Filed 8/31/26 Moore v. Valley Pacific Petroleum Services CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
JESSIE MOORE et al., C103882
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CV-UOE-
v. 2024-0007423)
VALLEY PACIFIC PETROLEUM SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jessie Moore and Christopher Sanchez (collectively respondents) sued their
former employer, Valley Pacific Petroleum Services, Inc. (Valley Pacific), in a putative
class action lawsuit asserting violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition under
the Business and Professions Code, and seeking civil penalties under the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA). Based on
arbitration agreements purportedly signed electronically by respondents during the hiring
process, Valley Pacific moved to compel arbitration of their individual claims, dismiss or
stay their class claims, and stay their PAGA claims pending arbitration. The trial court
denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Valley Pacific failed to
prove that respondents electronically signed the respective arbitration agreements.
Valley Pacific now contends there was no factual dispute regarding the existence
of the arbitration agreements, the electronic signatures were sufficiently authenticated,
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and the trial court abused its discretion in requiring an evidentiary hearing. Finding no
merit in the contentions, we will affirm the trial court’s order denying Valley Pacific’s
motion.
BACKGROUND
Valley Pacific is a petroleum distributor. In October 2022, the company hired
Sanchez as a transloading operator at a Visalia facility. He interviewed for the position
the previous month with the facility’s terminal manager, Jesse Neri. After the interview,
Sanchez was given a conditional job offer letter, which he signed by hand. That letter
stated that the offer of employment was conditioned upon, among other things, reading
and signing an arbitration agreement.
Subsequent details of Sanchez’s onboarding with the company are disputed by the
parties. According to Neri, he told Sanchez that he would be receiving an e-mail from
Paycom, “which would then start their onboarding process.” Paycom is the human
resources and payroll platform used by Valley Pacific. According to the company’s
human resources director, Cara Dickson, when a new employee is offered a job with
Valley Pacific, she adds that person to the Paycom system by clicking “a button that says,
‘Add new employee,’ ” and then types in the name and e-mail address listed on their job
application and clicks “ ‘Create and send invitation.’ ” Paycom then sends the employee
an e-mail with a link that allows them to set up an employee account by creating a
username and password. After creating the account, the new employee electronically
signs various documents as part of the onboarding process, including an arbitration
agreement. Only after the onboarding process is complete is the employee able to clock
in and out for their shifts using the Paycom platform.
Eleven days after signing the conditional offer letter, Sanchez sent Neri an e-mail
saying that he had “not received anything” from Paycom. Neri forwarded the e-mail to
Dickson asking for her assistance. About two hours later, Sanchez responded that he “got
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the email” and “filled it out already.” Neri believed this meant that Sanchez received the
e-mail from Paycom and created an account.
Sanchez started work about a month later. According to Neri, when Sanchez
arrived for his first day of work, Neri discovered that he had not completed the Paycom
onboarding process. Because of this, Neri had to clock Sanchez in and out that day.
The next day, the arbitration agreement was electronically signed using Sanchez’s
account on the Paycom platform. According to Sanchez, he did not create a Paycom
account. Instead, on his first day of work, Neri handed him a “sticky note” with a
username and password written on it. He used those credentials to log into an account
that had already been created. Sanchez denied signing any documents on the Paycom
platform, including the arbitration agreement. He also stated that he had a long-standing
practice of not signing arbitration agreements and had not signed one in more than
10 years.
In May 2023, Valley Pacific hired Moore as a customer service representative at
an Ione gas station/convenience store. After a successful interview with the store’s
manager, Lisa Bucy, Moore also hand signed a conditional job offer letter stating that the
offer of employment was conditioned upon reading and signing an arbitration agreement.
According to Dickson, the same onboarding process described above was applicable to
Moore.
On Moore’s first day of work, the arbitration agreement purportedly signed by him
was electronically signed using his Paycom account. Moore denied signing the
agreement. According to Moore, prior to his first day, Bucy gave him a stack of physical
documents to take home and sign by hand. He did so and brought them back to her, but
did not remember an arbitration agreement being among them. The only document that
he acknowledged signing electronically using the Paycom platform was a declination of
medical insurance. Although Moore admitted creating a Paycom account, he claimed
that he was unable to login, so Bucy had to call HR to get him a new username and
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password, which she gave him on a “little stickem note.” Like Sanchez, Moore stated
that he generally declined to sign arbitration agreements; he claimed to have never signed
one at any point.
Neri and Bucy denied signing the arbitration agreements for Sanchez and Moore,
respectively. According to Dickson, no one other than the employee who created the
Paycom account has access to that employee’s username and password. Managers have
access to Paycom with respect to approving timecards and time off requests, but not for
viewing or signing onboarding documents. And although the HR department has access
to view the onboarding documents signed by employees, no one other than the employee
who created the account has the ability to sign the onboarding documents. Thus,
according to Dickson, only Moore and Sanchez would have been able to access and sign
the arbitration agreements through their unique login credentials on the Paycom platform.
Dickson acknowledged, however, that she did not have personal knowledge of Paycom’s
security measures protecting employee accounts. She also acknowledged that she would
have no way of knowing whether an employee logged into Paycom using their
credentials or whether someone else logged into that employee’s account using those
same credentials. The data record pertaining to respondents’ arbitration agreements
indicates that they had been “modified” by two unknown individuals, designated
“224939” and “214971,” respectively.
In June 2024, Moore filed a putative class action lawsuit against Valley Pacific,
alleging violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition under the Business and
Professions Code. The operative complaint added Sanchez as a named plaintiff and also
added a cause of action seeking civil penalties under PAGA.
Valley Pacific moved to compel arbitration of respondents’ individual claims,
dismiss or stay their class claims, and stay their PAGA claims pending arbitration.
Valley Pacific attached the respective arbitration agreements to the motion and submitted
a declaration from Dickson. As relevant here, the company argued: “[Respondents]
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logged into their personal email, using a password they created, to click on the link,
access and review the Arbitration Agreement, and sign it. [Citations.] The date for the
electronic signature was recorded. [Citations.] The electronic signature of [respondents]
could only have been placed on it by [respondents] logging in to [their Paycom account]
and accessing the unique link and password through Paycom. [Citations.] Thus, [Valley
Pacific] has met the ‘not … difficult’ burden of showing that [respondents]’ e-signatures
were made by them on the specified time and date, confirming their agreement to
arbitrate any and all claims arising from their employment with [Valley Pacific].”
Respondents opposed the motion. Relying on Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz), they argued “there is no evidence linking any IP
address (which is not provided) to [respondents], or any additional evidence to
demonstrate that it was specifically [respondents] (and no one else, such as management
personnel or otherwise) who affixed their signature[s] on the arbitration agreement[s].”
Respondents also argued that Dickson’s conclusion that only they could have signed the
agreements was not supported by the evidence: “Specifically, no testimony is offered on
the reliability of [Valley Pacific’s] policies, procedures, or practices, nor would …
Dickson likely have personal knowledge of the digital security of a third-party electronic
application program sufficient to demonstrate that any e-signatures in [Valley Pacific’s]
records came from [respondents]’ act.”
In Valley Pacific’s reply brief, the company argued that it met its burden of
proving that respondents electronically signed the arbitration agreements, but also
requested “an evidentiary hearing on the issue” if the trial court had “remaining
questions.”
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. After receiving testimony from
Dickson, Neri, Bucy, Sanchez, and Moore, the trial court denied the motion, concluding
that Valley Pacific did not carry its burden of proving that respondents electronically
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signed the arbitration agreements. Relevant portions of the trial court’s ruling will be set
forth in the discussion portion of this opinion.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A party to an arbitration agreement may seek a court order compelling the parties
to arbitrate a dispute covered by the agreement.” (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 583 (Brockman).) Subject to various exceptions,
the trial court “shall order the [parties] to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.)
The trial court must first determine whether the parties have entered into such an
agreement. (Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50,
59.) “The trial court makes this determination using a summary procedure in the manner
‘for the making and hearing of motions.’ [Citation.] ‘In these summary proceedings, the
trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other
documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to
reach a final determination.’ [Citation.]” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 584.)
“The party seeking arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of an
arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. … The party opposing
arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any defense
to the agreement’s enforcement.” (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 821, 829, fn. omitted (Ramirez).) However, “the need to raise a defense
to enforcement arises only if the moving party first meets its burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Brockman, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 587.) “While public policy favors contractual arbitration of
disputes, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party who has not agreed to arbitrate a
controversy cannot be compelled to do so.” (Id. at pp. 584-585; see Espejo v. Southern
California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057 (Espejo).)
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“Although the burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the burden of production may
shift in a three-step process. [Citation.] ‘First, the moving party bears the burden of
producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” ’
[Citation.] ‘The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the
alleged agreement.’ [Citations.] The moving party can meet its initial burden ‘ “by
attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s
signature.” ’ [Citations.]” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 586, fns. omitted;
see Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere); Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa).)
If the moving party satisfies this initial step, and the opposing party disputes the
existence of a valid agreement, “then in the second step, the opposing party bears the
burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [Citation.]
The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may
testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not
remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember
signing the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) If the opposing
party satisfies this second step, “the third step requires the party seeking arbitration to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties formed a valid contract to
arbitrate their dispute.” (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830.)
Where, as here, the trial court denies a motion to compel arbitration based on
a finding that the moving party did not carry its burden of proving that the parties formed
a valid contract to arbitrate their dispute, the question for this court is whether the trial
court’s finding is erroneous as a matter of law. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 587; Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1196.)
Under this standard, we must determine “ ‘ “whether the [moving party’s] evidence was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
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no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1121
(Trinity).) An appellate court has no power to judge the credibility of witnesses, reweigh
the evidence, or substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; instead,
“ ‘it must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of
the judgment.’ ” (Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067
(Fabian).)
DISCUSSION
As mentioned, the first step of the analysis places the burden on the party seeking
arbitration to produce prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy. Valley Pacific satisfied that step by attaching to its motion copies of the
arbitration agreements purportedly bearing respondents’ electronic signatures. (Espejo,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) The trial court so found, and its finding is not
challenged.
In the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to
challenge the authenticity of the agreements. If that burden is satisfied, the third step
requires the party seeking arbitration to prove that the parties formed a valid contract to
arbitrate their dispute. Valley Pacific argues the trial court erred at the second and third
steps of the analysis. Specifically, Valley Pacific contends there was no factual dispute
regarding the existence of the arbitration agreements, the electronic signatures were
sufficiently authenticated, and the trial court abused its discretion in requiring an
evidentiary hearing.
As to the second step of the analysis, the trial court found that respondents “shifted
the burden back to [Valley Pacific] by presenting evidence that creates questions
surrounding the authenticity of their signatures on the [arbitration agreements].” Valley
Pacific challenges that finding, arguing that respondents, in their opposition filing,
“offered nearly identical two-page declarations claiming they (1) ‘did not recall ever
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being presented with nor signing any agreement to arbitrate [their] claims,’ and (2) that
they ‘had no memory of affixing an alleged electronic signature on the purported
Arbitration Agreement.’ ” Relying on Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 747, Valley Pacific
argues: “These statements do not amount to [respondents] affirmatively averring that
they did not sign the Agreement, that they did not use the Paycom platform to sign
employment-related documents, or that their signatures were forged or inauthentic.”
Valley Pacific’s reliance on Iyere is misplaced. That case involved an arbitration
agreement bearing the plaintiffs’ apparent “handwritten” signatures. (Iyere, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) The plaintiffs declared that they did not remember signing
the agreement and did not know how their signatures were placed on the document. They
also declared that they were given a stack of documents to sign on their first day of work,
and that they immediately did so. (Ibid.) The trial court concluded that was sufficient to
raise a question as to the authenticity of their signatures. But the appellate court
disagreed, noting that no plaintiff had declared they had not signed the agreement or that
their physical signature was forged or inauthentic. (Ibid.) The court explained: “The
declarations explicitly acknowledge that [the] plaintiffs signed a ‘stack of documents’
and do not deny that the stack included the agreement. Although [the] plaintiffs state
they do not recall signing the agreement, there is no conflict between their having signed
a document on which their handwritten signature appears and, two years later, being
unable to recall doing so. In the absence of any evidence that their purported signatures
were not their own, there was no evidence that [the] plaintiffs did not in fact sign the
agreement.” (Ibid.)
In so concluding, the court distinguished cases involving electronic signatures,
including Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th 836, in which the employee “averred he did not
recall electronically signing the [arbitration] agreement,” thereby shifting the burden to
the employer to prove that he in fact did so. (Id. at p. 844.) Explaining the difference
between handwritten and electronic signatures for purposes of the second step of the
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analysis, the Iyere court stated: “An individual cannot confirm or deny the authenticity
of an electronic signature by viewing a computer printout of the person’s printed name
followed by the words ‘(Electronic Signature).’ In such a case, the individual’s inability
to recall signing electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that the person
did not do so. However, an individual is capable of recognizing his or her own personal
signature. If the individual does not deny that the handwritten personal signature is his or
her own, that person’s failure to remember signing is of little or no significance.” (Iyere,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.)1
In this case, respondents’ purported signatures were electronically affixed to the
arbitration agreements. In their declarations, they averred that they did not recall
electronically signing the agreements. Ruiz held that such an averment was enough to
shift the burden in an electronic signature case, and Iyere did not hold otherwise.
Although we do not hold that such a lack of recall is always enough to challenge the
authenticity of purported electronic signatures and shift the burden back to the party
seeking arbitration, we agree it may be enough in some cases, and in any event, here the
trial court did not base its finding that respondents satisfied their burden of production
solely on their declarations. At the hearing on the motion, Sanchez denied signing any
documents on the Paycom platform, including the arbitration agreement. Moore also
denied signing the arbitration agreement and claimed the only document he signed
electronically using the Paycom platform was a declination of medical insurance. A
plaintiff’s “denial of signing an arbitration agreement is sufficient to shift the burden.”
1 Iyere rejected a contrary conclusion reached in Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 158,
also a case involving a handwritten signature. Following Ruiz, the Gamboa court held
that the plaintiff satisfied her burden of production by declaring that she did not
remember the agreement. (Id. at pp. 168.) Because our case, like Ruiz, involves
electronic signatures, not handwritten signatures, we need not weigh in on the split
between Iyere and Gamboa.
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(Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52 (Garcia).)
Respondents also testified that they were given sticky notes with their Paycom login
information, raising questions regarding whether someone else could have logged into
their accounts using that information. Based on all the evidence submitted by
respondents, in their declarations and testimony at the hearing, the trial court did not err
as a matter of law in concluding that they shifted the burden back to Valley Pacific to
prove the authenticity of respondents’ electronic signatures.
Turning to the third step of the analysis, the trial court found that Valley Pacific
failed to carry its burden of (1) establishing that respondents used a login and unique
password known only to them to sign the arbitration agreements, and (2) authenticating
the electronic signatures of respondents on the arbitration agreements, and thus Valley
Pacific did not establish valid arbitration agreements between the parties. As previously
stated, we must determine whether Valley Pacific’s evidence was so uncontradicted and
unimpeached, and of such a character and weight, as to leave no room for the trial court
to conclude that it was insufficient. (See Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
Valley Pacific has not persuaded us that it presented such evidence. (Bookout v. State of
California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486; Fabian,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)
“Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature
may authenticate the signature—that is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the
person the proponent claims it is. The statute states: ‘(a) An electronic record or
electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of
the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any
security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or
electronic signature was attributable.’ ” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 843, italics
omitted, quoting Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).)
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In Ruiz, the defendant’s business manager, Main, stated in a declaration in support
of the motion to compel arbitration that the plaintiff, Ruiz, electronically signed an
arbitration agreement on a specific date, and that the same agreement was presented to all
people seeking employment with the company. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 839.)
After Ruiz denied any memory of signing the agreement, “Main explained in her reply
declaration that the … agreement was part of an employee acknowledgment form” and
that “each employee is required to log into the company’s HR system, using his or her
‘unique login ID and password,’ to review and sign the employee acknowledgment
form.” (Id. at p. 844.) The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed,
explaining that although “ ‘[Ruiz’s full name] (Electronic Signature)’ ” appeared on the
agreement’s signature line, followed by a date and time, “Main never explained how [the
electronic signature] … came to be placed on the … agreement” and “did not explain
how she ascertained that the electronic signature on the … agreement was ‘the act of’
Ruiz.” (Id. at pp. 841, 843-844.) Main also did not explain that Ruiz’s electronic
signature “could only have been placed on the … agreement … by a person using Ruiz’s
‘unique login ID and password’; that the date and time printed next to the electronic
signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature was made; that all
[company] employees were required to use their unique login ID and password when
they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms and agreements; and the
electronic signature on the … agreement was, therefore, apparently made by Ruiz [at
the date and time printed next to the signature].” (Id. at p. 844; see also Garcia, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 45, 53 [affirming the denial of a motion to compel arbitration; the
defendant submitted a declaration from an HR systems analyst stating that the plaintiff, as
part of the employee onboarding process, created a unique user ID and password, clicked
on a link to review the arbitration agreement, and then signed the agreement; but the
declaration did not show that only the plaintiff could have placed the electronic signature
on the arbitration agreement and did not explain how the declarant knew that the
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plaintiff’s name could have only been placed on the agreement using her user ID and
password].)
In Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, the appellate court applied “the
requirements articulated in Ruiz” and reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration. (Id. at p. 1062.) There, the defendant’s systems consultant,
Tellez, provided a detailed description of the company’s “electronic review and signature
process for … employee agreements,” including the arbitration agreement. (Id. at p.
1053.) The description was provided in a supplemental declaration, which was struck by
the trial court as untimely. (Id. at p. 1055.) After concluding that the trial court abused
its discretion in striking the supplemental declaration (id. at p. 1060), the appellate court
explained that the declaration “offered the critical factual connection that the declarations
in Ruiz lacked.” (Id. at p. 1062.) According to the court, “Tellez detailed [the
company’s] security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique
username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his
or her name on the signature line of the … [arbitration agreement]. Based on this
procedure, she concluded that the ‘name Jay Baniaga Espejo could have only been placed
on the signature pages of the … [arbitration agreement] by someone using Dr. Espejo’s
unique user name and password. … [¶] Given this process for signing documents and
protecting the privacy of the information with unique and private user names and
passwords, the electronic signature was made by Dr. Espejo’ on the … [arbitration
agreement] at the date, time, and IP address listed on the documents. These details
satisfactorily meet the requirements articulated in Ruiz and establish that the electronic
signature on the [arbitration agreement] was ‘the act of’ Espejo (Civ. Code, § 1633.9,
subd. (a)), and therefore provide the necessary factual details to properly authenticate the
document.” (Espejo, at p. 1062.)
Valley Pacific argues that it too “met the Ruiz authentication requirements.”
According to Valley Pacific, Dickson’s declarations and testimony “outlined the security
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measures tied to the Paycom account creation process, identified the confidentiality
provision prohibiting Paycom users from disclosing or sharing their account information,
and explained how the electronic signature on [Valley Pacific’s] onboarding documents
is generated.” Valley Pacific argues that this established the first and second elements of
Ruiz: (1) that the electronic signature in the name of the employee could only have been
placed on the arbitration agreement by a person using respondents’ unique Paycom
username and password, and (2) that the date printed next to Paycom’s electronic
signature indicated the date the electronic signature was made. Valley Pacific also points
to Dickson’s testimony that no one had the ability to execute an agreement on behalf of
another employee, Paycom does not allow anyone to access the password of another
employee, and all Dickson could do was prompt Paycom to send a temporary password
to the employee’s personal e-mail address, requiring the employee to create their own
new password.
We accept Valley Pacific’s characterization of Dickson’s declarations and
testimony. However, we need not determine whether that evidence, if credited by the
trial court, would have been sufficient to satisfy Ruiz. That is because the trial court
credited respondents’ testimony that they were given their login credentials on “sticky
notes.” We have “no power to pass on the credibility of witnesses” or “resolve conflicts
in the evidence.” (See In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839.) If respondents were
given their login credentials by their respective managers, as the trial court found, those
same managers had the ability to log into respondents’ accounts and sign the arbitration
agreements. Bucy and Neri each denied doing so. But the burden was not on
respondents to prove that someone else signed the arbitration agreements on their behalf.
The burden was on Valley Pacific to prove that respondents signed the agreements.
Finding that Valley Pacific failed in this regard, the trial court also found that the data
record pertaining to respondents’ arbitration agreements indicated that the agreements
had been “modified” by two unknown individuals, designated “224939” and “214971,”
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and that Dickson “had no explanation.” The trial court found that this, alongside other
“factual discrepancies,” caused it to doubt the authenticity of respondents’ electronic
signatures. The trial court therefore found that Valley Pacific “failed to meet its burden
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that [respondents] themselves
electronically signed the Arbitration Agreements.”
On this record, the trial court’s determination was not erroneous as a matter of
law. Specifically, Valley Pacific’s evidence was not so uncontradicted and unimpeached,
and of such a character and weight, as to leave no room for the trial court to conclude that
it was insufficient. (See Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
Valley Pacific further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by holding an
evidentiary hearing “in the absence of a factual dispute” because, according to Valley
Pacific, the declarations Valley Pacific submitted were sufficient to authenticate
respondents’ electronic signatures, and respondents’ declarations “were not sufficient to
raise a factual dispute necessitating such hearing.” We disagree.
As stated previously, in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, “ ‘the trial court
sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary
evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final
determination.’ [Citation.]” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 584.) The
evidence provided by respondents effectively challenged the authenticity of their
purported electronic signatures and shifted the burden back to Valley Pacific to prove that
respondents in fact signed the agreements. Valley Pacific argued in its reply brief that it
met its burden in this regard, but also requested “an evidentiary hearing on the issue” if
the trial court had “remaining questions.” The trial court had remaining questions and
granted the request for a hearing. Just as a litigant cannot be heard to complain that the
trial court decided an issue that the litigant asked it to decide (see, e.g., Bains v.
Department of Industrial Relations (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126), Valley Pacific
cannot now complain that the trial court granted its request for a hearing.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Respondents
are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/S/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/S/
MESIWALA, J.
/S/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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