Filed 6/26/26 Montego Riverside County Homeowners Assn. v. Deutsche Bank etc. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MONTEGO RIVERSIDE COUNTY D087796
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CVSW2208601)
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee, etc.
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Raquel A. Marquez, Judge. Affirmed.
The Judge Law Firm and James Arthur Judge for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Klinedinst, Ian A. Rambarran, and W. Jason Scott, Robert
Shaughnessy, and Megan E. McDonald for Defendants and Respondents.
Montego Riverside County Homeowners Association (HOA) appeals
from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer to its
complaint against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank)
and Western Progressive, LLC (Western Progressive). The HOA asserts that
the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to its cause of action for
equitable estoppel to prevent Deutsche Bank from foreclosing on a loan. We
affirm the judgment of dismissal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Allegations of Operative Complaint
In August 2005, Jorge and Maria Salas obtained a $250,000 loan to
purchase a condominium unit. The loan was secured by a recorded deed of
trust. The deed provided that the loan was to be paid in full by September 1,
2035 and gave the lender a power of sale in the event of any default. The
deed further stated that “[a]ny forbearance by Lender in exercising any right
or remedy . . . shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or
remedy.”
In 2009, Deutsche Bank acquired the original lender’s interest in the
trust deed in a recorded assignment.
Between 2012 and 2016, the HOA recorded notices of delinquent
assessments and an abstract of judgment against the Salases’ property. In
2019, the Salases conveyed the property to the HOA by a grant deed, which
was recorded in May 2022.
According to the HOA’s complaint, when the Salases conveyed the
property to the HOA, they had not occupied it for about ten years, and
Deutsche Bank and its predecessors had made no effort to seek foreclosure.
The HOA allegedly “relied on this lack of action by DEUTSCHE BANK and
its predecessors in taking title to the Subject Property.” The complaint
alleged: “Such reliance was reasonable and justifiable because any reasonable
person would conclude after such a lengthy period of time that DEUTSCHE
BANK and its predecessors had no intention of foreclosing on the Subject
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Property, or such delay was caused by some other legal deficiency which
prevented such foreclosure, or wasn’t foreclosing so as to avoid payment of
monthly assessments to [the HOA] during the many years that had elapsed
since the Salas’ had stopped making payments on the Deed of Trust. [The
HOA] also reasonably relied on because [sic] the Salas’ told [the HOA] that
they had offered to return the property to the various Deed of Trust holders
during the ten (10) years they didn’t occupy the property, and said Deed of
Trust holders had failed, refused, and neglected to accept the same.”
In August 2022, Western Progressive was substituted as trustee on the
deed of trust, with Deutsche Bank remaining as the beneficiary. On behalf of
Deutsche Bank, Western Progressive recorded a notice of default and election
to sell the property in foreclosure.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
The HOA filed suit against Deutsche Bank, Western Progressive, and
others not involved in this appeal. The operative complaint alleged causes of
action for equitable estoppel, quiet title, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
The equitable estoppel claim alleged that Deutsche Bank was equitably
estopped from enforcing the deed of trust and the underlying promissory
note.
Deutsche Bank demurred to the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.1 As to equitable estoppel, the bank argued the HOA had failed
to allege the following essential elements of the claim: (1) that the bank
intentionally waived its right to foreclose by not foreclosing earlier or that
1 Western Progressive filed a declaration of nonmonetary status and
agreed to be bound by whatever nonmonetary order the court issued. The
HOA has never disputed this status. Deutsche Bank and Western
Progressive are both respondents in this appeal.
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the HOA had the right to believe the bank intentionally waived its right to
foreclose; (2) that the HOA reasonably relied on the bank’s lack of action;
and (3) that the HOA suffered any injury. The HOA opposed the demurrer
without contesting that these were essential elements of the equitable
estoppel claim.
After the court issued a tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer,
neither party requested oral argument. The court then confirmed its
tentative ruling and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. The court
concluded “no facts are alleged to show Deutsche [Bank], or its predecessor,
refrained from taking steps to initiate a foreclosure of the property for about
10 years as an intentional act to lead [the HOA] to believe that it had no
intentions on ever proceeding to foreclosure. Also, no facts are alleged to
suggest [the HOA] was ignorant of any intention of Deutsche [Bank], or its
predecessor, to proceed to exercise the rights under the deed of trust which
remained recorded on title to the property since 2005. Further, no damages
are alleged which resulted from Deutsche [Bank]’s, or its predecessor’s,
alleged inaction.”
The court further noted that the HOA “knowingly took title subject to
Deutsche [Bank]’s lien interest” based on the deed of trust recorded in 2005
and its assignment to Deutsche Bank recorded in 2019. The court explained:
“Under California law, a person who acquires property subject to a lien takes
subject to that lien interest of which he or she had constructive notice. . . .
Here, [the HOA] states no reason why it should be entitled to a relief that
would bypass the operation of California’s recordation law and alleges no
facts that would lead to an inference that the deed of trust was defective or
unenforceable for any reason.”
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The HOA elected not to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the action against Deutsche Bank and Western Progressive with
prejudice. The HOA has appealed from the judgment of dismissal.2
DISCUSSION
We resolve this appeal based primarily on HOA’s deficient briefing. As
we shall explain, the HOA has failed to comply with the applicable rules for
several reasons. As a result, the HOA has either forfeited its claims or failed
to meet its burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (See Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [judgment of lower court is presumed
correct and error must be affirmatively shown].)
First, the HOA has attached as an exhibit to its opening brief a
portion of its opposition to the demurrer filed in the trial court and purports
to incorporate this pleading by reference “for the balance of its arguments”
on appeal. This is improper. An appellate brief must include argument
supporting each point asserted and must present each point under a separate
argument heading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “The appellant
may not simply incorporate by reference arguments made in papers filed in
the trial court, rather than briefing them on appeal. . . . [O]therwise, the
point will be forfeited.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656; see
also Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 294, fn. 20
2 Nearly five months after the respondent’s brief was filed, and over
two months after the expiration of time to file a reply brief (with two 30-day
extensions of time having been granted), appellant’s counsel submitted a
declaration requesting a stay of the appeal, leave to file an amended opening
brief, and “to be relieved from not filing a Reply Brief.” We denied the
request.
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[“It is well settled that the Court of Appeal does not permit incorporation by
reference of documents filed in the trial court.”].)
Second, as a result of the HOA’s forfeiture of arguments it attempted
to incorporate by reference, it has failed to address all of the grounds for the
trial court’s ruling. The opening brief only purports to address the trial
court’s ruling regarding Deutsche Bank’s alleged intent to induce reliance
through its inaction or delay in foreclosing. But the trial court also ruled as
to other elements of equitable estoppel that (1) the HOA failed to adequately
plead ignorance of the true facts because it was on notice of the recorded deed
of trust; and (2) the HOA failed to adequately plead damages. Separate and
apart from the intent requirement, these are essential elements of a claim for
equitable estoppel. (City of Goleta v. Superior Court (2006) 40 Cal.4th 270,
279 (City of Goleta).)3 Because the HOA has not briefed these alternative
grounds for the trial court’s demurrer ruling, it has failed to demonstrate any
reversible error. (Sonoma Luxury Resort LLC v. California Regional Water
Quality Control Bd. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 935, 941 [judgment of dismissal
affirmed where plaintiff failed to overcome all legal grounds on which trial
court sustained demurrer].)
In particular, the HOA has failed to demonstrate any deficiency in the
trial court’s ruling as to the HOA’s lack of knowledge of the true facts or its
right to believe that Deutsche Bank or its predecessors intended to induce
3 The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped
must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be
acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right
to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true
state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. (City of
Goleta, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 279.)
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any reliance. The trial court ruled that the HOA took possession of the
property with at least constructive notice of the recorded deed of trust. (Civ.
Code, §§ 1213, 1215.) The deed of trust stated that the final maturity date of
the loan was September 1, 2035. Under California law, the beneficiary of a
recorded deed of trust has until 10 years after the date of maturity to pursue
its power of sale if the maturity date is “ascertainable” from the recorded
document, as it is here. (Civ. Code, § 882.020, subd. (a)(1); Trenk v. Soheili
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1033, 1043–1044.) The lender therefore had until
September 1, 2045 to exercise its power of sale. The deed of trust also stated
that “[a]ny forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy . . . shall
not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy.” Moreover,
when the HOA acquired the property in 2019, there was already case law
holding that a mere delay in foreclosing within the limitations period does
not give rise to an estoppel. (Nicolopulos v. Superior Court (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 304, 310–311 (Nicolopulos).) The HOA’s opening brief does not
address any of this and does not argue why in these circumstances the trial
court erred in ruling that the complaint failed to adequately allege the HOA
was “ ‘ignorant of the true state of facts’ ” or had a “ ‘right to believe’ ” that
Deutsche Bank or its predecessors intended to induce any reliance. (City of
Goleta, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 279.) “When a trial court states multiple
grounds for its ruling and appellant addresses only some of them, we need
not address appellant’s arguments because ‘one good reason is sufficient to
sustain the order from which the appeal was taken.’ ” (People v. JTH Tax,
Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.)
Third, the HOA’s briefing also does not adequately address the trial
court’s ruling on the element of Deutsche Bank’s intent to induce reliance.
The HOA makes general arguments that a representation may be inferred
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from silence or inaction and that intent may be generally pled, but it fails to
discuss how these principles apply to the specific allegations of its complaint.
Regarding intent to induce reliance and detrimental reliance, for example,
the HOA merely asserts without any record cite: “In the case at bar, the only
thing Appellant needed to do was properly plead these elements, which it
did.” Other than to make this conclusory assertion, the HOA never identifies
any allegation of the complaint in which it pled the required intent—either
generally or specifically. As the trial court ruled, there is no such allegation.
And by choosing not to amend its complaint, as the trial court permitted, the
HOA waived any unpled allegations. (Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 753–754.) Moreover, the HOA does not
explain how such an intent could reasonably be inferred from the allegations
of its complaint.
Finally, the HOA has failed to discuss controlling authority on the
equitable estoppel issue, which Deutsche Bank cited and relied on in the trial
court and its briefing on appeal. (Nicolopulos, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 310–311.) In Nicolopulos, the court rejected a similar claim of estoppel.
There, the holder of a promissory note began foreclosure proceedings more
than 10 years after the note’s maturity date and almost seven years after the
plaintiff property owner stopped making payments. (Id. at p. 307.) The
Court of Appeal concluded that because the maturity date of the loan was not
ascertainable from any recorded document, the noteholder’s power of sale did
not expire until 60 years after the deed of trust was recorded under Civil
Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2). (Nicolopulos, at pp. 310–311.) The
court went on to reject the plaintiff’s argument that the noteholder “should be
estopped from relying on the 60-year limitation period” because he could have
foreclosed years earlier when the plaintiff stopped paying on the note. (Id. at
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p. 311.) The court explained: “No conduct by [the noteholder] occurred upon
which [the plaintiff] relied; [the noteholder] simply did not act. While an
estoppel may arise from silence, there must be a duty to speak [citation], and
we discern none. Moreover, [the plaintiff] was not ‘ignorant of the true state
of facts.’ He was aware of all facts known by [the noteholder]; it was only the
law he misconstrued. Accordingly, no basis exists to estop [the noteholder]
from relying on the 60-year limitation period in Civil Code section 882.020.”
(Ibid.)
The same reasoning applies to the HOA’s claim of estoppel here. In
fact, the HOA has implicitly conceded that its estoppel claim is not supported
by existing law—by asking this court “in good faith” to “extend the law of
estoppel” to this case. (Capitalization deleted.) An appellant is of course free
to make “a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
the existing law.” (Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.1(a)(2); see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b)(2).) But it is not proper to do so without disclosing
directly adverse authority. (Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(2); see
Brawerman v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1106, 1121, fn. 5.)
Because the HOA did not disclose Nicolopulos in its opening brief and made
no effort to demonstrate it was wrongly decided—and did not file any reply
brief responding to Deutsche Bank’s reliance on Nicolopulos—it has offered
no reason for us to depart from its holding. We will not entertain a request to
extend existing law that fails to acknowledge contrary authority and provides
no meaningful argument for such a departure.
For all these reasons, we conclude the HOA has either forfeited its
claims of error or failed to meet its burden of demonstrating error. Although
we have discretion to overlook any forfeiture, we decline to do so given the
HOA’s deficient briefing. We therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
recover their costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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