Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Rehman and Ashraf CA1/4

Filed 9/30/26 Marriage of Rehman and Ashraf CA1/4
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/30/26 Marriage of Rehman and Ashraf CA1/4

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Marriage of NAIMA REHMAN
and MUHAMMED MANSUR
ASHRAF.

NAIMA REHMAN,
Respondent, A176025
v. (Alameda County
MUHAMMAD MANSUR ASHRAF, Super. Ct. No. 24FL062887)
Appellant.

Respondent Muhammad Mansur Ashraf appeals from the January 27,
2026 order and statement of decision of the Alameda County Superior Court,
issued under Family Code section 70. The order sets the date of marital
separation between him and Naima Rehman as February 6, 2024, when
Rehman filed a petition for dissolution of marriage (January 27 Order),
rather than as April 4, 2015, which Ashraf contended was the correct date.
Ashraf argues the court applied the wrong legal framework by basing
its order on what it said was “fair” when it was required instead under
Family Code section 70 to determine the date of a complete and final break in
the marital relationship. He asks that we reverse the January 27 Order and

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remand to the superior court for a redetermination of the date of separation
under the correct legal standard.
We decline to address the merits of Ashraf’s appeal. Rather, we will
dismiss the appeal as an effort to seek review of a nonappealable
interlocutory order issued prior to entry of a final judgment. An interlocutory
order of the kind presented here is appealable only upon the issuance of a
certificate of probable cause from the superior court, which Ashraf failed to
obtain. And no exception to the one final judgment rule applies on this
record.
I.
On December 18, 2025, the parties stipulated to, and the superior court
issued, a status only judgment terminating the marriage between Ashraf and
Rehman, the court reserving all other issues for later determination. The
following month, the court issued its January 27 Order determining only the
date of separation. Ashraf filed a notice of appeal on March 2, 2026, stating
that he was appealing from an order after judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), meaning the January 27 Order.
Ashraf did not include any probable cause certification by the superior court.
In his opening brief (the only brief filed in this appeal), Ashraf
acknowledges the superior court filed a status only judgment on December
18, 2025. He does not directly argue that the January 27 Order is
appealable. Instead, he simply states, “Appellant’s Notice of Appeal
identifies the appealable basis as Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(2).”
II.
A threshold question in any appeal is whether we have appellate
jurisdiction. (Wong v. Dong (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 109, 114.) We are

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obligated to consider that question sua sponte. (See West v. Arent Fox LLP
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069.) On our own motion, we conclude that
the January 27 Order is not appealable under section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(2).
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 codifies the one final judgment
rule. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756.) It provides that
an appeal may be taken “ ‘[f]rom a judgment’ [citation] and in its remaining
subdivisions lists various specific additional appealable orders that stand as
exceptions to the general rule.” (Id. at p. 756, fn. 3.)
“In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court . . . may sever
and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of the dissolution of the
marriage apart from other issues.” (Fam. Code, § 2337, subd. (a); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.390(a).) “A ‘status only’ dissolution judgment is immediately
appealable as a final judgment on the issue of dissolution of marital status.”
(In re Marriage of Turfe (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1120, fn. 1.)
“The court may separately try one or more issues before trial of the
other issues if resolution of the bifurcated issue is likely to simplify the
determination of the other issues,” including resolution of the date of
separation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.390(b)(2).) Determining the date of
separation impacts other still-undetermined issues. “Because ‘[t]he earnings
and accumulations of a spouse . . . while living separate and apart from the
other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse’ [citation], the date of
separation can be of considerable consequence with regard to the parties’
property rights.” (In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 929.)
When a final judgment has not yet been entered, “an order on a
bifurcated issue is not separately appealable,” but “the family law court may
certify . . . that there is probable cause for immediate appellate review of the

3
issue . . . .” (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433;
Fam. Code, § 20251; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.392 [regarding certificates of
probable cause for bifurcated issues].) Ashraf has not obtained such a
certificate and, therefore, we have no jurisdiction to consider his appeal.
There are exceptions to the one final judgment rule, but none is
applicable here.
First, Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(14)
provides than an appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment in a
bifurcated proceeding regarding child custody or visitation rights. The
January 27 Order does not rule on child custody or visitation rights.
Second, an “exception to the ‘one final judgment’ rule codified in Code of
Civil Procedure section 904.1 is the so-called collateral order doctrine. Where
the trial court’s ruling on a collateral issue ‘is substantially the same as a
final judgment in an independent proceeding’ [citation], in that it leaves the
court no further action to take on ‘a matter which . . . is severable from the
general subject of the litigation’ [citation], an appeal will lie from that
collateral order even though other matters in the case remain to be
determined.” (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 561.) An
interlocutory order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine when it
is “collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in
relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or
performance of an act.” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.)

1 Family Code section 2025 states in relevant part, “Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, if the court has ordered an issue or issues
bifurcated for separate trial or hearing in advance of the disposition of the
entire case, a court of appeal may order an issue or issues transferred to it for
hearing and decision when the court that heard the issue or issues certifies
that the appeal is appropriate.”

4
We see no indication that the court’s January 27 Order was a collateral
order. It was one in a series of rulings the court reserved, and served as a
foundational ruling for subsequent rulings. It also did not direct payment of
any money or performance of an act.
Finally, appellate courts have the discretion to consider appeals from
nonappealable orders “ ‘under unusual circumstances.’ ” (Global Protein
Products, Inc. v. Le (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 352, 365, quoting Olson v. Cory
(1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) We decline to do so here, since the circumstances
presented are not so unusual in marital dissolution proceedings that we find
it necessary to address them as a matter first impression or find them
otherwise deserving of immediate appellate attention. (See In re Marriage of
Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1434–1435 [declining to exercise its
writ of mandate discretion because “[h]usband has shown no exigent reasons
why review of the interlocutory order should not await the rendition of a final
judgment.”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
STREETER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
GORDON, J.*

* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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