Filed 8/24/26 Meza v. CoWorx Staffing Services CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ELDA MEZA, D085734
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00029634-CU-OE-CTL)
v.
COWORX STAFFING SERVICES LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marcella O. McLaughlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Ongaro, David R. Ongaro, Cara R. Sherman, Glen Turner, and
Kirsten McNelly Bibbes for Defendant and Appellant.
Pancer Law, Ian Pancer, Janine R. Menhennet, and Joe Virgilio for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
CoWorx Staffing Services LLC (CoWorx) appeals from an order denying
its motion to compel arbitration of Elda Meza’s individual claims for civil
penalties under the Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698
et seq.). We find no error in the trial court’s ruling that CoWorx failed to
meet its ultimate burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement
by a preponderance of the evidence. We therefore affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Individual Action
In a prior non-PAGA action, Meza sued CoWorx in an individual action
for failure to provide her with access to employee records in response to her
requests dated March and May 2024 under Labor Code sections 226, 1198.5
and 432.1 On November 4, 2024, CoWorx made an offer to settle the matter
for $2,000 under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Meza accepted the offer
on November 20, 2024.
B. PAGA Action
Meza filed this PAGA action in May 2024 and amended her complaint
in August 2024. The operative complaint alleges that Meza “is not suing in
her individual capacity” but as “an individual in her capacity as the State of
California’s designated proxy under the Private Attorneys General Act and
on behalf of all Aggrieved Employees . . . .” She asserts PAGA claims for
multiple Labor Code violations, including failure to provide access to
employee personnel records, failure to pay minimum and overtime wages,
failure to timely pay wages, meal and rest break violations, wage statement
1 Meza’s motion to augment the record filed December 23, 2025 is denied
as to Exhibits 1 and 2 because those exhibits are already included in the
record as Exhibits 1 and 4 to CoWorx’s motion to augment, which we granted
on November 21, 2025. We previously granted Meza’s motion to augment as
to Exhibit 3. We deny Meza’s motion to augment as to Exhibits 4-9 because
they post-date the trial court’s order at issue in this appeal and they are not
relevant to our disposition of the appeal.
2
violations, failure to maintain payroll records, failure to reimburse, and other
miscellaneous violations.
C. Motion to Compel Arbitration of Individual Claims in PAGA Action
In September 2024, CoWorx filed a motion to (1) compel arbitration of
Meza’s “individual employment-related claims” in the PAGA action based on
an arbitration agreement she allegedly signed when her employment began
in May 2021, and (2) stay the litigation of Meza’s non-individual claims
pending completion of the individual arbitration. CoWorx attached a copy of
the arbitration agreement to its motion. The agreement had what purported
to be a digital signature with an e-mail address as follows:
Meza filed an opposition asserting that: (1) the motion was moot
because she had already settled her individual claims against CoWorx in the
prior action and there was nothing left to arbitrate; and (2) CoWorx had not
provided competent evidence that Meza signed the arbitration agreement.
Meza submitted a declaration in opposition to the motion asserting:
“I have no recollection of signing any such agreement, and I do not believe I
signed an agreement to arbitrate my claims against CoWorx.”
In reply, CoWorx submitted the declaration of Jessica Cardinale, its
“Senior Director” of “Operations Excellence,” to establish the authenticity
of Meza’s digital signature. Cardinale stated that CoWorx uses an online
onboarding technology platform called “OB365.” She believed OB365 was a
“widely used” and “reputable creator of signature authentication software
3
with a solid pedigree” and “a reputation in the staffing industry as a reliable
and secure method of obtaining electronic signatures.”
According to Cardinale, CoWorx initiates the onboarding process by
sending a request to a “known email” for the candidate to log into OB365
and fill out any required onboarding paperwork. A person who receives the
request follows the link and logs into the OB365 portal with their personal
e-mail address provided during the application process. The employee then
reviews all required onboarding documents and policies for employment and
affixes her electronic signature to be returned to CoWorx through OB365.
Cardinale further stated that CoWorx received many signed documents
from Meza as part of this process, including signed tax and withholding
documents, acknowledgment of policies, an emergency contact form, and the
arbitration agreement. Cardinale attached to her declaration the arbitration
agreement with the digital signature received from “Elda M. Meza” through
OB365 (Exhibit A), as well as an audit log of the transactions CoWorx
subsequently received from OB365 (Exhibit B). Cardinale declared she was
“confident that the electronic signature attached hereto as Exhibit A was
actually created by Elda Meza using the OB365 candidate onboarding
process.”
D. Trial Court’s Ruling
After a hearing, the court confirmed its tentative ruling and denied
CoWorx’s motion to compel arbitration in a written order.
In its order, the court cited Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 (Gamboa) and other California cases applying
a three-step burden-shifting procedure for determining the existence of a
written agreement to arbitrate. As the trial court explained, the moving
party must first produce prima facie evidence of a written agreement to
4
arbitrate. If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden, the
opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the
authenticity of the agreement. Finally, if the opposing party meets this
burden, “the moving party must establish a valid arbitration agreement
by a preponderance of the evidence.”
The trial court found that CoWorx met its initial prima facie burden
by submitting a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing
Meza’s electronic signature. The court also found that Meza met her
opposing burden by providing evidence that she did not remember signing
the arbitration agreement. The court concluded that the burden shifted back
to CoWorx “to prove the authenticity of [Meza]’s electronic signature.”
The court stated that “[t]o authenticate an electronic signature on
an arbitration agreement, the moving party must show that the electronic
signature ‘was the act of the person’ opposing the petition to compel
arbitration.” (Quoting Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) Quoting Bannister v.
Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545 (Bannister), the court
further explained: “The moving party may make this showing ‘by presenting
evidence that a unique login and password known only to that person was
required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing the
procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and
the accompanying security precautions.’ ”
The trial court summarized Cardinale’s declaration and then concluded
it was “insufficient to show that the electronic signature on the arbitration
agreement was ‘the act of’ plaintiff.” The court explained its ruling as
follows:
“First, Cardinale does not explain how plaintiff’s electronic
signature came to be placed on the agreement. See
5
Bannister, 64 Cal.App.5th at 545. Second, the declaration
fails to establish that only plaintiff could have
electronically signed the arbitration agreement. Although
plaintiff had to use her personal email address to log into
OB365, there is no evidence of any other security measures
– such as a unique password – to prevent someone else
from accessing the onboarding documents and/or altering
plaintiff’s information in OB365. Accordingly, defendant
has not established the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. See Gamboa,
72 Cal.App.5th at 165–66; see also Fabian v. Renovate
America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069–70
(affirming order denying arbitration where defendant left a
‘critical gap’ in its evidence by failing to provide specific
details about the circumstances surrounding the contract’s
execution and to explain how the electronic signature could
only have been placed on the contract by plaintiff).”
(Boldface omitted.)
DISCUSSION
I
The Appeal is Not Moot
The parties each refer to various arguments without asserting them
properly under a separate argument heading with citation to authority. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(A) & (B).) For her part, Meza suggests that
this appeal is “pointless” because she settled her individual claims in the
prior action and thus “CoWorx can never receive any relief in the form of
arbitration in this lawsuit, which is PAGA-only.”
To the extent Meza means to argue this appeal is moot, we disagree.
Meza has only settled her own Labor Code claims for failure to provide
access to employee personnel records. She has not settled the “individual”
component of her PAGA claims for civil penalties recoverable on behalf of the
state for the alleged Labor Code violations sustained by her individually.
6
Even though a PAGA plaintiff sues in a representative capacity on behalf of
the state, “[i]n PAGA parlance, Labor Code violations suffered by the plaintiff
are ‘individual claims.’ ” (Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
121, 127.) Under the current PAGA statute, the civil penalties which would
otherwise belong to the state are distributed 65 percent to the state and 35
percent to the aggrieved employees as a kind of bounty to encourage
enforcement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (m).) No such PAGA claim on behalf
of the state was asserted or settled in Meza’s prior action. Moreover, this
“individual” component of Meza’s PAGA claims is subject to arbitration under
a mandatory arbitration agreement. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1117–1119.) We therefore conclude that the appeal is
not moot.2
II
The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard
For its part, CoWorx suggests in passing (without an argument
heading) that the trial court failed to apply the governing preponderance
of the evidence standard for determining the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. We easily dispose of this contention. The court’s final order
explicitly stated that “the moving party must establish a valid arbitration
agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Italics added.) The court
ultimately concluded that CoWorx had “not established the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Italics added.)
As CoWorx itself states in its reply brief: “The order admits that
2 We express no view on the claim preclusion effect of the settlement in
Meza’s prior action. If Meza were required to arbitrate her individual PAGA
claim, this would be an issue on the merits for the arbitrator to decide.
7
‘preponderance of the evidence’ was the proper standard.” Thus, the court
applied the correct standard.
In its reply brief, CoWorx pivots to a new argument by asserting that
the trial court failed to follow the “substantial evidence” standard. But this is
a standard of appellate review, not a standard for the factfinder to apply in
adjudicating the facts in the first instance. To the extent CoWorx is arguing
that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s ruling, we address
that question in the next section of this opinion.
III
The Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Order
Refusing to Compel Arbitration
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“A trial court must grant a petition to compel arbitration only ‘if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.’ ”
(Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 583
(Brockman).) The trial court makes this determination using a summary
procedure in which “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the
affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.”
(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)
“While public policy favors contractual arbitration of disputes,
arbitration is a matter of contract and a party who has not agreed to
arbitrate a controversy cannot be compelled to do so. Thus, a court, before
granting a petition to compel arbitration, must determine the factual issue
of the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. An arbitration
agreement is subject to the same rules of construction as any other contract.”
(Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 584–585 [cleaned up].)
8
“Although the burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to
prove the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the
burden of production may shift in a three-step process.” (Brockman, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 586.) “First, the moving party bears the burden of
producing ‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy.’ ” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “If the moving
party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the
agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of
producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement.” (Ibid.)
“If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the
third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the
agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving
party.” (Id. at pp. 165–166.)
“When, as here, the court’s order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is based on the court’s finding that the moving party failed to
carry its burden of proof with respect to the ultimate question of whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists, the question for the reviewing court is whether
that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) uncontradicted and
unimpeached and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. Unless
the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing party, we
presume the trial court found the party’s evidence lacks sufficient weight and
credibility to carry the burden of proof. We have no power on appeal to judge
the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. The appellate court
cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it
9
must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in
support of the judgment. All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of
the respondent.” (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588 [cleaned
up].)
It is “ ‘almost impossible’ ” for an appellant who bore the burden of
proof in the trial court to prevail under this standard because we have no
power to judge the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. (Fabian
v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067 (Fabian); accord
Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 53 (Garcia);
Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
B. Meza Met Her Burden of Producing Evidence to Challenge the
Authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement
The trial court ruled that (1) CoWorx met its initial burden of
producing prima facie evidence of the existence of the arbitration agreement,
and (2) Meza met her opposing burden of producing evidence to challenge the
authenticity of the agreement. Meza does not dispute that CoWorx met its
initial burden, but CoWorx contends the trial court erred in ruling that Meza
met her opposing burden.
We disagree. Meza’s declaration stated: “I have no recollection of
signing any such agreement, and I do not believe I signed an agreement to
arbitrate my claims against CoWorx.” This was sufficient to shift the burden
back to CoWorx. In this step of the analysis, the party opposing arbitration
may meet their burden by “declar[ing] under penalty of perjury that the
party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party
never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Gamboa, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, italics added; accord Brockman, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at p. 587; see also Espejo v. Southern California Permanente
10
Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1054 [plaintiff did not recall
seeing or signing document]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 836, 846 (Ruiz) [“In the face of [plaintiff]’s failure to recall
signing the [arbitration] agreement, [defendant] had the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the electronic signature was
authentic.”].)
In arguing to the contrary, CoWorx relies on two cases: Iyere v. Wise
Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747 (Iyere) and Ramirez v. Golden Queen
Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821 (Ramirez). But those cases
both involved handwritten signatures, not electronic signatures, and they
expressly distinguished authorities involving electronic signatures. As
the court explained in Iyere: “An individual cannot confirm or deny the
authenticity of an electronic signature by viewing a computer printout of
the person’s printed name followed by the words ‘(Electronic Signature)’.
In such a case, the individual’s inability to recall signing electronically may
reasonably be regarded as evidence that the person did not do so. However,
an individual is capable of recognizing his or her own personal signature. If
the individual does not deny that the handwritten personal signature is his
or her own, that person’s failure to remember signing is of little or no
significance.” (Iyere, at p. 757, italics added.)
The Ramirez court quoted this passage from Iyere with approval
and went on to state: “We agree with this conclusion and the underlying
rationale.” (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 834, 835.) The court
summarized its holding as follows: “We join Iyere in concluding that an
individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if
that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that
11
person’s failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual
dispute about the signature’s authenticity.” (Id. at p. 825, italics added.)
This case involves an electronic signature, not a handwritten signature.
Iyere and Ramirez both acknowledged that an individual’s inability to recall
signing a document electronically may be treated as evidence that the person
did not do so. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; Ramirez, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) Meza stated under oath that she did not remember
electronically signing the arbitration agreement. This was sufficient to shift
the burden back to CoWorx.3
C. The Trial Court Properly Concluded That CoWorx Failed to Prove
the Existence of an Arbitration Agreement by a Preponderance of the
Evidence
Finally, CoWorx contends the trial court erred by ruling it failed to
meet its ultimate burden of establishing the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. The proponent of an electronic
signature bears the burden of authenticating it by showing that it was “the
act of the person” in question. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) This “may
be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security
procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or
electronic signature was attributable.” (Ibid.) Because CoWorx bore the
burden of proof and lost in the trial court, it can prevail on appeal only by
establishing that its evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached,
3 In its reply brief, CoWorx claims that Meza’s declaration “lacks
foundation and is inadmissible.” This claim is forfeited because no such
evidentiary objection was made in the trial court or raised in the opening
brief.
12
and (2) of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding against CoWorx.
(Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588.) For several reasons,
we conclude that CoWorx’s evidence does not meet this high standard.
First, CoWorx provided only general information about its use of
OB365 and did not present any evidence specific to Meza’s application or
onboarding. Cardinale is a senior director of CoWorx who did not claim to
have any personal knowledge of the specifics of Meza’s onboarding.
Critically, Cardinale’s declaration stated that CoWorx initiates the
onboarding process by sending a request to a “known email” for the candidate
to log into OB365, but she did not say how CoWorx requested or obtained a
“known email” for Meza in the first place. Cardinale’s declaration contained
no information about who sent this initial request to Meza, how the request
was sent, or the manner of Meza’s response. There is no evidence in the
record regarding how or when Meza provided her e-mail address to CoWorx.
Because the e-mail address is ultimately what CoWorx is relying on to
identify Meza’s digital signature as her own, the trial court could reasonably
have viewed this as a vital missing piece in CoWorx’s proof of authenticity.
Other appellate courts have relied on the absence of such specifics in
affirming similar rulings. (See, e.g., Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53;
Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 170; Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1069–1070; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838–839.)
Second, there is no evidence in the record that Meza had exclusive use
of either this e-mail address or the OB365 account. It is possible for people
to share e-mail addresses or allow others to access their e-mail accounts or
fill out forms for them. CoWorx does not argue that arbitration would be
compelled even if someone other than Meza signed the arbitration agreement
13
using the digital signature without her knowledge or consent. Moreover,
Cardinale’s declaration made no mention of any other private username or
password required to access the OB365 account. (Cf. Bannister, supra, 64
Cal.App.5th at p. 547 [affirming finding that employer failed to authenticate
electronic signature on arbitration agreement where its “evidence did not
establish that Bannister was assigned a unique, private username and
password such that she is the only person who could have accessed the
onboarding portal and signed the agreement”].) As the trial court observed,
CoWorx’s evidence therefore did not establish “that only plaintiff could have
electronically signed the arbitration agreement.”
CoWorx suggests the trial court erred by requiring it to prove that
“only” Meza could have electronically signed the arbitration agreement. But
the trial court merely mentioned this as a relevant fact; it did not treat this
as the governing legal standard. Even CoWorx’s counsel agreed in the trial
court that this was “an important fact.” Other appellate courts have relied
on the same fact in finding that the employer failed to meet its ultimate
burden of proof on the authentication issue. (See, e.g., Garcia, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 53 [employer’s evidence “did not show that only Garcia
could have placed the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement”];
Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 [employer’s evidence “did not
suggest how the electronic signature could have only been placed on the
Contract by Fabian”]; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 [employer’s
evidence “did not explain that an electronic signature in the name of ‘Ernesto
Zamora Ruiz’ could only have been placed on the [form] by a person using
Ruiz’s ‘unique login ID and password’ ”].) Thus, the trial court properly relied
on this as a relevant fact.
14
Finally, as we have explained, Meza’s “inability to recall signing
electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that [she] did not do
so.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757.) Thus, CoWorx’s evidence was
not uncontradicted and unimpeached. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th
at p. 587.) It was for the trial court to weigh the conflicting evidence and
determine whether CoWorx ultimately met its burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.
CoWorx nevertheless contends that its own evidence was “weightier”
than Meza’s. We do not reweigh the evidence in conducting our appellate
review. (Brockman, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588.) We merely
determine whether the evidence compelled a finding in CoWorx’s favor as a
matter of law even when viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Meza. (Ibid.) “It is not our role to second guess the trial court’s factual
determinations.” (Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.) We therefore
find no error in the trial court’s ruling that CoWorx failed to meet its
ultimate burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement by a
preponderance of the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The order denying CoWorx’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Meza is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
15