Filed 9/22/26 Mijangos v. Pereira CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
XOCHITL MIJANGOS, H052481
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CV406033)
v.
TERESA L. PEREIRA,
Defendant and Appellant.
This appeal arises from an unlawful detainer action filed under Code of
Civil Procedure,1 section 1161a, subdivision (b)(4) (section 1161a(b)(4)).
Xochitl Mijangos brought suit against Teresa Pereira, asserting that
Mijangos had purchased property from Pereira and Pereira’s ex-husband, and
the grant deed had been delivered and recorded. Pereira refused to move out
of the property, contending that she had not sold the property and title had
not been duly perfected in Mijangos. The principal question posed in this
appeal is whether Pereira’s assertion challenging Mijangos’s title to the
property was cognizable in the unlawful detainer proceeding.
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The trial court decided that it was not. The court excluded from the
trial any evidence or legal instructions relevant to establishing Pereira’s
claims regarding cancellation of the property sales contract and invalidity of
the deed. The jury found in favor of Mijangos, and the court awarded her
unlawful detainer damages in the amount of $210,000 and costs of suit.
On appeal, Pereira contends that the evidence shows that the property
was never sold to Mijangos, the grant deed was not delivered, and title was
never perfected. Pereira maintains that the trial court erroneously denied
her motion for summary judgment and improperly granted motions in limine
and made other evidentiary rulings at trial that prevented her from
challenging Mijangos’s claim of title to the property. Pereira also argues the
court erred pretrial in granting Mijangos’s motion for reclassification of the
case from a limited to unlimited civil matter.
We conclude the trial court committed prejudicial error in limiting
Pereira’s challenge to Mijangos’s ownership. Because the unlawful detainer
claim under section 1161a(b)(4) required Mijangos to prove that “title under
the sale has been duly perfected,” Pereira’s evidence challenging the sale of
the property and perfection of title related directly to the triable issue of
possession and should not have been excluded.
We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts2
Pereira and her estranged husband3 were in divorce proceedings when
they decided to sell their property on Columbet Avenue in San Martin,
California (property). The Pereiras entered into a residential listing
agreement.
Mijangos and her brother (who is not a party to this action) signed a
purchase offer for $2,410,000 with escrow to close 30 days after acceptance.
On May 17, 2022,4 the Pereiras counteroffered for a purchase price of
$2,455,000. The counteroffer included a lease back option for “a 29 day rent
back of [the] entire property” and a “90 day rent back of the shops [and] office
(upstairs apt.).” Mijangos and her brother (buyers) accepted and signed the
counteroffer. That same day, the parties entered into a ratified purchase
agreement.
On May 10 and 26, buyers removed all contingencies. On June 21,
Pereira sent an e-mail to buyers’ realtor restating the lease back terms.
Pereira’s e-mail indicated that she had “a 29 day rent back from close of
escrow,” “a 60 [d]ay [r]ent [b]ack” for a “living space” that she “define[d]. . . as
2 The factual background is drawn from the trial exhibits and the
record on appeal. “We recite the essential relevant facts ‘in the manner most
favorable to the judgment, resolving all conflicts and drawing all inferences
in favor of respondent.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233,
fn. 2.) We describe conflicting evidence where relevant to each side’s
contentions regarding the claims in the appeal. We separately discuss the
record’s inclusion of a partial transcript of the electronically recorded
proceedings.
3 We refer to Pereira and her ex-husband, Antonio Pereira (who is not a
party to this action), together as “the Pereiras.” When referenced separately,
we refer to Teresa Pereira as “Pereira” and Antonio Pereira by his full name.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2022.
3
the apartment below office that is due to end on 9/15/22,” and a “90 [d]ay
[r]ent [b]ack for the office (upstairs) and [w]elding shop for our business and
that is to end on 10/15/22.”
Around that same time, Pereira signed the grant deed, which she avers
was “to be held in trust contingent upon and subject to funding being
delivered on or before June 21, 2022.” Payment did not occur by June 21. On
June 27 the Pereiras provided buyers a “notice demand to close escrow and
notice to buyer to perform #1” (capitalization omitted) within three days.
According to Pereira, with the July 4 holiday, close of escrow was due by the
close of business on July 5.
On July 8, Pereira delivered (by fax, hand delivery, and e-mail) a
“Letter to Rescind Signature on Grant Deed” (some capitalization omitted)
(letter to rescind) to escrow officer Katherine Gutierrez of Fidelity National
Title Company (Fidelity) asking Gutierrez to return the grant deed.
Gutierrez did not do so. On August 2, Pereira’s attorney in her family law
matter e-mailed Fidelity with instructions to cancel the escrow because the
buyers were “out of contract.”
Notwithstanding these communications, the buyers made payment of
$2,455,000, and escrow closed “on or about August 9.” On August 9, Fidelity
recorded the grant deed for the property with the Santa Clara County Clerk-
Recorder. The recorded deed identifies “Antonio Pereira and Teresa Pereira,
husband and wife as joint tenants,” as the grantors, and Mijangos, her
brother, and her father Octavio E. Mijangos as the grantees. The $2,455,000
paid by buyers was not returned or refunded to them. According to Pereira’s
trial counsel, the payment was held in the trust account of Pereira’s divorce
lawyer. After August 9, Mijangos (together with her brother and father)
made all property tax payments for the property and paid the monthly
4
mortgage, without contribution from Pereira, even though Pereira remained
in possession of the property.
Pereira asserts that the deed was recorded over her objections and
without her permission, purporting to be a grant deed between her and her
estranged husband, though she “never authorized [her] estranged husband to
have said deed delivered or recorded” and even though the deed is signed by
him “as ‘trustee’ ” of their living trust, not as husband and wife as joint
tenants. She maintains that, because the buyers failed to perform within the
contract window and she rescinded her signature on the grant deed, the deed
should not have been recorded.
On September 22, Mijangos effected service (by process server) of a
“Three Day Notice to Quit” (three-day notice) under section 1161a(b)(4) on
Pereira and several other individuals believed to be occupying the property.
B. Procedural History
1. Unlawful Detainer Complaint
Mijangos filed a limited civil complaint for unlawful detainer against
Pereira and others in October, followed in May 2023 by the operative first
amended complaint (complaint).
The complaint named Pereira and several individuals (not parties to
this appeal) alleged to be “in possession of the premises.” The complaint
alleged that Mijangos’s interest was “as an owner,” that the fair rental value
of the premises was $315.77 per day, and that damages due to defendants’
unlawful detainer of the promises would “accrue at the rate of $315.77
beginning on October 1, 2022,” and end upon the entry of judgment.
The complaint asserted two causes of action, stated in the alternative.
It alleged, pursuant to section 1161a(b)(4), that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between Mijangos and Pereira, that Pereira “once owned
5
the premises but then lost her ownership in the sale of the premises that was
duly perfected” and Mijangos and Pereira “never agreed” to terms of a sale
leaseback, and that the period stated in the three-day notice had expired, and
Pereira had “failed to comply with the requirements of the notice by that
date.” Pereira alleged that “[d]efendants are persons who holdover and
continue in possession of real property after a written notice to quit the
property has been served” (§ 1162) and that Mijangos “seeks to remove
[Pereira] from the premises, and to recover possession, pursuant to []
[section] 1161a(b)(4).”
The complaint alternatively alleged, pursuant to section 1161,
subdivision (1), that Pereira “leased back the premises” from Mijangos “as
confirmed” in the e-mail dated June 21 from Pereira to buyers’ realtor,
attached to the complaint as exhibit C. Mijangos alleged that the other
defendants held over under Pereira “as either subtenants, guests or invitees”
and that any right to use and possess the premises “has expired” and
defendants had failed to vacate.
The complaint sought possession of the premises, costs, and damages at
the stated daily rate. The complaint waived recovery, excluding costs, in
excess of $25,000 “for so long as this action remains” in the limited civil
jurisdiction.
Pereira demurred to the complaint, which the trial court commissioner
overruled. In a verified answer, inter alia, Pereira denied that she had “lost
ownership in the sale of the premises that was duly perfected.” She further
denied Mijangos’s interest as an owner and that Mijangos was entitled to
immediate possession of the property. Pereira asserted affirmative defenses,
including failure to state a cause of action and unclean hands.
6
2. Motions for Stay, Reclassification, and Summary Judgment
Mijangos’s unlawful detainer action was the subject of extensive
pretrial litigation.5
After filing her answer, in September 2023, Pereira moved for a stay in
light of a pending lawsuit—filed by Pereira against Mijangos and others
(including the title company and realtors involved in the property sale)—
challenging the close of escrow and validity of the property sale, and seeking,
inter alia, cancellation and rescission of instruments. (Pereira et al. v.
Mijangos et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 23CV416527) (Pereira
action).) In her motion for stay, Pereira asserted that the cases “involv[ed]
the same parties and issue of title to the subject real property.” She argued
that case authority required the unlawful detainer action be stayed pending
adjudication of Pereira’s claims for cancellation of the “void deed” and
rescission of the purchase agreement, since both matters placed at issue the
right to title and possession.
Mijangos opposed the motion for stay, arguing that it was a delay tactic
to avoid the unlawful detainer action going to trial and that Mijangos was
entitled to have the unlawful detainer resolved expeditiously. In November
2023, the trial court denied the motion for stay “without prejudice” to Pereira
bringing motions to stay and to consolidate in the unlimited civil action.
There is no indication in the record that Pereira subsequently brought any
such motions in the Pereira action.
In January 2024, Pereira filed in the unlawful detainer action a motion
for summary judgment based on a cotenant theory (claiming Mijangos could
not unilaterally seek to evict her when she allegedly co-owned the property,
5 The litigation history in this matter includes two petitions for writ of
mandate filed in this court, which this court summarily denied.
7
and Pereira claimed to be a “tenant of the other co-tenants”). The trial court
denied summary judgment, finding Pereira had not carried her burden, and
triable issues remained concerning the right to possession and cotenancy.
While the summary judgment motion was pending, Mijangos filed a
motion for reclassification of the action pursuant to section 403.040,
subdivision (b) (reclassification motion). The trial court granted the motion
to reclassify the case from limited to unlimited and ordered Mijangos to pay
any related fees. We discuss the reclassification motion further in our
analysis, post (pt. II.D.).
In March 2024, Pereira filed a second motion for summary judgment
(summary judgment motion), which we discuss in more detail in our analysis,
post (pt. II.B.). This summary judgment motion asserted that the unlawful
detainer action failed as a matter of law because Mijangos could not prove
elements of her claim, namely “that the subject property was duly sold to her
and/or that the title to the property was duly perfected in her.” The trial
court denied the motion.
Pereira also filed a motion to consolidate the unlawful detainer with
the Pereira action pursuant to section 1048, subdivision (a). Mijangos
opposed the motion, which the court denied without prejudice to it being
renewed. Mijangos separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in
the alternative, summary adjudication, which the court denied in a minute
order.
8
3. Jury Trial
The unlawful detainer action proceeded to a four-day jury trial.6
Mijangos brought two motions in limine limiting examination and evidence
(including expert testimony) related to or supporting Pereira’s claims that
Mijangos does not have title to the property, Pereira canceled the escrow,
and/or Pereira did not deliver a deed to Mijangos.
The trial court granted Mijangos’s motions in limine. It found that the
deed was recorded and declined to “look behind that” for purposes of the
unlawful detainer trial, noting that Pereira was challenging title in the
Pereira action. The court also noted that the proceeds of the sale were being
held by Pereira’s divorce lawyer in a trust account and had not been returned
to the buyers.
After jury selection, the trial court seated a jury. Both sides presented
and cross-examined witnesses, including Mijangos, Pereira, and the process
server Kimberly Soller. The jury reached a verdict in favor of Mijangos.
Based on the jury verdict, on August 13, 2024, the trial court entered
judgment for Mijangos. The judgment granted possession of the property to
Mijangos and against Pereira, other named defendants, and “all unknown
occupants of the premises” and awarded Mijangos unlawful detainer
damages of $210,000. The court further ordered costs of suit against Pereira
and directed the clerk to issue a writ of possession under sections 715.010–
715.040, directing the county sheriff to take all legal steps necessary to
remove defendants from the premises.
6 Prior to trial, the parties’ motions were heard, variously, by three
different bench officers. A fourth bench officer presided over the unlawful
detainer trial.
9
4. Transcript of Electronically Recorded Proceedings
Because there was no court reporter for the trial, Pereira elected to
proceed on appeal with a settled statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137.)
Instead of a settled statement, the trial court ordered a transcript to be
prepared from the electronically recorded proceedings, which had been used
to record most of the trial proceedings. (Id., rule 8.137(f)(2).) (See Family
Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (2026) 20 Cal.5th 564, 591
[“[C]reating a settled statement requires a cumbersome multistep process in
the trial court, and settled statements suffer from well-known shortcomings
that preclude their use as a systematic substitute for an official verbatim
record of trial court proceedings.”].) Although Mijangos asserts the trial court
lacked authority to order use of the transcript of the electronic recording, that
issue is not properly before us. Pereira has not raised this issue on appeal,
and Mijangos has not appealed the judgment.
Nevertheless, we grant Mijangos’s unopposed request for judicial
notice, filed in this court on May 14, 2026, of a document in support of her
argument that inclusion of the transcript in the record on appeal is improper.
Judicial notice of the attached document (General Order re Operation of
Electronic Recording Equipment for Specified Proceedings Involving
Fundamental Liberty Interests in the Absence of an Available Court
Reporter, filed November 14, 2024, Superior Court of California, County of
Santa Clara) is permissible as an official act of the Santa Clara Superior
Court and a court record. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, 452, subds. (c), (d).) We also
grant Pereira’s unopposed request for judicial notice, filed in this court on
January 27, 2026, pertaining to the reporter’s transcript of the summary
judgment hearing on March 28, 2024. (See id., §§ 459, 452, subd. (d).)
10
We have reviewed the transcript of the electronically recorded trial
proceedings as part of the record on appeal but recognize it does not provide a
verbatim record of the entire trial proceedings and rely on it primarily for
context and clarification. Its contents are not determinative of our resolution
of the issues raised in this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Pereira raises multiple challenges to the judgment. She asserts that
she cancelled or withdrew from the purchase agreement when buyers failed
to fund the purchase pursuant to the contract, the grant deed was never
delivered, the grant deed is defective, and the invalid deed “cannot represent
good title.” Pereira contends that she was entitled to summary judgment, the
trial court improperly prevented her from challenging the deed and title at
trial, and the court erroneously rejected her proposed special jury
instructions on this issue. Pereira also maintains that the court erred in
granting Mijangos’s reclassification motion.
The resolution of these issues turns largely on whether, or to what
extent, Pereira should have been permitted in the unlawful detainer action to
challenge Mijangos’s evidence of sale and duly perfected title. We begin with
a brief survey of the applicable legal principles.
A. Unlawful Detainer: Legal Principles
“Unlawful detainer actions are authorized and governed by [] section
1161 et seq. ‘The statutory scheme is intended and designed to provide an
expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property.’ ” (Coyne
v. De Leo (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 801, 805 (Coyne); see Green v. Superior Court
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 633, 636; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255
(Vella).)
11
Historically, the unlawful detainer “constituted a summary method,
created by statute, for litigating the right to possession of real property
between landlords and tenants. Title to property was not in issue. [Citation.]
It is still the rule that, generally, neither cross-complaints nor counterclaims
raising any issue extrinsic to the right of immediate possession are allowed in
unlawful detainer proceedings, as their introduction would defeat the basic
statutory purpose of unlawful detainer, i.e., a speedy determination of the
right to possession, as distinguished from broader issues of title.” (Gonzales
v. Gem Properties, Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1034 (Gonzales).)
The 1929 addition of section 1161a to the unlawful detainer statute
created “[a] qualified exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in
unlawful detainer.” (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255.) Section 1161a
“extends the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional landlord-
tenant relationship to include certain purchasers of property.” (Ibid.) It
“provides for a narrow and sharply focused examination of title.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Unlawful detainer actions are, accordingly, of limited scope, generally
dealing only with the issue of right to possession and not other claims
between the parties, even if related to the property.’ ” (Coyne, supra, 26
Cal.App.5th at p. 805; Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255.) Due to its limited
scope, an unlawful detainer judgment “usually has very limited res judicata
effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a
subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations] or to adjudicate
other legal and equitable claims between the parties.” (Vella, at p. 255.)
In a handful of cases (mostly involving trustee sales), courts have
explored the degree to which title of the plaintiff seeking possession can be
litigated in a section 1161 proceeding.
12
In Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158 (Cheney), the court
considered this question in an unlawful detainer brought “by the purchaser
at a sale under a deed of trust.” (Id. at p. 159; see § 1161a, subd. (b)(3).) The
court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that, due to the summary nature of the
proceeding, “the right to possession alone was involved, and the broad
question of title could not be raised and litigated by cross-complaint or
affirmative defense.” (Cheney, at p. 159.) Nevertheless, the high court
recognized that the section 1161a claim required the plaintiff to “prove his
acquisition of title by purchase at the sale.” (Ibid.) It clarified, however, that
“it is only to this limited extent, as provided by the statute, that the title may
be litigated in such a proceeding.” (Ibid.)
Cheney reasoned that the defendant’s cross-complaint to quiet title,
which asserted “the sale was merely colorable, . . . and that plaintiffs did not
thereby acquire a valid title” alleged “grounds of attack on plaintiff’s title
[that] have no place in the present summary proceeding.” (Cheney, supra, 9
Cal.2d at p. 160.) The court thus held that because “the plaintiff need only
prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by
purchase at such sale, . . . the defendant may raise objections only on that
phase of the issue of title. Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or
primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are
neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are
they concluded by the judgment.” (Ibid.) Such issues “may be properly
presented in a separate action, but have no place in the summary proceeding
in unlawful detainer.” (Id. at p. 161.)
Cases since Cheney “have held that, in an unlawful detainer
proceeding, the court must make a limited inquiry into the basis of the
plaintiff’s title when acquired through proceedings described in [] section
13
1161a.” (Gonzales, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035.) Indeed, “ ‘it has been
held that title, to the extent required by section 1161a, “not only may, but
must, be tried in such actions.” ’ ” (Kartheiser v. Superior Court (1959) 174
Cal.App.2d 617, 620.)
Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837 (Kessler) is
instructive. There, the Court of Appeal considered an unlawful detainer
judgment based on former section 1161a, subd. (4).7 (Kessler, at p. 838.) The
court observed that, to prevail under this provision, “a plaintiff must prove
affirmatively that the property was ‘duly sold’ and that ‘the title under the
sale has been duly perfected.’ ” (Ibid.) As a result, “title . . . becomes an
issue.” (Ibid.) Because there was “a bona fide dispute” between the parties
“whether the property has been duly sold and the title duly perfected” (id. at
p. 841), the court decided that the defendant’s claims including fraud in the
inducement, cancellation of the escrow, and rescission of the transaction,
necessarily had to “be litigated, for otherwise a judgment in the unlawful
detainer suit is res judicata as to them.” (Id. at p. 839.) The court held that
the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to assert equitable
defenses in the unlawful detainer action, requiring reversal of the judgment
and a remand for new trial. (Id. at p. 842.)
The California Supreme Court in Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health
Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474 (Dr. Leevil) cited Kessler with approval but
also reiterated the limitations articulated in Cheney. Dr. Leevil interpreted
the “perfection of title” requirement under section 1161a(b), for purposes of
effectuating service of the three-day written notice to quit. (Id. at p. 477.)
7 At the time, section 1161a, subdivision (4), provided that a holdover
occupant may be removed after written notice to quit “[w]here the property
has been duly sold by him, or a person under whom he claims, and the title
under the sale has been duly perfected.” (Stats. 1941, ch. 1095, § 1.)
14
After considering the statutory language, nature of the remedy authorized by
the statutory scheme, and “broader context in which section 1161a(b) was
enacted” (id. at p. 480), the court concluded that the owner “must perfect title
before serving the three-day written notice to quit required by [] section
1161a(b)” (id. at pp. 484–485). This “requires that the instrument of
conveyance ([i.e.,] the trustee’s deed) be recorded pursuant to Government
Code section 27280.” (Id. at p. 479.) Further, “ ‘[t]itle is duly perfected when
all steps have been taken to make it perfect, i.e., to convey to the purchaser
that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt[]
[citation], which includes good record title [citation], but is not limited to good
record title, as between the parties to the transaction. . . . The court in an
unlawful detainer [action] . . . has jurisdiction to determine the validity of
such defenses.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Kessler, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. at
p. 841.)
Having determined that perfection of title was a prerequisite to
bringing an action under section 1161a, Dr. Leevil considered whether the
unlawful detainer defendant was, in defense, “ ‘free to challenge’ ” the
plaintiff’s claimed ownership. (Dr. Leevil, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 483.) The
court explained that the right to challenge ownership is narrow. It stated
that while a defendant may “use the unlawful detainer action to litigate
whether [the plaintiff] ‘ “acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale
and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ [its] title,” ’ ” it did not permit the defendant
“to litigate every possible issue related to [the plaintiff’s] claim of ownership.”
(Ibid.) Quoting Cheney, supra, 9 Cal.2d at page 160, the court reiterated that
matters “ ‘affecting the validity of the trust deed . . ., or other basic defects in
the plaintiff’s title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding
15
for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.’ ” (Dr. Leevil, at
p. 483.)
Notwithstanding these (and other) case authorities, the extent to which
unlawful detainer proceedings afford defendants a full and fair opportunity to
challenge the property sale and duly perfected title continues to perplex
courts and litigants. (See Gonzales, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036 [noting
courts have seen “varying results” when deciding “at what point the unlawful
detainer proceeding has provided the means of litigating equitable attacks by
the defendant therein on plaintiff’s title”].) The demarcation line has proved
particularly challenging in cases where—as here—there exists a parallel civil
proceeding raising issues of title to the same property.
Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367 (Martin-Bragg)
illustrates these difficulties. There, the appellate court reversed the
judgment after trial on plaintiff Martin-Bragg’s unlawful detainer complaint,
in light of a parallel quiet title action. In response to the unlawful detainer
complaint, Moore challenged Martin-Bragg’s ownership (id. at p. 371) and
separately filed a quiet title action, alleging that he had transferred the
property to Martin-Bragg “with the understanding that she would hold it in
trust for him” (id. at p. 372). Trial on the unlawful detainer proceeded after
the court denied Moore’s motion to consolidate the cases. (Ibid.) After
denying a renewed request to consolidate the cases, and over defendant
Moore’s objection that he was prejudiced by his inability to obtain discovery
in the summary proceeding, the trial court entered judgment in Martin-
Bragg’s favor. (Id. at pp. 379, 382.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded “the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing [defendant] Moore’s request to consolidate the unlawful
detainer and quiet title actions for trial and that Moore was prejudiced by
16
being forced to litigate the complex issue of title to the property under the
summary procedures that govern actions for unlawful detainer.” (Martin-
Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 370–371.) The court acknowledged that
the key issue was ownership of the property. (Id. at p. 376.)
The Martin-Bragg court agreed with the trial court that “Moore was
entitled to interpose his claim of equitable ownership of the . . . property as a
defense to Martin–Bragg’s claim of unlawful detainer” because his “quiet title
claim related directly to the issue of possession; if he were to prevail . . . , the
result would be a judgment entitling him to retain possession of the
premises.” (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.) Yet the Court
of Appeal held that in denying the consolidation motion and trying the issues
in the expedited summary proceeding of unlawful detainer, the trial court
had undermined Moore’s right to a full and fair trial on the complex issues of
ownership in favor of Martin-Bragg’s interest in pursuing the summary
procedure. (Id. at pp. 389–391.) Given the conflicting evidence on key issues
in the case, the Court of Appeal determined the error was prejudicial. (Id. at
p. 395.) It explained, “the trial court’s trial and implicit determination of the
ownership issue within the summary unlawful detainer proceeding, and
refusal to permit trial of the issue of title outside of those summary
procedures, was an abuse of discretion requiring the judgment’s reversal and
remand to the trial court for determination of the parties’ rights to legal and
beneficial title to the property and their respective rights to possession based
on that determination.” (Ibid.)
Adding to the difficulty of line drawing in this case, neither party has
cited (and we are similarly unaware of any) published case law interpreting
the extent to which title can be litigated in an unlawful detainer proceeding
brought under the subdivision at issue here, current section 1161a(b)(4).
17
We turn now to the application of these principles to the issues Pereira
raises on appeal.
B. Summary Judgment
Pereira contends she was entitled to summary judgment because the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Mijangos could not prove the elements
needed to prevail in her unlawful detainer action, namely that (1) the subject
property was duly sold to her, and (2) title to the property was duly perfected
in her. (§ 1161a(b)(4).)
Mijangos counters that due to the summary nature of unlawful
detainer actions, a defendant cannot challenge title in them (apart from
certain exceptions not applicable here) and points out that Pereira is “free to
litigate those issues in her quiet title action.”8 Mijangos maintains that
Pereira proffered no evidence in support of her motion establishing
cancellation or rescission, and the denial of summary judgment was proper.
1. Additional Background
Pereira moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment in March 2024,
after the action was reclassified to an unlimited civil action. The summary
judgment motion asserted that Mijangos could not prove the elements
required for the unlawful detainer claim for holdover occupancy under section
1161a(b)(4). Pereira maintained that the “indisputable facts” in her
declaration and exhibits demonstrated that the subject property was not duly
sold to Mijangos, and title was never duly perfected in her. The facts Pereira
8 The parties at times refer to the Pereira action as the “quiet title
action.” While the first amended complaint in that case does not actually
contain a cause of action for quiet title, the 10th cause of action for rescission
of instruments alleges that the plaintiffs in that action “seek to quiet title to
said property and have said void and fraudulently procured deed declared
null and void, and rescinded.”
18
cited included that she never delivered the deed nor intended to deliver the
deed, placing it in escrow only on the condition that buyers timely perform by
funding the purchase (which buyers failed to do), and the escrow company
violated Pereira’s express written instructions to cancel escrow and rescind
the deed. Pereira contended that, based on these facts, title never
transferred.
In opposition, Mijangos requested that the trial court take judicial
notice of two documents: a copy of Pereira’s complaint in the Pereira action
and a certified copy of the grant deed, recorded on August 9. Mijangos
argued that, apart from limited exceptions contained in the statute, title
cannot be litigated in an unlawful detainer action and must instead be
addressed in Pereira’s quiet title action. Furthermore, Mijangos asserted
based on the terms of the purchase agreement that Pereira could not
unilaterally cancel the escrow, and there remained triable issues of material
fact concerning whether title was duly transferred and whether Pereira had a
leaseback.
In a written order after hearing, the trial court granted the request for
judicial notice and denied Pereira’s summary judgment motion. The court
decided that Pereira had challenged Mijangos’s claim of right to possession in
the unlawful detainer action but had not established an absence of triable
issues of material fact as to that issue.
2. Appealability of Summary Judgment Denial
We begin by addressing Pereira’s ability to challenge on appeal the
trial court’s decision denying her motion for summary judgment.9
9 Neither party raises this issue. Nevertheless, because Pereira’s
ability to challenge the interlocutory order on appeal from judgment after
trial pertains to appealability (see §§ 904.1, 906), we address it on our own
motion. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.)
19
“Although orders denying motions for summary judgment or summary
adjudication may be reviewed on direct appeal from a judgment after trial,
the appellant must nevertheless show the purported error constituted
prejudicial, or reversible, error (i.e., caused a miscarriage of justice).
[Citation.] In general, an order denying a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication does not constitute prejudicial error if the same
question was subsequently decided adversely to the moving party after a trial
on the merits. [Citations.] However, if the same question is not decided after
trial, an appellant potentially may successfully assert on appeal that the trial
court prejudicially erred in denying his or her motion for summary judgment
or summary adjudication.” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 333, 343 (Federal Deposit).)
This is such a case. Pereira sought to establish in her summary
judgment motion that Mijangos could not prevail on her unlawful detainer
claim because the property was not duly sold and title not duly perfected in
Mijangos. The jury subsequently decided—adversely to Pereira—that
Mijangos had the right to possession. However, because the trial court’s in
limine rulings precluded Pereira from disproving any predicate questions
pertaining to validity of the sale and title, that issue was not decided after a
trial on the merits. Pereira therefore may assert on appeal that the court
prejudicially erred in denying her motion for summary judgment. (Federal
Deposit, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 343.)
3. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“ ‘We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. [Citation] “In
practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules
and standards which govern a trial court’s determination of a motion for
summary judgment.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Though summary judgment review is de
20
novo, review is limited to issues adequately raised and supported in the
appellant’s brief.’ ” (Jackson v. Lara (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 337, 343
(Jackson); see also Federal Deposit, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 344.)
Summary judgment is warranted where there are no triable issues of
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) “A defendant moving for summary judgment must
show the plaintiff’s causes of action have no merit. It may do so by negating
an element of a cause of action or showing it has a complete defense to a
cause of action. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue
of material fact as to the cause of action or defense.” (Ghazarian v. Magellan
Health, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 171, 182 (Ghazarian); see Miller v.
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460.)
In reviewing the motion and supporting and opposing papers, the court
“ ‘liberally constru[es] the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion
and resolv[es] all doubts about the evidence in favor of the opponent.’
[Citation.] Similarly, ‘any doubts as to the propriety of granting a summary
judgment motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the
motion.’ ” (Ghazarian, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) “The appellate court
is not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons for its ruling on the motion, as
the appellate court reviews only the ruling and not its rationale.” (Bed, Bath
& Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 867, 873; see also California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22 [The reviewing court “ ‘may affirm [or deny] a
summary judgment on any correct legal theory, as long as the parties had an
adequate opportunity to address the theory in the trial court.’ ”].)
21
4. Analysis
Mijangos’s complaint for unlawful detainer asserts two causes of action
for holdover occupancy under section 1161a(b)(4). The statutory provision
states, “[A] person who holds over and continues in possession of . . . real
property after a three-day written notice to quit the property has been served
upon the person, . . . may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this chapter:
[¶] . . . [¶] Where the property has been sold by such person, or a person
under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly
perfected.” (§ 1161a(b)(4), italics added.)
Both sides agree that, under the statute, Mijangos had to prove that
(1) Pereira sold the property to her and (2) title under the sale was “duly
perfected.” However, Pereira asserts that the only evidence before the trial
court on summary judgment established “as a matter of law the property was
not duly sold and that the . . . title was not duly perfected.” Pereira
maintains that, under the terms of the purchase agreement, the buyers had
no contractual right to pay the purchase amount into escrow after July 5 (per
the demand to close escrow), and the escrow company had no power to record
the deed (i.e., that she never authorized delivery of) after that date. She
contends that the “opposition failed to raise any triable issue of fact to
establish her claim” to the contrary.
We decide that Pereira has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error in
the denial of her summary judgment motion. Pereira’s asserted grounds for
summary judgment required the trial court to construe the terms in the
purchase agreement governing the close of escrow and due dates for the
buyers’ deposit of funds and resolve disputed issues concerning the delivery of
the deed, validity of the Pereiras’ signatures on the deed, and alleged
cancellation of the escrow. These issues are cognizable to the extent that
22
they represented “a bona fide dispute” between the parties as to “whether the
property has been duly sold and the title duly perfected” (Kessler, supra, 161
Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 841) and thus “related directly to the issue of
possession” (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 388). At the same
time, certain issues raised by Pereira arguably extended beyond the question
of “whether [the plaintiff] ‘ “acquired the property at a regularly conducted
sale and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ [her] title” ’ ” (Dr. Leevil, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 483) to include allegations against third parties and the pursuit of
equitable remedies such as rescission.
While Pereira cites numerous legal authorities to support her assertion
that the property was never sold and, furthermore, could not be sold because
it was the subject of a pending divorce action, she has not shown how (or to
what extent) these claims come within the purview of the unlawful detainer
and may be fairly litigated in the summary proceeding.
Even assuming that Pereira’s asserted grounds for summary judgment
come entirely within the scope of the proceedings, Pereira has not shown an
absence of triable issues of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) As the
defendant seeking summary judgment against a plaintiff with the burden of
proof at trial, Pereira bore the “initial burden of production to make a prima
facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar))—a
burden that requires submitting evidence in support “including ‘affidavits,
declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and
matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ ” (Id. at p. 855,
citing § 473c, subd. (b).)
Pereira contends that her declaration and exhibits in support of the
summary judgment motion were “unrebutted.” This assertion ignores the
23
triable issues apparent on the face of the submitted documents (especially
given that the court reviewing the motion “ ‘liberally constru[es] the evidence
in favor of the party opposing the motion and resolv[es] all doubts about the
evidence in favor of the opponent’ ” (Ghazarian, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at
p. 182)) and competing inferences that may be drawn from them. For
example, Pereira’s June 8 letter to rescind informed the escrow company that
she was “rescinding [her] signature on the [g]rant [d]eeds immediately.” Yet
the purchase agreement and demand to close escrow, including rights of
cancellation, refer to the Pereiras together as the seller and do not clearly
provide for a co-seller’s unilateral authority to cancel. Viewed together with
the contractual documents, the legal effect of the letter to rescind is unclear
and subject to competing inferences and interpretations. Pereira’s
submissions do not show Mijangos’s causes of action have no merit. (Ibid.)
Moreover, even if Pereira’s submissions in support of the summary
judgment motion satisfied her prima facie burden, Mijangos’s submission of
the complaint in the Pereira action and recorded grant deed sufficed to
demonstrate a triable issue of material fact concerning the “duly sold and
title duly perfected” elements of Mijangos’s unlawful detainer action. (§ 437c,
subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Ghazarian, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) In analogous cases involving trustee’s sales under
section 1161a(b)(3), sale of the property and recording of the instrument of
conveyance (trustee’s deed) pursuant to statute are prerequisites to perfect
title, if not (depending on the circumstances and defenses raised) sufficient.
(Dr. Leevil, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 479; see Kessler, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d
Supp. at p. 841.) Construing the documents presented in support of an
opposition to Pereira’s summary judgment motion in the light most favorable
to Mijangos (as the party opposing the motion) (Ghazarian, at p. 182), triable
24
issues emerge regarding Pereira’s purported cancellation of the sale and
intent to rescind the deed. Hence, Pereira has not shown the trial court erred
in denying summary judgment. (Jackson, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 343.)
C. Evidentiary Rulings at Trial
Pereira contends that, by granting Mijangos’s motions in limine Nos. 1
and 2 and disallowing any presentation of evidence or cross-examination as
to the deed and purchase agreement, the trial court effectively decided the
validity of the grant deed and title and precluded Pereira from challenging
the claims against her, depriving her of a fair trial. Mijangos counters that
the in limine rulings were not dispositive and the court acted well within its
discretion in limiting cross-examination regarding the deed and title.
1. Additional Background
Mijangos’s motion in limine No. 1 sought to preclude Pereira from
presenting any evidence, testimony, or argument “attempt[ing] to introduce
or support any claim that” Mijangos did not have title to the property, or that
Pereira cancelled the contract to sell the property, cancelled the escrow, or
did not deliver the deed. Mijangos’s motion in limine No. 2 sought to exclude
any expert witness testimony on these same issues. Mijangos argued in
support of the motions in limine that, under section 1161a, she had to prove
that Pereira sold the property to her and that title under the sale was duly
perfected, “[b]ut that is the limit of how title should be litigated in this case.”
Pereira opposed both motions and, citing Kessler, argued that Mijangos had
to prove the property was sold to her and title duly perfected (thus
warranting evidence to show the purported sale was invalid).
The trial court granted both motions in limine. It explained orally that
for purposes of the trial, it would rely on the recorded deed, treating it as
“prima facie evidence of a valid deed” and would not “look behind that as to
25
whether there was any withdrawal of the signature.” In practical effect, the
court’s in limine rulings excluded all of Pereira’s evidence purporting to
establish cancellation of the contract, fraud or fraudulent inducement by the
buyers, withdrawal of Pereira’s signature, and rescission of the deed.
During Mijangos’s case in chief, the trial court sustained objections
when Pereira’s counsel tried to cross-examine Mijangos regarding issues
including the timing of the close of escrow and her understanding of the
signatures on the grant deed.
2. Standard of Review
We typically review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or
exclusion of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.) “ ‘Under this standard, a trial court’s
ruling will not be disturbed . . . unless the trial court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior
Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 919.) In other words, “[a] judgment of the
trial court may not be reversed for the erroneous admission or exclusion of
evidence unless the error was prejudicial.” (Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial
Corp. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129, 185; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, §§
353, 354.)
However, where an evidentiary ruling or “ruling on a motion in limine
precludes an entire cause of action, the ruling is subject to independent
review on appeal as though the court had granted a motion for nonsuit.”
(Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279 (Kinda), citing
Dillingham–Ray Wilson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1396,
1402 (Dillingham–Ray); Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158
Cal.App.4th 1582, 1595 (Amtower).) “Under those circumstances, the
26
appellate court ‘review[s] the court’s order de novo, examining the record in
the light most favorable to the party offering the evidence.’ ” (Kinda, at
p. 1279.)
3. Analysis
Pereira asserts that this court should review the in limine motions de
novo, as it would a dispositive motion for nonsuit. She maintains that the
trial court failed to adhere to the admonition in Amtower that “in limine
motions are not designed . . . to replace the dispositive motions prescribed by
the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1593.)
Mijangos disputes that the motions in limine operated as dispositive motions
and maintains the court did not substitute its judgment for that of the jury
on factual matters.
“In limine motions are designed to facilitate the management of a case,
generally by deciding difficult evidentiary issues in advance of trial. ‘ “The
usual purpose of motions in limine is to preclude the presentation of evidence
deemed inadmissible and prejudicial by the moving party. A typical order in
limine excludes the challenged evidence and directs counsel, parties, and
witnesses not to refer to the excluded matters during trial.” ’ ” (Amtower,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1593, italics omitted.) While the de novo
standard of review applies (as for a dispositive motion) when a motion in
limine excludes “all evidence on a particular claim” (Dillingham–Ray, supra,
182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402), abuse of discretion review applies when “an in
limine ruling does not preclude an entire claim but instead limits the
evidence” offered to prove that claim. (Id. at p. 1403.)
The granting of the two in limine motions did more than significantly
narrow the scope of Pereira’s cross-examination on topics pertaining to the
purchase agreement and grant deed. In granting the motions, the trial court
27
precluded Pereira from presenting evidence and argument challenging
satisfaction of the purchase agreement and the validity of title based on the
recorded deed.
It is true that the court’s rulings did not exclude “all evidence”
(Dillingham–Ray, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402) on the unlawful
detainer claim. Mijangos retained the burden to put forth evidence of the
sale of the property to her (including the offer and counteroffer, signed
purchase agreement, bank loan, and payment amount) and title (based on the
escrow company’s recording of the deed). Nevertheless, by preventing Pereira
from challenging fulfillment of the sale, delivery of the deed, and the
recording of title, the trial court effectively eliminated the defense’s ability to
dispute the key triable issues for the unlawful detainer under section
1161a(b)(4): whether “the property was ‘duly sold’ ” and “ ‘the title under the
sale . . . duly perfected.’ ” (Kessler, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 838; Dr.
Leevil, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 483 [explaining a defendant may “use the
unlawful detainer action to litigate whether [the plaintiff] ‘ “acquired the
property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter ‘duly perfected’ [its]
title” ’ ”].)
On this record, the trial court’s exclusion of any evidence or argument
to challenge the property sale and recorded deed, and its treatment of the
recorded deed as “prima facie evidence of a valid deed,” may be characterized
as tantamount to a dispositive motion ruling, warranting our de novo review.
(See Amtower, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1594; Kinda, supra, 247
Cal.App.4th at p. 1280.) However, even under an abuse of discretion
standard, we decide the court erred in summarily litigating the issue of duly
perfected title without permitting Pereira to present her defenses to
Mijangos’s claim of possession.
28
The trial court treated the recorded deed as proof that the property was
sold to Mijangos and the title was duly perfected in her. Additionally, the
court’s in limine and evidentiary rulings prevented Pereira from attempting
to establish otherwise through the evidence of Mijangos’s alleged violations of
the purchase agreement terms and demand to close escrow, Pereira’s July 8
letter to rescind (delivered to Fidelity) and return the grant deed, and her
attorney’s August 2 instructions to Fidelity to cancel the escrow because the
buyers were “out of contract.”
Although the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the verdict
forms, we infer from the judgment of unlawful detainer that the jury found in
favor of Mijangos on her claim of possession and unlawful detainer based on
Pereira holding over after being served with a three-day notice. The finding
of unlawful detainer under section 1161a(b)(4) necessarily required a
determination that “the property has been sold by such person [i.e., Pereira],
. . . and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.” (See Dr. Leevil,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 479; Kessler, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 838.)
Under these circumstances, the combined effect of the trial court’s findings on
the recorded deed, its in limine rulings excluding evidence challenging the
sale and perfection of title, and the jury verdict of unlawful detainer and
award of damages to Mijangos for Pereira’s holdover occupancy, is that the
issue of title was decided (at least for purposes of the unlawful detainer
judgment) by the court as a matter of law, instead of resolved by the jury as
fact finder.
This outcome—though the understandable result of the trial court’s
attempt to avert further delay or improper expansion of proceedings intended
to provide a “speedy determination of the right to possession” (Gonzales,
supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034) and “ ‘expeditious remedy for the recovery of
29
possession of real property’ ” (Coyne, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 805)—
deprived Pereira of her ability to defend against the claim of unlawful
detainer by presenting her claim of continued ownership. Pereira was
entitled to assert these claims in the unlawful detainer proceeding to the
extent that they “related directly to the issue of possession” (Martin-Bragg,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 388) and would allow her to retain possession of
the property, were she to prevail (ibid.). Put differently, the right to litigate
title in the unlawful detainer proceeding is narrow but must include at least
those objections that pertain to the plaintiff’s need to prove the sale and
perfection of title. (See Cheney, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 160 [confirming that the
“defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title”
subject to proof under § 1161a]; Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255 [permitting
in the unlawful detainer “claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate
possession” and “cross-complaints and affirmative defenses, legal or
equitable, . . . only insofar as they would, if successful, ‘preclude the removal
of the tenant from the premises’ ”].)
We decide it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to effectively
decide the issue of title under section 1161a(b)(4) as a matter of law and at
the same time deny Pereira the opportunity to cross-examine Mijangos on
issues going to the validity of the sale and authority of the escrow company to
record the deed. The trial court’s decision, in effect, disallowed Pereira from
bringing her defenses and affirmative claims on the issue. While it appears
that the court anticipated and intended that Pereira’s claims regarding title
and ownership would be addressed in the pending Pereira action, that
eventuality did not mitigate the arguable prejudice to Pereira in this action,
which resolved the issue of lawful possession of the property. “Error in trial
proceedings is prejudicial when there is a ‘ “reasonable probability” ’ that the
30
error affected the outcome of the trial. [Citation.] And ‘reasonable
probability’ does not mean ‘more likely than not’; it means merely a
‘reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” (Martin-Bragg,
supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)
Pereira asserted throughout the trial that title needed to be litigated
under section 1161a(b)(4) and sought to introduce evidence that undermined
Mijangos’s claim of duly perfected title. Indeed, the factual disputes
involving the parties competing claims of possession were the basis on which
the trial court had earlier denied Pereira’s motion for summary judgment.
Although the court conducting the unlawful detainer trial agreed that title
was at issue within the limited scope of the unlawful detainer statute, it did
not permit Pereira to challenge the sale of the property or recording of the
grant deed.
On the record presented, there is at least a “reasonable chance” that,
absent the exclusion of Pereira’s arguments and evidence concerning the
buyers’ alleged untimely performance under the purchase agreement and
Pereira’s communicated intent to withdraw her consent to the sale and
delivery of the deed, the unlawful detainer trial might have produced a result
more favorable to Pereira. We therefore conclude the error was prejudicial.10
10 There is also a risk that the trial court’s decision to exclude Pereira’s
challenges to title could unfairly prejudice her still pending civil action. The
unlawful detainer judgment—predicated on section 1161a(b)(4)’s requirement
that (1) the property was sold, and (2) title in the plaintiff was duly
perfected—could arguably be used in an attempt to bar subsequent
allegations of irregularity related to the conduct of the sale and perfection of
title at issue in the unlawful detainer proceeding. (See Vella, supra, 20
Cal.3d at p. 256 [noting in relation to actions involving trustee’s sale under
1161a(b)(3), that “[a]pplying the traditional rule that a judgment rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to any issues necessarily
determined in that action, the courts have held that subsequent fraud or
31
Given the factual dispute at trial regarding sale of the property and
whether title was duly perfected in Mijangos (§ 1161a(b)(4)), the trial court’s
de facto resolution as a matter of law of Pereira’s challenge to title was an
abuse of discretion, requiring the vacatur of the judgment and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings on the unlawful detainer claims. Insofar
as the statute requires the plaintiff to prove her acquisition of title to the
property by purchase, “it is only to th[at] limited extent, as provided by the
statute, that the title may be litigated in [the unlawful detainer] proceeding.”
(Cheney, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 159; accord, Dr. Leevil, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 483.) We express no opinion as to whether, following remand,
consolidation of the unlawful detainer action with the Pereira action11 (or
some other procedural mechanism potentially available to enable
adjudication of the issue of duly perfected title as relevant to the right of
possession) may also be appropriate.12
quiet title suits founded upon allegations of irregularity in a trustee’s sale are
barred by the prior unlawful detainer judgment”].) Because the court
rendered judgment based on Mijangos’s right of possession based on that sale
and title under section 1161a(b)(4), the potentially preclusive effects of the
judgment are unclear. Even so, we are not persuaded by Mijangos’s general
assertion that “[a] judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res
judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a
subsequent action to resolve questions of title.”
11 Pereira does not raise on appeal the trial court’s denial without
prejudice of her motion to consolidate the unlawful detainer and the Pereira
action, which motion Pereira’s counsel attempted to renew at the unlawful
detainer trial. While consolidation may raise other concerns “about loss of
the summary procedures to which unlawful detainer plaintiffs are entitled”
(Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 389), trial courts must
nevertheless evaluate “whether and how [the defendant]’s rights and needs
might be balanced with [the plaintiff]’s legitimate interests in the [unlawful
detainer] matter’s prompt resolution.” (Id. at p. 391.)
12 In light of our reversal of the judgment and remand for further
proceedings, it is unnecessary for us to consider the additional, trial-related
32
D. Reclassification of Limited Civil Action
Pereira contends the reclassification of the case from limited to
unlimited jurisdiction “some 16 months after filling [Mijangos’s] original
complaint” in October constituted “clear error.” (Capitalization & boldface
omitted.) Mijangos responds that because she demonstrated the case was
incorrectly classified and she had good cause for not seeking reclassification
earlier, reclassification was proper.
1. Additional Background
In late January 2024, approximately 16 months after the filing of her
original complaint, Mijangos filed her reclassification motion pursuant to
section 403.040, subdivision (b). Mijangos stated that, although she filed the
action as a limited civil case based on the damages sought and dispute in
controversy at the time, Pereira’s litigation tactics had caused Mijangos to
incur over $155,000 in damages (as of the hearing on the motion). Mijangos
asserted that the action was incorrectly classified, since the damages
incurred would exceed those of a limited civil case. She also asserted there
was good cause to reclassify since neither she, nor her attorney, could have
anticipated the delays.
Pereira opposed the reclassification motion. She argued that Mijangos
had expressly waived any recovery (excluding costs) in excess of $25,000 in
both her original and first amended complaint, filed seven months later,
indicating she “was intent on keeping the matter in limited jurisdiction to get
the numerous benefits attendant to litigation in limited jurisdiction cases.”
issues Pereira raises on appeal. We do not reach the issue of whether the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting Mijangos’s lay opinion
testimony regarding the reasonable rental value of the property, or whether
the court erred in denying Pereira’s requested proposed special jury
instructions Nos. 7 through 18.
33
Pereira asserted that Mijangos had not met the standard for reclassification.
Moreover, Pereira argued that she had reasonably relied on the limited
jurisdiction status in pursuing her litigation strategy, and Mijangos was
estopped for that reason from seeking reclassification.
After a hearing in February 2024, the trial court issued an order
granting the reclassification motion. The court found, based on a review of
the file and after considering the arguments of the parties, “that the length of
the delay that has occurred has been caused by actions of the defendant,” and
“[i]t was not reasonable for the [p]laintiff to expect at the time of the filing of
the unlawful detainer action that it would be delayed for over eighteen
months.” The court also found that Mijangos had shown that the damages
accruing had “far exceed[ed] the limited civil maximum.” The court
concluded that Mijangos had “shown more than sufficient good cause to
justify the reclassification.”
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Since the unification of California’s superior and municipal courts,
“civil cases formerly within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts are
classified as ‘limited’ civil cases, while matters formerly within the
jurisdiction of the superior court’s are classified as ‘unlimited’ civil action.
(§§ 85, 88.)” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 274
(Ytuarte).) Among other requirements, an action shall be treated as a limited
civil case only if “the amount in controversy does not exceed thirty-five
thousand dollars ($35,000).” (§ 85, subd. (a).) Thus, “if a case is designated
as a limited civil case, the court has no authority (i.e., jurisdiction) to award a
judgment in excess of $[3]5,000.” (Ytuarte, at pp. 274–275.)
“Whether an action qualifies as a limited or unlimited civil action is
determined initially from the prayer or demand for relief in the plaintiff’s
34
complaint. Once classified as limited or unlimited that classification
normally continues throughout the litigation.” (Ytuarte, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) Section 403.040, subdivision (a) authorizes
reclassification if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional
classification. Subdivision (b) of section 403.040 authorizes motions for
reclassification filed after the time for a party to amend that party’s initial
pleading (or, in the case of a defendant, to respond to the initial pleading).
Under that subdivision, “the court shall grant the motion and enter an order
for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied: [¶]
(1) The case is incorrectly classified. [¶] (2) The moving party shows good
cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.” (§ 403.040, subd. (b).)
We review “a reclassification order according to an abuse of discretion
standard, i.e., whether the court made an informed decision within its
discretion or whether the order exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Stern v.
Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 231 (Stern); see Walker v.
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272.)
3. Analysis
The reclassification motion and supporting declarations explained the
reason for initially filing the matter as a limited civil case, and the heavily
litigated response by the defendant, including but not limited to motions to
quash service, petitions for writ of mandate, two demurrers, a motion for
stay, motion for consolidation, and motions for summary judgment. Due to
the resulting delays in setting a trial date, Mijangos showed that based on
her alleged damages of $315.77 per day, she had accrued damages in excess
of $155,000. After considering the parties’ arguments and the case file, the
trial court was unequivocal. It found it “clear” that the length of the delay
had been caused by Pereira’s actions, and that “[i]t was not reasonable” for
35
Mijangos to anticipate such delays at the time of filing the unlawful detainer,
thus establishing good cause.
Pereira fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting Mijangos’s motion to reclassify. In arguing that Mijangos “did not
and could not possibly establish the first element” for reclassification, Pereira
misstates the legal standard as “the matter was incorrectly classified at the
time of its filing.” The statutory language contains no such temporal
specification. Rather, it permits reclassification—even after the time for
amendment of pleadings has passed—if the moving party shows “[t]he case is
incorrectly classified.” (§ 403.040, subd. (b)(1).) This standard permits the
court “to conduct a pretrial hearing to obtain information about whether the
amount of the judgment will require reclassification.” (Stern, supra, 105
Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) The procedures articulated in Walker, applicable at
the time to deciding a case “transfer” from superior to municipal court,
“continue to apply when a court makes a determination of the amount in
controversy for purposes of ‘reclassification.’ ” (Stern, at p. 230.) Walker held
“that a matter can be transferred (or reclassified) when (1) before trial, the
complaint, petition, or related documents make the absence of jurisdiction
apparent; or (2) during pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter
will ‘necessarily’ result in a verdict below the jurisdictional amount.” (Id. at
pp. 230–231.)
Mijangos’s motion invoked the latter circumstance. That Mijangos’s
complaint waived damages over the limited civil amount did not preclude her
from later, pursuant to a noticed motion, asserting that the course of
litigation had shifted the amount in controversy. Indeed, by its own terms,
the waiver as stated in the complaint applied only “for so long as this action
remains” in the limited civil jurisdiction. Moreover, the trial court accepted
36
Mijangos’s showing and found good cause for her delay in seeking
reclassification, and the record amply supports its findings. We conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion in granting reclassification more than 16
months after the filing of the initial complaint.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Pereira is entitled to her
reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
37
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Grover, J.
H052481
Mijangos v. Pereira