Filed 9/16/26 Marriage of Sovari and Vahdani CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Marriage of ALI SOVARI 2d Civil No. B349006
and NOOSHIN VAHDANI. (Super. Ct. No. D398067)
(Ventura County)
ALI SOVARI,
Respondent,
v.
NOOSHIN VAHDANI,
Appellant.
Nooshin Vahdani (wife) appeals from the trial court’s order
modifying spousal support payable by Ali Sovari (husband)
pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement. She
contends the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying a
“non-modifiable” agreement and committed reversible error by
using the discretionary factors set forth in Family Code section
43201 rather than the “bargained-for,” objective formula set forth
in the parties’ agreement. Wife also appeals from the trial court’s
order denying her “arrears” request for order as “moot.” She
contends the finding of mootness must be reversed because it was
predicated on the trial court’s “jurisdictionally flawed decision to
modify support.” We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background2
The parties were married in July 1999. They have one
child, Ryan, who is now 15 years old. Husband is a physician.
He was the “breadwinner” for the family during the marriage.
Wife did not work. The parties separated in August 2019. In
June 2020, husband filed for dissolution of marriage.
In September 2021, the parties signed a marital settlement
agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment of
dissolution filed October 12, 2021.
In December 2023, wife filed a Request for Orders for child
support modification, attorney fees, Talking Parents, and for
court interpretation of the judgment of dissolution. In February
2024, husband filed a Request for Orders to modify spousal
support, a request for a section 4320 analysis, and a motion to
determine the marital standard of living.
The trial court determined that the MSA was “highly
confusing and complicated regarding spousal support, utilized
dissomaster calculations, required constant recalculations, and
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code.
2 We summarize these facts from the trial court’s July 18,
2025 order modifying support.
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was poorly written.” Based on those issues, the trial court agreed
with husband that support should be litigated.
On May 30, 2024 and June 7, 2024, the trial court heard
testimony regarding the marital standard of living, at the request
of both parties. At the time, wife was represented by counsel.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its ruling finding the marital
standard of living was middle class.
On May 29, 2025, the trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the criteria set forth in section 4320. At the hearing,
husband was represented by counsel and wife represented herself
in propria persona. After listening to testimony and hearing
argument, the trial court adjusted the child support orders for
the period of 2024 and 2025. It also ordered the “current
temporary spousal support” to remain at $8,245 per month. It
then took the matter of permanent spousal support under
submission.
On July 18, 2025, the trial court issued its ruling on the
submitted matter. In its order, the trial court found that this was
a long-term marriage. Both parties are presently living above the
marital standard of living, which was middle class. Wife was
choosing not to work and when she did, she was “vastly
underemployed.” The trial court issued wife a Gavron3 warning
and set spousal support at $4,400, effective August 1, 2025, to be
payable until wife remarries, the death of either party, or further
order of the Court.
3 A Gavron warning is a fair warning to the supported
spouse that he or she is expected to become self-supporting. (In
re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55; In re
Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705.)
3
On July 29, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on
numerous issues, including wife’s April 11, 2025 request to
modify spousal support, child support, and for attorney fees. The
trial court denied the request for orders as it relates to the
support issues as “moot” based on its prior ruling after the May
29, 2025 hearing. As to wife’s request for attorney fees, the trial
court indicated it had already awarded wife $22,000 in attorney
fees. The trial court explained that wife “is saying she owes more
money, but that was the Court’s decision. And I rest with that.”
While this appeal was pending, wife filed a petition for writ
of supersedeas seeking to stay enforcement of the July 18, 2025
order, which we denied.
Discussion
At the outset, we note the record on appeal is wholly
inadequate to conduct a meaningful review of wife’s claims of
error. The record does not include any of the parties’ pleadings,
request for orders, or the transcripts from the May 30, 2024 and
June 7, 2024 hearings, at which the trial court determined the
marital standard of living. Nor does the record include the
judgment of dissolution and MSA, which forms the basis of wife’s
entire appeal. In the notice designating record on appeal, wife
elected to proceed with a clerk’s transcript (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.122) and a reporter’s transcript (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.130) from the hearings conducted on May 29, 2025 and July 29,
2025. Several exhibits were introduced at the evidentiary
hearing on May 29, 2025, including the judgment of dissolution
and the MSA (Exhibit 11). Because wife did not request any
exhibits to be included in the clerk’s transcript, there are no
exhibits included in the record on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.224; see also In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176
4
Cal.App.4th 1438, 1447, fn. 4 [declining to consider trial exhibits
that are not part of the appellate record].)
However, wife included the judgment of dissolution and
MSA as an exhibit to her petition for writ of supersedeas. We
will therefore, on our own motion, take judicial notice of the
judgment and MSA included in this court’s records. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, 459.)
Contentions
Wife contends the trial court committed a fundamental
error of law when it rewrote a “final judgment under the guise of
interpreting it.” She claims by casting aside the parties’
“bargained-for formula” and conducting its own analysis under
the “prohibited” section 4320 framework, the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction. Wife further contends that even if
modification were permissible, the trial court failed to apply the
correct legal framework by finding a material change of
circumstance to justify departing from the MSA’s formula. As we
explain, wife’s contentions are meritless.
Family Code Section 4320 Framework
In exercising its discretion to modify a spousal support
order, the trial court considers the criteria set forth in section
4320, including the supported party’s contribution to the
education/career of the supporting party; the supporting party’s
ability to pay; the parties’ respective needs based on the marital
standard of living; the parties’ obligations and assets; the
duration of the marriage; and the parties’ ages and health. (§
4320, subds. (b)-(f), & (h).) The trial court also considers the
extent to which each party’s earning capacity is sufficient to
maintain the standard of living established during the marriage,
the supported spouse’s ability to engage in gainful employment,
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and the goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting
within a reasonable period of time. (Id., subds. (a), (g) & (l); In re
Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496.) In addition to
these specific factors, a court also takes into consideration the
“balance of the hardships” to the parties and “[a]ny other factors
[it] determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320, subds. (k), (n).)
The trial court reduced wife’s spousal support from $8,245
per month to $4,400 per month.
Standard of Review
A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct
and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it
on matters as to which the record is silent. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Appellant must affirmatively
show error and do so by an adequate record. (9 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (6th ed. 2026) Appeal, § 651, p. 687.)
Wife argues that we should review the trial court’s order
under the de novo standard of review, applying the interpretation
of contracts principles. Husband argues the trial court’s ruling is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. We conclude wife’s
contentions fail under either standard.
Normally, “ ‘[w]hether a modification of a spousal support
order is warranted depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case, and its propriety rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court the exercise of which this court will not disturb unless
as a matter of law an abuse of discretion is shown.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 7; In re Marriage of
Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 479-480.)
However, “ ‘ “[m]arital settlement agreements incorporated
into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory
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rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.” ’ ” (In
re Marriage of Hibbard (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1012.)
“ ‘ “The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give
effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.] If
contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. . . .” ’ ” (Id.
at p. 1013.) “ ‘ “The mutual intention to which the courts give
effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’
intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as
extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding
circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into
the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the
contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. . . .” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘The parties’ expressed objective intent, not their
unexpressed subjective intent, governs.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 948.)
The MSA Provisions
Wife contends she and husband sought to ensure finality
and predictability by way of three specific, interlocking provisions
governing spousal support set forth in the MSA.
Those provisions are as follows:
Section 22: “This agreement may not be altered, amended,
or modified, except by an instrument in writing executed by both
parties.”
Section 27: “The parties acknowledge and agree that the
Court in the underlying proceeding for dissolution of marriage
shall reserve jurisdiction to make all orders necessary to enforce
and compel compliance of the terms of the Marital Settlement
Agreement.”
Section 10.3: “For purposes of calculating ongoing spousal
[support] commencing September 1, 2021, the parties agree to not
7
use the factors set forth in Family code § 4321 [sic], but rather
calculate the amount of spousal support based on Santa Clara
County guideline temporary spousal support.”
Wife contends this plain language divests the trial court of
authority to do anything other than enforce the agreed-upon
formula and by modifying the non-modifiable agreement, the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction. We disagree.
In re Marriage of Hufford (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 825
(Hufford), the appellate court considered “whether judicial
modification of spousal support is precluded by a boiler plate
provision in a marital settlement agreement that merely provides
that the agreement is entire and cannot be amended, altered or
modified by the parties except by a writing signed by both
parties.” (Id. at p. 827.)
The Hufford court concluded that the provision did not
exclude judicial modification, explaining that “ ‘Although no
particular magic words are needed to provide the exception to
nonmodifiability contemplated by [Civil Code] section 4811,
subdivision (b),[4] some specific unequivocal language directly on
the question of modification is required. . . .’ ” (Hufford, supra,
152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 832-833, quoting Fukuzaki v. Superior
Court (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 454, 458 [“The import of the statute
may not be ‘avoided by drawing inferences as to the intention of
4 Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (b) was subsequently
recodified as Family Code, § 3591, subdivision (c). That provision
states: “An agreement for spousal support may not be modified or
revoked to the extent that a written agreement, or, if there is no
written agreement, an oral agreement entered into in open court
between the parties, specifically provides that the spousal
support is not subject to modification or termination.”
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the parties’ from general provision of the agreement which do not
contain a specific provision concerning judicial modification”].)
We conclude the boiler plate language provided in section
22 of the MSA, does not “specifically provide” that the spousal
support agreement was not subject to judicial modification. This
is particularly so when considering the agreement in its entirety,
which is what the trial court did here.
Moreover, the trial court’s July 18, 2025 order noted that
“[t]he Court heard testimony on May 30, 2024 and June 7, 2024
regarding the marital standard of living at the request of both
counsel.” It appears from this record that wife agreed that the
trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
This inference is further supported by the trial court’s
statements at the close of the evidentiary hearing on May 29,
2025. There, the trial court observed that “ . . . both parties
argued respectively with the request for orders and asked the
Court to do - - essentially a bifurcated sort of 4320 analysis,
which encompassed several factors . . . along with the main part
of the analysis, which was the marital standard of living.”
(Italics added.)
On this record, wife has not affirmatively shown error.
Wife’s contention that the trial court’s role was
“circumscribe[d]” to the “ministerial function of ensuring the
agreement is carried out as written” is similarly without merit.
After conducting the evidentiary hearing on May 29, 2025,
the trial court explained, “So there’s a number of reasons why the
Court needs to redo the spousal support . . . in the manner of
which it’s going to do.” However, “the main reason in the Court’s
view is that it’s contrary to public policy.” (Italics added.) The
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trial court explained that the agreement contained language that
said “temporary,” it “was used on a DissoMaster,” and
“[p]ermanent spousal support does not utilize a DissoMaster or
the Xspouse.”
Family law cases “ ‘are equitable proceedings in which the
court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve
fairness and equity.’ ” (In re Marriage of Egedi (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 17, 22-23.) “ ‘ “Equity . . . will assert itself in those
situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its
intervention.”. . .’ ” (Id. at p. 23.)
That is the case here. The MSA was drafted using a
mediator. It had never been adjudicated on the merits. And as
the trial court noted in its ruling, spousal support is supposed to
be “commensurate with the parties[’] pre-separation lifestyle, not
equality of post-separation income.” (Citing In re Marriage of
Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 209; Marriage of
Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 363.)
Wife contends even if modification were permissible, the
trial court erred by failing to identify a material change in
circumstances.
Spousal support is intended to permit a supported spouse
to afford reasonable expenses consistent with the marital
standard of living. The party seeking modification of spousal
support must demonstrate a material change in circumstances
since the last support order. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575.) Changed circumstances exist where
there is a decreased need for support. (In re Marriage of McCann
(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.)
Here, the trial court found the marital standard of living
was middle class, but the evidence showed that both parties were
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presently living above the marital standard of living. The parties
never owned a home during the marriage. However, after the
divorce, wife purchased a home, invested $166,000 in a
restaurant that later burned down, received a 27.5% interest in
husband’s profit sharing plan, and is “currently choosing not to
work.” Although the trial court did not expressly state that it
had found a “material change in circumstances,” the record
supports such a finding.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s July 18, 2025 order
does not warrant reversal. Because we so conclude, wife’s
challenge to the trial court’s July 29, 2025 order and finding of
mootness as “jurisdictionally flawed” necessarily fails.
Disposition
The orders are affirmed. Husband shall recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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Michele M. Castillo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Feinberg & Waller and Marshall W. Waller, Ryan C.
Waller, for Appellant.
Law Offices of Bryan J. Clifton and Bryan J. Clifton, for
Respondent.