Filed 7/24/26 Marriage of Stout CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of JAMIE B343600
and SCOTT STOUT.
_____________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STFL07045)
JAMIE RAE STOUT,
Respondent,
v.
SCOTT FRANKLIN GROVES
STOUT,
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Esther P. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Quinn & Dworakowski, Stephane Quinn and David
Dworakowski for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
_______________________________
Scott Franklin Groves Stout (Scott) appeals from a
judgment of dissolution, contending the trial court erred by
awarding certain property interests and attorney fees to his ex-
wife, Jamie Rae Stout (Jamie). The principal property dispute
concerned Scott’s ownership shares in MedVector, Inc., a startup
company that Scott founded before the parties separated. Scott
did not dispute that his MedVector shares were a community
asset in part, but he argued that the shares should be
apportioned between the community estate and his separate
estate to account for his post-separation efforts to develop
MedVector. The trial court apportioned to the community a 12
percent interest in Scott’s MedVector shares and awarded Jamie
one-half of the community interest (6 percent). The trial court
also awarded Jamie $14,000 as a remedy for Scott’s sale of a
motorcycle in breach of his fiduciary duty, and ordered Scott to
pay Jamie’s remaining balance of $35,108 in attorney fees.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. Before separation, Scott founded MedVector, quit his
full-time job to focus on the company, and raised
$474,500 in capital from third-party investors.
Jamie and Scott married in October 2007 and separated on
May 1, 2019. They have three minor children.
In July or August 2017 (around one year and eight months
before the parties separated), when Scott was working full time
as a financial advisor at Wells Fargo, he conceived the idea for a
startup company that would become MedVector, based on an
innovative method of recruiting patients for clinical trials. A
month later, he secured support from a telemedicine provider and
2
prospective investors to pursue his business idea. While
continuing to work at Wells Fargo, he began working on
MedVector around five to 10 hours per week. He created
MedVector’s name and logo, researched existing companies, and
conducted legal outreach.
In December 2017, he incorporated MedVector and Scott
became its CEO. MedVector had no other employees or
independent contractors at that time. Scott received MedVector
shares that initially represented a 90 percent ownership interest
in the company.
In April 2018, Scott resigned from Wells Fargo and began
receiving $15,000 in monthly income from MedVector. A few
months later, he began working as a consultant for Raymond
James. Scott’s MedVector work increased to 20 and then 30
hours per week. In December 2018, he acquired an office for his
MedVector work. He occasionally traveled on MedVector
business.1
By the end of 2018, Scott had raised $474,500 in MedVector
capital from third-party investors. He agreed that he “worked
[his] tail off” to raise that initial capital. He testified that
without the initial capital, MedVector “never would have started”
1 The parties presented conflicting testimony regarding
whether Jamie contributed to some of Scott’s pre-separation
MedVector work. Both parties acknowledged that the issue was
immaterial because the fruits of Scott’s pre-separation efforts
were community property even if Jamie was not involved.
3
and “wouldn’t exist.” He and Jamie did not invest any of their
own money in MedVector.2
Before separation, Scott did not take out or personally
guarantee any loans for MedVector. Although he personally
guaranteed a MedVector credit card, he used MedVector’s capital
to pay the card’s balance every month.
B. After separation, Scott continued working on
MedVector full time, raised over $3 million in
additional third-party capital, and personally
guaranteed MedVector debts.
Scott remained MedVector’s CEO through the time of trial.
He stipulated that he received $17,000 in monthly income from
MedVector and $4,182 in monthly income from his consulting for
Raymond James. Jamie received $1,282 in monthly income from
a part-time job at a distillery.
Scott testified that his MedVector work became much
“busier” after separation. He further testified that his work
exceeded the typical scope of a CEO’s duties “by far,” and
included legal compliance, human resources, marketing, public
relations, and fundraising. By the time of trial, MedVector had
raised a total of $3,807,874 in capital ($474,500 before separation
and $3,333,374 after).
After separation, a MedVector credit card that Scott
personally guaranteed (as noted above) accrued an unpaid
balance of around $130,000. Also after separation, Scott
personally guaranteed around $148,000 in small business loans
2 After separation, Scott invested approximately $500 in
MedVector. Scott did not argue below or on appeal that his $500
investment was material.
4
for MedVector and a $250,000 loan to MedVector from his
parents.
MedVector has never generated revenue. Its debts exceed
its assets. Scott believes MedVector has the potential to become
a multibillion-dollar company.
C. Scott violated pretrial orders, including by selling a
motorcycle without Jamie’s consent. At trial, Jamie
requested related attorney fees and sanctions.
In June 2019, Jamie petitioned for dissolution. Jamie
served Scott with the summons, which provided notice of
automatic temporary restraining orders (ATROs) against both
parties. (See Fam. Code, § 233, subd. (a).)3 One ATRO
restrained each party from “transferring, encumbering,
hypothecating, concealing, or in any way disposing of, any
property, real or personal, . . . without the written consent of the
other party or an order of the court, except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life . . . .” (See § 2040, subd.
(a)(2)(A).)
Scott responded to the petition through counsel. He
remained represented by counsel throughout the proceedings,
except during two months between November 2020 and January
2021.
After separation, Scott withdrew the full $15,000 balance
from a joint investment account that he and Jamie held with
Raymond James. He subsequently withdrew $40,000 from their
joint individual retirement account (IRA) with Raymond James.
He withdrew the money to pay unspecified “joint bills.” He did
3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family
Code.
5
not give Jamie notice that he planned to withdraw the money
from the accounts.
In September or October 2020, without notice to Jamie,
Scott sold a Harley-Davidson motorcycle that he had purchased
before separation for $14,000. He sold the motorcycle for
approximately its original $14,000 purchase price, used some of
the sale proceeds to pay off the outstanding balance of the note,
and contributed the remaining proceeds to the purchase of
another motorcycle.4 He did not transfer to Jamie any of the sale
proceeds. He did not inform Jamie that he was going to sell the
motorcycle because “[s]he hated it.” He felt he did not need
Jamie’s consent to sell the motorcycle.
In response to questioning by the trial court, Scott claimed
that when he sold the motorcycle, he was self-represented and
unaware of the ATRO prohibiting him from transferring property
without Jamie’s written consent. He acknowledged that he had
been served with the summons and likely had read the ATRO
described therein.
In February 2022, the trial court ordered Scott to pay
Jamie temporary child support and spousal support. The court
also ordered Scott to reimburse Jamie for half of their children’s
medical expenses within two weeks after receiving invoices for
such expenses. Finally, the court ordered Scott to pay Jamie
$40,000 in need-based attorney fees by March 30.
4 Scott testified that he did not recall the amount of the
outstanding balance on the note at the time he sold the
motorcycle, and that he “would be guessing” if he testified about
the amount. Later, he “guess[ed]” that the balance was around
$10,000.
6
Scott accumulated arrears on support payments. He did
not reimburse Jamie for one-half of the children’s medical
expenses.
Scott paid Jamie the $40,000 in court-ordered attorney
fees. Although the record does not reveal when Scott paid the
fees, the trial court found in its proposed and final statements of
decision that his payment was untimely. Scott did not dispute
that finding.5
Pursuant to section 2030 (need-based fees) and/or section
271 (fees as sanctions), Jamie asked the trial court to order Scott
to pay the remaining balance of her attorney fees (fees as
sanctions). And pursuant to section 1101, subdivision (h), Jamie
asked the trial court to award her 100 percent of the motorcycle’s
value as a remedy for the breach of his fiduciary duty in selling it
without her consent.
D. The parties disputed the proper division of Scott’s
MedVector shares.
“The fruits of a spouse’s expenditure of time, talent and
labor during marriage and before separation are community
property . . . .” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family
Law (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 8:336, p. 136.) “Thus, where
community efforts [including one spouse’s pre-separation efforts]
increase the value of a spouse’s separate property, the increase
generally must be apportioned between the separate property
5 Before trial, Jamie filed an order to show cause regarding
contempt based on Scott’s failure to timely pay the $40,000 in
attorney fees. The judge then presiding over pretrial matters
found Scott not guilty of contempt. Scott does not argue that the
not-guilty finding precluded the trial court from finding that he
failed to timely pay the fees.
7
capital investment and community effort.” (Id., ¶ 8:120, p. 55,
italics omitted; see also Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1326, 1340; In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 842, 852 (Dekker).) Conversely, “[t]he fruits of a
spouse’s postseparation efforts and skill are their separate
property [citations]. Therefore, where a community asset
increases in value because of a spouse’s efforts after separation
(e.g., a [community property] business operated after separation),
the increase must be apportioned between the community and
separate estates.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide:
Family Law, supra, ¶ 8:350, p. 143.)
Here, as discussed above, Scott acquired shares in
MedVector before separation. At the time of trial, Scott’s shares
represented a 61.5 percent ownership interest in MedVector.
Although MedVector (and Scott’s shares therein) had no present
economic value, testimony indicated that the business had an
estimated $10 million in “speculative future value,” at least in
part due to Scott’s work to found and develop the company before
and after separation.
Jamie argued that Scott’s MedVector shares were
community property in full and should be divided equally
between the parties. Scott did not dispute the characterization of
his MedVector shares as a community asset in part, but argued
the shares should be apportioned between the community estate
and his separate estate to account for his post-separation efforts
to develop MedVector. (Cf. In re Marriage of Lehman (1998) 18
Cal.4th 169, 176 [distinguishing “characterization, i.e., whether
the enhancement [of one spouse’s retirement benefits] was a
community asset in any part,” from “apportionment, i.e., to what
extent the enhancement, if a community asset at least in some
8
part, belonged to the community and separate estates” (italics
added)].)
Scott retained forensic accountant Ron J. Anfuso, CPA, to
offer an expert opinion regarding the apportionment of Scott’s
MedVector shares between community and separate property.
1. Legal background
California courts have developed two principal (but
nonexclusive) approaches to apportioning an increase in a
business’s value between community efforts and separate capital,
which approaches take their names from Pereira v. Pereira (1909)
156 Cal. 1 and Van Camp v. Van Camp (1921) 53 Cal.App. 17.
(Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra,
¶¶ 8:341-8:342, 8:345, pp. 139, 140-141; Dekker, supra, 17
Cal.App.4th at pp. 852-853 & fn. 14.) “The Pereira approach is to
allocate a fair return to the separate property investment and
allocate the balance of the increased value to community property
as arising from community efforts.” (Dekker, at pp. 852-853.)
“The Van Camp approach is to determine the reasonable value of
the community’s services, allocate that amount to community
property and the balance to separate property.” (Id. at p. 853.)
As noted, the Pereira and Van Camp approaches are not
exclusive. (Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 852, fn. 14.) In
Todd v. McColgan (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 509, 512-514, the Court
of Appeal approved an apportionment approach used by state tax
authorities, which had previously been used by federal tax
authorities and approved by a federal court in Todd v. C.I.R. (9th
Cir. 1945) 153 F.2d 553, 555-557. (See Dekker, at p. 852, fn. 14
[referring to that apportionment approach as “the tax, or Todd,
formula”].) Under the Todd formula, “the first figure (a) is an
estimate of a fair rate of return on the separate capital
9
investment . . . . The second figure (b) is an estimate of fair
compensation for community efforts on the business. After
totaling these two figures (a + b), the allocation ratio for separate
property is a ÷ (a + b); for community, the ratio is b ÷ (a + b).”
(California Family Law Report, Cal. Family Law Practice (2d ed.
2025) § M.74; see also Todd v. McColgan, at p. 512.)
“[C]ourts have not developed a precise standard in choosing
[an apportionment formula], but have endeavored to adopt that
formula which is most appropriate and equitable under the
circumstances.” (Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.) “The
court has discretion to choose whichever formula will effect
substantial justice.” (Ibid.; see also Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶ 8:347, pp. 141-142.)
2. Anfuso initially opined that the community had a
12 percent interest in Scott’s MedVector shares,
relying on an erroneous assumption that the
community invested in MedVector’s pre-
separation capital. He then opined that because
third parties, not the community, invested that
capital, the community’s interest was 1 percent.
Anfuso testified that he conducted an apportionment
analysis under a “capital labor apportionment model” (CLAM)
method. As he acknowledged, California appellate courts have
not addressed the CLAM method. Anfuso characterized the
CLAM method as equivalent to the Todd formula, and as a
combination of the Pereira and Van Camp approaches.6
6 Anfuso also testified that he conducted a Van Camp
analysis, under which he concluded that the community had zero
10
Anfuso did not clearly explain what the CLAM method
entails or how he applied it. It appears that Anfuso sought to
apportion the community an interest in Scott’s MedVector shares
equal to (1) the sum of the community’s capital contributions, if
any, plus what he believed to be reasonable compensation for
Scott’s pre-separation efforts, divided by (2) the sum of all capital
contributions, whether contributed by the community, either
spouse’s separate property, or third parties.7
In Anfuso’s initial CLAM analysis, which was reflected in
Exhibit YYY (a one-page spreadsheet), he characterized the
$474,500 in MedVector capital “raised” before separation as a
community contribution. Based on that contribution, he opined
that the community had a 12 percent interest in Scott’s
MedVector shares and Scott’s separate estate had an 88 percent
interest. He acknowledged that in calculating the community’s
12 percent interest, he effectively divided MedVector’s $474,500
in pre-separation capital by its $3,807,874 in total capital. The
reasonable compensation that he assigned to Scott’s pre-
separation efforts had no material impact on his calculation.
interest in Scott’s MedVector shares (apparently because Scott’s
total income from MedVector before and after separation
exceeded the reasonable value of Scott’s pre-separation efforts).
Anfuso did not discuss any Pereira analysis.
7 Anfuso did not explain why his CLAM analysis treated all
capital invested by third parties as equivalent to a contribution
from Scott’s separate property, such that the more capital third
parties invested, the more interest in Scott’s MedVector shares
would be apportioned to Scott rather than the community.
Scott’s appellate brief summarizes the conclusions that Anfuso
reached by applying the CLAM method but does not explain how
Anfuso applied that method.
11
Anfuso, however, agreed that without Scott’s pre-separation
efforts to raise funds, MedVector would have had zero pre-
separation value and would have gone out of business.8
Anfuso testified that his initial CLAM analysis
characterized MedVector’s $474,500 in pre-separation capital as
a community contribution because he erroneously assumed that
the community invested that capital. During a pause in his
testimony, Anfuso performed a revised CLAM analysis that
attributed the pre-separation capital to third parties (and
effectively treated that capital as equivalent to a contribution
from Scott’s separate estate). He offered a revised opinion that
the community had a 1 percent interest in Scott’s MedVector
shares and Scott’s separate estate had a 99 percent interest. He
opined that apportioning the shares in that manner was
equitable because, in his view, most of Scott’s work on the
business occurred after separation. Anfuso did not explain how
he calculated the community’s 1 percent interest. No document
reflecting his revised CLAM analysis was offered into evidence.
In Scott’s trial brief, relying on Anfuso’s initial CLAM
analysis, Scott argued: “When applying the CLAM method in
this case, Scott’s work on MedVector during the marriage . . .
represents 12% of the community’s total interest in the
8 Anfuso’s view of reasonable compensation for Scott’s pre-
separation efforts was based on what he determined to be
reasonable base pay (excluding other compensation such as stock
options) for Scott’s work as CEO beginning when MedVector
incorporated in December 2017 (excluding Scott’s MedVector
work earlier in 2017). Anfuso acknowledged that in 2021,
MedVector hired a CFO, a COO, and an advisor, each of whom
received stock options in addition to base pay.
12
company.” In closing argument, relying on Anfuso’s revised
analysis, Scott argued that the community’s interest was only 1
percent.
In a single sentence, Scott’s trial brief argued that if, in the
future, MedVector failed and did not pay its debts that Scott had
personally guaranteed, Jamie must be responsible for a portion of
those debts. Subsequently, Anfuso testified that whether Scott
personally guaranteed any MedVector debt was irrelevant to the
apportionment analysis, “especially if he did that after the
parties’ date of separation . . . .” In closing, Scott did not renew
his argument that Jamie should be responsible for any portion of
MedVector’s debts. Instead, he argued that because he alone
bore the risk of paying those debts if MedVector failed, it was
equitable to offset that risk by apportioning 99 percent of his
shares to his separate estate pursuant to Anfuso’s revised CLAM
analysis.
E. In its proposed statement of decision, the trial court
awarded Jamie a 6 percent interest in Scott’s
MedVector shares, awarded her $14,000 as a remedy
for Scott’s sale of the motorcycle, and ordered Scott
to pay Jamie’s balance of $35,108 in attorney fees.
The trial court issued a detailed, 26-page proposed
statement of decision. The trial court rejected Jamie’s request to
divide Scott’s MedVector shares equally between the parties,
explaining: “The Court finds that a division in kind would not
achieve substantial justice between the parties as it would
completely discount Respondent’s separate property efforts to
build MedVector, post separation, for the past five years.
Further, it was primarily Respondent’s efforts, even during the
marriage from inception to growth, which made MedVector into
13
the existence that it is today. Moreover, the Court heard
testimony as to multiple loans secured by Respondent to continue
growing MedVector, post separation.”
The trial court found that apportioning Scott’s MedVector
shares pursuant to Anfuso’s CLAM method “would achieve the
Court’s goal of substantial justice between the parties.” The
court agreed with Anfuso’s initial CLAM analysis and initial
conclusion that the community’s interest in Scott’s MedVector
shares was 12 percent (as reflected in Exhibit YYY). Noting that
Anfuso’s initial analysis treated MedVector’s $474,500 in pre-
separation capital as a community contribution, the court stated:
“[W]hile testimony was received that neither Petitioner nor
Respondent invested actual monies into MedVector, Exhibit YYY,
considered the monies raised during the marital period.
Therefore, the Court will determine $474,500 as community
funds as they were raised during the marital period, regardless of
actual monies invested by the parties.” (Original italics.) The
trial court awarded Jamie a 6 percent interest (one-half of the
community’s 12 percent interest) in Scott’s MedVector shares.9
The trial court found that Scott breached his fiduciary duty
by selling his Harley-Davidson motorcycle without obtaining
Jamie’s written consent. As to the remedy for that breach, the
trial court stated: “The Court finds that Respondent’s breach of
9 Although Scott states that the trial court awarded Jamie
a 6 percent interest “in MedVector,” the court agreed with
Anfuso’s initial conclusion that the community had a 12 percent
interest in Scott’s MedVector shares, not all MedVector shares.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over MedVector shares owned
by third parties. (See § 2010, subd. (e); Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶¶ 8:901, 8:907, pp. 335,
338.)
14
fiduciary duty to Petitioner, by his conduct of selling the Harley
Davidson motorcycle to upgrade to a newer model, w[as] within
the ‘ambit’ of Civil Code § 3294, the standard for an award of
punitive damages in a civil action. Therefore, Petitioner is
entitled to an award of 100% of the value of this asset. . . . [A]s
the Court heard testimony from Respondent that he sold the
2016 Harley Davidson for $14,000, the Court awards to
Petitioner that amount.” The court discredited Scott’s testimony
that when he sold the motorcycle, he was self-represented and
unaware of the ATRO prohibiting the sale without Jamie’s
written consent. The court additionally observed: “Respondent’s
testimony and demeanor in Court showed that he did not believe
that he needed Petitioner’s permission to sell the motorcycle,
leading to this Court’s award to Petitioner for the full amount of
the breach. And, as the Court will further describe below,
Respondent’s conduct shows a pattern of disregard for the Court’s
orders and breach of fiduciary duty.”
Finally, the trial court ordered Scott to pay Jamie’s
remaining balance of $35,108 in attorney fees. The court agreed
with Jamie that a fee award was warranted under both section
2030 (need-based fees) and section 271 (fees as sanctions).
Regarding need-based fees, the trial court explained: “The
Court finds that there is a disparity in access to funds and that
Respondent has the ability to pay all of both parties[’] legal fees
incurred in this case. Respondent’s salary is $20,000 a month,
with Petitioner earning $1,282.64 a month. There is no doubt
that Respondent is the higher wage earner. The case was
somewhat complicated in that the division of MedVector was a
difficult one to determine, requiring an expert to be retained.
The attorneys on both sides are well qualified and the fees
15
incurred in this five-year litigation were reasonable, while the
delay was not.”
The trial court continued: “As to the delay in litigation and
Petitioner’s request for section 271 attorney fees, the Court notes
that, at the very least, Petitioner has shown that Respondent has
engaged in six separate instances, a disregard for the Court’s
order: (1) order for reimbursement of medical expenses for the
children; (2) a prior order for attorney fees that was not paid on a
timely basis; (3) arrears that has accumulated, without payment
for support; (4) withdrawal of funds from the Raymond James
[investment] account, in violation of the ATROS; (5) withdrawal
of funds from the retirement IRA, in violation of the ATROS, and
(6) the sale/upgrade of the motorcycle in violation of the ATROS.
[¶] The Court finds those instances to contribute to the award of
attorney fees in the amount of $35,108 . . . .”
F. Scott objected to the proposed statement of decision.
In its final statement of decision, the trial court
determined the objections did not require a response
and reiterated its prior findings and analysis.
Scott objected to the trial court’s proposed statement of
decision, arguing that: (1) the trial court did not address
Anfuso’s testimony that Exhibit YYY reflected an erroneous
assumption that the community invested MedVector’s $474,500
in pre-separation capital; (2) the court improperly failed to assign
Jamie any portion of the MedVector debts that Scott personally
guaranteed; (3) the court’s findings and the evidence were
insufficient to support the $14,000 award to Jamie under section
1101, subdivision (h); (4) the court failed to make an adequate
finding that Scott had the ability to pay Jamie’s attorney fees;
(5) the court improperly failed to specify how much of the $35,108
16
attorney fee award constituted need-based fees and how much
constituted fees as sanctions; and (6) the evidence did not support
the award of fees as sanctions.
The trial court issued a final statement of decision, which
reiterated the proposed statement of decision’s findings and
analysis summarized above. The trial court addressed Scott’s
objections as follows: “[T]he Court finds many of [Scott’s] stated
objections do not address an ambiguity or raise controverted
issues the Court did not address. Rather the objections attempt
to reargue the case, challenge credibility findings, or state
disagreement with this Court’s ruling. The Court is not required
to provide specific answers to those questions so long as the
statement of decision fairly discloses its determination of these
issues. [Citation.] Further, the Court is not required to address
how it resolved intermediate evidentiary conflicts or respond
point by point to the various issues posed in the Respondent’s
objections which are a restatement of his position and argument
of the case. [Citation.] Further, Respondent . . . requests this
Court to consider arguments not raised at trial, which is
improper.”
The trial court entered judgment based on its final
statement of decision. Scott filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. The trial court did not err by awarding Jamie a 6
percent interest in Scott’s MedVector shares without
assigning her any portion of the MedVector debts
that Scott personally guaranteed.
As noted, in apportioning property interests between the
community estate and a spouse’s separate estate, a trial court
17
“has discretion to choose whichever formula will effect
substantial justice.” (Dekker, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 853; see
also Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra,
¶ 8:347, pp. 141-142.) The trial court’s application of its chosen
apportionment formula is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Dekker, at pp. 849, 855; In re Marriage of Brooks (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 576, 589.) The trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for substantial evidence.10 (Brooks, at pp. 589, 597.)
Here, the trial court applied the CLAM method advanced
by Scott and his expert, Anfuso. Scott does not challenge the trial
court’s decision to apply that method. He, however, argues that
no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
community had a 12 percent interest in Scott’s MedVector shares
and the court abused its discretion by failing to assign Jamie a
portion of the MedVector debts that Scott personally guaranteed.
1. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that the community had a 12 percent interest
in Scott’s MedVector shares.
In finding that the community had a 12 percent interest in
Scott’s MedVector shares, the trial court relied on Anfuso’s initial
CLAM analysis, as reflected in Exhibit YYY. In his initial
analysis, Anfuso concluded that the community had a 12 percent
interest in Scott’s MedVector shares because Scott’s community
efforts resulted in raising $474,500 in capital, which amount
10 Scott argues that alleged deficiencies in the trial court’s
statement of decision affect the standard of review by precluding
application of the doctrine of implied findings. We address the
alleged deficiencies in our discussions of the substantive issues to
which they relate.
18
represented 12 percent of the $3,807,874 in total capital that
MedVector raised before and after separation.
Scott argues that Anfuso’s initial CLAM analysis is not
substantial evidence of a 12 percent community interest because
Anfuso testified that he characterized MedVector’s $474,500 in
pre-separation capital as a community contribution for an
erroneous reason, i.e., his erroneous assumption that the
community invested that capital. Scott, however, does not
address the trial court’s finding that Anfuso correctly
characterized that capital as a community contribution for an
alternative reason, i.e., the capital was raised before separation
by Scott’s efforts. That finding contradicts Scott’s assertion that
the trial court’s statement of decision contains no finding
“explaining why the court relied on [Anfuso’s] withdrawn
calculation . . . .”
Scott argues that because the trial court adopted Anfuso’s
CLAM method and because no other witness contradicted
Anfuso’s revised CLAM analysis, the law required the court to
adopt Anfuso’s revised conclusion that the community’s interest
was only 1 percent. We disagree. Generally, the trier of fact may
reject even uncontradicted expert testimony, as long as it does
not act arbitrarily. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 621, 632; see also In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783,
823 (Scott) [“The fact finder determines the facts, not the experts.
Indeed, the fact finder may reject even ‘a unanimity of expert
opinion’ ”].)
Here, Anfuso did not explain how, in his revised CLAM
analysis, he calculated the community’s 1 percent interest. The
record contains no document from which we might discern such
an explanation, because no document reflecting Anfuso’s revised
19
analysis was offered into evidence. Absent any explanation of
Anfuso’s reasoning, the trial court did not act arbitrarily by
rejecting Anfuso’s revised opinion. (See Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 823 [“ ‘ “The chief value of an expert’s testimony . . . rests
upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the
reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his
conclusion” ’ ”].)
We note that the trial court’s stated goal in applying the
CLAM method was to achieve “substantial justice between the
parties.” Jamie had a one-half interest in the fruits of Scott’s pre-
separation efforts to found and develop MedVector. (See
Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra,
¶ 8:336, p. 136.) Scott raised MedVector’s $474,500 in pre-
separation capital by the end of 2018, when MedVector had no
employees or independent contractors other than Scott. He
testified that he “worked [his] tail off” to raise that capital,
without which MedVector “never would have started” and
“wouldn’t exist.” Anfuso agreed that without Scott’s pre-
separation efforts, MedVector would have had zero pre-
separation capital and would have gone out of business. Because
Scott’s pre-separation efforts were critical to MedVector’s
continued existence, without which his MedVector shares would
lack even speculative future value, the trial court did not act
arbitrarily in finding that justice was better served by
apportioning to the community an interest of 12 percent rather
than 1 percent (resulting in an award to Jamie of 6 percent
rather than 0.5 percent).
20
2. The trial court did not err by assigning Jamie no
MedVector-related debts.
“[T]he community estate is liable for a debt incurred by
either spouse before or during marriage . . . .” (§ 910, subd. (a).)
“ ‘During marriage’ for purposes of this section does not include
the period after the date of separation . . . and before a judgment
of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.”
(§ 910, subd. (b).) “Thus, debts incurred by either spouse after
separation are the debtor spouse’s separate obligation, neither
chargeable against nor reimbursable from the community estate.”
(Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra,
¶ 8:746, p. 287, original italics; accord, Blizzard Energy, Inc. v.
Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 853.) “[A]ll separate
debts . . . shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse who
incurred the debt.” (§ 2625.)
Here, Scott testified that after separation, he personally
guaranteed loans to MedVector and charges on a MedVector
credit card. As his trial brief stated: “Since the parties’
separation, Scott has had to personally guarantee loans to keep
MedVector afloat, including . . . credit card debts.” (Italics
added.) Scott argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to assign Jamie any portion of those MedVector debts.
Scott, however, cites no authority suggesting that
MedVector’s debts (i.e., debts incurred by a third party) were
subject to division between Scott and Jamie merely because Scott
personally guaranteed those debts. (See Fam. Code, § 910, subd.
(a) [community estate is liable for certain debts incurred “by
either spouse”]; Civ. Code, § 2787 [“A surety or guarantor is one
who promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
21
another, or hypothecates property as security therefor” (italics
added)].)
Even assuming, arguendo, that Scott personally incurred
debts by guaranteeing MedVector’s debts, the community is not
liable for Scott’s MedVector-related debts because Scott incurred
them after separation. (§ 910, subds. (a)-(b).) Anfuso implicitly
recognized as much, testifying that whether Scott personally
guaranteed any MedVector debt was irrelevant to the
apportionment analysis, “especially if he did that after the
parties’ date of separation . . . .”
Because Scott incurred his MedVector-related debts after
separation, his reliance on section 2550 is misplaced. That
statute generally requires a trial court to “divide the community
estate of the parties equally.” (§ 2550, italics added.) As
discussed, Scott’s post-separation debts are not chargeable
against the community estate. (§ 910, subds. (a)-(b).) “[O]nce the
court characterizes an unpaid liability as a ‘separate debt’
[citation], the debt does not factor into the equal division of the
community estate.” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide:
Family Law, supra, ¶ 8:1288, p. 476, italics omitted; accord, In re
Marriage of Cairo (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1255, 1267.)
The trial court’s statement of decision noted that the court
“heard testimony as to multiple loans secured by [Scott] to
continue growing MedVector, post separation.” (Italics added.)
The statement of decision did not expressly find that those loans
were MedVector’s debts or Scott’s separate debts. Contrary to
Scott’s suggestion, that omission was not reversible error.
Although Scott’s trial brief requested, in passing, that the trial
court assign Jamie a share of his (speculative) future
responsibility for the MedVector debts that he personally
22
guaranteed, he did not contend in his trial brief or in closing
arguments that he personally incurred those debts, much less
that he did so before separation or that they were chargeable to
Jamie’s interest in the community for any other reason. Thus,
the characterization of those debts was not among the principal
controverted issues that the statement of decision was required
to address. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 632 [where properly
requested, statement of decision must explain factual and legal
basis for trial court’s decision “as to each of the principal
controverted issues at trial”]; Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA
Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 559 (Yield Dynamics)
[“While we have found no existing definition of that phrase
[principal controverted issues], it is settled that the trial court
need not, in a statement of decision, ‘address all the legal and
factual issues raised by the parties’ ”].)
Even assuming, arguendo, the trial court erred by failing to
make an express finding regarding the characterization of the
MedVector-related debts, the error was harmless because, for the
reasons discussed above, the undisputed evidence compels a
finding that they were MedVector’s debts or Scott’s separate
debts. (See Pallco Enterprises, Inc. v. Beam (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 1482, 1501 [omission of required finding from
statement of decision is harmless error unless sufficient evidence
supports finding in appellant’s favor].)
To the extent Scott suggests it is unfair for Jamie to receive
equity in MedVector without bearing the risk of paying
MedVector’s debts if the business fails, we disagree. Just like
any other shareholder, Jamie need not assume personal
responsibility for the business’s debts. If the business succeeds
23
and its shares acquire actual economic value, its debts will
reduce that value as to all shares, including Jamie’s.
In short, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
awarding Jamie a 6 percent interest in Scott’s MedVector shares
or by assigning her no MedVector-related debts.
B. The trial court did not err by awarding Jamie
$14,000 as a remedy for Scott’s sale of a motorcycle in
breach of his fiduciary duty.
“Each spouse shall act with respect to the other spouse in
the management and control of the community assets and
liabilities in accordance with the general rules governing
fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons
having relationships of personal confidence as specified in Section
721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been
divided by the parties or by a court.” (§ 1100, subd. (e).) A
spouse’s fiduciary duty carries an obligation, among others, of
“[a]ccounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit
or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse that concerns the community
property.” (§ 721, subd. (b)(3).) The fiduciary duty also requires
“accurate and complete disclosure of all assets and liabilities in
which the [other] party has or may have an interest or
obligation . . . , including an immediate, full, and accurate update
or augmentation to the extent there have been material changes.”
(§ 2102, subd. (a)(1).)
“Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty . . . when the
breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code
shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse
of 100 percent, or an amount equal to 100 percent, of any asset
undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty.” (Fam.
24
Code, § 1101, subd. (h).) Civil Code section 3294 provides: “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages
for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”11
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
Here, Scott sold a community property motorcycle for
$14,000, without informing Jamie or obtaining her consent, and
used the sale proceeds in purchasing another motorcycle. The
trial court found that the sale breached Scott’s fiduciary duty and
that the breach was within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294.
Based on the $14,000 sale price, the trial court found that the
motorcycle’s value was $14,000 and awarded Jamie 100 percent
of that value as a remedy for the breach under Family Code
section 1101, subdivision (h). We review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Rossi (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 34, 40 (Rossi).)
Scott argues that the trial court failed to make a required
finding that he was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice within
the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. We disagree. The trial
court expressly found that “Respondent’s breach of fiduciary duty
to Petitioner, by his conduct of selling the Harley Davidson
motorcycle to upgrade to a newer model, w[as] within the ‘ambit’
of Civil Code § 3294 . . . .” The trial court’s express language
mirrored that of Family Code section 1101, subdivision (h), which
11 If the breach does not fall within the ambit of Civil Code
section 3294, remedies shall include an award of 50 percent, or
an amount equal to 50 percent, of the asset. (Fam. Code, § 1101,
subd. (g).)
25
authorizes an award of 100 percent of an asset transferred in
breach of the fiduciary duty “when the breach falls within the
ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code . . . .” Scott cites no
authority—and we are aware of none—holding that such an
express finding is insufficient to support an award under Family
Code section 1101, subdivision (h).12
Scott argues that no substantial evidence supported a
finding that he was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. Again,
we disagree. “ ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant
with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise
causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
Scott does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that Scott knowingly violated
the ATRO prohibiting his sale of the motorcycle without Jamie’s
written consent. After knowingly violating that order, Scott used
the sale proceeds in buying another motorcycle, without
transferring to Jamie or holding in trust her share of the
proceeds. The trial court observed that Scott’s testimony and
12 In re Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 520, 527, held that a trial court abused its discretion
by making a 100 percent award of quasi-marital property under
Family Code section 1101, subdivision (h), because the trial court
“erroneously believed it could award 100 percent of the quasi-
marital property . . . without finding oppression, fraud, or
malice.” The opinion does not mention any express finding by the
trial court that the breach of fiduciary duty fell within the ambit
of Civil Code section 3294. “[C]ases are not authority for
propositions not considered.” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1160.)
26
courtroom demeanor showed that he did not believe he needed
Jamie’s consent for the sale (despite a court order to the
contrary), and that Scott’s other litigation conduct reflected a
pattern of disregard for the court’s orders and breaches of
fiduciary duty.
We conclude that Scott’s undisputed conduct was
substantial evidence that he was guilty of fraud because he
intentionally concealed the motorcycle sale and the proceeds with
the intent to deprive Jamie of property (her share of the proceeds)
or legal rights (her rights under the ATRO). (See Civ. Code,
§ 3294, subd. (c)(3); Rossi, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40-42
[spouse’s intentional failure to disclose community property
lottery winnings constituted fraud and supported 100 percent
award under Family Code section 1101, subdivision (h)].)
Finally, Scott argues that no substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that the value of the motorcycle was
$14,000. “The value of the asset shall be determined to be its
highest value at the date of the breach of the fiduciary duty, the
date of the sale or disposition of the asset, or the date of the
award by the court.” (§ 1101, subd. (g).) Scott does not dispute
that his testimony that he sold the motorcycle for $14,000 was
substantial evidence that on the date of the breach (the sale), the
motorcycle’s fair market value was $14,000.
Instead, Scott argues that the value awardable under
section 1101, subdivision (h), was limited to the community
equity created by Scott’s pre-separation payments on the note
used to finance the original purchase of the motorcycle. He
argues that the community had no interest in the equity he
created by making payments on the note after separation.
27
Scott, however, produced no evidence that he made his
post-separation payments with his separate funds rather than
community funds (such as the $55,000 in community funds he
improperly withdrew from the parties’ Raymond James
investment and retirement accounts). Absent such evidence,
Scott’s reliance on section 2640 is misplaced. (See § 2640, subd.
(b) [“In the division of the community estate . . . , [a] party shall
be reimbursed for the party’s contributions to the acquisition of
property of the community property estate [including payments
that reduce the principal of a loan used to finance the purchase of
the property] to the extent the party traces the contributions to a
separate property source” (italics added)].)
Moreover, because Scott’s breach of his fiduciary duty was
the reason the motorcycle was removed from the community
estate and the proceeds were used to pay the balance on the note
without an accounting, he bore the burden to prove to what
extent, if any, the motorcycle’s value was reduced by any
outstanding community debt on the note. (See In re Marriage of
Prentis-Margulis & Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1269
[“Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations
between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of
proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and
disposition of missing assets”].) Scott testified that he did not
recall (and could only guess) the amount of the outstanding
balance on the note at the time he sold the motorcycle. Although
he “guessed” what the balance was, his speculation could not
satisfy his burden of proof. (Carter v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc.
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 [“ ‘inferences that are the
result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a
finding’ ”].) Because Scott failed to meet his burden to prove a
28
lesser value, we conclude that the undisputed $14,000 sale price
was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that
the motorcycle’s value was $14,000.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
awarding Jamie $14,000 as a remedy for Scott’s breach of
fiduciary duty under section 1101, subdivision (h).
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ordering Scott to pay Jamie’s attorney fees.
Section 2030 authorizes an award of need-based attorney
fees. “In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, . . . the court
shall ensure that each party has access to legal
representation . . . by ordering, if necessary based on the income
and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or
to the other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably
necessary for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or
defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”
(§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) “When a request for attorney’s fees and
costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award
of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is appropriate,
whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel,
and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of
both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and
ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s
fees and costs.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) “The court may make an
award of attorney’s fees and costs under Section 2030 . . . where
the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just
and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective
parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).)
Section 271 authorizes an award of attorney fees as
sanctions. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the
29
court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the
extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or
frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation
and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by
encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An
award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in
the nature of a sanction.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) “In making an
award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into
consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets,
and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to
this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on
the party against whom the sanction is imposed.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court granted Jamie’s request for attorney
fees under sections 2030 and 271 and ordered Scott to pay her
remaining balance of $35,108 in fees. We review the attorney fee
award for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Rangell (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1218.) “Under this standard of review, the
trial court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless, considering all
the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order and
indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could
reasonably make the order.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s
factual findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Scott argues that we should apply a less deferential
standard of review because the trial court’s statement of decision
was deficient as to the attorney fee award. We disagree. Indeed,
“[a] trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision for
an attorney fee award.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 964, 981 (Falcone).)
Scott challenges the attorney fee award on three grounds:
(1) the trial court failed to make required findings to support an
30
award of need-based fees under section 2030; (2) the trial court
failed to make required findings to support an award of fees as
sanctions under section 271; and (3) the trial court failed to
allocate the amount of fees awarded between need-based fees and
fees as sanctions. We address each issue in turn.
1. The trial court made adequate findings to support
the award under section 2030.
Scott argues that the trial court failed to make the findings
required by section 2030, i.e., “whether an award of attorney’s
fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is
a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one
party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties.”
(§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) We disagree. The trial court implicitly
found that a fee award was appropriate and expressly found “that
there is a disparity in access to funds and that Respondent has
the ability to pay all of both parties[’] legal fees incurred in this
case.”
Without citing the record, Scott argues that the trial court’s
ability-to-pay finding was deficient because it was “conclusory”
and contradicted by certain evidence. Scott’s stipulation that he
received $21,182 in monthly income, however, was substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that he could pay the
$35,108 fee award. The trial court expressly relied on the
evidence of Scott’s monthly income. Scott cites no authority—and
we are aware of none—suggesting that section 2030 required the
trial court to discuss the evidence in more detail, if at all. As
noted, a statement of decision was not required for the attorney
fee award. (Falcone, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 981.) Even
assuming, arguendo, a statement of decision was required, the
trial court was required “ ‘only to set out ultimate findings rather
31
than evidentiary ones.’ ” (Yield Dynamics, supra, 154
Cal.App.4th at p. 559.)
Finally, Scott argues that the trial court failed to make a
required finding under section 2032, which provides that a trial
court may award fees under section 2030 “where the making of
the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable
under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.”
(§ 2032, subd. (a).) Unlike section 2030, however, section 2032
does not require a trial court to “make findings.” (§ 2030, subd.
(a)(2).) Scott does not dispute that the trial court considered
whether the award was just and reasonable, which is all that
section 2032 requires.
2. The trial court made adequate findings to support
the award under section 271.
Scott argues that the trial court failed to make required
findings under section 271, which authorizes a trial court to base
an attorney fee award on the extent to which a party’s conduct
frustrates the policies of promoting settlement and reducing the
cost of litigation, and which prohibits a trial court from imposing
an unreasonable financial burden via such an award. (§ 271,
subd. (a).) Like section 2032, however, section 271 does not
require a trial court to make findings. (See ibid.)
In any event, as noted, the trial court expressly found that
Scott had the ability to pay all of the parties’ attorney fees,
thereby implicitly finding that the fee award did not impose an
unreasonable financial burden on him. Further, the trial court
expressly agreed with Jamie’s argument that Scott’s disregard for
court orders led to further litigation, i.e., that his conduct
frustrated the policies of promoting settlement and reducing the
cost of litigation. Contrary to Scott’s assertion that the trial court
32
failed to identify specific acts of sanctionable conduct, the court
expressly based its award of fees as sanctions on Scott’s conduct
in (1) failing to pay court-ordered reimbursement for one-half of
the children’s medical expenses; (2) failing to timely pay court-
ordered attorney fees; (3) failing to pay support arrears;
(4) violating the ATRO by withdrawing funds from the Raymond
James investment account; (5) violating the ATRO again by
withdrawing funds from the Raymond James retirement account;
and (6) violating the ATRO a third time by selling the motorcycle.
Scott argues that section 271 required the trial court to find
that his conduct caused Jamie to incur the $35,108 in attorney
fees awarded. Case law is to the contrary. (Falcone, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 990 [“ ‘[A] sanctions award under [Family Code]
section 271 need not “be limited to the cost to the other side
resulting from the bad conduct” ’ ”]; Hogoboom & King, Cal.
Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, ¶ 14:245, p. 95 [section 271
“does not require a direct correlation between the amount of the
sanction imposed and expenses incurred in resisting the
sanctionable conduct”]; see also In re Marriage of Feldman (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1480 [section 271 “does not require any
actual injury”].)
Scott acknowledges that section 271 “does not require a
direct dollar-for-dollar causal link between the offending conduct
and specific attorney fees incurred.” Citing In re Marriage of
Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1529-1531, he asserts
that the amount of fees awarded under section 271 “must still be
reasonably tied to the extent the conduct increased the burden of
litigation or frustrated settlement, and the trial court must
explain this connection.” In Davenport, the Court of Appeal
affirmed an award under section 271 without addressing whether
33
the law required the trial court to explain any such connection.
(Id. at pp. 1525-1536.) “[C]ases are not authority for propositions
not considered.” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 1160.)
3. The trial court awarded the full amount of fees on
two independently adequate grounds.
Scott argues that the trial court erred by failing to allocate
the $35,108 in attorney fees between need-based fees under
section 2030 and fees as sanctions under section 271. His
premise is that the $35,108 award was a “blended” award
comprising an unspecified amount of need-based fees plus a
separate, unspecified amount of fees as sanctions.
Scott identifies no support for that premise in the record.
In discussing need-based fees under section 2030, the trial court’s
statement of decision found that Scott had the ability to pay “all”
of the parties’ fees and that the fees incurred in the litigation (not
merely some portion thereof) were reasonable. In discussing fees
as sanctions under section 271, the trial court found that Scott’s
pattern of disregard for court orders contributed to the award of
$35,108, i.e., the full amount of the award.
Based on those findings, we read the trial court’s statement
of decision as determining that each of section 2030 and section
271 was an independently adequate ground for awarding Jamie
the full remaining balance of her fees ($35,108). Thus, the trial
court had no occasion to allocate the fees between the two
grounds.
In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Jamie her attorney fees.
34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
35