Filed 8/13/26 Merchant Capital Source v. Salwan CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MERCHANT CAPITAL SOURCE,
LLC,
G065754
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
v. 01385145)
RIPUDAMAN SALWAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Bradley S. Erdosi, Judge. Affirmed.
Ripudaman Salwan, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Collection at Law and Angela A. Velen for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Ripudaman Salwan challenges the denial of his
motions to (1) vacate a default judgment against him, and (2) quash
postjudment subpoenas and a writ of execution. Because the trial court
correctly ruled that there was no basis to vacate the judgment or interfere
with the enforcement efforts, we affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff Merchant Capital Source, LLC brought contractual
claims against Salwan, seeking about $45,000, plus interest, costs, and
attorney fees. It served him by personal service at a New York address. The
summons stated he had 30 days to respond.
After Salwan failed to respond, in May 2024, the clerk entered a
default and later entered a default judgment. The judgment awarded
Merchant about $36,000, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. By early July
2024, Salwan communicated with Merchant about a potential payment plan
for the “judgment.”
About six months after the entry of default and default judgment,
Salwan moved to vacate the default and the default judgment, asserting he
had not filed a responsive pleading because he was confused by an arbitration
clause in the parties’ contract and paperwork sent by the court.1 (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 473, subds. (b), (d).)2 He sought judicial notice of records from
hundreds of other cases involving Merchant. Along with his motion, he filed a
fee waiver application.
Meanwhile, Merchant sought to enforce the judgment by serving
third-party subpoenas and obtaining a writ of execution directed to the Los
1 Salwan submitted his motion more than six months after the
default but within six months of the default judgment. His submission was
rejected for technical reasons and he filed a corrected version days later, more
than six months after the judgment.
2 All statutory references are to this code.
2
Angeles County Sheriff.3 Salwan moved to quash both the subpoenas and the
writ. He contended the subpoenas were overbroad and unduly burdensome,
relied on confidential information from his fee waiver application, and
allowed insufficient time to object. He claimed the writ of execution listed an
incorrect address for him and should not have been directed to the Los
Angeles County Sheriff because he had no assets there.
The trial court denied Salwan’s motion to vacate, concluding it
was untimely and provided no basis for relief. On timeliness, the court noted
that Salwan filed his motion more than six months after the default and the
judgment and found that “[i]t was not reasonable to wait months to file [it].”
As for the merits, the court concluded Salwan’s asserted confusion about the
response deadline did not warrant relief because the summons plainly stated
the deadline. It denied judicial notice, finding the records immaterial.
The court likewise denied Salwan’s motions challenging
Merchant’s enforcement efforts. It found that Merchant had provided
sufficient time to object to the subpoenas and noted that Salwan filed his
motion to quash several days before the objection deadline. The court also
found that Merchant could not have accessed Salwan’s fee waiver application
unless he voluntarily provided it. Finally, it concluded there was no basis to
quash the writ of execution.
3 The record on appeal contains the writ of execution but does not
include the accompanying mandatory forms: Request for Sheriff to Serve
Court Papers; and Special Instructions for Writs and Levies—Attachment
(Judicial Council Forms, forms SER-001 & SER-001A). (See Ahart, Cal.
Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments and Debts (The Rutter Group 2026)
¶6:582 [discussing mandatory forms judgment creditor must provide levying
officer].)
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DISCUSSION
We find no error in the trial court’s rulings.
First, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Salwan’s
motion to vacate the judgment. Initially, it correctly concluded the motion
was untimely. Because Salwan did not provide an attorney affidavit of fault,
his motion was directed to the court’s discretion. (Lorenz v. Commercial
Acceptance Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 989.) A discretionary motion
to vacate must be made “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after the judgment . . . or proceeding.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Contrary to
Salwan’s suggestion, the trial court did not find his motion untimely simply
because he filed it more than six months after the default. Instead, the court
rightly concluded he did not act within a reasonable time under section 473
because he “wait[ed] months,” even after the judgment, to file it.4 (See
Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1184 [unexplained delay of
three months or more is unreasonable as matter of law].)
Salwan offers no satisfactory explanation for his delay in seeking
relief from the default and default judgment. In his reply brief, Salwan
claims for the first time that as late as mid-August 2024, he did not
understand that a default judgment had been entered. He has forfeited this
claim by failing to include it in his opening brief. (Provost v. Regents of
University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1295 [“we will not
address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief”].) In any case,
the record refutes his assertion. It shows he communicated with Merchant
about the “judgment” about six weeks earlier.
4 For this reason, it is immaterial whether Salwan’s delay is
measured by the initial submission of his motion or its ultimate filing days
later. In either case, he waited about six months to seek relief.
4
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding
that Salwan’s motion failed on the merits. “‘Although an honest mistake of
law is a valid ground for relief where a problem is complex and debatable,
ignorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly
sustain a finding denying relief.’” (Anderson v. Sherman (1981) 125
Cal.App.3d 228, 238.) The trial court reasonably rejected Salwan’s claim of
mistake of law because the summons plainly stated the deadline to respond.
Nothing in the arbitration provision or the court paperwork purported to
alter that deadline and Salwan does not contend otherwise. Even considering
Salwan’s assertion that he was dealing with anxiety, depression, and
financial strain during that time, his showing was insufficient to compel the
court to find an excusable mistake of law. (See ibid.; cf. People ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 39, 46 [significant
emotional anguish and depression insufficient to establish excusable neglect];
Bellm v. Bellia (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1036, 1038 [affirming denial of relief
where defendant was distraught and burdened by his father’s recent death].)
To the extent Salwan invoked the court’s inherent equitable
power to vacate the judgment, he fares no better. “‘A party who seeks to set
aside a default judgment pursuant to the court’s equity power must make a
substantially stronger showing of the excusable nature of his or her neglect
than is necessary to obtain relief under . . . section 473.’” (Kramer v.
Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 29.)
We are unpersuaded by Salwan’s assertions, for the first time on
appeal, that the judgment was void because of discrepancies in the listed
address and the amount awarded. The fact that the proof of service listed his
address as being in “Moriches,” New York, while other documents listed the
same street address in “Brookhaven,” New York, is immaterial. Salwan does
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not show these references were to different physical locations, rather
different postal designations. More importantly, Merchant served him by
personal service and he does not contend the service itself was defective.
Nor did the default judgment exceed the relief demanded in the
complaint. The judgment awarded about $36,000, less than the roughly
$45,000 Merchant sought in the complaint. Merchant was not required to
specify the amount of interest, attorney fees, and costs in the complaint.
(Sass v. Cohen (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1040 [for default judgment
purposes, “the operative complaint must allege the amount of ‘relief’ sought
for damages, but not prejudgment interest, attorney fees, or costs”].)
Relatedly, the trial court properly denied Salwan’s request for
judicial notice. Beyond a conclusory assertion that the records provided
“context” for equitable claims, Salwan does not explain how records from
hundreds of other cases involving Merchant were relevant to his motion to
vacate. (Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
322, 335, fn. 4 [denying judicial notice of immaterial documents]; County of
Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 475 [contention not
developed in opening brief is forfeited].)
Next, the trial court did not err by denying Salwan’s motions to
quash the subpoenas and the writ of execution. We review those rulings for
abuse of discretion. (See Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Touchstone) (2020)
10 Cal.5th 329, 359 [subpoenas]; Williams v. Williams (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d
636, 640 [writ of execution].)
As the trial court noted, Merchant could not have had access to
Salwan’s financial-waiver application unless he provided it to Merchant,
whether intentionally or inadvertently. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.54 [fee
waiver application is confidential and may be accessed only by authorized
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persons].) In any case, although a court can quash a subpoena to protect a
party’s privacy (§ 1987.1), Salwan cites no authority suggesting that using
previously disclosed confidential information to prepare an otherwise
unobjectionable subpoena provides a basis to quash it.
Nor does Salwan show that any misstatement regarding the
objection deadline resulted in prejudice. As the trial court observed, Salwan
filed his motion to quash several days before the correct deadline. And while
Salwan claims the court failed to address his contention that the subpoenas
were overbroad and unduly burdensome, he develops no argument
demonstrating they were. Thus, he cannot establish any reversible error. (See
Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 455 [appellant has burden to
establish prejudicial error].)
As for the writ of execution, Salwan fails to show that directing it
to the Los Angeles County Sheriff was improper. A writ of execution must be
“directed to the levying officer in the county where the levy is to be made.”
(§ 699.510.) Because Salwan has not included Merchant’s written levy
instructions in the appellate record, we do not know what property Merchant
sought to levy and thus cannot say that directing the writ to the Los Angeles
County Sheriff was improper. (See § 699.530 [creditor’s written instruction
must be delivered to levying officer together with writ]; Judicial Council
Forms, form SER-001A.) Even if, as Salwan claims, he has no specific assets
in Los Angeles County, that does not necessarily mean the writ cannot be
executed there. For instance, it may be necessary or permissible to levy a
bank account by service in that county. (See Ahart, Cal. Practice Guide:
Enforcing Judgments and Debts, supra, ¶¶9:550–9:554 [discussing levy on
deposit accounts].) And if he truly has no assets that can be reached by levy
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in Los Angeles County, he can suffer no harm from the direction of the writ to
the sheriff of that county.
Nor did any address discrepancy invalidate the writ. Although
Salwan again points to the Moriches/Brookhaven distinction, he does not
claim he was not served with the writ. Moreover, because he has not included
Merchant’s Request for Sheriff to Serve Court Papers, we do not know what
address Merchant listed there and will not assume that it misdirected the
sheriff on the proper place to serve Salwan once the writ is executed. Salwan
has forfeited his additional contention that the address listed in the writ was
outdated because he has not included this point in his opening brief. (Provost
v. Regents of University of California, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295.)
Regardless, for the reasons discussed, this claimed defect, too, would not
invalidate the writ. Accordingly, Salwan has not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment orders are affirmed. Merchant is awarded
costs on appeal.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SERVINO, J.
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