Filed 9/21/26 Menifee Neighbors Care v. City of Menifee CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MENIFEE NEIGHBORS CARE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E086831
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2403156)
CITY OF MENIFEE, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent;
MISTER CAR WASH et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Harold W. Hopp, Judge.
Reversed.
Carstens, Black & Minteer, and Douglas P. Carstens; Klapach & Klapach and
Joseph S. Klapach, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis, Jonathan E. Shardlow, Heather S.
Riley, for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
1
Rutan & Tucker, Jeffrey T. Melching, and Robert O. Owen, for Defendant and
Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Respondents Mister Car Wash and Trevor Buhl proposed building a daycare and
car wash (the Project) on a vacant lot in the City of Menifee. In approving the Project,
the City found that it was exempt from review under the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21050 et seq.). Appellant Menifee
Neighbors Care (MNC) filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the approval,
arguing that the Project was not exempt from CEQA because it would have significant
environmental effects in the form of noise and traffic impacts. The trial court found that
the Project was exempt from CEQA and denied the petition. We reverse.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Buhl, on behalf of Mister Car Wash, applied for a permit to build the Project. The
proposed Project combined an automated car wash and an adjoining daycare facility,
along with landscaping and a parking lot.
The City’s Planning Commission approved the Project. In doing so, it found that
the Project was categorically exempt from CEQA review under the “Class 32” categorical
exemption for infill development, in part because it would have no significant
2
environmental impacts as to noise or traffic. (See CEQA Guidelines, tit. 14, div. 6, ch, 3,
1
§ 15332.) MNC appealed the decision to the City Council.
The City held a public hearing on MNC’s appeal during which MNC voiced its
concerns about the Project. MNC argued the Project did not qualify for a Class 32
exemption because of its noise and traffic impacts. The City denied MNC’s appeal and
approved the Project, finding that it qualified for a Class 32 exemption.
MNC then filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court. MNC argued,
among other things, that the Project did not qualify for a Class 32 exemption because of
its noise and traffic impacts. MNC further argued that the City improperly “mitigated the
Project into a Class 32 exemption” because the Project, as approved, proposed a sound
wall designed to reduce the car wash’s noise impacts on the daycare.
The trial court denied MNC’s petition. MNC timely appealed.
1
“Class 32 consists of projects characterized as in-fill development meeting the
conditions described in this section. [¶] (a) The project is consistent with the applicable
general plan designation and all applicable general plan policies as well as with
applicable zoning designation and regulations. [¶] (b) The proposed development occurs
within city limits on a project site of no more than five acres substantially surrounded by
urban uses. [¶] (c) The project site has no value, as habitat for endangered, rare or
threatened species. [¶] (d) Approval of the project would not result in any significant
effects relating to traffic, noise, air quality, or water quality. [¶] (e) The site can be
adequately served by all required utilities and public services.” (Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 14,
§ 15332.)
3
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“CEQA requires an agency proposing to approve or carry out a project to prepare a
document called an environmental impact report, or an EIR, if the project ‘may have a
significant effect on the environment.’” (We Advocate Through Environmental Review v.
County of Siskiyou (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 629, 635.) But there are “classes of projects
that generally do not have a significant effect on the environment and therefore may be
exempted from CEQA review.” (Committee to Save The Hollywoodland Specific Plan v.
City of Los Angeles (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1186.) A “Class 32” exemption for
“in-fill development” applies when, among other conditions not relevant here, approval
of the project “would not result in any significant effects relating to traffic, noise, air
quality, or water quality.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15332, subd. (d).)
“On appeal from denial of a petition for writ of administrative mandamus, we
review the agency’s decision, not the superior court’s, to determine whether the agency
has prejudicially abused its discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of discretion is established if
the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination is not
supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We exercise our independent judgment to
determine whether the agency employed proper procedures and review the agency’s
factual findings for substantial evidence.” (Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v.
City of Arcadia (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, 428.) We likewise “review an agency’s
4
factual determination that a project falls within a statutory or categorical CEQA
exemption for substantial evidence.” (West Adams Heritage Association v. City of Los
Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 395, 410.)
B. Analysis
We conclude the City’s finding that the Project qualifies for a Class 32 exemption
was unsupported for two principal reasons, both of which relate to the car wash’s noise
impacts on the daycare. These two errors individually and cumulatively require reversal.
We first reject Respondents’ argument that MNC forfeited its challenges to the
trial court’s decision by submitting on the court’s tentative decision because MNC
advances the same arguments on appeal as in the trial court, which the trial court
considered and rejected. (See Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 216, 226; Lindsay v. Patenaude & Felix APC (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 335, 343-344.)
We next reject Respondents’ argument that the car wash’s noise impacts on the
daycare cannot be significant as a matter of law because a Project cannot have significant
impacts on its own users. The argument is foreclosed by our Supreme Court’s decision in
California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 369 (CBIA).
There, the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether CEQA requires an
analysis of how “existing environmental conditions” at a project site “will impact future
residents or users” of the project. (CBIA, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 381.) The Court
5
explained that the environment’s effects on a project need not be considered, but CEQA
mandates “an analysis of how a project might exacerbate existing environmental
hazards.” (Id. at p. 392.) The Court reasoned that, because CEQA’s “core requirement”
is for an agency to study a “project’s impacts on the environment—how a project might
worsen existing conditions,” requiring an agency “to evaluate how such worsened
conditions could affect a project’s future users or residents is entirely consistent with
CEQA.” (Id. at p. 389, italics added.) So “when a proposed project risks exacerbating []
environmental hazards or conditions that already exist, an agency must analyze the
potential impact of such hazards on future residents or users.” (Id. at p. 377.)
In short, CBIA held that CEQA requires an analysis of how potentially significant
environmental conditions exacerbated by a project may affect its own “future users or
residents.” Here, for instance, the City was not required to study the impact of
preexisting noise levels on its future users or residents. But it was required to study how
the Project’s operation could exacerbate those noise levels and the resulting noise impacts
on the Project’s users, including those at the daycare. (CBIA, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 381;
Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 161, 193-194
[noting that, under CBIA, agency would have to study fire hazards to project’s livestock,
personnel, and clients if exacerbated by the project]; see also cf. Tiburon Open Space
Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, 770, fn. 37 [rejecting
6
argument that agency need not study a project’s increased fire risks because those risks
2
are “only impacts on the Project itself, not impacts on the environment”].)
The City thus properly decided to study the effects of the Project’s car wash on the
3
daycare’s users, but its analysis was flawed.
An agency must decide whether a project is categorically exempt “without
reference to or reliance upon any proposed mitigation measures.” (Salmon Protection &
Watershed Network v. County of Marin (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1106 (Salmon
Protection); accord, Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin
Watermaster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1199-1200 (Azusa Land).) Thus, an agency
2
To support its argument that CBIA held that CEQA does not require an agency
to study a project’s effect on its own users, Respondents cite three cases purportedly
“applying CBIA,” but all three predate CBIA. (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of
Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 474; South Orange County Wastewater
Authority v. City of Dana Point (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1604; City of Long Beach v. Los
Angeles Unified School District (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 889. Needless to say, these
cases did not apply a decision that did not yet exist. More to the point, when discussing
these cases, Respondents entirely ignore CBIA’s holding that requiring an agency to
study how a project’s impacts might affect its future users or residents “is entirely
consistent with CEQA.” (CBIA, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 389.)
3
We reject Respondents’ argument that MNC forfeited its argument that the
Project does not qualify for a Class 32 exemption in part because its noise impacts would
violate the City’s 65-decibel limit in the Development Code. MNC unambiguously made
this argument below in its opening and reply briefs. The trial court in turn addressed the
issue, finding that the project would not have significant noise impacts because its
operation “will not exceed the City’s applicable exterior noise limits” of 65 decibels.
More importantly, the City never disputed below that the 65-decibel level was the
applicable threshold to assess whether noise impacts would be significant. The City
instead argued in its opposition below that the project would not violate the 65-decibel
threshold, which it deemed “the applicable noise limitation[].”
7
may not rely on a mitigation measure to support a categorical exemption. (Salmon
Protection, supra, at p. 1102; Azusa Land, supra, at pp. 1199-1200.)
In Salmon Protection, a county found that a residential construction project might
have potential adverse impacts on adjacent stream habitat, but the county adopted
numerous conditions expressly to mitigate the impacts and qualify the project for a
categorical exemption. (Salmon Protection, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104.) The
Court of Appeal noted that mitigation measures are only proper at later stages of the
CEQA process, which the county improperly evaded by prematurely adopting mitigation
measures to classify the project as exempt. (Ibid.)
In Azusa Land, an agency approved continued disposal of waste at a landfill that
was leaking pollutants. (Azusa Land, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) The agency
nonetheless found the project exempt from CEQA because it found that mitigation
measures would prevent further pollution. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held the agency
erred because it improperly relied on mitigation measures to find the project exempt. (Id.
at p. 1199.) This is because “proposed mitigation measures cannot be used to support a
categorical exemption; they must be considered under the standards that apply to a
mitigated negative declaration.” (Ibid.)
This case involves circumstances much like those in Salmon Protection and Azusa
Land—two cases MNC relies on heavily, yet Respondents ignore entirely.
8
In April 2024, Respondents obtained a Noise Impact Analysis (April NIA) report
that evaluated the car wash’s noise impacts on the daycare. Under a section entitled
“Cumulative Impact Assessment,” the report stated: “Unmitigated noise levels generated
4
by the car wash operations would cause noise levels to exceed 65 [decibels ] at the
proposed day care to the west. Because noise levels exceed the applicable criteria of 65
5
[decibels], project operations would constitute a noise impact.” In the next section,
entitled “Noise Reduction Measures,” the report continues: “Due to an expected noise
exceedance of 65 [decibels] to the west, noise reduction features in the form of [a] sound
wall at the exit of the car wash tunnel was evaluated. . . . [N]oise levels from the car
wash operations at the surrounding sensitive land uses, with the incorporation of an 8-
foot-high wall along the car wash tunnel’s exit, would be below 65 [decibels] and would
be in compliance with the desired noise criteria.” The report concluded that “[w]ith the
construction of the . . . noise wall . . . [the] noise levels . . . would be less than significant
and comply with the City’s noise standards.”
4
The technical sound measurement is “dBA Leq.” “Decibels are the units of
measurement for sound intensity. Because knowing a sound’s decibel level does not in
itself adequately characterize how humans perceive the sound, the sound is often
described in terms of A-weighted decibels — which, unlike unweighted decibels, account
for the human ear’s varying sensitivity to different frequencies. To account for varying
sound levels over time, the sound is also often described in terms of the A-weighted
equivalent sound level [Leq]— which represents the average sound level over a specified
period — and in terms of the A-weighted maximum sound level — which represents the
highest sound level over a specified period.” (Sierra Watch v. County of Placer (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 86, 107, fn. 6.) For brevity’s sake, we use “decibels.”
[footnote continued on next page]
9
Respondents obtained a revised Noise Impact Analysis report in May 2024 (May
NIA). The May NIA focused only on the daycare’s outdoor playground area. Under the
“Cumulative Impact Assessment” section, the report states: “Noise levels generated by
the car wash operations would not cause noise levels to exceed 65 [decibels] at the
playground area of the proposed day care to the west. Because noise levels would not
exceed the applicable criteria of 65 [decibels] at the playground area, project operations
would not constitute a noise impact.” The “Noise Reduction Measures” section states:
“Notwithstanding the absence of a significant noise impact, a noise reduction feature in
the form of a sound wall at the exit of the car wash tunnel was evaluated. . . . [W]ith the
addition of [the] wall . . . noise levels for the entire day [c]are center building would be
below 65 [decibels].” The report concluded: “The proposed project would not generate
on-site stationary noise from car wash operations resulting in noise levels above 65
[decibels] at the playground area of the day care . . . . Notwithstanding, to further reduce
the potential for noise, [Respondents] will construct a 8-foot-high noise wall at the car
wash tunnel exit.”
Both NIAs thus explicitly provide that exceeding the 65-decibel threshold in the
City’s Development Code is a significant noise impact under CEQA, and both make clear
5
The “applicable criteria of 65 [decibels]” comes from section 9.210.060,
subdivision (D) of the City’s Development Code, which provides: “No person shall
create any sound, or allow the creation of any sound, on any property that causes the
exterior and interior sound level on any other occupied property to exceed the sound level
standards set forth in Table 9.210.060-1, Stationary Source Noise Standards.” That Table
then provides that exterior sound levels may not exceed 65 decibels.
10
that the sound wall was proposed as a mitigation measure. The April NIA notes that the
“unmitigated noise levels” caused by the car wash would exceed 65 decibels, but that a
“noise reduction feature” in the form of a sound wall would reduce the noise to under 65
decibels. The May NIA similarly noted that noise levels from the car wash would be
under 65 decibels for the entire daycare “with the addition of the sound wall.” Both
reports discuss the sound wall under a section entitled “Noise Reduction Measures.”
Under CEQA, a mitigation measure includes any effort “minimizing” a significant
impact “by limiting [its] degree or magnitude.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15370; see also
Citizens for Environmental Responsibility v. State ex rel. 14th Dist. Ag. Association
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 555, 569.) The sound wall was explicitly proposed in both the
April NIA and May NIA as a “Noise Reduction Measure” designed to reduce the car
wash’s noise to under 65 decibels at the daycare—in other words, to mitigate the noise to
a less-than-significant level. We fail to see how the sound wall could be anything other
than a mitigation measure. (See Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 645, 656, fn. 8 [plant and tree-related measures adopted to “reduce or
eliminate” an environmental impact caused by a highway “plainly mitigation measures
and not part of the project itself”].)
Respondents unpersuasively argue the sound wall is a “project design feature,” not
a mitigation measure. In support, they cite Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City and
County of San Francisco (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 863 (Plastic Bag), and Wollmer v. City
of Berkeley (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1329. Neither case helps Respondents.
11
In both cases, the challenged project contained a design feature that was proposed
to help alleviate a pre-existing environmental issue. In Plastic Bag, the design feature
was a 10-cent per bag fee in a city ordinance intended to “address[] the problem of
single-use bags, a problem that preexisted the proposed project.” (Plastic Bag, supra,
222 Cal.App.4th at p. 882.) In Wollmer, the project proposed a bike lane, which
improved a preexisting traffic problem at the project site “for the benefit of the
community.” (Wollmer v. City of Berkeley, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353.) Thus, in
both cases, the challenged project design feature did not mitigate an environmental
impact caused by the project, but instead ameliorated an already existing environmental
issue. (See also Citizens for Environmental Responsibility v. State ex rel. 14th Dist. Ag.
Assn., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 569 [project’s manure management plan was not a
mitigation measure because it was “a preexisting measure previously implemented to
address a preexisting concern”].)
That is not the case here. The project’s sound wall was expressly proposed to
lessen (mitigate) the noise impacts of the carwash—after the carwash had been
designed—so that its noise levels would be below the City’s 65-decibel limit. The sound
wall is thus a mitigation measure, not just a project design feature, as Respondents
contend. (See Berkeley Hills Watershed Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 880, 893, fn. 9 [project design features proposed “to meet building code
requirements” and to “address preexisting conditions on the site” were not mitigation
measures]; Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
12
943, 961 [traffic management plan proposed for construction of a home was not a
mitigation measure because it was not “proposed subsequent action taken to mitigate any
significant effect of the project”]; see also Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los
Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 445 [“A ‘mitigation measure’ is a suggestion or
change that would reduce or minimize significant adverse impacts on the
environment caused by the project as proposed,” italics added].)
An agency may not circumvent CEQA by adopting mitigation measures to qualify
a project for a categorical exemption. (Salmon Protection, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p.
1106.) That is what the City did here. This alone warrants reversal.
Respondents argue the sound wall is not a mitigation measure because the City
found there was “no significant noise impact in the first instance,” so “there was no
significant noise impact to mitigate.” This leads us to a second critical flaw in the City’s
analysis.
Respondents contend that, in finding no significant noise impacts, the City
properly relied on the May NIA, which found that the car wash’s operation will not
exceed 65 decibels at the daycare’s playground area. They contend the City had
discretion to focus on noise levels at the playground, where “sensitive receptors”
(children) would be present for long periods of time instead of other areas where people
would be present only intermittently and for short periods.
13
But the City’s Development Code’s 65 decibel-limit does not apply only to select
portions of an occupied building’s exterior. It applies to “the exterior . . . on any other
occupied property,” without qualification. It is thus immaterial that the playground
would not be subjected to 65-plus decibels of noise because the 65-plus decibel noise
impacts on other parts of the daycare would nonetheless violate the Development Code.
We agree with Respondents that a violation of the City’s Development Code’s
noise limits (or any other noise limit regulation) is not per se substantial evidence of a
significant environmental effect. (See Krovoza v. City of Davis (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th
623, 638-639.)
But, according to the City, the Project would create significant noise impacts if
noise from its operation exceeds 65 decibels. Again, the April NIA says the project’s
“operations would constitute a significant noise impact.” The May NIA, on the other
hand, says its operations would not constitute a significant noise impact “[b]ecause noise
levels would not exceed the applicable criteria of 65 [decibels] at the playground area.”
The City thus argued below that there would be no significant noise impacts because the
project would not violate the 65-decibel limit (at the daycare).
Thus, by the City’s own standards and evidence in this case, the Project’s noise
impacts will be significant if they exceed 65 decibels. As explained, the Project’s noise
impacts will exceed that threshold at areas other than the playground, even with the
14
6
sound wall, thereby creating significant noise impacts. (See We Advocate Through
Environmental Review v. County of Siskiyou, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 695.) This is a
second reason why the Project does not qualify for a Class 32 exemption and provides a
second ground for reversal. (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15332, subd. (d).)
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the City improperly found the Project is
exempt from CEQA analysis as a Class 32 project. We thus need not and do not address
MNC’s arguments concerning the project’s traffic impacts. (See Koi Nation of Northern
California v. City of Clearlake (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 815, 823; Marina Coast Water
District v. County of Monterey (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 46, 65 fn. 17.)
6
At oral argument, Respondents noted for the first time that the City’s
Development Code provides that the “Noise Control Regulations” chapter is “not
intended to establish thresholds of significance for the purpose of any analysis required
by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and no such thresholds are hereby
established.” (Menifee Dev. Code, § 9.210.060, subd. (A).) The City also emphasized
lead agencies have “substantial discretion in determining the appropriate threshold of
significance to evaluate the severity of a particular impact” (King & Gardiner Farms,
LLC v. County of Kern (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, 884.) But, again, the City’s own
evidence (the NIAs) states that, at least for the project’s purposes, noise impacts above 65
decibels are significant. The City cannot now argue otherwise, particularly given their
argument below that the Project will not have significant noise impacts because its
operation will not create noise above 65 decibels. (See We Advocate Through
Environmental Review v. County of Siskiyou, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 694-695 [lead
agency cannot say threshold is significant then say project’s impacts exceeding that
threshold are insignificant].)
15
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded and the trial court is instructed
to issue a writ of mandate directing the City to set aside its finding that the Project
qualifies for a Class 32 exemption. MNC may recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
16