Wang settled the unlawful detainer
action using a form stipulation and judgment. Pursuant to the
stipulation: (1) Plaintiffs would vacate the Property by
November 30, 2019; (2) Plaintiffs would pay the monthly rent of
$2,700 from June 2019 through November 2019; and (3) Wang
would return Juan’s security deposit pursuant to Civil Code3
section 1950.5. The stipulation further stated that if Plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the terms of the stipulation, judgment would be
entered against Plaintiffs, under which Wang would be awarded
possession of the Property and all rights Plaintiffs had under the
lease would be forfeited. Wang dismissed the unlawful detainer
action, and Plaintiffs vacated the Property in November 2019.
According to Defendants, they discovered around $8,000 in
damage to the Property after Plaintiffs left but attempted to
return the security deposit despite this damage. Juan claimed
Defendants retained his security deposit in bad faith.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 3, 2021, Juan commenced the instant action
against Defendants and alleged four causes of action: (1) actual
fraud; (2) quantum meruit; (3) unlawful and bad faith retention
of security deposit; and (4) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The first cause of action alleged
Defendants caused Juan to remodel the Property without
intending to keep their promise of not raising the rent for several
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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years. The second cause of action alleged Juan was entitled to the
reasonable value of the remodeling services he provided. The
third cause of action alleged Defendants retained the
$1,700 security deposit in violation of section 1950.5. The fourth
cause of action alleged Defendants breached the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing contained in the lease.
On September 2, 2021, Defendants filed a negligence cross-
complaint against Plaintiffs, alleging they caused $8,000 in
damage to the Property.
On April 1, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary
adjudication against Juan, but the parties’ briefing is not in the
record before us. On June 24, 2022, the first trial court
(Hon. Timothy Dillon) that presided over this matter summarily
adjudicated Juan’s fourth cause of action in Defendants’ favor.
The court ruled that pursuant to the form stipulation and
judgment resolving the unlawful detainer action, Juan forfeited
all rights under the lease and thus was not entitled to any relief
based on the lease. The court also noted that although Juan had
three remaining causes of action, Juan did not premise them on
the lease. Instead, Juan based them on Defendants’ alleged
breach of the Remodeling Agreement and violation of
section 1950.5.
On September 22, 2022, Melissa filed a cross-complaint
against Defendants. In Melissa’s operative first amended cross-
complaint, she alleged three causes of action: (1) breach of
contract; (2) violation of Civil Code section 1950.5; and
(3) common counts. That same day, Melissa filed a Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6 peremptory challenge, and the case was
reassigned to the second trial court (Hon. Kristin S. Escalante)
that presided over this matter.
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On November 17, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for
summary adjudication against Melissa, but neither the parties’
briefing nor the trial court’s order on the motion are in the record.
A minute order dated April 11, 2024, merely states the court
denied the motion. Although we do not know the full rationale for
the court’s ruling, in the court’s later order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for attorney fees, the court noted it had held Melissa did
not forfeit all rights under the lease when she settled the
unlawful detainer action. The court also acknowledged its ruling
was inconsistent with the first trial court’s ruling on Defendants’
motion for summary adjudication against Juan, but the court
declined to reconsider the first ruling.
In May 2024, Defendants served Code of Civil Procedure
section 998 offers on Plaintiffs. Defendants offered to settle
Juan’s claims for $45,000, to settle Melissa’s claims for $300, and
to dismiss the cross-complaints against Plaintiffs. The offers did
not mention attorney fees or costs. Plaintiffs accepted the offers,
and the parties filed a joint request to dismiss their respective
operative complaints and cross-complaints with prejudice.
On November 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking
$177,667.50 in attorney fees pursuant to section 1717 and the
attorney fees provision of the lease. Defendants opposed.
On March 26, 2025, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion
for attorney fees. With respect to Juan, the court held that
because the first trial court had found Juan’s rights under the
lease had been forfeited by virtue of the unlawful detainer
settlement, he was “not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a fee
provision in an agreement that had been forfeited before the
claims at issue in this action arose.” As for Melissa, the court
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found she could not recover contractual attorney fees because she
was not a party to the lease.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Juan argues the first trial court’s summary adjudication
ruling does not preclude him from recovering contractual
attorney fees. Melissa argues she can recover contractual
attorney fees even though she was not a party to the lease. We
reject these contentions.
I. Relevant Law and Standard of Review
California follows the so-called “American rule” when it
comes to attorney fees: Parties in civil litigation bear their own
attorney fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)
Under pertinent provisions of Civil Code section 1717, the
“prevailing party” in “any action on a contract” may recover
attorney fees “incurred to enforce that contract.” (Id., subd. (a).)
“By its terms, . . . Civil Code section 1717 has a limited
application. It covers only contract actions, where the theory of
the case is breach of contract, and where the contract sued upon
itself specifically provides for an award of attorney fees incurred
to enforce that contract.” (Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc.
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342 (Xuereb).) If the action is not
brought to enforce the contract containing the attorney fees
clause, Civil Code section 1717 does not apply and the right to an
award of attorney fees must be authorized under the more
comprehensive provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021
or by other statute. (See Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
155, 160–161.)
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Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 states, “Except as
attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors
at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.”
Under this section, if a contract’s attorney fees provision is
phrased broadly enough, “parties may validly agree that the
prevailing party will be awarded attorney fees incurred in any
litigation between themselves, whether such litigation sounds in
tort or in contract.” (Xuereb, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.)
We review a trial court’s determination of the legal basis
for an award of attorney fees de novo. (G. Voskanian
Construction, Inc. v. Alhambra Unified School Dist. (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 981, 995.)
II. Juan Is Not Entitled to Contractual Attorney Fees
The trial court appropriately concluded Juan was not
entitled to contractual attorney fees.
“Summary adjudication of a cause of action ‘is a judicial
determination that the issue is not subject to further
controversy.’ ” (Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of
California (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 99.) “Following a grant of
summary adjudication in a defendant’s favor, the cause of action
is deemed ‘established’ and the parties may not relitigate the
issue.” (Ibid.) “A summary adjudication is binding upon the trial
court prior to judgment unless an appellate court vacates the
summary adjudication on pretrial review under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 437c or the trial court does so upon
reconsideration of its ruling.” (Abadjian v. Superior Court (1985)
168 Cal.App.3d 363, 370 (Abadjian).)
Here, when Juan settled the action, there was a binding
summary adjudication ruling against him that found he had
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forfeited all rights under the lease. There is no indication Juan
sought writ review, and neither trial court reconsidered the
determination. Because the lease was the sole basis for Juan’s
request for attorney fees, the second trial court appropriately
referred to the summary adjudication ruling and found Juan was
“not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a fee provision in an
agreement that had been forfeited before the claims at issue in
this action arose.”
Juan’s arguments do not support a contrary conclusion.
First, Juan argues the second trial court erroneously found it was
bound by the summary adjudication order. Specifically, Juan
argues the summary adjudication was an interlocutory order that
did not survive the request to dismiss the action with prejudice.
It is true that summary adjudication rulings are not “final” in the
sense they are generally not immediately appealable and might
be reversed on postjudgment appeal. (See Wilson v. County of
San Joaquin (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1, 7; Abadjian, supra,
168 Cal.App.3d at p. 370.) However, as already noted, they
remain binding until reversed on appellate review or
reconsidered by the trial court, and neither of these events
occurred. (Abadjian, at p. 370.)
None of the authorities Juan cites prohibits a trial court
from relying upon a prior summary adjudication order to
determine whether a party is entitled to attorney fees after a case
has settled and been dismissed with prejudice. The cases Juan
cites merely applied general legal principles that are not directly
applicable here. (See, e.g., Harris v. Billings (1993)
16 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402–1406 [affirming a plaintiff’s right to
voluntarily dismiss an action and holding that voluntary
dismissals generally deprive trial courts of jurisdiction to act
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further in the action]; Rail Services of America v. State Comp.
Ins. Fund (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 323, 332 [holding prior
interlocutory orders reviewable because they have been
subsumed in a final judgment]; Chavez Reyes v. Hi-Grade
Materials Co. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1099–1100 [voluntary
dismissals are not appealable orders].) And the statutes Juan
cites merely provide general definitions, for terms like
“judgment” and “action,” and describe when an action can be
dismissed. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 577, 581, subd. (a)(1), 581d.)
Second, Juan argues the stipulation he entered to settle the
unlawful detainer action was not a novation of the lease. In
making this argument, he appears to be arguing that the first
trial court erred in summarily adjudicating his fourth cause of
action. Assuming Juan can challenge that ruling in connection
with his appeal from the order denying attorney fees, Juan’s
argument is forfeited because he did not supply us with the
parties’ briefing on the summary adjudication motion or the
evidence considered by the court. (See Mack v. All Counties
Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 940 [“ ‘ “It is the
duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the court
establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant” ’ ”].)
III. Melissa Is Not Entitled to Contractual Attorney Fees
The trial court also appropriately concluded Melissa was
not entitled to contractual attorney fees.
Melissa does not dispute that she did not sign the lease.
She accordingly does not have a right to recover contractual
attorney fees. (See, e.g., Sessions Payroll Management, Inc. v.
Noble Construction Co., Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 671, 682
[where “the plaintiff did not sign the contracts containing
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attorney fee provisions, the plaintiff ha[s] no independent right to
recover fees under contractual attorney fee clauses”]; Cargill, Inc.
v. Souza (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 962, 966 [“As a general rule,
[contractual] attorney fees are awarded only when the lawsuit is
between signatories to the contract”].)
Resisting this conclusion, Melissa argues that because
Defendants alleged in the unlawful detainer action that she was
a party to the lease, judicial estoppel bars them from arguing
that she cannot seek attorney fees under that contract as a
nonsignatory. But other than generally describing the doctrine of
judicial estoppel and conclusorily stating that it applies because
Defendants have taken inconsistent positions, she does not
establish that all of the elements have been satisfied or that the
trial court erred in failing to apply it. Thus, Melissa has not met
her burden of demonstrating error. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287 [bare assertions of error are
insufficient; “an appellant must supply the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis . . . .”].)
Melissa also argues she can recover contractual attorney
fees because she was a third party beneficiary of the lease. This
argument is forfeited because Melissa raised it for the first time
in the reply brief. (See Conservatorship of Anne S. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1032.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for
attorney fees is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on
appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J.
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