Filed 9/24/26 Marriage of Tkachenko v. Spence
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of OLGA
ALYSSANDRA TKACHENKO and
CHARLES FRANK SPENCE.
OLGA ALYSSANDRA TKACHENKO,
Respondent, A174013
v.
(San Mateo County Super. Ct.
CHARLES FRANK SPENCE,
No. 19FAM02095)
Appellant.
The San Mateo County dissolution of the short-term marriage of
Charles Frank Spence and Olga Alyssandra Tkachenko gave the parents
joint legal custody of their infant child (born after their separation) with
primary physical custody to Tkachenko and visitation for Spence.
Subsequently, Tkachenko and Spence separately moved to Santa Clara
County, and then later, Tkachenko moved back to San Mateo County. After
receiving notification of Tkachenko’s intended return to San Mateo County,
Spence sought to prohibit Tkachenko’s move with their child “pending a
hearing on a noticed motion for move-away” and preclude their child’s new
school enrollment, among other things. Spence appeals from the portion of
the trial court’s findings and order after hearing that denied his request to
1
prohibit Tkachenko’s move and granted Tkachenko’s requests to enroll their
child in the neighborhood public school and for the $7,150 in attorney’s fees
the court issued as sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271.1 We
conclude that Spence’s agreement to the move before the trial court waived
any subsequent challenges on appeal, and we treat Spence’s remaining
contentions as forfeited for failure to comply with appellate briefing
requirements; we therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Spence and Tkachenko married in 2016, and in 2019, Tkachenko
petitioned for dissolution in San Mateo County. They have one child together
born after the filing of the petition. A stipulated judgment for dissolution
was filed in February 2021, and, according to the parties, an April 25, 2022
“Findings and Order After Hearing” governed child custody at the time of the
order being appealed. It provided that Tkachenko and Spence shared joint
legal custody of their minor child; Tkachenko had sole physical custody of the
child, and Spence had visitation twice per week for up to five hours each visit,
with exchanges to take place in Redwood City in San Mateo County.
In May 2022, Tkachenko moved from San Mateo County to the City of
Santa Clara, in Santa Clara County. One year later, in April 2023, Spence
moved to San Jose, also in Santa Clara County.2 According to the “Case
Summary” included in the appellate record, it does not appear that either
Tkachenko or Spence filed a request for a move-away order or a motion for
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2 According to Tkachenko’s January 2025 declaration filed in response
to Spence’s request for change of venue, discussed below, Spence had “lived in
six different cities located in five different counties (for two years living at a
distance of over 200 miles in South Lake Tahoe)” since their child’s birth.
According to Spence, he “never lived in San Mateo County.”
2
change of venue at the time of either move to Santa Clara County. However,
in January 2024, Spence filed a request for order seeking to increase his
custodial time with the child. At the ensuing June 2024 hearing, the court
denied Spence’s request and sanctioned him in the amount of $1,650 (for
“three hours of [Tkachenko’s] counsel’s time”) for litigation abuse. In the
related findings and order after hearing that was issued on November 7,
2024,3 the court cautioned, “Father does need to understand that continually
dragging Mother into court does not promote settlement but rather litigation
which is the basis fo[r] the requested and justified sanctions.”4
In October 2024, 18 months after his move to Santa Clara County,
Spence filed a request for order under Code of Civil Procedure sections 397
and 397.5 et seq., seeking to transfer venue to Santa Clara County, asserting
it had been more than two years since Tkachenko and their child had lived in
San Mateo County, the child’s activities, school, exchange point, and private
child custody evaluator were in Santa Clara County, and neither parent
worked in San Mateo County.
On January 6, 2025,5 “after [she] secured a place to live,” Tkachenko
informed Spence that when her lease ended later that month, she intended to
move to Moss Beach in San Mateo County and enroll their child in the nearby
3 The June 2024 hearing transcript is not included in the appellate
record; thus, we assume, but cannot confirm, the court uttered similar words
when ruling in June.
4 The case summary demonstrates multiple filings of requests for order
after the entry of final judgment in the dissolution; Spence’s counsel later
represented, “Mother has filed three motions and father has filed 11, most of
those occurring between 2020 and 2022.”
5 Subsequent dates are in 2025 unless otherwise specified.
3
public kindergarten. Tkachenko therefore asked Spence to dismiss his still
pending request for change of venue.
Spence refused, and on January 14, before Tkachenko moved, he filed
an ex parte request for order seeking temporary emergency orders
prohibiting Tkachenko’s move out of Santa Clara County “without a hearing
on a motion for a move-away.” The request for order further sought primary
custody of their child “if mother moved without a court order,” as well as
orders prohibiting either parent from enrolling the child in a new school
without consent of the other parent and maintaining the current custody
exchange location at the Santa Clara Police Department.6 Spence also
requested a child custody evaluation regarding the move-away pending the
outcome of his change of venue request for order.
In her January 15 opposition to the ex parte request for order,
Tkachenko argued there was no basis for an ex parte order because she had
no intention of “filing for a move-away” since she was returning to San Mateo
County, the case’s jurisdictional home, nor was she requesting a change to
Spence’s timeshare or schedule. Tkachenko asserted her move would not
impact Spence’s visitation; she had requested a different exchange location
closer to her new home and “only 15 minutes further” from Spence’s residence
than from the current exchange location in Santa Clara, but, “[p]ending an
order on the exchange location, will continue to follow the court order for
exchanges at Santa Clara Police Department.” Tkachenko explained that she
was unable to remain in her current rental home because her landlord was
moving back into the property in February 2025; the Moss Beach location
6 The record does not specify when or how the exchange location moved
from Redwood City in San Mateo County to the Santa Clara Police
Department.
4
was closer to her work in San Francisco and offered a lower cost of housing.
Tkachenko also requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,200 as
sanctions under section 271 for opposing the “meritless” and “abusive” ex
parte application that was “misleading the court.”
On January 16, the court denied Spence’s request for emergency relief
prohibiting Tkachenko’s move and scheduled a hearing for February 27.
On January 30, Tkachenko filed a responsive declaration to Spence’s
change of venue request for order, in which she acknowledged she had
resided in Santa Clara County since 2022 but claimed his motion was now
moot because she had already moved to Moss Beach.7 Tkachenko requested
as sanctions under section 271, “not less than $3,300 for having to spend
money on defending against this motion, wasting the court’s time, and
depleting my financial, physical, and emotional resources, which negatively
impacts [the child’s] wellbeing.” She argued Spence’s request to change
venue was “brought in bad faith and was based on falsehoods” and
complained Spence refused to withdraw the venue request for order after she
moved back to San Mateo County.8
On February 11, Tkachenko filed an additional responsive declaration
to Spence’s ex parte request for emergency relief prohibiting her move, in
which she requested sole legal custody of the child due to Spence’s “actions
7 Tkachenko attached to her response a text string with her landlord
demonstrating the July 2024 negotiation of a six-month lease, starting in
August 2024.
8 Tkachenko also included an e-mail from the child’s prospective school
representing that Spence had contacted the school “multiple times” and said
he did not want their child enrolled. The school principal wrote, “Since you
and [Spence] have joint legal custody . . . we are not going to proceed with
this application until either you and [Spence] come to an agreement about his
schooling or you seek a court order to resolve the matter.”
5
and poor parental judgment,” a continued request for a new child visitation
exchange point 15 minutes further from the current Santa Clara location,
and an increased amount of $3,850 in sanctions for Spence’s abuse of the ex
parte process, misleading the court, and abusive requests.9
On February 24, the court held a hearing on Spence’s change of venue
request for order, at which both Tkachenko and Spence were sworn and
testified concerning the timing and reason for Tkachenko’s relocation to Moss
Beach. Thereafter, the court found Tkachenko credible and “genuinely
concerned about the well-being of her child” and Spence not credible and
denied his request to change venue to Santa Clara County.10 The court
reserved ruling on Tkachenko’s request for $3,300 in venue-related sanctions
until the February 27 hearing on Spence’s ex parte request for order
prohibiting Tkachenko’s move.
On February 27, at the outset of the hearing, the court orally issued a
tentative ruling denying Spence’s request to prohibit Tkachenko’s move
because, “this is not a move away,” and granting Tkachenko’s request for
sanctions in the amount of $3,850.
During the ensuing argument, Spence’s counsel informed the court that
they had taken the court’s comments at the February 24 hearing “to heart”
9 On February 13, Spence attempted to file an additional reply
declaration in support of his request for change of venue, but it was rejected
by the court’s electronic filing system and therefore never reviewed by the
court.
10 The court issued a related findings and order after hearing on April
23. Spence subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandate, prohibition or
other relief challenging the denial of his change of venue request for order
and arguing the court abused its discretion by denying his motion and not
considering his reply; we denied the petition in the unpublished order of
Spence v. San Mateo County Superior Court (No. A173196). Spence does not
otherwise challenge the April 23 order on appeal.
6
and “reached out and attempted to dismiss and resolve the case . . . and made
clear that there were agreements on all pending issues in this case pursuant
to [Tkachenko’s] move and school.” Counsel explained that the ex parte
motion was procedurally proper at the time it was filed—before Tkachenko’s
move—but, since then, Spence had “agreed” and “consented” to Tkachenko’s
relocation; “We attempted to dismiss.” However, Spence asked for a referral
to Family Court Services to consider another school alternative that is “free
of charge” to make sure “both parties are looking at all the options.”
The court followed by confirming Spence’s acceptance of the tentative
ruling: “So the tentative was to deny the move away. It sounds like you’re
okay with that tentative as you were willing to dismiss.”
Spence’s counsel offered no additional comment and instead asked the
court to hear argument on Tkachenko’s request for sanctions arising out of
the ex parte request to prohibit her move to Moss Beach. Specifically,
counsel argued the requested sanctions of $3,850 would be “more than an
undue financial burden” because Spence “makes a total of $4,800 per month
net take-home after taxes,” approximately half of which goes to rent.
Because he pays child support and has other expenses, including payments
for the sanctions ordered in June 2024, “All of his income is completely eaten
up by his expenses and in fact he has more expenses than income.” Counsel
represented Spence had taken out personal loans to pay his own attorney’s
fees; “There is absolutely no leftover money.” Counsel asserted, in contrast,
“[Tkachenko] makes at least double what he earns. And [she] does have the
ability to pay her own attorney’s fees and costs.” The court then considered
Spence’s submitted pay stubs, which were consistent with his last filed
income and expense declaration from July 2022, showing an annual income of
$73,000.
7
After a break in the hearing, the court confirmed, “the RFO [request for
order] re the move away has been resolved and it’s understood that [it] will be
denied.” Regarding Tkachenko’s associated sanctions request, the court
found that Spence’s “actions in the case has frustrated the policy of the law to
promote settlement of litigation, and where possible, to reduce the costs of
litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys” and
also explained, “I have considered [Spence’s] ability to pay and based upon
his pay stubs I do find that he has the ability to pay those sanctions.” The
court then offered Spence the opportunity to pay the sanctions in
installments.
At the suggestion of Tkachenko’s counsel that “a total amount” of
sanctions be ordered, the court agreed to hear and ultimately granted
Tkachenko’s separate request for sanctions in the amount of $3,300 arising
out of Spence’s motion to change venue that had been heard and denied on
February 24. The court heard further argument concerning an appropriate
payment plan based on Spence’s ability to pay and ultimately ordered Spence
to pay the total section 271 sanctions amount of $7,150 in 12 monthly
installments of $595.83 with a delayed payment start of April 1.
Addressing Spence’s additional requests included within his ex parte
motion, the court denied Spence’s at-hearing request to be referred to a child
custody evaluator to discuss school or child exchange location alternatives
but suggested he “is free to” “make an additional RFO regarding school
choices,” found it to be “in the child’s best interest to be enrolled in school,”
and permitted Tkachenko to “enroll the child in her neighborhood public
school.” The court also maintained the current point of custody exchange at
the Santa Clara Police Department and directed the parties to “file an RFO”
if either wanted a location change. The court also formally denied Spence’s
8
request for primary custody if Tkachenko moved out of Santa Clara County
and denied his request for a child custody evaluation regarding Tkachenko’s
move as moot.
Spence appeals the findings and order after hearing filed on May 16,
confirming the court’s oral orders of February 27.11
DISCUSSION12
On appeal, Spence challenges the trial court’s denial of his January 14
ex parte request for emergency orders and its order “imposing $7,150 in
[section] 271 sanctions” contending: (1) the court’s refusal to refer custody
issues to mediation “on the contested issues of school choice and visitation”
was error; (2) the court violated section 217 and due process “by announcing,
11 After the court’s entry of the May 16 findings and order after
hearing, Spence filed here (separately from the current appeal) a request for
an immediate stay of the sanctions order and a petition for writ of mandate,
prohibition, certiorari, and/or other appropriate relief challenging this order
as a failure to exercise informed discretion in deciding the motion and
ordering unwarranted sanctions, which we denied in the unpublished order of
Spence v. San Mateo County Superior Court (No. A173307).
On January 12, 2026, Spence also filed an application for a stay and
writ of supersedeas in this appeal seeking a stay of the monthly sanctions
payments pending this opinion, arguing the sanctions, “were imposed without
compliance with the procedural and evidentiary safeguards required . . . .”
We denied his request on January 21, 2026.
12 Tkachenko contends Spence’s appeal was untimely as filed after the
60-day deadline set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).
But because the record does not appear to contain a proof of service triggering
that deadline, the 180-day deadline set forth in rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) applies;
the appeal is therefore timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104(a)(1)(A) &
(C); Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1456 [when the
“record on appeal does not contain a document showing when, or if, a notice
of entry (or file-stamped copy) of the order was mailed . . . or served . . . we
presume the applicable appeal period, absent a rule extending that period, is
the 180-day period”].)
9
‘we are not having an evidentiary hearing’ ” and not swearing witnesses
before resolving “disputed factual issues”; (3) the court “misappl[ied] move-
away law and abuse[d] its discretion by classifying the case as ‘not a move-
away’ ”; (4) the court’s authorization of Tkachenko to “unilaterally enroll the
child in her local public school” had the improper effect of modifying the
parties joint legal custody without holding a hearing compliant with section
217; and (5) the court “abused its discretion” and “violated due process” in
imposing $7,150 in sanctions pursuant to section 271, “while refusing to
consider his filed reply, expanding the sanction grounds at the hearing, and
failing to take testimony or consider his ability to pay.” After our review of
the record, we conclude Spence waived his challenge to the court’s move-away
orders and Spence’s improper briefing forfeits his remaining claims on
appeal. The May 16 orders are therefore affirmed.
I. Waiver
It is axiomatic that a party cannot challenge on appeal an order or
procedure to which he consented. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rodriguez
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 625, 638 [“ ‘an order will not be disturbed on appeal
prosecuted by a consenting party’ ”]; In re Marriage of Moore (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 1275, 1289 [“The failure to raise an issue in the trial court
forfeits the claim of error on appeal”]; In re Marriage of Broderick (1989)
209 Cal.App.3d 489, 501 [similarly to the doctrine of invited error, “an
appellant waives his right to attack error by expressly or implicitly agreeing
or acquiescing at trial to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal”].)
At the start of the February 27 hearing concerning Spence’s ex parte
request to prohibit Tkachenko’s move to Moss Beach in San Mateo County,
his counsel expressly told the court, “Father agrees to mother’s relocation.
Father consents to it.” In fact, Spence had “attempted to dismiss” the motion
10
and might have also consented to the change in school enrollment, but
unresolved discussions concerning sanctions and child exchanges precluded a
formal agreement.
The court followed up, “It sounds like you’re okay with [the denial of
the request for order] as you were willing to dismiss.” Spence’s counsel did
not verbally reply and instead requested to be heard on the issue of sanctions.
The ensuing argument devolved and spurred a court-ordered break, after
which, the court resumed, “Before me today is the RFO regarding a move
away at petitioner’s request. [¶] So the RFO re the move away has been
resolved and it’s understood that that will be denied.” Spence did not object.
The court then ordered $3,850 in section 271 sanctions in connection with the
motion, and Spence requested a payment plan. To the extent Spence’s appeal
challenges the move he agreed to before the trial court, his express consent
and lack of objection waived his ability to do so now. (See In re Marriage of
Broderick, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 501.)
Thereafter, as the trial court stated, because the move-away issue was
resolved, Spence’s request for a child custody evaluation prior to the potential
move-away hearing became moot. His related argument on appeal is thus
similarly waived.
II. Failure to Comply with Appellate Briefing Requirements
We turn next to Spence’s remaining challenges, including the orders
regarding school assignment, his request for a child custody evaluation
concerning school choice, and the ordered section 271 sanctions associated
with both motions.
11
In opposition, Tkachenko argues the custody-related issues are moot,
as intervening custody orders have issued,13 and the sanctions order is not
appealable because the two sanctions awards cannot be aggregated to meet
the $5,000 jurisdictional minimum of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(11). Rather than deeming it moot, we continue to address the
substance of Spence’s appeal concerning the move-away, because the
visitation provisions included in the December 8, 2025, stipulation of which
we take judicial notice appears to be a “temporary” order that does not
resolve all of the issues being appealed. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282
[“courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute” “ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties’ ”].) We also do not decide Tkachenko’s challenge to the aggregation
of Spence’s sanctions awards because, as is discussed below, we conclude
Spence forfeited his remaining claims on appeal.
Fundamentally, a lower court’s rulings are presumed correct, and the
appellant bears the burden of affirmatively showing error. (Universal Home
13 On March 9, 2026, Tkachenko filed a request for judicial notice,
which Spence opposed, seeking judicial notice of (1) the register of actions in
a new criminal case charging Spence with driving under the influence of
alcohol (People v. Spence, case No. B2503494); (2) the misdemeanor complaint
in Spence, No. B2503494 (CEN No. 25026862); (3) a notice to appear filed
September 24, 2024, in the same matter (CEN No. 25026862), showing a
mailing address in Palo Alto; (4) the police report associated with Spence’s
September 2025 arrest; (5) a stipulated court order dated December 8, 2025,
requiring Spence’s child visitation to be supervised; and (6) an e-mail
regarding service of the notice of appeal on Tkachenko. Because they are
“[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state” and are relevant to this appeal, we
take judicial notice of the requested register of actions, the misdemeanor
complaint, and the stipulation and order reflecting the new visitation
agreement. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) Tkachenko’s request is
otherwise denied.
12
Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) To do so, the appellant “ ‘must supply [us] with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 142, 146, quoting City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) This requirement starts with an appellant’s
opening brief, which “must ‘provide a summary of the significant facts limited
to matters in the record.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246
(Nwosu); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) In order to “enable
appellate justices and staff attorneys to locate relevant portions of the record
quickly” (Pagan v. City of San Rafael (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 853, 865, “Each
and every statement in a brief regarding matters that are in the record on
appeal, whether factual or procedural, must be supported by a citation to the
record.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 96, fn. 2.) The
statement of facts must state critical facts and evidence accurately and fairly;
issues and arguments can be forfeited by material omission. (In re Marriage
of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1531.)
In addition, “an appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.” (Hodjat v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10; In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“We are not bound to
develop appellants’ arguments for them”].) If an appellant fails to comply
with these rules, “we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point
urged on appeal.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894; Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)
To start, although Spence’s briefing is peppered with citations to the
record, the citations do not necessarily represent the facts or positions
13
asserted. (See In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1531.) For example, in challenging the court’s failure to consider his reply
in the change of venue motion, Spence’s opening brief represents in his
section entitled, “Factual and Procedural History,” that his attorney
“electronically filed and served a reply to Mother’s January 30 response,
which included a declaration regarding the venue motion, along with a proof
of service (CT 94:108.).” He continues, “As shown in the Clerk’s
Transcript, the reply was file-stamped ‘electronically filed’ (CT 123.). In
addition to the electronic filing, a hand-delivered courtesy copy of the reply
was delivered to Department 5, where the venue hearing was scheduled. The
reply delivered to Department 5 was stamped ‘Courtesy Copy’ but was
rejected because it lacked e-filing (CT 123.).” But the cited “CT 94” is the
cover page for the reply that shows nothing about service, and “CT 123” is a
portion of the matter’s case summary that does not explain how a reply was
“file-stamped” or if or where a “hand-delivered courtesy copy” was delivered
or stamped. These types of inaccurate citations that continue throughout the
briefing require forfeiture of Spence’s claims on appeal. (WFG National Title
Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894 [“Rather
than scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has
forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate
citations to the record”].)
More significantly, Spence’s appellate briefs present a one-sided
recitation of the prior proceedings that again requires forfeiture. (Ashby v.
Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509 [by “reciting only favorable evidence,
[appellant] forfeited his sufficiency of the evidence” challenge to trial court’s
DVRO ruling].)
14
For example, Spence begins his opening brief challenging Tkachenko’s
move to San Mateo County by citing the April 25, 2022, findings and order
after hearing ordering joint legal custody with physical custody to Tkachenko
and twice-weekly visitation to Spence. But he neglects to mention that the
order provided for custodial exchanges to take place in Redwood City in San
Mateo County, where Tkachenko then lived, not at the Santa Clara Police
Department where Spence demanded—and was granted—the exchanges
continue at the time of his January 2025 motion, nor does he explain when or
why the location for exchanges changed. Similarly, Spence represents he
“moved to Santa Clara County in 2023 to be closer to Minor” and “cannot
move again,” but fails to mention he resided in “in six different cities located
in five different counties” since the child’s birth in 2022, or that he had been
splitting time between South Lake Tahoe and Contra Costa County
immediately prior to his 2023 move to Santa Clara County.
For that matter, Spence neither details nor includes in the record on
appeal the custody orders associated with the initial judgment of dissolution
or the requests for order that preceded the April 2022 custody orders, his
multiple requests for order (at least 11 per his counsel’s acknowledgment)
that preceded his change of venue and ex parte motions, the court’s sanctions
against him issued in June 2024, or any of the writ petitions he filed in this
court, all of which were denied. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609 [“ ‘[the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record.
[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that
the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’ ”].)
Spence similarly minimizes the notice Tkachenko gave him of her move
to Moss Beach after she found a place to live for less rent and neglects to
mention his knowledge that Tkachenko’s Santa Clara landlord’s return to his
15
residence necessitated her January move. He further challenges Tkachenko’s
move as effectively reducing his court-ordered visitation but did not inform us
that in September 2025, before filing his opening brief on appeal, Spence was
arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and
stipulated to the modification of his custody and visitation orders on
December 8, 2025 (the same date Spence filed his opening brief).14
Perhaps most strikingly, rather than acknowledge his represented
consent to the move during the February 27 hearing, Spence’s opening
“statement of facts” offers a single misleading sentence: “the parties had
resolved all issues raised in the RFO except for school enrollment.”
Similarly, Spence’s myopic briefing overlooks the rulings the court made in
his favor, such as denying Tkachenko’s requests for “ ‘sole decision-making
authority with respect to school choice’ ” and sole legal custody and granting
Spence’s request to maintain the Santa Clara exchange location.
Regarding his sanctions challenge, Spence complains the court did not
adequately consider his ability to pay the sanctions ordered but omits
mention of the court’s analysis of his financial records and agreement to a
payment plan more extended than was requested by Tkachenko and with a
delayed start date.15 Spence fails to mention that it was he who on February
24 requested the court defer hearing Tkachenko’s venue-related sanctions
request to February 27 because he was “not prepared to go forward on that,”
during which time the parties unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement
concerning the sanctions and other outstanding issues. This extensive but
14 Spence does address this stipulation in his reply brief, contending it
does not render this appeal moot as “no final custody order exists.”
15 Spence also fails to mention that it was Tkachenko’s counsel who
suggested the two sanctions orders be consolidated in order to facilitate a
payment plan.
16
non-exhaustive list of misrepresentations and one-sided characterizations
provides additional reason why Spence’s appellate claims must be forfeited.
(See In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531.)
Last, Spence’s briefing fails to cite legal authority or provide sufficient
legal argument to permit appellate review. (In re Marriage of Falcone &
Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [the “absence of cogent legal argument
or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived”];
Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at
p. 10.)
For example, Spence argues that the court’s “refusal to refer contested
custody issues to mandatory mediation was a reversible legal error,” but he
only generally cites section 3170 as purportedly requiring “all contested
custody and visitation issues” to be “set for custody mediation before
adjudication” without explaining or providing legal authority showing how
the court’s orders here modified custody or visitation or required a child
custody evaluation. Similarly, Spence contends that the issues of “the school-
enrollment narrative and the sanctions/ability-to-pay dispute—are classic
credibility questions that § 217 assumes will be decided based on live
testimony, not competing unsworn arguments,” but he provides no legal
authority for this statement. Because “Mere suggestions of error without
supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do
not properly present grounds for appellate review” (Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078), we may treat these contentions as forfeited.
(Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910 [failure to
develop arguments by “stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of
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the record, [which show] that the trial court committed reversible error,”
“justifies rejection of [appellant’s] argument[s] on this basis alone”].)
Consequently, Spence’s inadequate and inaccurate citations to the
record, one-sided recitation of the related proceedings, and failure to develop
his legal arguments or cite supporting authority requires forfeiture of his
remaining claims on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The May 16, 2025, order after hearing is affirmed. Respondent
Tkachenko is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)
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DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
STEWART, P. J.
RICHMAN, J.
In re Marriage of Tkachenko and Spence (A174013)
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