Filed 9/29/26 Marriage of Washburn CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of KARLA M. B349543
and TIMOTHY J. WASHBURN.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
KARLA M. WASHBURN, 23WHFL01398)
Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY J. WASHBURN,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Esther P. Kim, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Timothy J. Washburn, self-represented litigant, for
Appellant.
Law Office of Katrina L. Perkins-Williamson, Katrina L.
Perkins-Williamson, for Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Timothy Washburn appeals from a judgment of dissolution
of marriage following a bench trial of contested issues. He
contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
continue the trial based on the pendency of a newly-filed criminal
charge against him; erred in adjudicating custody and visitation
by considering the criminal charge as substantive evidence that
he violated a criminal protective order; and erred when it made
rulings on the division of property and contested
reimbursements. We reverse the custody and visitation orders
but otherwise affirm the judgment.
II. FACTS
Timothy1 married Karla on December 30, 2008, and
separated from her on August 22, 2023. They had two children
together, E.A., born, 2013, and A.R., born 2016.
During the marriage, Karla’s engagement ring was stolen
from the home. In April 2015, Timothy gave Karla a replacement
ring as a birthday present. When the couple separated, Timothy
took possession of the ring and stated that he would not return it
unless Karla paid him $5,000.
Since the date of separation, Timothy had continued to
reside in the family residence and enjoyed the sole and exclusive
use of it. The parties also owned other property, including a
timeshare with the Disney Vacation Club. Timothy inherited
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to
them by their first names for clarity.
2
$5,000 from his mother and used the money to pay off debt
during the marriage.
Following separation, there was no disparity in income
between Karla and Timothy.
On September 1, 2023, Karla filed a petition for dissolution
of marriage.
A jury found Timothy guilty of domestic battery in violation
of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1)—battery on a
spouse; and the trial court issued a 10-year criminal protective
order2 in favor of Karla. Timothy was sentenced to three years of
probation.
On January 31, 2025, the Long Beach City Prosecutor filed
a new criminal charge against Timothy for violation of the
criminal protective order, case number 25LBCM00221. That case
was pending at the time of trial.
By January 2025, Timothy had completed a court-ordered
52-week batterers program, during which he sometimes took two
classes a week so that he could finish the program early. And, on
the advice of his counsel, he also completed a 12-week anger
management class but regretted doing so because he felt that by
taking the course, he gave credence to Karla’s “false claims of
anger management[.]” In his view, the anger management class
was “unnecessary” and “a waste of resources, money.” Timothy
also participated in a court-ordered parenting class, which he
found helpful.
Although the trial court had initially ordered that
Timothy’s visitation with the children be monitored, Karla
2 The parties stipulated at trial that a copy of the protective
order “with a conformed copy [date] of October 11, 2023,” could be
admitted at trial.
3
subsequently agreed that the visits could be unmonitored and she
acknowledged that the monitored visit on June 22, 2024, had
gone well.
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
As noted, Karla filed her petition for dissolution of
marriage on September 1, 2023.
On February 3, 2025, Timothy filed a motion to continue
the trial, based on a recent notice he received of a newly-filed
criminal charge against him. The trial court denied the request.
A bench trial commenced on February 10, 2025. At the
outset of the trial, the children’s counsel suggested proceeding in
a manner that might expedite the resolution of the custody and
visitation issues, the only issues in which she was involved on
behalf of her clients, stating: “It seems to me that with this new
[criminal] violation, it is befitting for the court to frame the issues
of custody and visitation relative to [Timothy’s] ability to rebut
Family Code section 3044.”4 The trial court responded that even
3 Other than Timothy’s written request to continue the trial
and his trial brief, the record does not contain any of the parties’
filings in the trial court prior to trial. And, it does not include
any of the 23 exhibits introduced at trial.
4 Family Code section 3044 (section 3044) provides in
pertinent part: “Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking
custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence within the
previous five years against the other party seeking custody of the
child ... there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole
or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has
perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest
4
prior to the filing of the new charges, at an earlier hearing on
October 16, 2024, the court and the parties “had these
discussions.”
Timothy stipulated that he had been convicted by a jury of
committing a crime of domestic violence.
The trial court heard testimony over two days from
Timothy, Karla, and Michael Park, a real estate appraiser
retained by the parties to provide an estimated value for the
family residence. Timothy, who represented himself, questioned
Karla.
At the completion of the testimony, the trial court indicated
that it would take the matter under submission following receipt
of closing briefs and further submissions.
On April 4, 2025, the trial court issued a proposed interim
statement of decision to which Timothy filed objections on
April 18, 2025.
On June 11, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment which
attached its final statement of decision.
The trial court made the following rulings on contested
issues. On custody, the trial court awarded sole legal and sole
physical custody of the children to Karla. On visitation, the court
ordered Timothy’s “parenting time to be monitored, professionally
or upon an agreed upon monitor by the parties, up to five hours,
on the [1st, 3rd, and 4th] Saturday to Sunday.” (Boldface
omitted.)
On division of property issues, the trial court denied
Timothy’s request to purchase the family residence because he
failed to provide adequate documentary evidence to show he
of the child … . This presumption may only be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (§ 3044, subd. (a).)
5
could buy out Karla’s interest in the home and therefore ordered
the home sold within 60 days. The court also ordered that the
parties’ Disney Vacation Club timeshare be sold within 30 days.
And, based on its finding that the replacement engagement ring
purchased by Timothy for Karla was a gift, the court awarded the
ring to her. Finally, the court denied Timothy’s request for
spousal support.
On the parties’ claims for reimbursement, the trial court
ordered Timothy to reimburse Karla the following amounts:
(1) $4,336.70 for his one-half share of the cost of Disney Magic
Key pass; (2) $3,544.00 for his one-half share of the health,
vision, and dental insurance costs; (3) $45.00 for medical
expenses; and (4) $75.00 for Stemcyte Cord Blood, for a total
reimbursement of $8,000.70. The court further ordered Timothy
to reimburse Karla $7,199.08 for the Disney Vacation Club
timeshare and $1,274.16 for car insurance and an IRA
reimbursement.
The trial court also ruled that Karla was entitled to a
Watts5 charge of $20,830.27 for Timothy’s use of the family
residence following separation.
5 Watts charges—named after the decision in In re Marriage
of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366—are used to compensate the
community when one spouse has the exclusive use of a
community asset, usually the couple’s residence, between
separation and trial. The spouse using the property is charged
for the reasonable value of its use. (In re Marriage of Mohler
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, 796–797 (Mohler).)
6
On Timothy’s claim for Epstein6 credits, the trial court
denied the request based on its finding that he remained in the
home after separation and had sole use of it, as well as his failure
to submit evidence in support of the requested credits.
On Timothy’s claim for reimbursement for the $5,000
inheritance he received during marriage, the trial court denied it
based on its finding that he used the money to pay off debt.
Finally, on the parties’ respective claims for attorney fees
based on disparity in income, the trial court denied them based
on its finding that there was no such disparity between Karla and
Timothy.
On August 8, 2025, Timothy timely filed a notice of appeal
from the judgment.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Continuance
Timothy contends that the trial court “denied due process
and abused its discretion by refusing to continue the trial after a
newly surfaced criminal complaint was disclosed less than two
weeks before trial, then allowing that unresolved allegation to
shape the custody determination.” (Boldface omitted.)
6 “The reverse of the Watts charge concept is the ‘Epstein
credit,’ whereby a spouse who uses his or her separate property to
pay a community obligation may seek reimbursement from the
community estate. (See In re Marriage of Epstein ((1979) 24
Cal.3d 76, 84–85.)” (Mohler, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 797,
fn. 4.)
7
1. Background
In his February 3, 2025, motion to continue the trial,
Timothy argued that there was a new criminal charge filed
against him for violation of the criminal protective order and he
was only notified of the charge when he received the Long Beach
City Prosecutor’s January 31, 2025, letter. According to Timothy,
“[g]iven the seriousness of the criminal charge and the
overlapping nature of the facts in both the criminal case and this
family law proceeding,” he needed to focus his attention on
preparing his defense and coordinating with counsel. He
maintained that a “hearing in this Family Law matter prior to
May 30, 2025, would severely prejudice [his] ability to defend
[himself] effectively in both proceedings.” Among other things,
the continuance would allow him to “[r]etain or coordinate with
legal counsel” in both matters; “[c]ollect and review necessary
evidence for each matter;” and “[a]void making statements in this
Family Law case that could be used against [him] in the criminal
matter.”
At the beginning of trial, the trial court noted “some
discussions” it had with the parties prior to the case being called
and then recited the parties’ stipulations to the admission of
certain facts and exhibits, including that a new criminal
protective order had been issued against Timothy on January 31,
2025, in a new case for a violation of the criminal protective
order.
8
The trial court reminded Timothy that he had requested
that this matter be set for trial at an early date.7 After the court,
counsel, and Timothy engaged in further discussions, the court,
apparently referencing the continuance request, addressed
Timothy and stated, “[Y]ou were the one that wanted an earlier
trial than later, and you filed two requests, which this court
denied for failure to cite good cause. So you’re telling me
inconsistent things—”
Timothy began explaining his involvement in the pending
appeal of his criminal conviction, including his preparations for
oral argument in that matter. The trial court then reminded
Timothy that “the court denied the request.”
The trial court proceeded to hear testimony. Early in
Timothy’s testimony, Karla’s counsel asked him about the new
criminal case that had been filed for violation of the criminal
protective order and, before Timothy could answer, the court
interjected, “Hold on, sir. Hold on, sir. And because there’s a
criminal case pending, let me advise you that you have a Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
may be used against you in another court proceeding.” Timothy
and the court then had the following exchange: “[Timothy:]
Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate that. And my children
deserve to know for their posterity the truth of these matters. [¶]
The Court: So you’re waiving your Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent? [¶] [Timothy]: I’m waiving my right, and I’m
putting everything on the record, Your Honor. Thank you for the
opportunity.” Timothy then proceeded to testify without further
7 The record on appeal does not include a reporter’s
transcript or a suitable substitute of any hearings that predated
the February 10, 2025, trial.
9
objection on Fifth Amendment grounds. We describe in further
detail below the substance of that testimony, as well as the
court’s findings.
2. Legal Principles
A trial court’s decision to stay or continue a civil proceeding
pending the outcome of a related criminal matter is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (See Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1131 (Alpha Media), citing Avant!
Corp. v. Superior Corp. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 881–882.)
A trial court considering such an issue is not required to
stay or continue the matter, even though the requesting party’s
Fifth Amendment rights may be implicated. “‘The Constitution
does not ordinarily require a stay of civil proceedings pending the
outcome of criminal proceedings. [Citations.] “In the absence of
substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved,
[simultaneous] parallel [civil and criminal] proceedings are
unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.” [Citation]
“Nevertheless, a court may decide in its discretion to stay civil
proceedings … ‘when the interests of justice seem[] to require
such action.’” [Citation.]’” (Alpha Media, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1131–1132, quoting Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision
(9th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 322, 324 (Keating).)
“Noting the decision whether to stay civil proceedings
pending the outcome of a parallel criminal case should be made
in light of the particular circumstances and interests at hand, the
[court in Keating, supra, 45 F.3d 322] adopted the following test:
‘[T]he decisionmaker should consider “the extent to which the
defendant’s [F]ifth [A]mendment rights are implicated.”
10
[Citation.] In addition, the decisionmaker should generally
consider the following factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiffs in
proceeding expeditiously with this litigation or any particular
aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay;
(2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings
may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the
management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial
resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil
litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil
and criminal litigation.’ (Keating, supra, 45 F.3d at pp. 324–325;
[citation].)” (Alpha Media, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.)
3. Analysis
A few months before trial, in October 2024, Timothy twice
urged the trial court to expedite trial, implicitly representing he
was prepared at that point to try the case. The court could have
reasonably inferred from those requests that his current claim
that he needed more time to retain counsel and prepare lacked
merit. Further, even before the initiation of the pending charges,
Timothy sustained a conviction for domestic violence on October
11, 2023. Thus, the court was required to apply the presumption
set forth in section 3044 that the awarding of sole or joint custody
to Timothy would not be in the best interest of the children.
(Abdelqader v. Abraham (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 186, 196
(Abdelqader).) Finally, as we discuss below, the trial court could
not use the existence of the pending charges as substantive
evidence against Timothy when deciding whether he was entitled
to custody of the children, an error that requires reversal of the
custody and visitation orders. Timothy therefore cannot
11
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court’s denial of his
request for a continuance. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th
795, 840 [“In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion
and prejudice to the defendant, a denial of his or her motion for a
continuance does not require reversal …”].)
B. Evidence of Pending Criminal Charge
Timothy next argues that the trial court’s admission and
use of the newly filed criminal charge to find that he had failed to
rebut the section 3044 presumption was improper and violated
his due process rights.
1. Background
During her examination of Timothy, Karla’s counsel asked
him about the facts underlying the new charge: “Okay. So that
was a ‘yes,’ you went to [Karla’s] apartment?” Timothy
explained, “On January 20th, it was the day after my children
were not present at school for their custody visitation, their
custody time with Dad. We had honored a 50/50 custody—”
At that point, the trial court interrupted Timothy’s
explanation, admonished him to focus on the questions and
answer only the one asked, and advised him that he would have
an opportunity later to explain his answers.
During her examination, the children’s counsel, referring to
the rebuttal criteria in section 3044, asked Timothy, “[I]sn’t it
true that one of the terms is that there be no violations of the
underlying restraining order; correct?” He replied, “Absolutely.”
Counsel followed up, “And isn’t it true that, as you sit here today,
12
you are facing a new charge for a violation; correct?” Timothy
responded, “Yes, I am.”
The trial court then questioned Timothy about the new
charge, resulting in the following exchange:
“The Court: What about your new case that you picked up?
“[Timothy]: Okay. Your Honor, the new case is based on
an allegation from January 20[,] 2024, which was fully addressed
in the court on January 30[,] 2025, and the [District Attorney]
and [the judge] … had heard the same new [criminal protective
order] violation allegations again, and they were dismissed. And,
in fact, counsel on the other side of the table was admonished by
[the judge] for interfering with this case.
“The Court: But you were arraigned recently on that new
violation.
“[Timothy]: That was a pretrial hearing, and he was … .
“The Court: But were you arraigned on January 31st on
that violation of a court order charge.
“[Timothy]: Yes, on a previous—on a charge from over a
year ago that was already addressed in the courts and dismissed.
Now it’s being presented again. I don’t control—
“The Court: But yet the Long Beach Prosecutor’s Office
found that there was sufficient evidence to file that against you.
“[Timothy]: Your Honor, I think you know, as well as
anybody, from the position you hold, that I deserve my
opportunity to be heard.
“The Court: Not on your criminal case. On your criminal
case, you will be fully heard in that criminal court.
“[Timothy]: And I’m innocent of the charges.
13
“The Court: What I’m asking you is … whether or not
you’ve been arraigned on January 31st on a new charge of Penal
Code section 166, which is a violation of a court order.
“[Timothy]: Yes. I was arraigned on a charge from over a
year ago, very suspicious timing ahead of court here, Your Honor.
“The Court: Okay. Thank you.”
After further questioning Timothy on other matters, the
trial court returned to the newly filed charge and had the
following exchange with him:
“The Court: You have a new charge that has since been
filed by the Long Beach City Prosecutor’s Office, to which this
court has received information from you that you were charged
with violating the court order, and you were recently arraigned.
“[Timothy]: I was recently arraigned on a false charge,
Your Honor.
“The Court: Okay. And that’s—
“[Timothy]: Another of many false accusations by [Karla].
“The Court: That’s for another court to determine.
“[Timothy]: And this court is on the record—she has been
acknowledging—
“The Court: You will have your remedies. You will have
your remedies once that court makes its determination depending
on when and how that court makes its determination.
[Timothy]: So long as my position is clear with this court,
Your Honor.
“The Court: Okay. Thank you.”
In its statement of decision on whether Timothy had
rebutted the section 3044 presumption, the trial court first
discussed the programs Timothy had completed, noting his
“agitated and angry” demeanor during testimony about them.
14
The court then concluded: “[A]ny modification to custody and
visitation per [Timothy’s] request, at this time, would be
detrimental to the children, and that [Timothy] has not rebutted
the presumption under [s]ection 3044. And this is especially in
light of the evidence presented that [Timothy] continues to
violate the [criminal protective order], as is evidenced by the
recent criminal filing by the Long Beach City Prosecutor’s office.
The Court finds that while [Timothy] was on probation, he
violated the [criminal protective order], thereby failing to comply
with the terms of probation. Even after being placed on
probation, and having a [criminal protective order] issued,
[Timothy] does not appear to be able to follow the Court’s orders.
For this reason, as well, [Timothy] has not rebutted the
presumption under [s]ection 3044.”
Based on its conclusion that Timothy had failed to rebut
the section 3044 presumption, the trial court awarded sole legal
and physical custody to Karla and granted Timothy monitored
visitation, three weekends a month for five hours.
2. Legal Principles
“[M]ere arrests are usually inadmissible, whether as proof
of guilt or impeachment (see People v. Anderson (1978) 20 Cal.3d
647, 650–651), or as aggravating penalty phase evidence (see
People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 132).” (People v.
Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 769; see People v. Turner (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 397, 411.) The courts apply this rule based on
concern about the prejudicial nature of the arrest evidence and
the potential a jury could use it as evidence of defendant’s bad
character, that is, the fact he had been arrested in a prior
incident tended to prove that he acted in conformance with such
15
past conduct during the incident in question. (People v. Williams
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 609–610, fn. omitted [“such evidence
invariably suggests the defendant has a bad character;” requiring
proof of convictions minimizes “the risk the jury would be
tempted to punish the defendant for the uncharged acts”].)
3. Analysis
Here, the trial court erred when it used the filing of and
arraignment on the new criminal charge as substantive proof
that Timothy committed a violation of the existing criminal
protective order. Although the court acknowledged that Timothy
had not been convicted and would have an opportunity to
challenge the merits of the charge in criminal court, it
nevertheless proceeded to rely on the fact that the crime had
been charged, without other evidence about the underlying
incident, to find Timothy had violated the existing criminal
protective order.
We further conclude that the error was prejudicial to
Timothy because there is a reasonable probability that he would
have obtained a more favorable result on the section 3044
presumption issue if the court had not considered the pending
charges as evidence that Timothy had violated the protective
order. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.)
We therefore reverse the custody and visitation orders and
remand the matter to the trial court to adjudicate the section
3044 presumption issue, without considering the existence of the
pending criminal charges as substantive evidence that Timothy
had violated the protective order.
16
C. Order Dividing Assets and Requiring Reimbursement
Timothy next contends that the trial court did not “give
meaningful effect” to certain evidence and that it therefore erred
when it: (1) ordered the sale of the family residence; (2) ordered a
reimbursement to Karla for amounts expended on the Disney
Magic Key passes and the Vacation Club dues; and (3) refused to
offset Watts charges against his claimed Epstein credits. He also
claims that Karla failed to adequately disclose marital assets
during the trial and that the court did not give sufficient weight
to purported findings by the Department of Children and Family
Services.
To the extent Timothy’s arguments can be construed as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order
dividing assets and requiring reimbursement, he has forfeited his
argument on appeal. To meet its burden on appeal to show a
finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence, an
appellant cannot recite only evidence in his favor, but must “‘“set
forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point and not
merely their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is
deemed to be waived.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Slone v. El
Centro Medical Center (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1173.)
Moreover, “‘on appeal it is manifestly “the duty of a party to
support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to
the record, which includes providing exact page citations.
[Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A party’s inaccurate or
missing record citations ‘frustrates this court’s ability to evaluate
which facts a party believes support his position.’ (Ibid.)”
(Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 276–
277.) “‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on
17
its own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to
support an argument with the necessary citations to the record,
… the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.
[Citation.]’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
As Karla notes, Timothy’s opening brief does not include
any citations to the reporter’s transcript, and his one-sided
recitation of facts fails to discuss all the evidence relevant to his
contentions. He has therefore forfeited any challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence regarding the trial court’s division of
assets and order requiring reimbursements. To the extent
Timothy challenges the court’s weighing of evidence, “‘[i]t is not
our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of
the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will
not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to support it.’”
(Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1300.)
D. Misconduct by the Children’s Counsel
Citing “bias and misconduct” by the children’s counsel,
Timothy contends that “the transcript shows that [the children’s]
counsel played a pivotal role in steering the [trial] court toward a
prejudicial frame. At the very outset of trial, [the children’s]
counsel asked the court to approach custody and visitation
through the lens of the new criminal-protective-order violation
and section 3044. The court adopted that frame.”
As we describe above, at the beginning of trial, the
children’s counsel suggested that the trial court “frame the issues
of custody and visitation relative to [Timothy’s] ability to rebut …
section 3044.” Timothy’s sustaining of a conviction for domestic
battery required the application of the section 3044 presumption.
There is nothing in counsel’s comment to suggest that counsel
18
engaged in misconduct or that Timothy was prejudiced as a
result of counsel’s statement.
E. Attorney Fees and Sanctions
Timothy argues that the trial court failed to make required
findings in support of its determination that neither party was
entitled to attorney fees in violation of Family Code sections 2023
and 2032. He also contends the court erred by not awarding
sanctions against Karla under Family Code section 271 based on
litigation conduct that frustrated settlement and increased
litigation costs.
On the issue of findings, the trial court made an express
finding that there was no disparity in income between the parties
and denied fees on that basis. Timothy does not challenge that
finding or specify what other findings were required under the
circumstances. Nor does he show that he made a request for such
other findings in the trial court. He has therefore failed to carry
his burden of affirmatively demonstrating prejudicial error on
appeal concerning the attorney fees award.
As to sanctions, Timothy fails to provide citations to the
record showing that he made a request for sanctions or that the
trial court failed to rule on that request. He also fails to include
record cites in support of his assertion that Karla engaged in
conduct that frustrated settlement or increased the costs of
litigation. He has therefore forfeited his sanctions contention on
appeal.
19
V. DISPOSITION
The custody and visitation orders are reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall bear their
own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KUMAR, J.*
* Retired judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
20