Filed 7/1/26 Marriage of Sarkissian and Darbinian CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of SILVA B347129
SARKISSIAN and ARGAM
DARBINIAN. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
SILVA SARKISSIAN, 22STFL01352)
Respondent,
ORDER MODIFYING
v. OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING
ARGAM DARBINIAN,
NO CHANGE IN THE
Appellant. JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 15, 2026, be
modified as follows:
1. On page 5, line 4 from the bottom of the last paragraph
ending “the court clerk served him on that day,” add as
footnote 2 the following footnote, which will require
renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
2 Although the court’s 8:30 a.m. minute order on
January 24, 2025—which reflected the court’s action
in taking the vexatious litigant motion under
submission—ordered counsel to prepare “an Order
After Hearing,” the separate 1:30 p.m. minute
order—which reflected the court’s ruling on the
submitted motion (and which is before us on
appeal)—did not contemplate a further order and, to
the contrary, was signed by the court and contains
the clerk’s certificate that it was served upon
Darbinian that day.
* * *
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
——————————————————————————————
HOFFSTADT, P. J. BAKER, J. KIM (D.), J.
2
Filed 6/15/26 Marriage of Sarkissian and Darbinian CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re the Marriage of SILVA B347129
SARKISSIAN and ARGAM
DARBINIAN. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
SILVA SARKISSIAN, 22STFL01352)
Respondent,
v.
ARGAM DARBINIAN,
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Michelle L. Kazadi, Judge. Dismissed.
Argam Darbinian, in pro per, for Appellant.
Silva Sarkissian, in pro per, for Respondent.
******
Argam Darbinian seeks to appeal the family court’s orders
(1) designating him as a vexatious litigant (Code Civ. Proc., § 391
et seq.),1 and (2) renewing a domestic violence restraining order.
Because Darbinian filed untimely notices of appeal from both
orders, we must dismiss the entirety of his appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Marriage, Entry of Restraining Order, and
Dissolution
Darbinian and his former wife, Silva Sarkissian, married in
September 2003, separated in February 2022, and, a few weeks
later, Sarkissian filed for dissolution and for a domestic violence
restraining order. The family court issued a three-year
restraining order on April 29, 2022. After a multi-day trial in
October and November 2023, the family court issued a final
dissolution judgment in April 2024.
On September 5, 2025, we affirmed the final dissolution
judgment in an unpublished opinion. (Sarkissian v. Darbinian
(Sept. 5, 2025, B339461) [nonpub. opn.].) In our opinion, we
noted that Darbinian had “violated [the] terms [of the restraining
order] multiple times by ‘incessantly’ harassing wife,” including
by following her in a car and “nearly running her off the road.”
He was arrested and prosecuted for violating the order as well.
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
2
II. Post-Dissolution Litigation
A. Leading to vexatious litigant declaration
In the late summer and early fall of 2024, Darbinian filed a
succession of motions aimed at overturning the April 2024
dissolution judgment—namely, (1) a request for order filed on
August 22, 2024, seeking to modify the child custody order,
visitation order, and attorney fees order, all of which sought to
relitigate the dissolution judgment, (2) a 261-page request for
order, filed on August 27, 2024, seeking to vacate the dissolution
judgment and compel discovery, and (3) a series of motions, some
ex parte, filed on October 22, 2024, seeking to vacate the
dissolution judgment (122 pages), as well as to change venue,
vacate prior sanctions orders against Darbinian, and compel
disclosure of any relationship between Sarkissian’s counsel and
the family court judge (59 pages). All of the requests were denied
and found to be either frivolous or “unintelligible”; the court also
imposed monetary sanctions against Darbinian because his
filings “frustrate[d] the policy of the law to promote settlement of
litigation and . . . needlessly increased the cost of litigation.”
On November 8, 2024, Sarkissian moved the family court to
designate Darbinian as a vexatious litigant based on his repeated
meritless attacks on the dissolution judgment.
The family court held a hearing on the motion on January
24, 2025. The same day, the family court issued a signed minute
order finding Darbinian to be a vexatious litigant on three
counts—namely, (1) that, as a self-represented litigant, he
“repeatedly litigated . . . the validity of the Judgment of
Dissolution and other issues . . . previous[ly] determined by order
of the Court” (thereby satisfying the definition of “vexatious
litigant” set forth in section 391, subdivision (b)(2)), (2)
3
“repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions, attempted to conduct
unnecessary discovery, and has engaged in other tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to unnecessarily harass [Sarkissian]
and to cause further delay of this matter” (thereby satisfying the
definition in section 391, subdivision (b)(3)), and (3) “after being
restrained pursuant to a Domestic Violence Restraining Order
after hearing, which is still an active order, [he] filed three
meritless Requests for Orders and one Exparte application,
causing [Sarkissian] to feel harassed and intimidated” (thereby
satisfying the definition in section 391, subdivision (b)(5)). The
clerk of court served notice of entry of the signed order on
Darbinian on the same day.
B. Leading to renewed restraining order
On January 24, 2025, Sarkissian filed a request to extend
the previously entered three-year domestic violence restraining
order. The court set an evidentiary hearing for March 11, 2025.
Darbinian sought to file a 44-page opposition on the day of
the hearing, but the family court struck it as untimely. The court
proceeded with the hearing, at which Darbinian and Sarkissian
both testified. The court found Sarkissian’s testimony to be
“credible”; found that Darbinian had “committed acts that
violated the restraining order”; and found that Sarkissian proved
she “has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse” by
Darbinian. The court made the restraining order “permanent.”
The hearing transcript suggests that Darbinian was personally
served with the order at the conclusion of that hearing on March
11, 2025. Darbinian was also served with an order after hearing,
signed by the family court, on April 7, 2025.
4
III. Appeals
Darbinian filed a notice of appeal challenging the vexatious
litigation designation on July 7, 2025.
Darbinian filed a notice of appeal challenging the
restraining order renewal on June 9, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Darbinian challenges the family court’s order designating
him to be a vexatious litigant as well as its order permanently
renewing the domestic violence restraining order. As explained
below, we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal of those orders.
I. Appeal of Vexatious Litigant Designation
An order designating a litigant to be a “vexatious litigant”
operates as an injunction, such that an initial designation may be
appealed. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347; § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) An appeal of the
initial designation must still be perfected, which requires that a
notice of appeal challenging the order be timely filed. As
pertinent here, a party has 60 days to file a notice of appeal “after
the superior court clerk serves on th[at] party . . . a filed-endorsed
copy” of a “signed order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(a)(1)(A), (c)(2); Shpiller v. Harry C’s Redlands (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 1177, 1179; cf. Etheridge v. Reins Internat.
California, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 908, 913 [signed minute
order sustaining demurrer and dismissing action with prejudice
constituted appealable judgment].) Here, the trial court signed
the order declaring Darbinian to be a vexatious litigant on
January 24, 2025, and the court clerk served him on that day.
Thus, the time to appeal expired 60 days later—on March 25,
2025. Darbinian did not file his notice of appeal until July 7,
2025. His notice of appeal is accordingly untimely.
5
Darbinian argues that his July 7, 2025 notice of appeal is
timely because (1) the trial court subsequently issued a signed
order after hearing on March 11, 2025 reaffirming its prior
January 24, 2025 designation, (2) no one served that March 11,
2025 order on him, such that (3) the 180-day time period for
orders that were never served on a party applies in this case,
meaning that he had until September 7, 2025 to file his notice of
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C)). We reject this
argument because where, as here, the trial court’s original signed
order does not contemplate issuance of a further order and
contains the same content as the original signed order,2 the
original signed order is what triggers the duty to file a notice of
appeal, regardless of what happens later. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(c)(2); McHale v. State of Cal. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d
396, 399 [“When a court enters a minute order which does not
call for the preparation and filing of a formal order, the minute
order is final and all legal consequences ensue therefrom”];
Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241,
1248.)
II. Appeal of the Restraining Order Renewal
An order renewing a restraining order is appealable as an
order granting an injunction. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 1495, 1502, fn. 9; § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) Even if we
ignore that the family court clerk was directed to personally serve
Darbinian with the renewed order at the March 11, 2025 hearing,
and instead rely on the April 7, 2025 further order after hearing
served on Darbinian on April 7, 2025, the 60-day window for
2 Darbinian’s assertion that the March 11 order includes a
$5,000 security requirement that the original order lacked is
incorrect.
6
appealing the further order expired on June 6, 2025. Darbinian
did not file his notice of appeal until June 9, 2025. It was
accordingly untimely.
* * *
Because we have no discretion to relieve a party from an
untimely notice of appeal (Chico Feminist Women’s Health Center
v. Scully (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 230, 254), we dismiss this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Sarkissian is entitled to her costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
7