Filed 9/28/26 Marriage of Zahi and Ouchene CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of LAMIA ZAHI
and ABDELWAHAB JAMEL
OUCHENE. A175157
LAMIA ZAHI,
(San Francisco City &
Respondent, County Super. Ct. No.
v. FDI-24-800489)
ABDELWAHAB JAMEL OUCHENE,
Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In this marital dissolution action, Abdelwahab Jamel
Ouchene appeals from an order denying his motion to set aside a
purported judgment entered in his wife’s favor (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, subd. (b) [hereafter § 473(b)]).2 Although his wife, Lamia
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant
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to standard 8.1 of the California Standards of Judicial
Administration, and Court of Appeal, First District, Local Rules,
rule 19.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
2
Procedure. Section 473(b) provides, in relevant part: “The court
may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party’s
legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
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Zahi, has not filed a respondent’s brief, we affirm because
Ouchene fails to present an adequate record on appeal and is
wrong on the merits.
Ouchene and Zahi married in 2001 and separated in 2023.
When Zahi filed her petition for dissolution, in November 2024,
she asked the trial court to void an interspousal deed that had
granted real property in San Lorenzo to Ouchene as his separate
property. Although the filing does not appear in the record before
us, she later asked the court to also characterize the San Lorenzo
property as community property and order Ouchene to
immediately place the proceeds from the property’s sale into an
interest-bearing bank account in both parties’ names.
In an order dated April 29, 2025—which is again not in the
record before us—the trial court granted Zahi’s requests to void
the interspousal transfer deed and to recharacterize the San
Lorenzo property as community property. The court also ordered
(inter alia) Ouchene to deliver a cashier’s check for 50 percent of
the net proceeds to Zahi’s attorney by May 9, 2025.
Between April 29, 2025, and November 20, 2025, Ouchene
did not comply with the April 29 order (or subsequent orders) to
provide Zahi’s attorney with 50 percent of the net proceeds
(determined to be $408,957.61) or a July 7 order to pay $27,180 in
sanctions.
Zahi filed requests for issuance of writs of execution, which
were eventually heard on November 20, 2025. On that same day,
the court also heard Ouchene’s motion to set aside the April 29,
2025 order and “the judgment dated June 13, 2025,”3 pursuant to
section 473(b), and his motion to remove the freeze on his bank
proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
3No order or judgment bearing that date appears in the
record before us.
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account—both of which were filed by Ouchene’s recently
substituted counsel. The court denied both of Ouchene’s motions
and granted Zahi’s requests for writs of execution in the amounts
of $408,957.61 and $27,180.
In his notice of appeal, Ouchene’s counsel indicates his
appeal is taken from an order entered on November 20, 2025,
which he states is appealable as a “request for order to revive
interspousal transfer deed; vacate judgment of 06/13/2025;
release funds from bank account.” Although his opening brief is
not entirely clear, Ouchene appears to challenge both the order
entered after the November 20 hearing and the April 29 order.
He suggests these orders are appealable as an order after final
judgment (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2)) and a final judgment (§ 904.1,
subd. (a)(1)) or under the collateral order doctrine.
We assume, without deciding, that the order entered after
the November 20, 2025 hearing is appealable as an order after
final judgment. (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see also Sakaguchi v.
Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 857, fn. 3 [“[a]n order
denying a motion to set aside the judgment is appealable,
regardless of whether the time to appeal from the underlying
judgment has expired”].)
However, it appears likely that we lack jurisdiction to
review the April 29 order because any appeal is untimely. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104(a)(1)(C) [notice of appeal must be
filed (at latest) by 180 days after entry of judgment], 8.108(c)(3)
[time to file notice of appeal is extended by motion to vacate
judgment to 180 days after entry of judgment]; Van Beurden Ins.
Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 [appellate court lacks jurisdiction over
untimely appeal].) The notice of appeal, which did not indicate it
was from the April 29 order in any event, was not filed until
November 20, 2025—205 days after April 29.
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Assuming any appeal from the April 29 order is timely and
properly before us, we conclude the order must be affirmed
because Ouchene failed to include the order in the appellate
record. (See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296
[appellant bears burden of providing record adequate for task of
determining whether error occurred]; Gee v. American Realty &
Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 [if the record
is inadequate for meaningful review, “ ‘the appellant defaults and
the decision of the trial court should be affirmed’ ”].)
As to the order denying Ouchene’s request to set aside the
judgment, Ouchene’s position is not supported by the record. He
argues that the trial court abused its discretion, and violated due
process, by denying his motion without giving him the
opportunity to testify regarding his whereabouts at the time he
failed to appear for a June 12, 2025 hearing he had requested.
He is wrong.
When Ouchene’s motions were heard, on November 20, the
trial court announced that the dispositive question was whether
Ouchene was in Algeria on June 12, 2025 and without reliable
internet access to appear at the hearing by video—as he had
asserted in his June 10, 2025 email to the court. The court
reviewed travel receipts on Ouchene’s phone, which showed that
he was in Paris, France, on June 12, 2025—not in Algeria.
Ouchene was sworn to testify and, although he initially claimed
to not remember, eventually admitted that he was in Paris. The
court found that Ouchene’s claim of inadvertence or excusable
neglect was not credible, took judicial notice of internet
availability in Paris, and found that Ouchene intentionally chose
not to appear remotely on June 12, and to violate the court’s
orders.
Ouchene presents no other reasoned and intelligible legal
argument, supported by references to the record and pertinent
authority, to challenge that decision. (See Hernandez v. First
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Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)–(C).)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s April 29, 2025 order and order denying
Ouchene’s motion to set aside the judgment, under section 473(b),
are affirmed. Zahi may recover her costs on appeal.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
Zahi v. Ouchene (A175157)
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