Filed 8/19/26 Miller v. Los Angeles County CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
PEARLIE KATE MILLER, JR. B342410
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV13395)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Kevin Clement Brazile, Judge. Affirmed.
Pearlie Kate Miller, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Peterson, Bradford, Burkwitz, Gregorio, Burkwitz & Su, Gil Burkwitz,
Michael T. Gebreestifanos; Pollak, Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Karen
M. Stepanyan for Defendant and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Pearlie Miller, Jr., believes that entertainer Michael Jackson
did not die in 2009. According to Miller, Jackson used a body double to fake
his death with the assistance of the Los Angeles County Coroner’s Office.
Miller filed suit against the County of Los Angeles (County), alleging she
suffered reputational harm from statements made by the Coroner’s Office
that contradict her assertion that Jackson’s purported death in 2009 was an
elaborate hoax. The trial court granted the County’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings without leave to amend and dismissed the case. Miller now
appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting the County’s motion. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Complaint1
Miller is an independent filmmaker and journalist who has been
investigating Jackson’s death for approximately 15 years. Miller has publicly
espoused the belief that Jackson’s purported death in 2009 was faked using
the body of an individual who passed away in 2007.
In May 2024, Miller filed suit against the County, asserting causes of
action for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional
misrepresentation, concealment, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and deceit. All of Miller’s claims were based on
allegations that the Coroner’s Office was complicit in faking Jackson’s death
and made false statements that caused the public to question the legitimacy
1 The factual representations in this section are taken from Miller’s
operative complaint.
2
of Miller’s assertions that a “body double” was used to fake Jackson’s death.
As a result of the Coroner’s statements, Miller was harassed by members of
the public who did not share her belief that Jackson’s 2009 death was a hoax.
The allegations of Miller’s complaint revolve around two case files from
the Coroner’s Office: the case file from Jackson’s purported death in 2009
(case number 2009-04415), and the case file of the alleged “body double” who
passed away in 2007 (case number 2007-08947). Miller’s complaint identified
three specific actionable statements made by the Coroner’s Office: (1) an
October 2021 statement confirming that Jackson was dead and that “[a]ny
reports of a body double are unfounded”; (2) a statement made in August
2022 that a particular digital screenshot of a website concerning the 2007-
08947 case did not originate from the Coroner’s Office; and (3) a July 2023
statement made by someone in the Coroner’s Office that 2007-08947 was “not
a valid case number.” According to Miller, this July 2023 statement “sparked
this lawsuit.”
Miller’s complaint acknowledged that she previously filed a similar
lawsuit against the County in February 2024, but decided to voluntarily
dismiss that action when she was informed that she failed to comply with the
claim presentation requirements imposed by the Government Claims Act
(Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).2 After dismissing her first suit, she filed a claim
with the County in March or April of 2024.3 The County denied the claim
because it was not filed within the required time limit.
2 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise specified.
3 In her complaint, Miller states that she filed a claim with the County
“on April 1, 2024.” However, her complaint also incorporates correspondence
indicating she filed her claim on March 20, 2024.
3
From 2020 to 2024, Miller was involved in a separate lawsuit against a
third party (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, No. 20VECV00347). As part of
that lawsuit, she subpoenaed the County to obtain the death certificate for
case 2007-08947, which she received in December 2023. Miller alleged that
her causes of action against the County did not accrue until she obtained the
death certificate in December 2023 because it was only at that point that she
had “the FACTS & enough SOLID EVIDENCE to back up her claims.” Miller
also alleged she could not have presented her claims to the County any
sooner because she was “consumed” with the 20VECV00347 matter until
2024.
However, Miller’s complaint also made clear that the death certificate
for case 2007-08947 could have been obtained at any time from the Los
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder’s Office. Indeed, Miller’s complaint
acknowledged that in January 2024 she went to the Registrar-Recorder’s
Office and obtained the death certificates for both the 2009-04415 and 2007-
08947 cases.
The complaint also detailed Miller’s attempts to investigate the 2007-
08947 case in September 2022 by sending a letter to the Coroner’s Office. In
her 2022 letter, Miller accused the Coroner’s Office of the same malfeasance
that forms the basis for her claims against the County in this action.
Specifically, her letter stated that she was suffering reputational harm from
statements made by the Coroner’s Office that cast doubt on her assertions
that Jackson’s death was faked. In her letter, Miller outlined the evidence
she had contradicting the Coroner’s statements. Miller’s letter threatened to
sue the Coroner’s Office for intentional misrepresentation and deceit for its
role in faking Jackson’s death. Miller also threatened to file similar litigation
against the County’s counsel in October 2023.
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II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In August 2024, the County brought a motion for judgment on the
pleadings challenging all of Miller’s causes of action. The County argued
Miller’s causes of action were barred because Miller failed to comply with the
claim presentation requirement imposed by the Government Claims Act.
(§ 911.2.) The County asserted that under California law, “no suit for ‘money
or damages’ may be brought against a public entity until a written claim has
been presented to the entity not later than six months after the accrual of the
cause of action.” The County argued that Miller’s causes of action accrued, at
the latest, in September 2022 when she sent the letter to the Coroner’s Office.
Alternatively, the County argued that Miller’s complaint failed to state
sufficient facts to constitute causes of action against the County.
Miller opposed the motion, arguing the delayed discovery rule applied
to delay the accrual of her claims because “[e]ven though [she] knew of the
facts that occurred and when they occurred, being under extreme emotional
distress, [she] was not thinking clearly and her mind was clogged, twisted
and misdirected consumed with stopping the gang of haters that had been
harassing [her] for more than 8 years on a daily constant basis.” She
asserted that receiving the death certificate for case 2007-08947 in December
2023 “cleared the clutter in her mind so she could SEE how the ‘County’
injured her.” Miller also alleged that it was not until December 2023 that she
“discovered the solid evidence to win the case.”
The trial court granted the motion, concluding that “[w]hether due to a
lack of specificity, a general failure to plead sufficient facts, a failure to
exhaust, the application of the statute of limitations, or lack of standing, the
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Complaint is inherently defective. Thus, the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is granted, without leave to amend.”
In October 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal
disposing of the case. Miller timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer
and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’ [Citation.] ‘All
properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.’” (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor
Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.) “If a judgment on the
pleadings is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will affirm
it regardless of the considerations used by the superior court to reach its
conclusion.” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 184–185.)
Where, as here, the trial court grants a motion for judgment on the
pleadings without leave to amend, we consider “‘whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.’” (Today's
IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1175 (Today’s IV).) “The decision whether to grant
leave to amend a complaint is a discretionary one for the trial court.” (City of
Rancho Palos Verdes v. State of California (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13, 23.)
“The appellant bears the burden of showing abuse of discretion and carries
that burden by showing how the complaint can be amended.” (Today's IV, at
p. 1176.)
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II. Government Claims Act
A. Statutory Framework
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, public entities are only
liable as provided by statute. (§ 815; Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection
Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803.) The Government Claims Act “is a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of
public entities and public employees for torts.” (Ibid.) Under the Act, a
plaintiff must first present a timely claim for damages to the public entity
before filing suit. (§ 911.2; A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 1252, 1257.) The purpose of this requirement is “‘to provide the
public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate
claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.’
[Citation.]” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins.
Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446.) Subject to certain exceptions not
applicable here, the “failure to timely present a claim for money or damages
to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.”
(State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, citing §§
911.2, 945.4.)
Section 911.2, subdivision (a), provides that claims for personal injury
must be presented to a public entity “not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of action.” The date of “accrual” under section 911.2 “‘“is
the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations
applicable to a dispute between private litigants.”’” (McCurdy v. County of
Riverside (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1113; § 901.) Generally, a “cause of
action accrues ‘when [it] is complete with all of its elements’—those elements
being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797 (Pooshs).)
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings
Miller’s causes of action arise from statements made by the Coroner’s
Office in October 2021, August 2022, and July 2023, which allegedly caused
her immediate reputational harm.4 Under ordinary rules, any causes of
action stemming from those statements accrued as soon as they were made
and Miller was harmed. (Pooshs, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 797.) As Miller’s
complaint concedes that she did not file a claim with the County within six
months of any of these statements, the trial court correctly determined that
her causes of action against the County were barred by the Government
Claims Act. (§§ 911.2, 945.4.)
Miller’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Miller attempts
to invoke the “discovery rule” to delay the accrual of her causes of action. The
discovery rule “postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff
discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) But the discovery rule
only delays accrual until a “plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the
cause of action.” (Ibid.) Inquiry notice exists where “the plaintiffs have
reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.”
(Ibid.) “‘A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific “facts” necessary to
establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery.
4 Miller’s complaint and appellate briefing contained extensive argument
in support of her belief that Jackson is currently alive. However, at oral
argument, Miller stated that this case is not about whether Jackson’s 2009
death was, in fact, a hoax. The question of whether Jackson is currently alive
or dead is irrelevant to our resolution of this appeal.
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Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive
to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a
suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot
wait for the facts to find her.’ [Citation.]” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v.
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 685
(Peregrine); accord Genisman v. Carley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 45, 51.)
“‘The discovery rule . . . presumes that a plaintiff has knowledge of
injury on the date of injury. In order to rebut the presumption, a plaintiff
must plead facts sufficient to convince the trial judge that delayed discovery
was justified.’” (William L. Lyon & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1310.) To carry this burden, a plaintiff “‘must
specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2)
the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’
[Citation.] In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery,
the court places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory
allegations will not withstand [a motion for judgment on the pleadings].’”
(Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 808.)
Here, the allegations of Miller’s complaint establish that at the time
she wrote the September 2022 letter, she believed that statements made by
the Coroner’s Office caused her the same reputational harm that forms the
genesis of her claims against the County here. Her complaint also
establishes that she was immediately aware of the alleged falsity of the
Coroner’s Office statement in July 2023 that 2007-08947 was not a valid case
number. And in opposing the County’s motion, she similarly conceded that
she “knew of the facts that occurred and when they occurred” before
December 2023. Taken together, these allegations show Miller was on
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inquiry notice of her claims more than six months before she first presented a
claim to the County.
Miller argues in conclusory fashion that she did not have all the
evidence needed to prevail on her claims until she received the 2007-08947
death certificate in December 2023. Even assuming that this is true, it does
not help her. The discovery rule will only delay accrual until a plaintiff has a
suspicion of wrongdoing, rather than when a plaintiff has finished gathering
the evidence necessary to prevail on the merits at trial. As Peregrine makes
clear, the collection of supporting facts and evidence is not a prerequisite to
the accrual of a cause of action. (Peregrine, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.)
We therefore conclude that the delayed discovery rule does not apply here to
delay the accrual of Miller’s causes of action.5
Miller also argues that she should not be bound by the six-month
deadline imposed by the Government Code because she did not know the
Government Code imposed a more stringent deadline than the statutes of
limitation that would otherwise apply in litigation between private parties.
The law on this point is clear: as a litigant proceeding in propria persona,
Miller is “entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other
litigants and attorneys. . . . Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to
the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.” (Bianco v. California
5 The allegations of Miller’s complaint are also insufficient to establish
that she acted with reasonable diligence in investigating her causes of action.
Miller’s complaint indicates that she could have obtained the death certificate
for case 2007-08947 at any time from the Los Angeles County Registrar-
Recorder’s Office. Her generalized assertion that she was too busy litigating
the 20VECV00347 matter to investigate her causes of action against the
County rings hollow where, as here, she used the 20VECV00347 action to
serve a subpoena to gather evidence for her lawsuit against the County. For
this separate reason we also reject Miller’s attempt to invoke the delayed
discovery rule.
10
Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125–1126; accord Lombardi v.
Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208–209.)
We conclude that Miller failed to timely file a claim with the County as
required by section 911.2. As a result, she is barred from asserting those
claims against the County in this litigation. (§§ 911.2, 945.4.) As Miller’s
claims are barred, the trial court did not err in granting the County’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. As we have
determined that the County was entitled to judgment on the pleadings under
the Government Claims Act, we need not address the alternate bases for the
trial court’s ruling and decline to do so.
C. New Arguments in Reply Brief
In her reply brief, Miller raises several new lines of argument that were
not raised in her opening brief. For example, she argues that she should
have been granted leave to amend her complaint because she could have filed
a petition under the Government Code to be relieved of the six-month time
limit imposed by section 911.2. Miller also attempts to invoke the doctrine of
equitable tolling, arguing it should be applied to extend her deadline to file a
claim under section 911.2. She also argues that the County failed to satisfy
the meet and confer requirement imposed by the Code of Civil Procedure in
filing its motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Miller has forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them in her
opening brief. “Points raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily
not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent
of an opportunity to counter the argument.” (American Drug Stores, Inc. v.
Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453.) Miller has also forfeited her
arguments regarding equitable tolling and the meet and confer process by
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failing to raise them in the trial court. (See Ramirez v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1313, 1335; Egelston v. State Personnel Bd.
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1055.) For these reasons, we decline to reach
the new arguments raised in her reply brief.6
D. Bias
Miller repeatedly asserts that the trial judge was biased against her.
Miller’s allegations of bias center on the fact that the trial court granted the
County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Miller speculates that the
trial court did not read her complaint because it ignored the “evidence, proof
and clues galore” contained therein in granting the County’s motion.
“Disparaging the trial judge is a tactic that is not taken lightly by a
reviewing court.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 422.) It is well
established that a “trial court’s rulings against a party, even if erroneous, do
not, by themselves, support a charge of bias.” (Severson & Werson, P.C. v.
Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 952; accord N.D. v. Superior Court
(2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1292, 1296, 1300–1301.) This is particularly true
where, as here, the trial court did not err in concluding that Miller’s claims
were barred by her failure to demonstrate compliance with the Government
Claims Act.
Miller’s accusations of bias also rely on her extrarecord representations
about the trial judge’s demeanor and body language—as well as statements
allegedly made by the County’s counsel—at the unreported hearing on the
6 However, we note that “the doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be
invoked to suspend section 911.2’s six-month deadline for filing a prerequisite
government claim.” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104,
1121.)
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County’s motion. Miller also speculates that the trial court was biased
against her because she is appearing in propria persona. Miller’s accusations
find no support in the record. Miller’s factual representations regarding what
occurred at the hearing are not part of the record on appeal. Miller’s claim
that the trial court is biased against pro per litigants is nothing more than
supposition devoid of any evidentiary support. “[W]e may disregard factual
contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are
based on information that is outside the record.” (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
The record before us simply lends no support to Miller’s allegations of
bias by the trial judge.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The County is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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