Filed 11/20/26 Milestone Financial, LLC v. Srinivasan CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
MILESTONE FINANCIAL, LLC,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174413
v.
BEENA SRINIVASAN et al., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 24CV089292)
Defendants and Appellants.
Beena Srinivasan owned a house, in Fremont, until
Milestone Financial, LLC (Milestone) acquired title to it at a
trustee’s sale, conducted pursuant to foreclosure on a deed of
trust in June 2020. Milestone filed an action for unlawful
detainer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a
against Beena and Vikram Srinivasan—who have refused to
vacate and deliver possession of the property—as well as other
defendants (who are not involved on appeal).1 The trial court
entered judgment against the Srinivasans after granting
Milestone’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Srinivasans challenge the trial court’s
decision on the motion for summary judgment and to strike the
amended answers filed by the Srinivasans after the summary
judgment motion was already pending. We conclude that the
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
1
Procedure.
1
Srinivasans fail to meet their burden to demonstrate error and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
“ ‘Unlawful detainer actions are authorized and governed
by state statute. (. . . § 1161 et seq.) The statutory scheme is
intended and designed to provide an expeditious remedy for the
recovery of possession of real property.’ [Citation.] ‘The remedy
is available in only three situations: to a lessor against a lessee
for unlawfully holding over or for breach of a lease; to an owner
against an employee, agent, or licensee whose relationship has
terminated; and to a purchaser at an execution sale, a sale by
foreclosure, or a sale under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed
of trust against the former owner and possessor.’ ” (Taylor v. Nu
Digital Marketing, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 283, 288–289.)
In the third circumstance above, section 1161a permits one
acquiring ownership through foreclosure to obtain possession in
summary unlawful detainer proceedings if a person continues
possession after service of a three-day written notice to quit
unless other applicable laws provide greater protection. (§ 1161a,
subd. (b)(3); Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 261, 273; Gross v. Superior Court (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 265, 270–271.)2 “The issues to be decided in the
unlawful detainer action are whether the property was sold in
2 Section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3) provides: “[A] person
who holds over and continues in possession of . . . real property
after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been
served upon the person . . . may be removed therefrom as
prescribed in this chapter [¶] . . . [¶] [w]here the property has
been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code,
under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by
such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the
title under the sale has been duly perfected.”
2
accordance with the procedures prescribed by [Civil Code
section] 2924, and whether the title obtained by the purchaser at
the sale has been perfected.” (5 Bender, Cal. Real Estate Law &
Practice (2026) § 123.24, p. 1.)
B.
After purchasing the Fremont house at the trustee’s sale
and recording a trustee’s deed upon sale, Milestone served and
posted a three-day notice to quit, on August 15, 2024. The
Srinivasans remained in possession after that three-day period.
On August 28, 2024, Milestone filed its unlawful detainer
complaint, pursuant to section 1161a, against the Srinivasans
and other defendants.
Although the filings themselves are not in the record before
us, it is undisputed that the Srinivasans responded by filing
extensive preliminary motions, including multiple challenges to
assigned judges, motions to quash, motions for reconsideration,
and motions to dismiss or strike. On June 26, 2025, the trial
court denied the Srinivasans’ motions to dismiss.
The next day, the Srinivasans (acting in propria persona)
filed their answers to the complaint. Their answers did not
include any denials (specific or general) of any facts alleged in the
complaint.
Milestone filed a motion for summary judgment, which
argued that it was entitled to restitution of possession, monetary
damages, and court costs because there were no triable issues of
fact. In support of the motion, Milestone filed the declarations of
its managing member and custodian of records, William Stuart,
and a registered process server. The trustee’s deed upon sale,
attached as an exhibit, was recorded on June 5, 2020. The
declaration of service for the notice to quit states that the process
server completed service, by posting and by mail, on August 15,
2024.
3
On the morning of July 3, 2025, the trial court held a
pretrial conference addressing, among other things, the summary
judgment hearing and jury trial fees. At this hearing, attorney
Cliff Schneider first “[s]pecially [a]ppear[ed]” as counsel for the
Srinivasans. Vikram (who was present in court) indicated that
the Srinivasans wanted Schneider to represent them. The court
noted that no “substitution of attorney” had been filed. The
amended minutes state: “The [c]ourt approves [the Srinivasans’]
request [for Schneider to represent them] and orders [the
Srinivasans] to file a substitution of attorney.”
After the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing on
July 3, but before a substitution of attorney was filed on July 8,
2025, the Srinivasans themselves, purporting to act in propria
persona, filed first amended answers. Their first amended
answers, filed on July 3, 2025, included (for the first time) both a
general denial and specific denials of Milestone’s allegations. The
amended answers were signed by the Srinivasans themselves,
not by Schneider.
On July 10, 2025, the trial court struck the Srinivasans’
first amended answers sua sponte because they were not signed
by counsel of record (§ 128.7, subd. (a)), were untimely, and had
not been served on Milestone. However, the court gave the
Srinivasans an opportunity to contest that decision in written
briefing. After considering the Srinivasans’ briefing and
argument filed four days later, the court reaffirmed its decision to
strike the answers.
The court explained: “The filings were accepted in error by
the clerk’s office because [the Srinivasans] made the filings pro
per even though they were represented by counsel and because
the deadline . . . to file amended answers had passed. [¶] At the
morning hearing earlier that day on [July 3, 2025], the [c]ourt
granted defendant’s and defense counsel Schneider’s joint oral
requests for defense counsel Schneider to represent [the
4
Srinivasans] in this matter, even though a substitution of counsel
form had not been filed beforehand. That order was entered into
the minute order for the . . . hearing. As such, Schneider was the
attorney of record for [the Srinivasans] as of that morning.
[(§ 284.)] Accordingly, the amended answers filed by [the
Srinivasans] on their own behalf after that hearing are null and
void because they were not signed by the attorney of record
(Schneider). [(§ 128.7[, subd.] (a).)] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he amended
answers were filed more than [five] days after [June 27, 2025]
and therefore are untimely under [sections] 1167.3 and . . .
586(a)(2).”
In that same order, the trial court also granted Milestone’s
motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that
Milestone had met its burden to submit evidence establishing the
requisite elements of its unlawful detainer claim. The court’s
decision rested (in large part) on the fact that the Srinivasans’
original answers did not deny any of Milestone’s allegations.
Accordingly, the court entered a judgment of possession in
Milestone’s favor. The court also ordered the Srinivasans to pay
damages and court costs in the amount of $82,475.
After the Srinivasans filed their notice of appeal, this court
granted their petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed
enforcement of any notice to vacate pending resolution of the
present appeal (order issued Dec. 31, 2025, A174785).3
3Milestone separately asked us to take judicial notice of an
indictment filed against Vikram. We deferred ruling on the
opposed request and now deny it because Milestone fails to
demonstrate the relevance of the existence of the indictment to
the issues on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.252(a)(2)(A); Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531,
544, fn. 4.)
5
DISCUSSION
A.
The Srinivasans insist the trial court erred in striking the
amended answers because they were not untimely or defective.
They fail to meet their burden on appeal.
1.
It is well established that appellate courts must presume a
trial court’s judgment or order is correct and that errors must be
affirmatively demonstrated on appeal. (Howard v. Thrifty Drug
& Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443; Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) To do so, the
appellant has the burden of providing a record adequate for the
task of determining whether error occurred. (Maria P. v. Riles
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific
Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) The appellant
must also provide a cogent argument supported by legal
authority and citations to the record. (Champir, LLC v.
Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.) An
appellant cannot overcome the presumption by ignoring the trial
court’s reasoning in its opening brief on appeal. (State Water
Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 836.)
An order striking a pleading is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San
Buenaventura (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1187; CLD
Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
1141, 1145.) “Section 436 gives the trial court discretion to strike
out all or any part of a pleading not filed in conformity with the
laws of this state.” (CLD Construction, Inc., at p. 1145.) A court
abuses its discretion if its determination is based on an erroneous
legal standard or a misapprehension of the governing law. (See
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
6
2.
In reaching the conclusion that five days was the period
governing when an amended answer may be filed without
seeking leave to amend, the court explicitly relied on sections
1167.3 and 586, subdivision (a)(2). In particular, the court said,
“the [Srinivasans’] amended answers were filed more than [five]
days after [June 27, 2025 (the date their answers were filed)] and
therefore are untimely under [sections] 1167.3 and . . . 586[,
subdivision ](a)(2). . . . There has been no showing of good cause
for the [c]ourt to extend the time under [section] 1167.3.”
In arguing that their amended answers were timely in
their opening brief on appeal, the Srinivasans ignore and do not
address the statutes relied on by the trial court. Instead, the
Srinivasans rely on sections 472 and 430.40, which have been
construed—as applied in general civil litigation—to mean that a
defendant has a right to amend their answer without leave of the
court if it is filed within 10 days of service of the original answer.
(See §§ 472, subd. (a), 430.40, subd. (b) [“A party who has filed a
complaint or cross-complaint may, within 10 days after service of
the answer to his pleading, demur to the answer”]; Tingley v.
Times Mirror Co. (1907) 151 Cal. 1, 4, 11–12 [libel action]; Bank
of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Goldstein (1938) 25
Cal.App.2d 37, 39, 45–46 [suit to foreclose trust deed].)4 They
4 Section 472, subdivision (a) provides: “A party may
amend its pleading once without leave of the court at any time
before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after
a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or
motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and
served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the
demurrer or motion to strike. A party may amend the pleading
after the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion
to strike, upon stipulation by the parties. The time for
responding to an amended pleading shall be computed from the
date of service of the amended pleading.”
7
insist their amended answers were timely because they were filed
“within [six] days of serving their answers.”
However, the Srinivasans do not grapple with the fact that
the unlawful detainer statutes generally provide shorter
timelines. (See Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381,
394–395 & fn. 2; Coyne v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805
[statutory scheme for unlawful detainer is intended and designed
to provide an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of
real property].) “In contrast to general civil proceedings, the
normal pretrial time periods prescribed by the unlawful detainer
statutes are shorter for a variety of procedures, including the
time to file a responsive pleading to the complaint, respond to
motions to quash and for summary judgment, conduct discovery,
and set the action for trial. (§§ 1167, 1167.3, 1167.4, 1170.5,
1170.8.)” (Stancil, at p. 395, fn. 2.)
Thus, in contrast to the 30-day rule generally applicable in
other civil proceedings (§§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3), 430.40, subd. (a);
Deal v. Municipal Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 991, 994), section
1167 requires a defendant in an unlawful detainer action to
answer or otherwise plead to the complaint within 10 court days
after service of summons.5 (§ 1167, subd. (a); Deal, at p. 994
[construing an earlier version of the statute].) And section 1167.3
provides: “In any action under this chapter, unless otherwise
ordered by the court for good cause shown, the time allowed the
defendant to answer the complaint, answer the complaint, if
amended, or amend the answer under paragraph (2), (3), (5), (6),
5 At the time Milestone filed its unlawful detainer
complaint in 2024, section 1167 provided only five court days to
file an answer. (Former § 1167, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.
2022, ch. 686, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) Section 1167 was amended,
effective January 1, 2025, and the time to answer was lengthened
to 10 court days. (§ 1167, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2024,
ch. 512, § 1.)
8
or (7) of subdivision (a) of [s]ection 586 shall not exceed five days.”
(Italics added.)
By failing to address the unlawful detainer statutes
explicitly relied on by trial court, the Srinivasans have forfeited
any claim of error. (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [“A
judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct” and
“error must be affirmatively shown,” italics omitted]; State Water
Resources Control Bd. Cases, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 835–
836 [issue forfeited because presumption of correctness cannot be
overcome by ignoring basis for trial court’s decision in opening
brief].)
In their reply brief, the Srinivasans belatedly (and in
conclusory fashion) argue that section 1167.3’s five-day deadline
does not apply here because “[t]he [a]mended [a]nswers in this
case did not arise under section 586.” “It is axiomatic that
arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be
entertained because of the unfairness to the other party.” (People
v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.) The Srinivasans fail to
meet their burden to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by striking their amended answers or by denying leave
to amend. Accordingly, we need not address the Srinivasans’
additional arguments that the amended answers were not
defective as filed in propria persona and that, assuming they
were defective, the court should have granted leave to amend
because a signature defect was curable.
B.
The Srinivasans also argue the trial court erred by
granting Milestone’s motion for summary judgment because
Milestone failed to meet its initial burden as the party moving for
summary judgment. We disagree.
We review an order granting a motion for summary
judgment de novo. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National
9
Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064.) Summary judgment
“shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A
plaintiff moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
persuasion that each element of the cause of action has been
proved, and thus that there is no defense thereto. (§ 437c, subd.
(o)(1); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850
(Aguilar).) We examine the record to determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist and “consider[ ] all the evidence set
forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which
objections were made and sustained.” (Johnson v. City of Loma
Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65–66.)
The Srinivasans’ argument is (at least in part) premised on
a misunderstanding of the nature of the unlawful detainer action
against them. They argue: “[Milestone] had the burden to show
1) a landlord and tenant relationship exists between plaintiff and
defendant[s], 2) Defendant[s] owe[ ] rent based on a lease
agreement, 3) Defendant[s] failed to pay rent, 4) Plaintiff issued a
valid 3-day notice, 5) Defendant[s] didn’t pay the amount
demanded within the three-day limit, and 6) Defendant[s] [are]
still occupying the property.” (Italics added.) The Srinivasans
insist that Milestone failed to meet its burden to show the notice
requirement was met because the evidence it submitted showed
only that it served and posted a notice to quit and not a “ ‘[n]otice
to pay [r]ent or [q]uit,’ ” which means they had no opportunity to
cure a rent arrearage.
The Srinivasans’ argument is mistakenly premised on a
statement of the elements of unlawful detainer under a wholly
different statute—section 1161.6 In contrast, a person seeking a
6Section 1161 provides (in relevant part): “A tenant of real
property, for a term less than life, . . . is guilty of unlawful
detainer: [¶] . . . [¶] 2. When the tenant continues in possession,
10
judgment of unlawful detainer, pursuant to section 1161a,
subdivision (b)(3), must establish that 1) “the property has been
sold in accordance with [s]ection 2924 of the Civil Code, under a
power of sale contained in a deed of trust”; 2) “title under the sale
has been duly perfected” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a, subd. (b)(3));
and 3) the occupant “continues in possession of . . . real property
after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been
served.” (Id., subd. (b), italics added; see Dr. Leevil, LLC v.
Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479; Lyons v.
Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
1499, 1505.)
The Srinivasans fail to explain why we should look to an
entirely different statute—section 1161—to determine the merits
of an unlawful detainer complaint filed explicitly under section
1161a. They do not point to any evidence presented in opposition
to the summary judgment motion showing that the Srinivasans
and Milestone had a landlord-tenant relationship. This
argument does not meet the Srinivasans’ burden to demonstrate
error. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Young
v. Fish & Game Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1190–1191
[court may disregard points unsupported by reasoned argument
or citations to record].)
The Srinivasans’ conclusory argument based on Civil Code
section 1946.2, subdivision (a) fails for similar reasons. That
statute provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, after a tenant
has continuously and lawfully occupied a residential real
in person or by subtenant, without the permission of the
landlord, or the successor in estate of the landlord, if applicable,
after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, and three days’
notice . . . in writing, requiring its payment, . . . shall have been
served upon the tenant and if there is a subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, also upon the subtenant.” (Italics
added.)
11
property for 12 months, the owner of the residential real property
shall not terminate a tenancy without just cause, which shall be
stated in the written notice to terminate tenancy.” (Italics
added.) They do not explain why Civil Code section 1946.2—
which clearly requires the existence of a lawful landlord-tenant
relationship (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 337, 341)—
has any application in this section 1161a action. The Srinivasans
have forfeited this contention of error by failing to support it with
reasoned argument. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B);
Young v. Fish & Game Com., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1190–
1191.)
The Srinivasans also insist that the notice to quit was
improperly served after (rather than before) the unlawful
detainer action was filed. They rely on the process server’s
declaration, which states: “On August 15, 2025, I served the
notice [to quit] by posting a copy for each of the above named
defendants in a conspicuous place on the property and by mailing
a copy to each of the defendants . . . by first class mail.” (Italics
added.) But the notice to quit itself and its proof of service were
both executed on August 15, 2024. And the process server’s
declaration and the motion for summary judgment were both file-
stamped on June 26, 2025—more than a month before August 15,
2025.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that there is no genuine
dispute. The year “2025” was a mere typographical error in the
process server’s declaration. It is not reasonable for us to infer
the existence of a triable issue of fact from this typographical
error. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 864 [“Speculation . . .
is not evidence”]; Bank of America, N.A. v. Roberts (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 1386, 1400 [typographic error in separate statement
does not create triable issue].)
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The stay imposed shall be lifted
upon issuance of the remittitur. Milestone is entitled to its costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR.
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
13