Filed 6/30/26 Mendoza v. LeBaron CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JENNIFER LYNN MENDOZA, D086814
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
v. 00006784-CU-HR-EC)
LIANA NOREEN LEBARON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tim Nader, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with instructions.
Briggs Law Corporation and Cory J. Briggs for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jennifer Lynn Mendoza, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Liana Noreen LeBaron appeals a postjudgment order awarding her a
portion of her requested additional attorney fees and costs. The order came
after LeBaron conducted a judgment debtor exam of Jennifer Lynn Mendoza
to collect attorney fees after LeBaron’s partially successful anti-SLAPP
motion.1 LeBaron challenges the portion of the order setting postjudgment
interest over both judgments at 5 percent rather than at 10 percent. She
argues the postjudgment debt is not a “personal debt” that would qualify for
the lower interest rate and contends she is therefore entitled to the statutory
10 percent interest rate under Code of Civil Procedure,2 section 685.010,
subdivision (a)(1). Based on the statute’s plain language, we agree. We will
therefore direct the trial court to modify the postjudgment order to award
interest at the statutory rate of 10 percent. As modified, we will affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2023, Mendoza filed a civil harassment restraining order petition
against LeBaron describing LeBaron’s egregious and harassing conduct
toward Mendoza and her husband. In response, LeBaron filed an anti-
SLAPP motion under section 425.16 to strike portions of Mendoza’s request
for a restraining order.3 The trial court partially granted LeBaron’s anti-
SLAPP motion and Judge Lynch ordered Mendoza to pay LeBaron statutory
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $32,683. Mendoza never appealed
the anti-SLAPP ruling or the extremely high attorney fee and costs award.
1 “Anti-SLAPP” refers to the procedural vehicle to strike legal actions
intended as a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.)
2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 The temporary order was later dismissed after LeBaron showed she
stopped her harassing behavior. Judge Lynch ruled on the anti-SLAPP
motion notwithstanding.
2
LeBaron later filed a second memorandum of costs claiming she
incurred additional postjudgment attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$33,067.4 Mendoza then filed a motion to strike/tax those costs.
After considering the parties’ argument, “[t]he court found that many of
the fees and costs claimed on the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment filed
by Respondent on December 18, 2024 were not necessary or reasonable
pursuant to [section] 685.040.”.5 Consequently, the trial court awarded
LeBaron an additional $7,735 in attorney fees and costs. In its order, the
trial court concluded that section 685.010 defined Mendoza’s money judgment
as a “personal debt” which accrues annual interest at a rate of 5 percent,
rather than the default 10 percent. LeBaron appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Language
Section 685.010, subdivision (a)(1), establishes that “[i]nterest accrues
at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a money
judgment remaining unsatisfied.” Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature
amended the statutory interest rate under section 685.010 to include a rate
of 5 percent per annum for certain exceptions to the general rule.
4 We call this the second postjudgment attorney fees and costs
memorandum, though there is another intervening postjudgment attorney
fees and costs memorandum in the appellate record which neither party
addresses. This intervening memorandum was signed by Mr. Briggs, but it
does not bear a trial court file stamp.
5 A different trial judge heard this second attorney fee motion.
3
(Stats. 2022, ch. 883, § 6.) Section 685.010, subdivision (a), as amended,
provides, in relevant part:
“(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), interest accrues at
the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount
of a money judgment remaining unsatisfied.
“(2)(A) For judgments entered on or after January 1, 2023,
or where an application for renewal of judgment is filed on
or after January 1, 2023, interest accrues at the rate of 5
percent per annum on the principal amount of a money
judgment remaining unsatisfied in the following cases:
“(i) The principal amount of a money judgment of under
two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) remaining
unsatisfied against a debtor for a claim related to medical
expenses.
“(ii) The principal amount of a money judgment of under
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) remaining unsatisfied
against a debtor for a claim related to personal debt.”
The statute defines “personal debt” as “money due or owing or alleged
to be due or owing from a natural person arising out of a transaction in which
the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for the debtor’s personal, family, or household
purposes.” (§ 685.010, subd. (a)(2)(C)(iii).)
B. The plain meaning of “personal debt” under section 685.010,
subdivision (a)(2)(C)(iii)
LeBaron argues that the interest rate on the unpaid portion of the
judgment is the statutory 10 percent rate—not 5 percent—because the
judgment against Mendoza is not “personal debt” as described under
section 685.010, subdivision (a)(2)(C)(iii). Neither party disputes the money
judgment award amount.
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As this appeal depends on the meaning of the words used in
section 685.010, it presents “a question of law that we review de novo.”
(Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724.) When
interpreting a statute, we must “determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 (Coalition).) We first give the
language “a plain and commonsense meaning . . . in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole[,] in order to determine its scope and purpose
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.” (Ibid.) We “must
generally follow [the] plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” (Ibid.) If the
“language permits more than one reasonable interpretation,” however, we
“may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history,
and public policy,” to assess its meaning. (Ibid.)
As noted, section 685.010, subdivision (a)(2)(C)(iii) defines “personal
debt” as “money due . . . arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services[,] which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for the debtor’s personal, family, or household purposes.” The
statute does not define “transaction.” “When a statute does not define its
operative words, ‘courts should give to the words . . . their ordinary, everyday
meaning. . . . ’ [Citation.]” (County of Orange v. Santa Margarita Water Dist.
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 189, 192.) We turn, then, to Black’s Law Dictionary for
assistance. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “transaction” as: “1. The act or
an instance of conducting business or other dealings; esp., the formation,
performance, or discharge of a contract. 2. Something performed or carried
out; a business agreement or exchange. 3. Any activity involving two or
more persons. 4. Civil law. An agreement that is intended by the parties to
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prevent or end a dispute and in which they make reciprocal concessions.”
(Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1808, col. 2.) Here, Mendoza’s petition
for a civil restraining order and LeBaron’s anti-SLAPP motion is a
transaction because, at minimum, it concerned “activity involving two or
more persons.”
Next, the statute narrows the relevant subject matter of the
transaction by defining a covered financial obligation as one “arising out of a
transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the
subject of the transaction . . . .” (§ 685.010, subd. (a)(2)(C)(iii), italics added.)
The statute uses restrictive, not open-ended, language. It does not say
“including” money, property, insurance, or services. Instead, it limits covered
transactions to those “in which” one of those four categories is the subject of
the transaction.
The relative clause “which are the subject of the transaction” further
operates to limit the listed categories rather than provide nonexclusive
examples. (§ 685.010, subd. (a)(2)(C)(iii), italics added.) This means the
statute does not define every financial obligation owed as a “personal debt.”
Rather, the plain language of the definition limits the subject matter of the
transactions to those involving money, property, insurance, or services. A
transaction that does not involve any of those subjects necessarily falls
outside a plain reading of the statute.
Here, the money judgment arose out of a transaction in which the
subject matter was a civil restraining order and anti-SLAPP motion—not a
transaction involving money, property, insurance, or services. Thus, the
financial obligation arising from this litigation is not within the ambit of
“personal debt” as defined in section 685.010, subdivision (a)(2)(C)(iii).
Because the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
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“ ‘we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of
the statute governs.’ [Citation.]” (California State University, Fresno Assn.,
Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 266.) Thus, we need not
consider other aids such as the Legislative history to inform our analysis.
(See Coalition, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 737.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court shall modify the order to reflect a 10 percent annual
rate of interest on any unsatisfied portion of the money judgment. As
modified, we affirm. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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