Filed 11/19/26 McHarris v. City of Milpitas CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STEVE MCHARRIS, H053453
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV427505)
v.
CITY OF MILPITAS,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Steve McHarris appeals after the trial court granted
defendant and respondent City of Milpitas’s (the City) motion for summary judgment.
McHarris alleged that the City retaliated against him for protected whistleblowing
activities in violation of Labor Code1 section 1102.5 by failing to renew his employment
contract as city manager for the City. He also alleged the City breached his employment
agreement by voting to terminate his employment without cause and by not timely
renewing the agreement.
On appeal, McHarris has abandoned his original breach of contract theory and
instead argues the City breached his employment agreement by failing to conduct a
performance evaluation consistent with the contractually required, agreed-upon process.
We conclude that McHarris presented sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of
material fact regarding whether the City violated section 1102.5. With regard to the
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Labor Code.
breach of contract cause of action, however, McHarris did not properly allege the theory
on which he now relies. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with
directions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Complaint
McHarris filed a complaint setting forth four causes of action: (1) breach of
employment contract; (2) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (3) constructive
termination of employment; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
McHarris alleged that the City hired him as the city manager in June 2019. In May 2020,
McHarris entered into a written employment agreement for a time period ending on June
3, 2022. McHarris and the City later extended the agreement’s term to June 3, 2023.
Starting in November 2021, McHarris observed certain conduct of various elected
officials and employees of the City, which he believed to be unlawful and/or unethical.
McHarris reported that conduct to the City. McHarris also refused to participate in
activities that he believed would result in a violation of the law.
McHarris listed and described the allegedly unlawful and unethical conduct in his
complaint. Following a City Council meeting in November 2021, the City’s mayor,
Richard Tran, in addition to vice mayor Carmen Montano and councilmember Evelyn
Chua, spoke with McHarris about the City’s newly hired economic development
specialist staff member, Eddie Truong. Montano and Chua stated that Truong was “bad”
and Tran and Montano talked about setting a meeting with McHarris “to discuss the
2 The pleadings “set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary
judgment. [Citations.]” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 621, 648 (Oakland Raiders).) Also, “[t]he determinative question in an
appeal from a summary judgment is whether there are any material facts in dispute.”
(King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 430.) Accordingly, we
recite in this section the facts alleged in the complaint. In our discussion of the causes of
action, we will discuss any additional facts that create triable issues.
2
hiring status of Truong.” McHarris told them they needed to be careful regarding
personnel matters. Several days later, the human resource director completed research
regarding accusations against Truong and reported that they were not true. Tran and
Montano met with McHarris again and Tran questioned whether Truong’s hiring had
been influenced by another councilmember, Anthony Phan, who was friends with
Truong. Montano stated that Truong had been fired in the past for racial reasons and that
she had received complaints about Truong from the Latino community. McHarris told
them it was a personnel matter. Following the meeting, McHarris spoke with the city
attorney and objected to demands from Tran and Montano to fire Truong. A couple of
days later, the city attorney issued a memo to the City Council regarding the legal
consequences of any elected official pressuring McHarris to fire an employee.
In a separate incident, McHarris became aware of an email exchange in December
2021 between the City’s planning director and a private consulting planning department
advisor, which contained a criticism of Tran by the advisor. McHarris met with the
planning director, who agreed to end contact with the advisor, but several days later Tran
received a copy of the emails. Tran made a public records act request for several
categories of documents: all emails between McHarris and the planning director; all
emails between McHarris and the economic development director; all of McHarris’s
emails for Project Homekey, a supportive housing project Tran had opposed; and a copy
of McHarris’s employment agreement. McHarris spoke to the city attorney and stated
that the public records request was workplace harassment and a thinly veiled threat.
In January 2022, Montano began refusing to schedule meetings alone with
McHarris, agreeing only to join Tran’s meetings with McHarris. During that year, she
also requested that McHarris cause the City to fund events and holiday dinners that did
not qualify as “bona fide City expenditures.” McHarris refused to approve these funding
requests.
3
In January 2022, Tran requested that McHarris’s performance evaluation be
placed on the City Council public agenda. McHarris objected to the request for an
unfacilitated performance evaluation because he believed it was inconsistent with past
practice and with his employment agreement, which required a facilitated evaluation.
Later that month, the City Council conducted the unfacilitated performance evaluation
without McHarris. The City Council held additional unfacilitated performance
evaluations without McHarris at the beginning of February and the beginning of March.
Also in February, Montano pressured McHarris to hire a friend for a city social
services position. McHarris explained the hiring process and stated that he did not
involve himself in the hiring of staff below department heads.
In March, Tran told McHarris that an employee union expected McHarris to drop
a council-directed landscape maintenance pilot program as a result of a deal Tran made
with the union. McHarris stated that this was not consistent with the City Council’s
direction and that it was an administrative role. After Tran informed the City Council
about the negotiations, McHarris communicated with the other councilmembers
regarding the inappropriate and illegal nature of Tran’s actions.
McHarris attempted to schedule a facilitated performance evaluation pursuant to
his employment agreement from April to May 2022, but was unsuccessful, and it
appeared that Tran, Montano, and Chua refused to participate. In May, a newly
appointed city attorney told McHarris that Tran had claimed the facilitator had been
untruthful about trying to reach Tran for scheduling. As a result of Tran sabotaging the
facilitator’s reputation, the facilitator resigned.
In late 2022, a City Council candidate told McHarris that Tran had offered her his
endorsement in exchange for her commitment to remove McHarris. When the candidate
refused, Tran demanded that she remove his name from her campaign materials.
4
In December 2022 and January 2023, Montano, who had become mayor, and
Chua pressured McHarris to violate the employee remote work policy, and to violate
established policy on City Council seating arrangements.
In February 2023, the city attorney informed the city manager’s staff that the City
Council was forming a subcommittee to replace McHarris. The City attorney also told
McHarris’s executive assistant that the formation of the subcommittee would be placed
on the upcoming City Council meeting agenda. On February 2, 2023, the City Council
voted not to renew McHarris’s employment contract.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication
The City filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary
adjudication. McHarris opposed the motion, but later withdrew his opposition to the
motion with regard to the fourth cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy.
In its motion, the City presented evidence that McHarris’s employment agreement
was set to expire on June 3, 2022, and that, after the contract was not renewed, McHarris
continued to receive his compensation and benefits until the agreement ended. The City
also provided evidence that, in July 2022, McHarris was given a performance evaluation
during a closed session in which he was critiqued for: (1) failing to create a safe space for
difficult conversations; (2) failing to speak up during meetings; (3) failing to practice
“professional distancing” with city employees and City Council members; (4) failing to
be more assertive during meetings; and (5) failing to take Councilmembers’ ideas or
requests seriously.
The trial court granted the motion as to each cause of action. On the first cause of
action for breach of contract, the trial court found that McHarris had a fixed-term contract
that terminated by operation of law, and that nonrenewal of the contract was distinct from
termination. With regard to the second cause of action for retaliation in violation of
section 1102.5, the trial court found that McHarris had not been subjected to an adverse
5
action because the terms and conditions of his employment agreement automatically
provided for expiration on June 3, 2023, so there had been no change in the terms and
conditions of his employment due to the agreement’s nonrenewal.
McHarris timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard and Standard of Review
Motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication are procedurally
identical. (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1290
(Dunn).) Their purpose “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the
parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact
necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 843 (Aguilar).)
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“Summary adjudication is warranted only if the motion completely disposes of a cause of
action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [Citation.]”
(Dunn, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) Like the trial court, we must “ ‘consider all
of the evidence’ and ‘all’ of the ‘inferences’ reasonably drawn therefrom [citation], and
must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations], in the light most
favorable to the opposing party.’ ” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843; cf. Scheer v.
Regents of University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 913 (Scheer) [appellate
court assumes role of trial court and applies same rules and standards governing summary
judgment].) “[W]e liberally construe plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions and strictly
scrutinize defendants’ own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in plaintiffs’ favor.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) “There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and only if, the
6
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Serri v.
Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860.)
“ ‘ “We review orders granting summary judgment or summary adjudication de
novo. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group, L.L.C.
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 357, 362.) In doing so, “ ‘[w]e determine whether the court’s
ruling was correct, not its reasons or rationale.’ [Citation.]” (Scheer, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 913.) We “must affirm on any ground supported by the record.”
(Jimenez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133, 140.)
B. Labor Code Section 1102.5
McHarris challenges the trial court’s order only with regard to the first and second
causes of action.3 We begin by addressing the second cause of action.
Section 1102.5, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n employer, or
any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for
disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or
may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, [or] to a person
with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance … if the employee has
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal
statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
3 McHarris has abandoned any issues concerning the third cause of action by not
addressing it in his appellate briefing, and we therefore deem waived any error in the trial
court’s ruling granting summary adjudication of that claim. (See Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics omitted [“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower
court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it
on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”];
Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [even on de novo review, “[i]ssues
not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned”].)
7
regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job
duties.”
“Section 1102.5, subdivision (b), concerns employees who report to public
agencies.” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 77.) “This provision
reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to
report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.” (Ibid.)
Subdivision (c) of the statute is similar, but focuses on an employee’s conduct
rather than disclosure. It provides that “[a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf of
the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an
activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or
noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation.” (§ 1102.5, subd. (c).)
“An employee injured by prohibited retaliation may file a private suit for damages.
[Citations.]” (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709
(Lawson).) Section 1102.6 “supplies the applicable framework for litigating and
adjudicating section 1102.5 whistleblower claims.”4 (Id. at p. 712.) “First, it must be
‘demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence’ that the employee’s protected
whistleblowing was a ‘contributing factor’ to an adverse employment action. [Citation.]
Then, once the employee has made that necessary threshold showing, the employer bears
‘the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence’ that the alleged
adverse employment action would have occurred ‘for legitimate, independent reasons’
even if the employee had not engaged in protected whistleblowing activities. [Citation.]”
4 Section 1102.6 states in full: “In a civil action or administrative proceeding
brought pursuant to [s]ection 1102.5, once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that an activity proscribed by [s]ection 1102.5 was a contributing factor
in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden
of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would
have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged
in activities protected by [s]ection 1102.5.”
8
(Ibid.) Because these statutes are part of the Labor Code, we liberally construe them
“ ‘ “ ‘to favor the protection of employees.’ ” ’ ” (People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v.
Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 725 (Kolla’s).)
McHarris alleged in the second cause of action that his actions of (1) reporting
unlawful or unethical conduct and (2) refusing to participate in certain activities were
“protected actions.” He alleged further that the City “wrongfully and unlawfully
retaliated against [him] by taking adverse employment action against him by failing to
renew his employment contract without cause.” As we will discuss, the record contains
evidence that McHarris disclosed his concerns to Tran and Montano regarding their
purported attempts to coerce him into firing Truong5 and there is a triable issue of
material fact regarding whether McHarris was subjected to retaliation as a result.
In moving for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for violation of
section 1102.5, the City made the following arguments before the trial court:
(1) McHarris did not engage in any protected activity; (2) the City did not subject
McHarris to any adverse actions; (3) McHarris cannot establish a causal link between any
protected activity and any adverse action; (4) the City’s evidence demonstrates the
existence of legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the nonrenewal of McHarris’s
employment agreement; (5) McHarris failed to demonstrate the abilities necessary to
perform his role as city manager; and (6) McHarris engaged in other misconduct while on
the job. On appeal, the City focuses on a subset of these arguments: (1) McHarris did not
engage in any protected activity; (2) there was no actionable adverse action; (3) McHarris
has not met his evidentiary burden as to causation; and (4) the City would have made the
same decision not to renew McHarris’s contract even without any alleged whistleblowing
activity.
5 McHarris’s report to Tran and Montano of their own allegedly improper conduct
may qualify as a “disclosure” under section 1102.5. (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.
729–730.)
9
1. Protected Activity
McHarris asserts that he disclosed wrongdoing to authorities and refused to
participate in unlawful activities. Disclosure falls under subdivision (b) of
section 1102.5, and requires the employee to reasonably believe there was a violation of a
state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal
rule or regulation. (Ibid.; Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 734.) “This clause imposes a
requirement of objective reasonableness and excludes from whistleblower protection
disclosures that involve only disagreements over discretionary decisions, policy choices,
interpersonal dynamics, or other nonactionable issues.” (Kolla’s, at p. 734.) In contrast
to subdivision (b), subdivision (c) of section 1102.5, which applies to refusal to
participate in an activity that would result in a violation of state or federal statute, or a
violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, “requires a
showing that the activity in question actually would result in a violation or
noncompliance with a statute, rule, or regulation.” (Nejadian v. County of Los Angeles
(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 703, 719.)
The City argues that there were no protected disclosures because the evidence
relied on by McHarris—his self-evaluation—is inadmissible.6 The City argues further
that, even if the self-evaluation were admissible, that evidence as well as a purported
conversation between McHarris and two members of the City Council constitute internal
administrative or personnel communications that do not give rise to whistleblower
protection.
McHarris stated in his self-evaluation that he was “concerned about a few serious
issues that are impacting [his] ability to effectively administer [his] duties as [c]ity
[m]anager, and require the immediate attention of each City Councilmember.” He asserts
6 The City submitted a series of objections to McHarris’s evidence. We will
address the objections in the course of our discussion as needed.
10
that he complained about Tran’s and Montano’s efforts to coerce him regarding
employment appointments by stating in the self-evaluation that the City Council should
“[a]bide by provisions of the [Milpitas] Municipal Code relative to the [c]ity [m]anager
and the [c]ity [m]anager job description” and “not attempt to influence [c]ity [m]anager
or staff on the making of employment appointments for any City personnel (with the
exception of the City Attorney’s Office).” (Hereafter Municipal Code.) McHarris also
states that he complained in the self-evaluation about Tran’s interference by individually
and directly negotiating with the union despite several months of union negotiations with
the City, by stating that it was “inconsistent with full Council direction to City staff,
undercuts staff authority, devalues your professional executive managers, and does not
follow your City Attorney guidance on fair bargaining practices.” In addition, McHarris
raised issues with the process for his evaluation, and with the approval of a car wash that
he contended did not comply with “the Midtown Specific Plan.”
We need not decide whether the City’s objection to the self-evaluation has merit
because, regardless of whether the self-evaluation is admissible, there is separate
evidence in the record to which the City did not object that raises a triable issue of
material fact regarding McHarris’s disclosure to Tran and Montano that they could not
interfere with the hiring of Truong. Montano stated in her deposition that she and Tran
wanted to set up a meeting with McHarris to talk about Truong. Montano stated further
that she and Tran spoke with McHarris and McHarris told them that they needed to be
careful regarding personnel matters. Montano understood that to mean that “the city
manager is the one that hires and fires” and that they “cannot tell a city manager to hire or
fire.”
The City argues that the conversation between McHarris and Montano does not
show that he disclosed a violation of the Municipal Code to persons with authority over
him, and that he is attempting to elevate internal conversations about personnel or
administrative matters to whistleblower status. Disclosures made in the context of
11
internal personnel matters, rather than in the context of a legal violation, do not amount to
whistleblowing. (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
1378, 1385.) Such personnel matters can include, for example, the forwarding of student
complaints (id., at pp. 1384–1385), or “[m]atters such as transferring employees, writing
up employees, and counseling employees.” (Mueller v. County of Los Angeles (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 809, 822.)
But here, evidence in the record shows that the issue regarding Truong’s hiring
status was not simply a general disagreement about an internal personnel matter
involving only a supervisor and his employee but was instead rooted in McHarris’s belief
that the alleged interference by Tran and Montano amounted to a legal violation.
McHarris contends that the Municipal Code (tit. 6, ch. 1, § 2.03) vests exclusive
appointment and removal authority in the city manager, and that his belief that he was
being asked to act unlawfully was therefore objectively reasonable.7 But construing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in McHarris’s favor as we must (Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 843), there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether two City
Council members, who had no direct authority over staff personnel matters, attempted to
coerce, pressure or force McHarris to fire Truong. And relatedly, it is a triable issue of
fact whether McHarris reasonably believed he was disclosing to Tran and Montano their
own potential violations of the Municipal Code.
This conclusion is further supported by McHarris’s statement in his declaration in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment that Tran threatened to fire McHarris if
McHarris did not fire Truong.8 When looked at in the light most favorable to McHarris,
7 Title VI, chapter 1, section 2.03 states, in relevant part, that “[t]he [c]ity
[m]anager shall be the ‘appointing officer’ of the City, and shall have the power to
appoint and dismiss all subordinate appointive officers and employees, subject to the
provisions of the City’s Municipal Code.” (Milpitas Mun. Code, tit. VI, ch. 1, § 2.03.)
8 The City submitted an objection to this paragraph of McHarris’s declaration, but
it appears to be directed mainly at McHarris’s contention elsewhere in the paragraph that
12
the declaration shows that the conversation with Tran regarding Truong went beyond a
normal discussion of or disagreement about personnel matters. McHarris’s description
reinforces the inference that Tran was attempting to coerce McHarris into making a
specific personnel decision that McHarris would not have otherwise made and that Tran
could not make himself, in potential violation of the Municipal Code. In other words, if
McHarris had conceded to the pressure and complied, the decision to terminate Truong
would essentially have been made by Tran, not McHarris, even though Tran had no
authority to make such a decision because that authority was vested only in the city
manager, i.e. McHarris.
We need not determine, however, whether or not there was an actual legal
violation, as it is not determinative in this instance. It matters only that McHarris
reasonably believed there was a legal violation. (Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce,
Inc. (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1251, 1261, italics omitted [“[S]ection 1102.5[,subd.] (b)
only requires an employee to have ‘reasonable cause’ to believe that a law has been
violated. … There is no requirement that the employee prove an actual violation.”].)
Evidence in the record shows that McHarris told his assistant that he would not terminate
Truong’s employment because he thought doing so under the circumstances was not
legal. This is sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding McHarris’s
belief. Further, McHarris was not required to specify the law he believed would be
violated. “Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), does not require such an express
statement. It requires only that an employee disclose information and that the employee
reasonably believe the information discloses unlawful activity. [Citation.]” (Ross v.
County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592–593.)
he received a low performance rating in 2022 due to “increasingly hostile and contentious
disputes” between him and Tran and Montano. To the extent the City is asserting a
hearsay objection, it is overruled, as Tran’s statement is admissible both for his mental
state and as a statement made by a party opponent. (See Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1150.)
13
Lastly, the City argues that the conversation with Tran and Montano did not
constitute a disclosure to persons with authority over him because it is the City Council
as a whole and not any individual councilmember that has authority over the city
manager. The City cites no authority for this proposition, and we reject it. Just because
the City Council as a whole would need to act regarding the statue of McHarris’s
employment does not mean that the individual members of the City Council did not have
authority over him for the purpose of applying section 1102.5. (See Killgore v. SpecPro
Professional Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 973, 985 (Killgore) [“A person ‘with
authority’ over the whistleblower is in a managerial position with the ability to act on that
information.”].)
Moreover, “[t]he legislative history of section 1102.5[, subdivision] (b), its
purpose, and its placement within a larger statutory scheme designed to protect workers
support a broad reading of the term ‘disclose.’ ” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 728.)
Because there is an extensive “ ‘public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-
blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation’ [citation],” (Killgore, supra,
51 F.4th at p. 985), there are several avenues for disclosure of potential wrongdoing:
“government or law enforcement agencies, a person with authority over the employee,
other employees with authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or
noncompliance, or any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 986.) The City’s ostensible position that section 1102.5 required
McHarris to make a disclosure about Tran and Montano to the City Council as a whole
rather than the individual members responsible for the conduct contravenes this policy.
In sum, we conclude that evidence in the record, if credited by the trier of fact,
shows McHarris disclosed information to persons with authority over him that he
reasonably believed was a violation of the law.9
9 A single disclosure is sufficient to support a claim under section 1102.5 and
summary adjudication cannot be granted as to only part of a cause of action. (Code Civ.
14
2. Adverse Action
The City argues that the City Council’s vote not to renew McHarris’s contract
does not qualify as an adverse action because of the doctrines of separation of powers,
legislative immunity, and discretionary immunity.10 Specifically, the City asserts that the
City Council has discretionary authority to give or withhold approval of long-term
contracts. The City did not make this argument in the trial court, but we acknowledge
that we must affirm a motion for summary judgment if it is correct on any grounds
asserted, even if those grounds were not asserted in the trial court, so long as the parties
have had an adequate opportunity to address those grounds on appeal. (Garrett v.
Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 181.)
Regardless, the City’s argument lacks merit. “Separation of powers means that
‘legislators have absolute immunity from damage suits based on legislative acts.’
[Citation.]” (People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 939 (Harris).)
Based on this principle, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is
not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was
Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); Orange County Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US,
LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [“A motion for summary adjudication may not be
granted if it resolves only part of a cause of action.”].) Accordingly, in light of our
conclusion that there is evidence raising a triable issue of material fact regarding
McHarris’s disclosure regarding Truong, we do not address any other alleged disclosures
or refusals to participate in an activity that would result in a legal violation.
10 In support of this argument, the City cites Civil Code section 47 and
Government Code sections 820.2 and 821. Civil Code section 47 concerns privileged
publications or broadcasts and Government Code section 821 provides that “[a] public
employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption of or failure to adopt an
enactment or by his failure to enforce an enactment.” There is no issue in this case
regarding a purportedly privileged publication or broadcast, or any injury caused by any
enactment, as that term is statutorily defined. (Gov. Code, § 810.6 [an enactment “means
a constitutional provision, statute, charter provision, ordinance or regulation”].) These
two statutes are inapposite.
15
the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be
abused.” (Gov. Code, § 820.2.)
But such immunity is not all-encompassing. “The scope of the discretionary act
immunity ‘should be no greater than is required to give legislative and executive
policymakers sufficient breathing space in which to perform their vital policymaking
functions.’ [Citation.]” (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 685.) “Additionally,
immunity does not apply where the individual defendant violated a statute and immunity
would frustrate the purpose of the statute violated. [Citations.]” (Bakos v. Roach (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 390, 401; see also Conn v. Western Placer Unified School Dist. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1178–1180 [holding that Government Code section 820.2
immunity did not apply to a violation of a whistleblower statute].)
We recognize that in Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 983 (Caldwell)
the California Supreme Court, in considering a claim under California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), held that a school board’s “collective
determination whether to hire or fire a person as the district’s superintendent must be
considered a basic policy decision, immune from civil damage actions that seek to hold
individual board members liable for the motives behind their votes.” (Fn. omitted) The
Court stated that “[w]hen elected school board members, representing their
constituencies, decide in whom they will repose confidence as the chief executive, policy
architect, and personal symbol of a diverse public school system, they engage in the
quintessential discretionary act of government. Under the [Tort Claims] Act, they are
thus immune from personal suit, even if the motives which influenced their decision
might otherwise give rise to actions against them grounded in FEHA.” (Id. at p. 988.)
One could make the argument that a city manager holds a position of similar importance
to a superintendent and that the same immunity would apply to the decision not to renew
McHarris’s employment agreement.
16
The Caldwell Court stated, however, that nothing it said was “intended to imply
that because the individual board members are immune, plaintiff’s FEHA claim against
[the school district] itself [was] also barred.” (Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 989,
fn. 9.) Indeed, the Court stated that “the issue of entity immunity is not before us in this
case, and we do not decide it.”11 (Ibid.)
McHarris has elected to bring suit against the City as an entity, not against any
individual councilmember. Section 1102.5 expressly provides that “[a]n
employer … shall not retaliate against an employee….” (§ 1102.5, subd. (b), italics
added.) The statute therefore authorizes a direct action against an entity, and
Government Code section 820.2, which provides immunity to a “public employee” for
discretionary acts is not relevant here. Further, applying immunity to this decision would
frustrate the purpose of section 1102.5. (See Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 352, 365 [“To preclude a whistleblower from revealing improper
conduct by the government based on confidentiality would frustrate the legislative intent
underlying the whistleblower statutes. For reasons of public policy, actions against a
public entity for claims of discharge from or termination of employment grounded on a
whistleblower claim are not barred by governmental immunity.”]; see also Chapin v.
Aguirre (S.D. Cal., 2007) 2007 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 41459, at *24 [“[T]o afford [Gov. Code,]
§ 820.2 immunity to a government employer who terminates a plaintiff ‘even though
such discharge was a retaliatory act expressly prohibited by’ a whistleblower statute such
as § 1102.5 ‘would emasculate the entire effect and purpose of the statute.’
[Citations.]”].) The City is therefore not entitled to immunity.
We now turn to whether the decision not to renew the employment agreement
constituted an adverse action. “[I]n order to establish either a discrimination or a
11 We observe that the Harris case, relied on by the City, also involved immunity
for individual legislators and not governmental entities. (Harris, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 939–940.)
17
retaliation claim, ‘an employee must demonstrate that he or she has been subjected to an
adverse employment action that materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment[.]’ ” (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158,
1168.) “When a plaintiff alleges a series of actions that comprise a course of conduct, we
need not examine each individually. Instead, we consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment
action.” (Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 92.)
“[T]here is no requirement that an employer’s retaliatory acts constitute one swift blow,
rather than a series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries. [Citations.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1055 (Yanowitz).)
McHarris alleged within his second cause of action only that the City took an
adverse employment action against him by failing to renew his employment contract.
But he also alleged other conduct earlier in the pleading concerning misconduct leading
up to the nonrenewal of his employment contract, such as issues with his performance
evaluations.12 To that end, McHarris presents evidence that, in contrast to his first three
performance reviews, he received a lower performance rating in his fourth evaluation
after he experienced issues with Tran and Montano. Unwarranted negative performance
evaluations can be considered as part of the totality of circumstances in determining
whether an employee was subject to retaliation. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1055.)
It is a factual question here whether the performance evaluation had an impact on the
City Council’s decision not to renew McHarris’s contract. Moreover, even by itself, the
nonrenewal could be considered an adverse action. (Taswell v. Regents of University of
12 While we reach a different conclusion with regard to the incorporation of earlier
allegations into the breach of contract cause of action, discussed infra, the earlier
allegations of conduct in the complaint are related to and lead up to the nonrenewal
allegation and should be considered together in the totality of the circumstances.
18
California (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 343, 365 [holding that the nonrenewal of an
employment contract is an adverse action].)
3. Causation
A “whistleblower retaliation claim[] brought under section 1102.5 … places the
burden on the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation
for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested
employment action.” (Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718.) The City argues that
McHarris has not presented evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on
causation. In making this argument, the City contends that the majority of the evidence
relied on by McHarris is inadmissible, and that any admissible evidence does not show
causation between the claimed protected activity and any adverse action. As we have
discussed, however, there is evidence in the record that is sufficient to raise triable issues
of material fact with regard to both protected activity and adverse action.
With regard to causation specifically, McHarris presented evidence that Tran
stated he would fire McHarris if McHarris did not terminate Truong’s employment. If
believed by the trial of fact, that evidence shows a direct link between McHarris’s
protected activity and the adverse action of nonrenewal of his employment agreement.
McHarris also provided evidence that, despite previously receiving three positive
performance evaluations, he received a poor performance review after his protected
activity. Whether the poor performance review was a result of the protected activity is a
factual issue not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment.
Further, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the poor
performance review was a contributing factor in the City Council’s decision not to renew
McHarris’s contract. The City contends that the chain of causation was broken in late
2022 when the composition of the City Council changed and there were two new
councilmembers that voted on McHarris’s contract. This argument fails to take into
account that there were still members of the City Council, like Montano, who had not
19
changed and whose votes were a “contributing factor” to the result, and also that any new
councilmembers could have nonetheless reviewed the poor performance review and been
influenced by it. We conclude there is a triable issue of material fact regarding causation.
4. “Same Decision” Defense
Once a plaintiff establishes “by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation
for an employee’s protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested
employment action … the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate,
independent reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.” (Lawson,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 718.) The City argues that it presented clear and convincing
evidence that it would have voted not to renew McHarris’s employment agreement even
in the absence of any alleged protected disclosures. The City states that it is undisputed
that McHarris received a lower overall score of 3.6 out of 5 on his July 2022 performance
evaluation and that the performance evaluation listed specific areas of concern. The City
contends that the concerns in the evaluation provide independent, legitimate grounds for
the City Council’s 2-3 vote not to renew McHarris’s contract.
For an employer to meet its burden, it is not sufficient to simply point out that
other legitimate, independent reasons for an alleged adverse action exist. Section 1102.6
requires the employer “to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged
action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had
not engaged in activities protected by [s]ection 1102.5.” (Italics added.) The City relies
on the poor performance evaluation and the areas of concern within it as an independent
reason for McHarris’s nonrenewal, but the reasons for McHarris receiving the poor
performance review are themselves disputed by the parties. McHarris contends he
received the poor evaluation as a result of his protected activities, and there is evidence
that can support that conclusion.
20
Consequently, the City has not met its burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that the same result would have occurred for legitimate, independent
reasons. There are instead triable issues of material fact regarding the true reasons for the
poor performance evaluation and whether performance issues raised in the evaluation
provided a legitimate basis for the City Council’s action in voting not to renew
McHarris’s employment agreement.
C. Breach of Contract13
In the first cause of action for breach of contract, McHarris alleged that the City
breached his employment contract, in violation of section 12(b) of the agreement (section
12(b)), by “voting to terminate his employment without cause and to not renew his
contract of employment before the expiration of six months after a City Council
election.”14 McHarris has abandoned this theory on appeal. Instead, he focuses on
section 6 of his employment agreement (section 6), which provides for annual
performance evaluations. The trial court declined to consider any alleged breach of this
provision, finding that the first cause of action was premised solely on an alleged breach
of section 12(b).
McHarris argues that the trial court erred by ignoring the section 6 breach of
contract theory because the first cause of action in the complaint incorporates by
13 McHarris requests judicial notice of four documents related to the award of
attorney fees and costs against him, which he contends are relevant to the breach of
contract cause of action. These documents are not relevant to our analysis and
conclusion and we deny the request. (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1257, 1276 [“Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters
[citation], only relevant material may be noticed.”].)
14 Section 12(b) states: “Termination Immediately Before or Following City
Council Election. No action by the City Council to terminate Employee, other than for
Cause, will be made within ninety (90) days before a City Council election or within six
(6) months immediately following a City Council election. Nothing in this subsection
alters the ‘at will’ status of Employee’s employment with City.”
21
reference all prior paragraphs, which include allegations regarding the City’s failure to
conduct an evaluation consistent with the contractually required, agreed-upon process.
The City disputes this, asserting that the complaint did not sufficiently put the City on
notice that McHarris intended to bring any breach of contract claim under section 6 of the
employment agreement.
McHarris incorporated all of his earlier allegations in his complaint into each
successive cause of action in the complaint. While it is permissible to incorporate earlier
allegations into later causes of action, incorporating all prior allegations into each cause
of action, sometimes referred to as “chain letter” pleading, “should be avoided as it tends
to cause ambiguity and creates redundancy.” (Kelly v. General Telephone Co. (1982)
136 Cal.App.3d 278, 285; see also International Billing Services, Inc. v. Emigh (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1179 [incorporating by reference all preceding paragraphs into
each cause of action “often masks the true causes of action”].)
In this instance, McHarris made certain general allegations related to his
employment contract, but did not specifically set them out in the breach of contract cause
of action. The only allegation in the first cause of action that the City “breached its
contract of employment with McHarris” concerns section 12(b) of the contract. Further,
although the entire contract is attached to the complaint and therefore incorporated by
reference, section 12(b) is also the only section of the agreement that is specifically called
out and quoted in the earlier general allegations in the “Facts of the Case” portion of the
complaint. Section 6 is not mentioned anywhere in the allegations of the complaint. A
fair reading of the first cause of action therefore would indicate that the only breach at
issue was the one relying on section 12(b), not section 6.
Further, it is not apparent that the general allegations regarding the performance
evaluations were alleged as support for the breach of contract cause of action as opposed
to the retaliation cause of action or simply for background information. (See Cal-West
Nat. Bank v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 96, 101 [“a civil plaintiff may for the
22
sake of convenience incorporate by reference previous portions of his pleading for
informational purposes only”].) The alleged facts in the background section that mention
the employment contract are listed in paragraph 15, which states, before setting out a list
of facts including those regarding the employment agreement, that “McHarris observed
the conduct of certain elected officials and employees of the City which McHarris knew,
or reasonably believed to be, unlawful and/or unethical. In written and/or verbal
communications, McHarris complained and reported that conduct to the City.” This
allegation corresponds with McHarris’s second cause of action for retaliation under
section 1102.5, in which he also alleged that he “report[ed] unlawful or unethical
conduct.”
“The complaint limits the issues to be addressed at the motion for summary
judgment.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.) “[T]he
burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate
plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not
refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings. [Citations.]”
(Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, italics omitted.)
The allegations of McHarris’s complaint do not provide notice that an alleged breach of
section 6 of the employment agreement is part of the breach of contract cause of action
and the City had no obligation to address such an alleged breach in its motion for
summary judgment.
To the extent McHarris now seeks to amend the complaint to allege a breach of
contract cause of action based on section 6 of the employment agreement, he may not do
so. McHarris cites several cases for the proposition that leave to amend can be requested
and granted on appeal. (See Ventura Coastal, LLC v. Occupational Safety & Health
Appeals Bd. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1, 32–33; see also The Oglio Entertainment Group,
Inc. v. The Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 573, 585; see also
Kempton v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1348.) Each of these cases
23
involved a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings, not a motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment cases have generally held that a party must “move to
amend … prior to the hearing on the summary adjudication motion. [Citations.]” (580
Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18;
Oakland Raiders, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 [“a plaintiff wishing ‘to rely upon
unpleaded theories to defeat summary judgment’ must move to amend the complaint
before the hearing. [Citations.]”)
While it is true that there is a policy of liberality in allowing amendments to the
pleadings, “ ‘this policy applies “ ‘only “[w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse
party.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘ “a long deferred presentation of the proposed
amendment without a showing of excuse for the delay” ’ may provide ‘ “a valid reason
for denial.” ’ [Citation.]” (Hughes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 73,
87.) “It would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [a] summary judgment
motion by allowing them to present a ‘moving target’ unbounded by the pleadings.”
(Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting
the City’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion as
to the first, third, and fourth causes of action, and denying the motion as to the second
cause of action. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
24
______________________________________
Adams, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Danner, J.
H053453
McHarris v. City of Milpitas