Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Millerberg v. Garden City CA6

Filed 11/19/26 Millerberg v. Garden City CA6
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/19/26 Millerberg v. Garden City CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JOSHUA MILLERBERG, H053689
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CV444472)

v.

GARDEN CITY, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

This appeal is from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Joshua
Millerberg sued his former employer Garden City, Inc. dba Casino M8trix (Garden City)
claiming, on behalf of himself as well as current and former Garden City employees,
various Labor Code and wage order violations. Garden City moved to compel arbitration
and to stay proceedings concerning Millerberg’s representative claims. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that the arbitration agreement upon which the motion
was based is unconscionable and unenforceable.
As explained below, we conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted the
scope of the arbitration agreement and that Garden City forfeited any challenge to the
trial court’s finding of unconscionability under that interpretation. We also conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to limit the scope of the agreement.
Accordingly, the order denying Garden City’s motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
Garden City operates a card room in San José, California. Millerberg was
employed by Garden City from August 2018 to April 2024, first as a security officer and
then as a security lead.
A. The Arbitration Agreement
During the onboarding process on his first day of employment with Garden City,
Millerberg signed an employment contract governing his relationship with Garden City.
Section VIII of the contract is a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate.” (Capitalization and
Boldface omitted.)
1. The Recital

The arbitration agreement begins with an introductory paragraph, titled “Joint
Agreement to Arbitration.” (Boldface omitted.) This paragraph recognizes that conflicts
might arise during Millerberg’s employment with Garden City: “Recognizing that
differences between [Garden City] and Employee may arise during the employment
relationship, both [Garden City] and Employee hereby agree to the terms and provisions
of this Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate (‘Mutual Arbitration Agreement’) to resolve such
potential differences.”
2. The Scope Provisions
The second and third paragraphs of the arbitration agreement describe claims that
are covered and not covered by the agreement.
The second paragraph states that the arbitration agreement covers all claims
between the parties: “To the extent permitted by law, CM [Garden City] and Employee
mutually agree to resolve through final and binding arbitration all claims or causes of
action that Employee may have against CM, or CM against Employee (collectively
‘claims’).” The second paragraph also provides examples of the claims covered: “The
claims covered by this Mutual Arbitration Agreement include, but are not limited to,
claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims; claims for

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discrimination or harassment; claims for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy; claims for retaliation; and claims for violation of any law, statute, regulation or
ordinance, including but not limited to all claims arising under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the California Fair Employment & Housing Act, the
California Labor Code, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985,
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”
The third paragraph of the arbitration agreement recognizes some exceptions to
the agreement to arbitrate, albeit only for claims that cannot be arbitrated by law: “This
Mutual Arbitration Agreement does not cover claims … for workers’ compensation
benefits or unemployment insurance benefits, or any other claims found not subject to
mandatory arbitration by governing law.”
3. Duration
The arbitration agreement states that it “shall remain in effect even after the end of
Employee’s employment with [Garden City].” The agreement also states that it “can
only be revoked or modified by a writing signed by both Parties that specifically states
their intent to revoke or modify this Mutual Arbitration Agreement.”
4. Severability
The arbitration agreement contains a severability provision: “If any provision of
this Mutual Arbitration Agreement is adjudged to be void or otherwise unenforceable, in
whole or in part, such a decision shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this
Mutual Arbitration Agreement. In such a case, this Mutual Arbitration Agreement shall
be reformed to the extent necessary to carry out the provisions of this Mutual Arbitration
Agreement to the greatest extent possible, and to ensure that the resolution of any and all
conflicts between the Parties is resolved by neutral, binding arbitration.” The
employment contract also contains severability provisions.

3
B. The Complaint
In August 2024, Millerberg sued Garden City. Asserting claims on an individual
basis and as a representative on behalf of other aggrieved employees under the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.), Millerberg alleged
violations of the Labor Code, including failure to pay overtime, minimum wages, meal
period premiums, and rest period premiums; failure to provide legally required meal
periods and rest periods; failure to timely pay wages, pay all wages at time of discharge
from employment, provide accurate wage statements, keep complete and accurate payroll
records, and reimburse employees for business-related expenses; and unlawful inquiry
into salary histories. Millerberg also sought attorneys’ fees and civil penalties under
PAGA.
C. The Motion to Compel Arbitration
Garden City moved to compel Millerberg to arbitrate his individual claims and to
stay proceedings on his representative claims. The motion was based on the arbitration
agreement in Millerberg’s employment contract. Millerberg opposed, arguing, among
other things, that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable.
The trial court denied Garden City’s motion. In doing so, the court rejected
several of Millerberg’s arguments. However, the court agreed with Millerberg that the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.
In reaching this conclusion the trial court found that the arbitration agreement was
a “contract of adhesion in the employment context” and thus had a “modest amount” of
procedural unconscionability. The court also found the arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable. In particular, the court found that the arbitration
agreement’s “broad scope” rendered it substantively unconscionable by requiring the
parties to arbitrate “all claims,” including those unrelated to Millerberg’s employment.
The court also found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable because it

4
remained in effect after the end of Millerberg’s employment until revoked or modified by
both parties and thus had “an indefinite duration.”
The trial court declined Garden City’s request to sever unconscionable provisions.
The court rejected Garden City’s suggestion that it simply strike the word “all” from the
arbitration agreement’s scope provisions. Instead, the court found the arbitration
agreement “ ‘tainted with unconscionability’ because its ‘central purpose’ ” appeared to
be arbitration of all disputes between the parties “forever, regardless of whether the
dispute is related to [Millerberg’s] employment.” The trial court also found that the
“unconscionable provisions are so pervasive … that they cannot be severed without
either augmenting or rewriting the agreement.”
Garden City filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying its motion to
compel. Although this appeal is interlocutory, we have jurisdiction over it under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1294, subdivision (a).
II. DISCUSSION
Garden City challenges the trial court’s refusal to compel arbitration on three
grounds. First, it argues that the agreement to arbitrate in Millerberg’s employment
contract is limited to employment-related claims. Second, Garden City argues that, so
limited, the agreement is not unconscionable. Third, it argues that, even if portions of the
arbitration agreement are unconscionable, the trial court should have severed those
portions and compelled arbitration of Millerberg’s claims. Absent conflicting extrinsic
evidence, the interpretation of a contract is reviewed de novo. (See, e.g., City of Hope
National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.) Similarly,
absent conflicting evidence, unconscionability rulings are reviewed de novo. (Ramirez v.
Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 493 (Ramirez).) However,
severance rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 513.)

5
A. The Agreement to Arbitrate
In its briefing, Garden City devotes most of its attention to arguing that the trial
court misinterpreted the arbitration agreement. In particular, it argues that the trial court
erroneously interpreted the agreement to extend beyond employment-related claims. We
disagree. By its plain language, the arbitration agreement covers all claims between the
parties, not just employment-related ones. And neither the agreement’s recital nor the
rules of contract interpretation invoked by Garden City justify disregarding the
agreement’s plain language.
1. The Scope Provisions
The arbitration agreement has two provisions addressing the claims covered by it.
By their plain language, these provisions cover all claims between Millerberg and Garden
City except those expressly excluded.
In interpreting contracts, courts “give effect to the mutual intention of the parties
as it existed at the time of contracting.” (Civ. Code, § 1636; see Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil
Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1069 (Sabetian).) This intention “is to be
inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.” (AIU Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 822.) Accordingly, “ ‘[i]f contractual language is
clear and explicit, it governs.’ ” (State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 186, 195; see also Civ. Code, § 1638 [“The language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.”].)
Here, the language of the arbitration agreement is clear and explicit. Paragraph
8.2 of the agreement is titled “Claims Covered By Agreement,” and paragraph 8.3 is
titled “Claims Not Covered By Mutual Arbitration Agreement.” (Boldface omitted.)
Paragraph 8.2 states that Millerberg and Garden City agree to arbitrate “all claims or
causes of action” between them: “To the extent permitted by law, CM [Garden City] and
Employee [Millerberg] mutually agree to resolve through final and binding arbitration all
claims or causes of action that Employee may have against CM or CM against Employee

6
(collectively ‘claims’).” Paragraph 8.3 in turn states that the agreement “does not cover
claims Employee may have for workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment insurance
benefits, or any other claims found not subject to mandatory arbitration by governing
law.” Thus, by its plain language, the arbitration agreement covers all claims between
Millerberg and Garden City except those for which arbitration is prohibited by law.
As courts repeatedly have recognized in this context “ ‘all’ means all.” (Stoker v.
Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91, 108 (Stoker) [agreement requiring
arbitration of “ ‘ “any and all claims, disputes, or controversies … including, without
limitation, claims arising out of or relating to … employment” ’ ” (italics omitted) applied
to all claims]; Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312,
321, 325 (Cook) [agreement requiring arbitration of “ ‘all claims, whether or not arising
out of … employment, remuneration or termination,’ ” applied to all claims]; Rubin v. W.
Mut. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1547 [“all means all”]; Winet v. Price (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166-1167 [same].) As a consequence, with the exception of claims
expressly excluded, the arbitration agreement requires arbitration of “all claims.”
This conclusion is reinforced by the severance clause in the arbitration agreement.
That clause provides that, if any provision of the arbitration agreement is held void or
otherwise unenforceable, the agreement should be reformed to carry out the rest of the
agreement as much as possible. The severance clause requires that such reformation
“ensure that the resolution of any and all conflicts between the Parties is resolved by
neutral, binding arbitration.” (Italics added.) As this requirement extends to “any and
all” conflicts, and not just employment-related ones, the severance clause contemplates
that the arbitration agreement will be interpreted according to the plain language of
paragraph 8.2 to apply to all claims not expressly excluded.
It makes no difference that paragraph 8.2 lists a number of employment-related
claims covered by the arbitration agreement. After stating that Millerberg and Garden
City “agree to resolve through final and binding arbitration all claims or causes of action”

7
between them, the paragraph states that the claims covered by the agreement “include,
but are not limited to,” contract, tort, and discrimination claims as well as claims for
violating various employment statutes and “the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.” Such an
expressly nonexhaustive list of examples does not limit an expressly open-ended grant of
coverage. (See Stoker, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at pp. 107-108 [holding statement that the
arbitration agreement covers all claims “ ‘including, without limitation, claims arising out
of or relating to my employment’ ” (italics omitted) does not restrict agreement to
employment-related claims]; Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 321-322 [same].)
Indeed, as it includes “tort claims,” the list itself recognizes that the arbitration agreement
is not limited to employment-related claims. (See Cocom v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (9th Cir.
2026) 179 F.4th 1168, 1175 [noting that the list of covered claims in Cook contained a
“general reference to tort claims” and therefore “included claims unrelated to
employment”].)
2. The Recital
Garden City argues that the recital at the beginning of the arbitration agreement
narrows its scope. We disagree.
Paragraph 8.1 of the arbitration agreement describes the initial motivation for the
agreement: “Recognizing that differences between CM [Garden City] and Employee
may arise during the employment relationship, both CM and Employee hereby agree to
the terms and provisions of this Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate … to resolve such
potential differences.”
This recital “cannot be used to override the agreement’s otherwise unambiguous”
terms. (Carolina Beverage Corp. v. FIJI Water Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 977,
990 (Carolina Beverage).) Unlike the substantive provisions of a contract setting forth
the “legal rights and obligations” of contracting parties, “[r]ecitals are given limited effect
even as between the parties” and generally are not binding. (Emeryville Redevelopment
Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1101.) This does not

8
mean that recitals are superfluous. To the contrary, “ ‘[i]f the operative words of a grant
are doubtful, recourse may be had to its recitals to assist the construction.’ ” (Sabetian,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069; see also Carolina Beverage, at p. 990 [“the recitals set
forth in a contract may be examined to interpret a contract’s otherwise ambiguous
operative terms”].) However, “where the words of grant are clear, the recitals cannot be
resorted to for the purpose of imparting an ambiguity to the entire instrument by which
clear words of grant may be limited in their effect.” (MacFarland v. Walker (1919) 40
Cal.App. 508, 512 (MacFarland); see also ibid. [“It is only when the operative words of
grant are doubtful that recourse may be had to its recitals to assist in the construction.”].)
Thus, while the arbitration agreement’s recital indicates that employment-related
disputes motivated the agreement, that motivation cannot override the plain language of
the agreement extending the agreement to all claims between Millerberg and Garden City
not expressly excluded.
3. Garden City’s Other Arguments
Garden City invokes two principles of contract interpretation. Neither helps it.
The first principle invoked by Garden City is that “[t]he whole of a contract is to
be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause
helping to interpret the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) Based on this principle, Garden City
argues that “the scope of the agreement must be harmonized with the preamble.”
However, as shown above, while a recital may be used to shed light on the proper
interpretation of ambiguous provisions in a contract, it cannot be used to override
unambiguous ones. (See Carolina Beverage, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 990; Sabetian,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1069-1070; MacFarland, supra, 40 Cal.App. at p. 512.)
Moreover, this conclusion does not render the recital superfluous: It simply limits its
significance to ambiguous portions of the arbitration agreement. (Carolina Beverage, at
p. 990; Sabetian, at pp. 1069-1070.)

9
The second principle invoked by Garden City is that “[a] contract must receive
such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable
of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the
parties.” (Civ. Code, § 1643.) This principle also applies only where contractual
language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. (See Ayala-Ventura v.
Superior Court (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 241, 255-256 [applying Civ. Code, § 1643
because “the Agreement is somewhat ambiguous in its application to claims that are not
employment related”].) Here, the agreement’s scope provisions are clear, and there is no
ambiguity to resolve.
Consequently, we conclude that the arbitration agreement plainly requires
arbitration of all claims, including those unrelated to employment, between Millerberg
and Garden City that are not expressly excluded.
B. Unconscionability
The trial court ruled the arbitration agreement unconscionable because it is a
“contract of adhesion in the employment context,” and because it is impermissibly broad
and of potentially infinite duration, remaining in effect even after the end of Millerberg’s
employment with Garden City. Garden City does not challenge these rulings. Instead, it
argues the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable if “properly construed” to require
only arbitration of employment claims. Consequently, Garden City has forfeited any
challenge to the trial court’s unconscionability ruling under the interpretation adopted
above.
In arguing that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable, Garden City does
not deny that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable; to the contrary, Garden City
concedes that the agreement is a contract of adhesion. Instead, Garden City denies that
the agreement is substantively unconscionability. In particular, Garden City argues that
Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 312, the primary case upon which the trial court relied in

10
finding the agreement substantively unconscionable, is distinguishable. First, Garden
City contends that, unlike the arbitration agreement here, the agreement in Cook did not
contain a preamble or other clause stating that the purpose of the agreement was to
resolve disputes that may arise during the employment relationship. Second, Garden City
contends that Cook is distinguishable because the arbitration agreement in that case
required arbitration of all claims, “ ‘whether or not arising out of’ ” employment. Finally,
contending that the arbitration agreement here “merely requires the employee to arbitrate
employment claims,” Garden City contends that the agreement is not substantively
unconscionable because it is fair to require arbitration of employment claims.
In its briefing, Garden City did not address whether the arbitration agreement is
substantively unconscionable if it is interpreted to extend to all claims between the
parties. As Garden City acknowledged at oral argument, its opening brief in this court
did not dispute the trial court’s ruling that under Cook the agreement is substantively
unconscionable if interpreted to encompass all claims brought by Millerberg even when
those claims are unrelated to his employment. Nor did Garden City dispute the trial
court’s ruling that, given that interpretation, the agreement is substantively
unconscionable under Cook because it is of indefinite duration. Thus, Garden City failed
to challenge the trial court’s ruling that the arbitration agreement is substantively
unconscionable if interpreted to cover all claims between the parties.
Accordingly, Garden City has forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s
unconscionability ruling under the interpretation of the arbitration agreement we have
adopted. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct ….” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608-609.) As a consequence, “the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 609.) Moreover, appellate courts are
“not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of Falcone &

11
Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) As a consequence, “issues and arguments not
addressed in the briefs on appeal are deemed forfeited.” (Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 1, 19, fn. 12.)
Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59 reached the
same conclusion. In Swain, the plaintiff sued a laser hair removal treatment center for
false advertising, negligence, fraud, and other claims. (Id. at pp. 63-64.) When the
treatment center moved to compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement, the trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the plaintiff had no ability to negotiate the
terms of the agreement (id. at p. 65) and the agreement only required arbitration of the
claims that the plaintiff was likely to bring. (Id. at p. 72.) On appeal, the treatment center
did not address the trial court’s ruling that the arbitration agreement was unfairly one-
sided until its reply brief. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that the treatment center
“forfeited this argument by failing to make it in its opening brief.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Even
when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.]’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
This case is indistinguishable from Swain. Here, like the defendant in Swain,
Garden City failed to address the basis for the trial court’s substantive unconscionability
ruling in its opening brief. Indeed, here, Garden City failed to address the ruling in either
its reply or its opening brief. Instead, Garden City chose to stake its appeal on its
contention that the arbitration agreement should be interpreted narrowly to cover only
employment-related claims. Accordingly, even more clearly than the defendant in Swain,
Garden City has forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s unconscionability ruling under
the broad interpretation of the arbitration agreement that we have adopted based on the
agreement’s plain language.

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C. Severance
Finally, Garden City argues that, if portions of the arbitration agreement were
unconscionable, the trial court should have severed those provisions and enforced the rest
of the agreement. In support, Garden City points out that both the arbitration agreement
and the employment contract contain provisions authorizing severance. Although these
provisions plainly contemplate severance, as explained below, the trial court properly
concluded that severance is not possible here.
When a contractual provision is held unconscionable, a trial court may remedy
that unconscionability in one of three ways: “(1) refuse to enforce the contract; (2) sever
any unconscionable clause; or (3) limit the application of any clause to avoid
unconscionable results.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 513 [discussing Civ. Code,
§ 1670.5]; see also Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 83, 122 (Armendariz) [Civil Code section 1670.5 “give[s] a trial court some
discretion as to whether to sever or restrict the unconscionable provision or whether to
refuse to enforce the entire agreement.”].) In deciding how to remedy unconscionability,
“[t]he ‘strong legislative and judicial preference is to sever the offending term and
enforce the balance of the agreement.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 513.) This is particularly true if
the contract contains a severance clause expressing an intent to enforce the contract
where invalidity may be cured by removing terms. (Id. at p. 517.)
However, “courts must have the capacity to cure the unlawful contract through
severance or restriction of the offending clause ….” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 124.) Consequently, severance should be denied when “an agreement is ‘permeated’
by unconscionability” (id. at p. 122), or “ ‘the central purpose of the contract is tainted
with illegality’ ” (Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 641, 658).
Moreover, in remedying unconscionability, “[c]ourts cannot ‘rewrite agreements and
impose terms to which neither party has agreed.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 516.)
Accordingly, courts may not reform, augment, or substantially rewrite an arbitration

13
agreement to address an unconscionable provision. (Ibid.; Armendariz, at p. 125; Cook,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.)
Here, the trial court found that the arbitration agreement is unconscionably broad
in both scope and duration and that the purpose of the agreement is to require arbitration
of all claims. As a consequence, it is unclear what, if any provision, the trial court could
have severed from the arbitration agreement to cure its unconscionability. Instead, as the
trial court observed, it would have had to augment or rewrite the agreement in order to
limit the scope to “all employment-related claims” or to limit the duration to a definite
term, which is impermissible. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 125; Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 516; Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.)
Indeed, in its briefing on appeal Garden City does not identify any provision that
could or should have been severed in order to cure the unconscionability. In the trial
court and at oral argument on appeal, Garden City argued that the word “all” could have
been stricken from the agreement’s first scope provision. However, if this were done, the
provision still would state that the parties “mutually agree to resolve through final and
binding arbitration [] claims or causes of actions” between the parties and thus still would
not be naturally interpreted to apply only to employment-related claims. Reformation
would have been required to limit the arbitration agreement to claims “arising from or
related to” the employment relationship, or merely those claims “arising from” the
employment relationship. (Cf. Ahern v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 675, 689.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting severance, finding the
arbitration agreement unenforceable, and denying Garden City’s motion to compel
arbitration.

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III. DISPOSITION
The order dated September 4, 2025 denying the motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Respondent is entitled to recover reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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______________________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
LIE, ACTING P. J.

____________________________________
WILSON, J.

Millerberg v. Garden City, Inc.
H053689

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