Filed 6/23/26 Medina v. Medina CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PORFIRIO MEDINA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064616, G064619
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. 30-2024-
01391217, 30-2024-01391218)
VERONICA MEDINA et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Bradley S. Erdosi, Judge. Affirmed.
Larson Law Group and Charles L. Larson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Porfirio Medina appeals from an order denying his
request for elder abuse protective orders against his children, Veronica
Medina and Ezequiel Medina.1 He contends the trial court wrongly found
none of the children’s conduct at their shared house constituted elder abuse.
But the court found him “particularly not credible” and the children offered
explanations and context contradicting Porfirio. Deferring to the court’s
express and implied credibility determinations, we affirm.
FACTS
The house at issue here belonged to the children’s mother,
Florinda Sotelo.2 Florinda made all the payments on the home. She had a
“steady job at a food-making factory,” then later “travel[ed] to [the] Inland
Empire to sustain [the] house.” In contrast, Porfirio was “a meth addict” who
did “side jobs” and only “held a job down, maybe, once or twice.” He was
“never in the home” or, at best, “in and out of the house.” Florinda never
married Porfirio.
When Florinda died, Porfirio did not vacate the house but the
record contains no indication Porfirio ever established any legal right to
possession. Instead, he rented out rooms to tenants, some living in the
garage. Their rent money paid the mortgage.
Eventually, Porfirio asked the children to “sign over the rights” to
the house to him. The children and relatives believed Porfirio wanted title so
1 We respectfully use first names for clarity.
2 We merely summarize the evidence below, without making any
binding factual findings. (Cf. Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich,
Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 884 [even when appellate court
makes findings, courts cannot take judicial notice that “those factual findings
are indisputably true”].)
2
he could bequeath the house to his new wife or refinance the house and “take
the money.”
The children did not cooperate with Porfirio, who obtained a
temporary restraining order excluding the children from the house. Porfirio
apparently failed to prove his allegations in court and the TRO expired.
When the children returned to the house, they discovered Porfirio
had thrown away their things; Ezequiel’s room “was completely empty” and
“all of [his] belongings were in—were gone. [His] daughter’s belongings,
everything was thrown away.” Veronica explained she “felt like [she] was in
danger” “because [her] father falsified information within the court” and
made “false statements” about elder abuse.
The children posted eviction notices at the house, which they
thought they could do as Florinda’s “next of kin” because she and Porfirio
“weren’t married.” Veronica thought the posting was just “one step in a
process to remove somebody from a home,” to be followed by “a court hearing”
in which “the court would determine the next steps as to what would—would
happen.” Ezequiel had “no clue” what would happen with the eviction notice;
he thought “it would be some type of communication between” the children
and Porfirio. Veronica also switched the locks because the keys for the old
locks didn’t work. Porfirio eventually got a set of the keys but the “doors
were never locked.”
The children’s half-brother became the administrator of
Florinda’s estate. He apparently filed an unlawful detainer action against
Porfirio. While no documentation from that case is in the record, Porfirio’s
counsel told the trial court the case had been dismissed for procedural
reasons.
3
Porfirio then filed requests for elder abuse restraining orders
against Veronica and Ezequiel. (Welf. & Inst. Code3, § 15657.03) Veronica
filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against Porfirio, who
in turn requested a domestic violence restraining order against her.
The court heard testimony over three days, working heroically to
keep the case on track despite witnesses whose testimony regularly
meandered, grew vague or inconsistent, and sometimes lost focus altogether.4
The children testified to the facts stated above, corroborated in many regards
by testimony from their half-brother, a tenant, and a friend.
The children explained they were not trying to exclude Porfirio
from the house. Veronica stated “I actually don’t want my father to leave the
home” and “I don’t have a problem with my father. The only problem that I
have is that he keeps coming and making false accusations that leave me and
my niece and my children in the streets . . . .” Ezequiel stated he intended to
move out and “would rather have [his] father stay there” in the house with
Veronica and her family.
Porfirio testified, conceding the house was not in his name. He
testified to various acts by the children, including posting eviction notices and
changing locks.
Porfirio explained his reasons for seeking the restraining
orders—he had been disrespected and wanted title to the house. He testified:
“Q: Does your elder abuse claim that you’re making here in the court today
have anything to do with trying to acquire title for the house? [¶] A: Yes. [¶]
Q: Okay. And—and in—in what sense? [¶] A: ‘Cause they didn’t treat me as if
3 All further statutory references are to this code.
4 The record contains the minute order for July 8, 2024 but lacks
the minute orders for June 24 and July 1, 2024.
4
I were their father; they treat me as a—any person or even worse. I—I cannot
count on them for anything in the house. They don’t even want to see me. [¶]
Q: Do you—do you believe, if you were successful in—in this proceeding, that
you were able to get—to get the orders that you’ve requested, do you believe
that—that—that would grant you ownership of the house? [¶] A: Yes.”
Porfirio called as witnesses his new wife, a tenant to whom
Porfirio rented the garage, and a man who claimed to be an owner of the
house but was not on title. That man stated Porfirio made the down payment
on the house but was not asked how he knew that or what documents would
show it.
The court denied all requested orders. With regard to Porfirio’s
requests, the court stated: “It is very clear to this court, very clear, that this
is a dispute solely about property. The court found Mr. Medina particularly
not credible, and to the extent that he was credible, if he was at all, he in his
own testimony admitted that the elder abuse restraining order request had to
do with acquiring title to the house.” It found “[p]osting an eviction order does
not rise to the level of elder abuse or even amount to a case of disturbing the
peace in this court’s opinion.” It continued: “The court has heard no credible
evidence, whatsoever, that any sort of domestic violence abuse has
occurred . . . . And certainly, the court has not heard any evidence,
whatsoever, presented by Mr. Medina—by a preponderance of the evidence
that either Veronica Medina or Ezequiel Medina have created any form of
elder abuse or imposed any form of elder abuse.”
5
DISCUSSION
Porfirio challenges only the order denying his requests for elder
abuse restraining orders against the children.5 “We resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of respondent[s], the prevailing part[ies], and indulge all
legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s
findings.” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137–1138
(Bookout).)
To obtain an elder abuse restraining order, Porfirio bore the
burden to show abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Bookout,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138 [burden of proof]; see also § 15610.07, subd.
(a)(1), (3) [defining elder abuse].) When a court issues a restraining order, we
review its factual findings for substantial evidence. (Bookout, at p. 1137.)
But when the court denies a restraining order request, we apply
the substantial evidence test in a different way. “The party seeking a
restraining order bears the burden of establishing the circumstances
justifying the order. In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or
implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the
burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-
proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. Instead
the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (Jan F. v. Natalie F.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593 [cleaned up] (Jan F.).)
“Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached and (2) of such a character
5 The record contains Porfirio’s request against Veronica in case
30-2024-1391218 but lacks his request against Ezequiel in case 30-2024-
1391217.
6
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.” (In re Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 550, 566 [cleaned up] (Diamond).)
“Where, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the
burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him or her to prevail on appeal by
arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his or her favor. That is because
unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing
party, we presume the trial court found that party’s evidence lacks sufficient
weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof.” (Jennifer K. v. Shane K.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 558, 579 [cleaned up] (Jennifer K.).)
“It was for the trial court to weigh the evidence and consider the
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses.” (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1141.) “The fact finder’s determination of the veracity of a witness is
final.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt).)
“Only the trial judge as a trier of fact is in a position to separate the truth
from the exaggeration, sometimes revealed by things like verbal hesitancy
and body language which are not picked up in a reporter’s transcript.” (In re
Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043.) “Fact finders see and hear
witnesses. The finder of the facts has a view appellate courts lack. That view
is better.” (Schmidt, at p. 582.)
“As the exclusive judge of the credit and weight to be given to the
testimony of a witness, the trier of fact may reject the testimony of a witness
even if, as is certainly not the case here, it is uncontradicted.” (Jennifer K.,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.) “The trial judge may believe or disbelieve
uncontradicted witnesses if there is any rational ground for doing so.”
(Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.) “[I]t is for the trier of fact to
resolve conflicts, and this rule ‘applies as well to cases of inconsistencies and
7
contradictions within the testimony of a single witness.’” (Wareham v.
Wareham (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 64, 68.)
Here, Porfirio has not shown “the evidence compels a finding” in
his favor “as a matter of law.” (Jan F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593
[cleaned up].) His biggest hurdle is that the court did not believe him, finding
him “particularly not credible.” As “the sole judge of witness credibility,” that
determination “is final.” (Jennifer K., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 579 [cleaned
up].)
While the trial court doesn’t have to explain its credibility calls,
in this case we know one reason why it didn’t believe Porfirio. The court
found he was using the restraining order process to get title to the house. It
was justified in considering his “interest in the result of the case” and his
“motives” in rejecting his testimony, even where it was uncontradicted.
(Jennifer K., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 579 [cleaned up]; accord Schmidt,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582 [trial court may “disbelieve uncontradicted
witnesses if there is any rational ground for doing so”].)
We presume the court disbelieved Porfirio’s witnesses, too. (See
Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137–1138 [drawing inferences to
support order].) With no credible witnesses, Porfirio has not shown his
evidence was “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”
(Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 566 [cleaned up].)
To be sure, the children testified openly about posting eviction
notices and changing the locks but that does not compel granting Porfirio’s
requests, given the context.
First, the court could have reasonably found Porfirio failed to
show his property was taken by the children. (See § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1)
8
[defining financial elder abuse].) Porfirio’s evidence did not compel a finding
that he had a property interest in the house. The children explained in detail
why Florinda had the funds to make the down payment and Porfirio did not.
The children also explained that after Florinda’s passing, any mortgage
payments were made out of rental proceeds from the tenants—though the
record does not show Porfirio had the legal right to collect rent. The lack of
credible evidence showing Porfirio’s interest in the house differentiates
Bookout, where there was no dispute the elder excluded from her home was a
joint tenant. (See Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)
Even if Porfirio had some kind of right to possession until
lawfully evicted, no credible witness testified that he left the house in
response to the eviction notices or couldn’t enter the house after the locks
were changed. The court had a “rational ground” for not believing the
testimony of Porfirio and his new wife. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p.
582.)
Second, even if Porfirio had proved he had property rights to the
home and the children’s conduct interfered with them, the court could have
reasonably found Porfirio failed to show they “knew or should have known
that [their] conduct is likely to be harmful” to him. (§ 15610.30, subd. (b)
[defining “wrongful use” element of financial elder abuse].) The children
explained they didn’t know the legal effect of the eviction notices, which they
thought would simply open up “communication” with Porfirio and be “one
step” in a legal process resulting in a court order. They changed locks because
Porfirio hadn’t given them keys to the old locks and, in any event, they
9
believed the doors were never locked. They made it clear they wanted Porfirio
to remain in the house.6
Finally, the court could have reasonably found Porfirio failed to
show he actually experienced any “mental suffering.” (See § 15610.07, subd.
(a)(1).) He never testified to how the eviction notices or changed locks made
him feel, other than disrespected. In any event, the court reasonably could
have considered the context of the ongoing dispute, in which Porfirio already
“falsified information within the court” to remove the children from the house
and throw away their personal property.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. As the children made no appearance, the
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
SCOTT, J.
I CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
6 Our dissenting colleague notes Porfirio’s claims about a
refrigerator and furniture. Veronica testified Porfirio’s refrigerator was “left
alone,” “not disconnected,” and “untouched.” She explained she replaced “old
and broken” couches that “were in bad condition” with “new couches,”
believing that Porfirio “would be happy to have new furniture that works.”
Thus, particularly given the court’s findings about Porfirio’s lack of
credibility, the court could reasonably conclude the children had not taken
the refrigerator and had no reason to know getting new couches would be
likely to harm Porfirio. (§ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (b).)
10
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J., Dissenting.
My colleagues in the majority, in my opinion, improperly conflate
the issue of whether Veronica’s and Ezequiel’s actions constitute elder abuse
with whether their father, Porfirio, is legally entitled to ownership of the
family home, an issue which is not before us.1 Because I conclude the
children’s admitted actions in posting false eviction notices and changing the
locks constitute elder abuse, I respectfully dissent.
FACTS
The following facts are uncontroverted:
Porfirio, who is 70 years old, has lived in the same home in
Anaheim for more than 30 years. He purchased the property in 1993 with his
longtime partner, Florinda Sotelo, Veronica and Ezequiel’s mother. They
shared responsibility for the mortgage and maintenance until her death in
2021. Title to the home was in Florinda’s name.
After Florinda died, Porfirio remained in the home. He collected
rent from tenants and continued to pay the mortgage. In 2023, Veronica and
Ezequiel moved into the house. Veronica acknowledged she did not have legal
title to the home and had not been appointed as administrator of Florinda’s
estate. Porfirio alleged Veronica and Ezequiel sought to force him out of the
home because they were worried he would sell it or deed it over to his new
wife and deprive them of their inheritance.
1
A separate civil action is currently pending to determine
equitable ownership and legal title of the house.
1
Veronica admitted she and Ezequiel changed the locks without
Porfirio’s permission and did not give him any keys to the new locks.2
Veronica testified that the doors were often left unlocked, but Porfirio stated
he felt forced to live in the garage to avoid confrontation with his children.
Veronica also removed Porfirio’s furniture from the house and disconnected
his refrigerator. Ezequiel admitted to keeping a car that he was directed by
court order to turn over to Porfirio.
Veronica and Ezequiel issued two alleged eviction notices to
Porfirio and served them on other occupants of the home. Veronica
acknowledged she had no legal authority, such as a court order, to justify
evicting Porfirio. Veronica testified that she believed she had a right to do so
as “next of kin” and that she did it to start a conversation with Porfirio but
admitted she was never legally appointed as a probate administrator.
Porfirio’s current wife, Rita Rojas3, testified to the following:
Veronica and Ezequiel prevented Porfirio from entering the house. Porfirio
was forced to urinate in a bucket because he was locked out of the house. Rita
had to bring food to Porfirio from her apartment because Veronica refused to
allow him use of the kitchen.
2 The majority notes that Porfirio “eventually” was given keys to
the changed locks. But when someone unilaterally changes locks to one’s
home, “eventually” is not an appropriate timeframe. If the intention is not to
exclude a person, that person is given the keys, either before or immediately
after the locks are changed. In addition, there was no evidence that Porfirio
was ever consulted about the locks being changed before it was done.
3 The majority states that Veronica testified that she did not take
or unplug Porfirio’s refrigerator. However, Rita testified that Veronica did in
fact unplug the refrigerator. I note that the trial court made no adverse
credibility determination regarding Rita’s testimony.
2
LEGAL STANDARD
The Act is the California Legislature’s response to the increasing
incidence of elderly adults and other dependents being subjected to abuse,
neglect or abandonment and a recognition of the state’s responsibility to
protect such persons. (§ 15600.) “[A]n order may be issued under this section,
with or without notice, to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
recurrence of abuse, if a declaration shows, to the satisfaction of the court,
reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse of the petitioning elder or
dependent adult.” (§ 15657.03, subd. (c).) An elder abuse protective order
“may issue on the basis of evidence of past abuse, without any particularized
showing that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.” (Gdowski v.
Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137 (Gdowski).) A preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof applies to section 15657.03 claims. (Bookout,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1139–1140.)
“Abuse of an elder” includes “[p]hysical abuse, neglect,
abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting
physical harm or pain or mental suffering,” as well as “[f]inancial abuse.”
(§ 15610.07, subd. (a)(1), (3).)
“Financial abuse” occurs when a person or entity “takes, secretes,
appropriates, obtains or returns real or personal property of an elder or
dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.”
(§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).) An action will be deemed to have been done “for a
wrongful use” if the actor “knew or should have known that this conduct is
likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult.” (§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(2)
& (b).) Proof of bad faith or fraud is not required. (Cameron v. Las Orchidias
Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 507 (Cameron).)
3
DISCUSSION
The trial court, as well as the majority opinion, fail to address
Porfirio’s allegations of elder abuse, instead focusing on the parties’ dispute
regarding ownership of the Anaheim home. Even assuming, as the court
found, Porfirio used the elder law proceedings as a tool to retain or regain
control of the house, that does not preclude the possibility that Veronica’s and
Ezequiel’s actions simultaneously constituted elder abuse.
Porfirio alleged multiple past and ongoing instances of financial
abuse under section 15610.30, including taking, secreting, appropriating or
retaining real or personal property for a wrongful use. Porfirio provided a
signed declaration and testified under oath that Veronica and Ezequiel
locked him out of the house by changing the locks, leading him to sleep in the
garage, prevented him from accessing kitchen and bathroom facilities, and
posted illegitimate eviction notices. Even if, as the court found and the
majority relies upon, Porfirio was not fully credible, that alone does not
defeat his request for an elder abuse restraining order. Veronica and Ezequiel
admitted they posted the eviction notices and changed the locks. These
actions alone constitute financial abuse because Veronica and Ezequiel “knew
or should have known” that posting illegal eviction notices and preventing
Porfirio access to the home and its facilities would “likely to be harmful” to
him. (§ 15610.30, subd. (b); see Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141
[locking elder out of her residence and interfering with access to her personal
property constituted substantial evidence of financial abuse].) Porfirio was
only required to demonstrate past abuse (Gdowski, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 137) and did not have to prove fraud or bad faith on Veronica’s and
Ezequiel’s part. (Cameron, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 507.)
4
Additionally, I am concerned that the majority opinion condones,
however unintentionally, Veronica’s and Ezequiel’s wrongful use of self-help.
Even if Veronica and Ezequiel had possessed legal title to the home, which
they admitted they did not at the time they posted the false eviction notices
and changed the locks, their actions were unlawful under Civil Code section
789.3, which prohibits landlords from taking many of the actions Veronica
and Ezequiel did here. For example, a landlord “shall not” “prevent the
tenant from gaining reasonable access to the property by changing the locks”
or “by any other similar method”; “remove the tenant’s personal property” or
“any other items without the prior written consent of the tenant”; or “cause,
directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of any utility service,”
which includes “refrigeration.” (Civ. Code § 789.3, subds. (a), (b)(1), (3).)
Based on the record before us, I conclude Porfirio met his burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate past acts of
financial abuse. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of
Porfirio’s request for elder abuse orders.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
5