Filed 8/31/26 Marriage of R.L. and S.L. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of R.L. and S.L. H053230
(Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 24FL00825)
R.L.,
Respondent,
v.
S.L.,
Appellant.
In pending marital dissolution proceedings between appellant S.L. (wife) and
respondent R.L. (husband), wife filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) based on allegations that husband disturbed her peace and exercised coercive
control over her.1 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) pending the
hearing, and later denied the DVRO request after an evidentiary hearing. Wife contends
the trial court erred by failing to consider evidence that husband violated the TRO’s
requirements regarding relinquishment of his firearms, ammunition, and body armor, and
by applying an incorrect legal standard when deciding whether to issue the restraining
1
Because this case involves proceedings under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), we identify the parties by their initials to protect the
privacy interests of protected persons. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).)
order. We conclude the trial court erred in failing to consider wife’s allegations that
husband violated the TRO’s requirements, and we will remand the matter for the trial
court to consider this evidence in determining whether to issue a DVRO. We otherwise
conclude the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard in evaluating wife’s
allegations of disturbing the peace and coercive control.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in May 2019. They had two children: a son born in
2019 and a daughter born in 2023. Husband worked as a general contractor and wife
worked as a nurse, though both parties did not work for periods following the birth of the
children. Husband moved out of the family home on August 2, 2024. Three days later,
husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage.
A. The DVRO Petition
Wife responded to the dissolution petition on August 20, 2024, and the day after
that, she petitioned for a DVRO. The DVRO petition asserted husband owned and
possessed an unknown number of firearms.
Wife attached a declaration to the DVRO petition alleging husband “has used fear
and intimidation and engaged in several repeated acts of coercive control and emotional
abuse, which has caused me to fear for my safety and that of our children . . . .” She
asserted husband “owns several guns, he has a history of violent altercations . . . , and I
am concerned that he may continue to hurt me and our children emotionally and it could
escalate to physical violence.”
Wife’s specific allegations included the following: (1) husband continued to enter
the family residence after leaving and used cameras to record her activity; (2) husband
messaged wife and wife’s family members, baselessly stating he could pursue criminal
charges if they left the county with the couple’s children; (3) he canceled health insurance
for wife and their children and canceled wife’s cell phone service, carrying through on
earlier threats to do so if she did not give in to his sexual demands; (4) husband restricted
2
wife’s visits to family out of state; and (5) he prohibited her from timely leaving for work
as punishment for not engaging in sex with him, which negatively impacted her job
performance. Wife also alleged that husband repeatedly engaged in unwanted sexual
contact with her, including that he “physically abused [her] in a sexual manner by
initiating unwanted sexual contact” while she was sleeping, “coerced [her] into unwanted
sexual intercourse” in a manner that caused one of their children to notice her crying,
kept her awake at night “demanding sex,” and “verbally threatened [her] numerous times
that if [she did] not have sex with him,” she and the children would have no financial
support. Wife also alleged that twice in 2023, husband left a loaded handgun in an
unlocked drawer where their son grabbed it, though their son turned over the handgun
both times without it being fired. Her declaration stated: “I need an order that [husband]
surrender his guns to ensure that they are nowhere near our children, especially during
these proceedings.” A filing from wife’s counsel that same day requested a DVRO based
on husband’s alleged coercive control and “overall disturbance of the peace” as defined
in Family Code section 6320.2
Wife attached text messages to support her allegations. With regard to her
allegations about husband cancelling health insurance and cell phone service, one
message showed husband stating: “If you won’t have more sex I want a divorce[.] [¶] If
you won’t try harder for me th[e]n you don’t deserve me. You can live on your own and
pay for everything yourself. I’m not going to support a lazy woman[.]” In another
message, husband stated: “You also need to get your phone off my plan before i shut it
down. I’m not purchasing your healthcare either. Since you don’t care to kiss hug or
love me anyway you can provide for yourself.” Regarding the allegations concerning a
loaded handgun left in a drawer, wife attached a photo that showed an ammunition clip,
but not a handgun, in a drawer.
2
Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
3
The trial court issued a TRO on August 22, 2024, the day after wife filed the
DVRO petition. Wife asserted on the TRO form concerning husband: “unknown amount
of guns and ammunition in [husband’s] possession; historically does not store guns in
safe location.” The TRO stated: “You cannot own, possess, have, buy or try to buy,
receive or try to receive, or in any other way get any prohibited item,” defined as
firearms, firearm parts, and ammunition. The TRO also stated: “You cannot own,
possess, have, buy or try to buy, receive or try to receive, or in any other way get body
armor.” The TRO required husband within 24 hours of receiving the order to “sell to or
store with a licensed gun dealer, or turn in to law enforcement, any prohibited items you
have in your immediate possession or control.” Within 48 hours of receiving the order,
the TRO required husband to “file a receipt with the court that proves all prohibited items
have been turned in, sold, or stored.” This opinion uses the term “firearms
relinquishment requirement” to summarize the TRO’s mandates regarding all prohibited
items.
Husband was served with these orders on August 23, 2024. The court set a
hearing on the TRO, at which time the court would also review whether husband
complied with the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement.
Nearly one month after the court issued the TRO, on September 19, 2024, the
court conducted that hearing.3 The appellate record contains a minute order from the
hearing that states: “Father states that he does not have access to firearms as they are in a
safe at the family home and at his parent[s’] house.” In a later filing, husband stated he
informed the court at this hearing that “there were guns in a safe inside of my parent[s’]
house” where he lived at the time. At the hearing, the court required husband to file a
form DV-800 indicating his compliance with the firearms relinquishment requirement,
3
The hearing was moved on request from its originally scheduled date of
September 10, 2024. The record does not evince why the hearing was continued, or who
requested the continuance.
4
and it set a September 26, 2024, hearing to review if husband complied with this
requirement, stating it would take the matter off calendar if husband filed the proper
documents.
Six days later, on September 25, 2024, husband filed a form DV-800, Receipt for
Firearms, Firearm Parts, and Ammunition, listing four firearms and two categories of
ammunition he had turned in on September 22, 2024, to the county sheriff’s office for
storage. In addition, husband answered yes to the question, “do you have or own any
other firearms (guns), firearm parts, or ammunition?” Attached to the form DV-800 was
a list of 14 additional firearms, with the following statement: “The following firearms
are located in a safe at the community residence that I have been ordered to stay away
from and do not have access to pursuant to the current Temporary Restraining Order in
effect in this case.” The appellate record indicates that the trial court did not hold the
hearing scheduled for September 26, 2024, or conduct any other proceedings regarding
husband’s compliance with the firearms relinquishment requirement.
Wife filed a supplemental declaration on October 1, 2024, raising allegations of
events transpiring since the TRO was issued in August. She asserted that she found
cameras outside the marital home that she did not recognize or that she had disconnected
but were again operational, and she stated that she discovered an unknown person parked
inside a locked gate at the house. She also alleged that she discovered a “body armor
hoodie” in the house while looking for any loose weapons that were not properly stored,
which caused her concern because “[t]here is no reason for [husband] to own firearm-
protective body armor unless he anticipates being fired on or exchanging fire,” and she
feared she and her children could be victims or bystanders of such exchanges.
Wife’s supplemental declaration stated that husband did not surrender any
firearms or ammunition or file a DV-800 between being served with the TRO on
August 23 and the September 19 hearing. She declared that when the court asked
husband at the September 19 hearing “how many firearms were in his possession or
5
control at that time, [husband] said he had possession of only one firearm that was in a
safe at his parents’ home – he claimed that the rest of his firearms were beyond his
control in the gun safes in our home.” She noted that husband’s form DV-800 then listed
four firearms he surrendered along with other firearms he owned that were located in a
safe at the marital home. She stated: “I do not want those firearms in my home while the
children and I are living there alone, even if they are in a safe. Given the incidents of
new and reconnected cameras on the property, combined with [husband’s] failure to file a
DV-800 until ordered to in court and his lack of full transparency to the Court about the
guns in his possession, I am afraid that [husband], or someone on [husband’s] behalf can
enter the home while I am not there and access those weapons.” She asserted that she did
not have the codes to the safes and asked the court to require husband to provide the
codes so she could turn the firearms over to the sheriff’s office on husband’s behalf. She
attached a printout of a web page with information about the body armor apparel and the
minute order from the September 19 hearing, among other attachments.
Wife’s trial brief in advance of the DVRO hearing noted the TRO’s firearms
relinquishment requirement but did not raise any issue regarding husband’s
noncompliance with this requirement. The brief listed four main points in favor of
issuing a DVRO: (1) “[Husband] has enacted a pattern of abuse against [wife] in the
form of coercive control”; (2) “[Husband] has unreasonably isolated [wife] from friends
and relatives”; (3) “[Husband] has deprived [wife] of basic necessities”; and
(4) “[Husband] has compelled [wife] by force, threat of force, or intimidation to engage
in sexual conduct which she has a right to abstain from.”
Husband then filed his trial brief and reply declarations. He generally denied
wife’s allegations, asserting that the DVRO application was an attempt to gain a more
favorable child custody determination. He declared that he kept firearms in the marital
home locked in safes to which wife had the codes, and he stated that wife had not “raised
any concerns about the TRO being violated . . . .” He denied violating the TRO by
6
installing, reconnecting, or viewing cameras at the home, and he stated that he had earlier
purchased the body armor apparel in the home because a neighbor had threatened him.
He declared: “I have never made [wife] have nonconsensual sex with me.” He stated
that he did not cancel health insurance for wife and the children in retaliation for her not
having sex with him, averring instead that the couple could not afford the insurance. He
declared that he attempted to get wife to switch the cell phone to her own account and
pay for it herself due to the couple’s financial situation.
B. The DVRO Hearing
The trial court conducted the DVRO hearing in October 2024. Wife submitted
declarations from her father and two sisters, and she testified at the hearing. Wife
referenced her supplemental declaration, testifying that “I want all the guns gone” from
the house. She said that at the September 19, 2024, compliance hearing, she did not ask
husband to provide the safe codes because she wanted to get some documentation in
order and have the sheriff’s office present when the safes were open, and she believed
some of the firearms were not lawful. She also testified regarding the remaining
allegations in her DVRO petition, trial brief, and declarations, including that there were
“just huge, huge unbelievable repercussions for not having sex with” husband, including
husband impeding her ability to go to work, cancelling health insurance, cancelling cell
phone service, and upsetting their children’s routines.
Husband submitted declarations from a friend and his parents. Husband rested on
his declarations but submitted to cross-examination. On cross, he admitted texting wife
and her family members not to take their children out of the county, stating he believed at
the time this was not permitted but later realized they were only prohibited from taking
the children out of the state. He testified that he does not leave firearms unlocked in the
home, and he testified as to financial struggles the couple experienced.
The trial court then asked husband about canceling wife’s cell phone service.
Husband testified he placed requests with the provider three times for wife to switch her
7
phone service to her own account after wife agreed to pay for this and other expenses
when she returned to work. The trial court asked: “Did you ever cancel her cell phone
. . . or cancel any insurance as a result of her not engaging in sexual conduct with you?”
Husband replied: “I definitely tied those conversations together, but the base was I didn’t
have enough money. If I would have had more money, none of that would have
happened.” The trial court then asked: “Did you ever tell her that you would cut her off
financially in some way if she didn’t engage in sexual conduct with you?” Husband
replied: “I may have. I may have. I can’t recall exactly at this moment, but again, we
talked about both those topics at the same time, and we shouldn’t have. It’s something I
do regret. I just wish that we could have worked more of those issues out in our therapy
sessions. That would have been really helpful.”
On recross-examination, husband testified that he did not cancel health insurance
but rather it lapsed due to their failure to pay insurance bills that were higher than they
expected. He again acknowledged messaging wife about shutting off her cell phone
service if she did not show more physical affection, saying he regretted that message.
The trial court denied wife’s DVRO petition. The trial court stated “I think it’s a
tough case” but wife had not met her burden “to establish the need for a domestic
violence restraining order.” The trial court discussed several of wife’s asserted bases for
a DVRO, finding each was not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. The
court stated that “while I was admittedly concerned with the allegations and the
discussions of cutting off either insurance or telephones for lack of sex, and that could be
in and of itself a grounds for [a] domestic violence restraining order, that under the
totality of the circumstances that that was not tied solely to that issue and that in and of
itself that was not sufficient to meet a [coercive] control finding for purposes of [a]
DVRO . . . .” The court stated the evidence demonstrated the health insurance and cell
phone service issues occurred during a time of financial problems for the couple, and
husband did not actually cancel the phone service but instead tried to facilitate switching
8
service to wife’s name. The court then stated: “With respect to the insurance, that was a
little bothersome, but nonetheless, I find that due to the financial straits that the family
was in, it appears to have been more tied to the financial condition of the family as
opposed to a deliberate attempt to exert control for purposes of securing sex between
husband and wife.” The trial court did not discuss evidence of husband’s noncompliance
with the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement.
The trial court concluded: “Frankly, this was a tough case. I think it was not an
unclose case. It was a close case, and your counsels both did a very good job of this. But
for those reasons, I’m going to respectfully decline to issue the restraining order after
hearing. I’m going to dissolve the temporary order.” Later the court repeated that
“frankly, this was a little close for my comfort,” stating, “if [wife] were to come back to
me, sir, and tell me, you know what, judge, you made a horrible mistake by not granting
this today and when you didn’t grant this, things went downhill and during exchanges
things went bad and things went south from where they are today, we could be right back
where we are in another domestic violence restraining order that might have a very
different result.”
II. DISCUSSION
Wife argues that the trial court erred in two respects when it denied her request for
a DVRO. She first contends that the trial court erred in not accounting for husband’s
alleged violation of the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement. She asserts that the
legislative intent behind the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) requires strict
compliance with the firearms relinquishment requirement, and the trial court had
“undisputed” evidence that husband violated this requirement. Second, wife argues that
the trial court applied incorrect legal standards in finding husband did not commit other
9
acts of abuse by focusing on husband’s intent rather than the effect of husband’s actions
and by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances.4
Husband responds that the trial court’s ruling was not erroneous. He argues that
the trial court did not find husband violated the TRO’s firearms relinquishment
requirement, wife forfeited the issue by failing to raise it to the trial court, and wife
invited any error. Husband further argues that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings and wife was not prejudiced by any asserted erroneous legal standard the
trial court used.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in not considering evidence that
husband violated the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement, but wife has not
demonstrated the trial court erred in any other aspect of its ruling. We will remand for
the trial court to issue a new ruling on the DVRO petition after considering whether
husband violated the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement, and if so, whether this
warrants issuance of a DVRO.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Under the DVPA, a court may issue a restraining order to prevent domestic
violence or abuse if the party seeking the order ‘shows, to the satisfaction of the court,
reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’ [Citations.]” (Melissa G. v. Raymond M.
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 367.) “Abuse” means intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury, committing sexual assault, placing a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another; or
engaging in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to section 6320.
(§ 6203, subd. (a).)
4
We granted the application of the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence
and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence for leave to file an amici curiae brief in
support of wife. We further granted the application of Mallika Kaur and Arneta Rogers
for leave to file an amici curiae brief in support of wife.
10
Under section 6320, subdivision (a), a person may be enjoined for “disturbing the
peace of the other party.” “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).) “This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive
control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes
with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” (Ibid.) “Examples of coercive control
include, but are not limited to, unreasonably engaging in any of the following: [¶]
(1) Isolating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support. [¶]
(2) Depriving the other party of basic necessities. [¶] (3) Controlling, regulating, or
monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances,
economic resources, or access to services. [¶] (4) Compelling the other party by force,
threat of force, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or suspected
immigration status, to engage in conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain
or to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage. [¶]
(5) Engaging in reproductive coercion, which consists of control over the reproductive
autonomy of another through force, threat of force, or intimidation, and may include, but
is not limited to, unreasonably pressuring the other party to become pregnant, deliberately
interfering with contraception use or access to reproductive health information, or using
coercive tactics to control, or attempt to control, pregnancy outcomes.” (Ibid.)
“In general, we defer to the trial judge when reviewing an order granting or
denying a DVRO. We review such decisions for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We
review a trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.] “ ‘ “The
question of whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in
11
exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review.” ’
[Citation.]” (Bailey v. Murray (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677, 684.)
B. Analysis
1. The trial court abused its discretion by not considering evidence that
husband violated the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement.
Section 6389, subdivision (a) states that a person subject to a protective order
“shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive a firearm or ammunition while that
protective order is in effect.” A domestic violence TRO must “include a notice that, upon
service of the order, the respondent shall be ordered to relinquish possession or control of
any firearms or ammunition and not to purchase or receive or attempt to purchase or
receive any firearms or ammunition for a period not to exceed the duration of the
restraining order.” (Id., subd. (b).) Upon service of a TRO, law enforcement may
request the restrained person to immediately turn over any firearm and ammunition, and
if law enforcement does not so request, the person must relinquish any firearm and
ammunition within 24 hours of being served with the order. (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Within
48 hours of being served with the restraining order, the person must file a receipt showing
the firearm or ammunition was properly surrendered or sold. (Ibid.)
Before and at the DVRO hearing, the trial court had before it evidence that
husband violated the TRO’s firearms relinquishment requirement. Husband was served
on August 23, 2024, with a TRO that informed him of this requirement. Husband was
required to surrender or sell his firearms and other prohibited items within 24 hours of
service, and to provide proof of his compliance within 48 hours of service. However, at
the hearing on September 19, 2024, husband did not demonstrate any action taken to
comply with the TRO. “Failure to timely file a receipt shall constitute a violation of the
protective order.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(A).)
The trial court had a statutory duty to ensure husband complied with the firearms
relinquishment requirement. “A court holding a hearing on this matter shall review the
12
file to determine whether the receipt has been filed and inquire of the respondent whether
they have complied with the requirement.” (§ 6389, subd. (c)(4); see also § 6322.5,
subd. (a) [when relevant information is presented that a restrained person has a firearm or
ammunition, the court “shall consider that information and determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, whether the person subject to a protective order has a
firearm or ammunition in, or subject to, their immediate possession or control in violation
of Section 6389”].)
Husband did not meet the 24-hour and 48-hour deadlines even after the
September 19, 2024, hearing. Husband did not surrender the firearms and ammunition
contained at his parents’ house until three days later, on September 22.5 He did not file
his DV-800 until three days after that, September 25, and he did not relinquish the
firearms or other prohibited items in the marital home.
Evidence that husband violated the TRO was relevant to the question of whether
the trial court should grant the DVRO petition. The definition of abuse under the DVPA
includes engaging in any behavior that has been enjoined. (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4); see also
N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 597 (N.T.) [“abuse includes behaviors that were
enjoined by a TRO”].) “While a trial court should, of course, hear and evaluate the
evidence relating to incidents set forth in a petitioner’s request, evidence of postfiling
abuse is also relevant, particularly when that abuse occurs after a temporary restraining
order has been issued . . . .” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106,
117 (F.M.).) “Postfiling abusive conduct is clearly relevant in cases in which a TRO has
been granted pending a hearing on a permanent restraining order.” (Ibid.)
Our conclusion that the trial court was required to consider evidence that husband
violated the TRO is consistent with the DVPA’s purpose. The DVPA is intended “to
5
Husband’s declaration asserted that he did not surrender his firearms and
ammunition sooner after the September 19 hearing because he learned his aunt had
passed away and he “spent the rest of that day grieving.”
13
prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation
of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these
persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) Section 6389’s
firearms relinquishment requirement furthers the DVPA’s aim to prevent domestic
violence by providing for a temporary firearms restriction “ ‘during a period when the
subject of the order is adjudged to pose a particular risk of further abuse. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571, 582.) “Courts should
broadly construe the [DVPA] to accomplish its purpose of preventing acts of domestic
violence.” (In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 535.)
Husband argues he “did not willfully or knowingly fail to timely surrender his
firearms such that it constituted an independent act of domestic abuse.” He asserts that
he could not relinquish the firearms in the family home when the TRO prohibited him
from entering the home, and he states that he believed he complied with the TRO’s
directive to surrender firearms in his possession or control. He argues that the record
demonstrates he “made good faith efforts to comply, and in fact substantially complied
with the TRO such that its policy goal—to prevent access and use of firearms pending
litigation—was achieved . . . .”
This argument is not persuasive. First, the cases husband cites do not demonstrate
that a TRO violation must be willful or knowing to constitute abuse. In Lister v. Bowen
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, the Court of Appeal affirmed the renewal of a restraining
order in light of evidence that the restrained party “knowingly violated the protective
order . . . .” (Id. at p. 334.) However, the reviewing court did not hold that a restraining
order violation must be “knowing” to justify renewal. Instead, the court stated: “It
almost goes without saying that any violation of a restraining order is very serious, and
gives very significant support for renewal of a restraining order.” (Id. at p. 335.) In N.T.,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 595, the court cited Lister in stating that a “knowing violation of a
DVRO cannot be characterized ‘as “a de minimis and technical violation.” ’ [Citation.]”
14
(N.T., supra, at p. 603.) Again, however, the court did not state that a TRO violation
must be knowing or intentional to constitute abuse under the DVPA.
DVPA provisions also demonstrate that husband’s TRO violations were not
required to be knowing or intentional to constitute abuse. Section 6203’s definition of
abuse states that one form of abuse—causing or attempting to cause bodily injury—must
be done “intentionally or recklessly.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) However, section 6203 contains
no such scienter requirement for engaging in behavior that has been enjoined. (Id.,
subd. (a)(4).) Other DVPA provisions also contain no requirement that a TRO violation
must be knowing or intentional. (See §§ 6322.5, subds. (a)-(c), 6389, subd. (c)(4).)
Moreover, the record casts doubt on husband’s assertion that he either
substantially complied with the TRO or did not willfully or knowingly violate it. As to
the items in the marital house, the TRO stated that he could not “own” any prohibited
items, even though it later stated that he was required to sell or surrender any prohibited
items in his “immediate possession or control.” If any confusion arose as to whether
husband was required to turn over any firearms he “owned” or just those he possessed
and had immediate access to, section 6389 alleviates such confusion. Subdivision (m)
states: “If the respondent notifies the court that the respondent owns a firearm or
ammunition that is not in their immediate possession, the court may limit the order to
exclude that firearm or ammunition if the judge is satisfied the respondent is unable to
gain access to that firearm or ammunition while the protective order is in effect.”
Husband—represented by counsel—had the option to ask the court to limit the TRO to
exclude firearms or other prohibited items in the marital home. The record contains no
indication that he did so.
Additionally, husband’s TRO violations were not limited to the items in the
marital home. Husband was required to turn over the firearms and ammunition that he
possessed at his parents’ house where he was living. He failed to do so for several weeks
15
after being served with the TRO, and then did not timely complete the DV-800 after the
trial court re-required him to do so at the September 19, 2024, hearing.
The trial court thus had evidence that husband violated the TRO. In denying the
DVRO petition, the trial court was required to “provide a brief statement of the reasons
for the decision in writing or on the record.” (§ 6340, subd. (b).) The trial court made
findings concerning wife’s other categories of alleged abuse, but it did not discuss
evidence of husband’s violation of the TRO firearms relinquishment requirement. We
decline to infer that the trial court made any findings concerning this issue. (See X.K. v.
M.C. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1287, 1296 [“The court was free to discredit X.K.’s facially
sufficient evidence of abuse at the evidentiary hearing, but the court did not make an
express credibility finding and the record does not support the conclusion that the court
made an implied finding”]; In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1115,
1130 (A.M.) [“We cannot imply other findings in favor of the order that were not made
expressly because the statute itself requires express findings”].) The trial court failed to
consider postfiling evidence of husband’s TRO violations, and this constituted an abuse
of discretion. (See F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117.)
We reject husband’s argument that wife forfeited this issue by failing to raise it to
the trial court. Wife’s October 1, 2024, supplemental declaration put the issue of the
TRO violations before the trial court. In that declaration, she stated that husband owned
an unknown amount of firearms, he failed to surrender any of his firearms until after the
September 19, 2024, hearing, and she did not want the remaining firearms to remain in
the marital home. Wife also stated in her initial declaration that she was concerned
husband possessed firearms and may harm her or their children. A declaration from
wife’s sister attached text messages wife sent to family members shortly before filing the
DVRO petition in which wife expressed fear for her life and expressed her wishes if she
were killed. At the evidentiary hearing, wife did not testify about the alleged TRO
violations specifically, but she did raise concerns about husband’s firearms possession,
16
testifying that husband kept firearms “[e]verywhere, but typically not in safes” before he
moved out of the house.
These assertions put the trial court on notice that it needed to address evidence of
husband’s TRO violations. This is particularly so because of wife’s assertion that
husband improperly stored weapons in the home, including leaving a loaded firearm in a
drawer that their son accessed, an issue the trial court also did not address in its ruling.
Wife declared, testified, and provided text message evidence that she did not feel safe
because of husband’s actions after he moved out of the home. The trial court was thus
required to determine whether husband committed abuse by violating the TRO’s firearms
relinquishment requirement and whether this warranted issuance of a DVRO.
Even if wife did forfeit this issue by not further raising it to the trial court, we
would excuse forfeiture here because the trial court’s failure to consider evidence of
husband’s TRO violations presents an issue of public concern. (See In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [appellate court has discretion to excuse forfeiture rarely in “cases
presenting an important legal issue”], superseded by statute on another ground as stated
in In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 273-274.) As husband acknowledges,
“[e]nforcement of firearms provisions of restraining orders is an important legal issue.”
We agree. “The very existence of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act bespeaks
California’s concern with an exceptional type of conduct that it subjects to special
regulation.” (Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833, 839; see also U.S. v. Hayes
(2009) 555 U.S. 415, 427 [“Firearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly
combination nationwide”].)
We also conclude wife did not invite the error. Husband asserts wife “invited the
trial court to err when she requested the trial court withdraw the order directing
preparation of the [Findings and Order After Hearing (FOAH)] or enter her proposed
FOAH lacking any findings or conclusions.” Nothing about wife’s actions invited any
error in the trial court failing to consider evidence of husband’s TRO violations. Wife
17
merely asked the trial court not to sign husband’s proposed FOAH because she asserted it
“misconstrues and omits findings by the Court and adds an order not made at the
hearing.” This came in the context of wife attempting to obtain a FOAH so her appeal
could be deemed taken from an appealable order.6 The trial court ultimately issued a
FOAH that recounted the court’s findings as to various allegations by wife. The FOAH
omitted reference to husband’s purported TRO violations because the trial court did not
make findings as to this matter. We see nothing about what wife did after the hearing
that invited the trial court’s error at the hearing.
The error in failing to consider evidence of husband’s TRO violations was
prejudicial. “To establish prejudice, an appellant must demonstrate that there was a
‘ “ ‘reasonable probability that in the absence of . . . error, a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (F.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th
at p. 118.) A court may issue a DVRO if a petitioner shows “reasonable proof of a past
act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The trial court stated that this was a “tough”
and “close” case. The court advised husband that “this was a little close for my comfort,”
and additional information about husband’s subsequent actions might lead to “a very
different result.” It is reasonably probable that considering evidence of husband’s TRO
violations would have led the trial court to reach a different conclusion in such a close
case.
6
The trial court directed husband’s counsel to prepare a hearing order and submit
it to the court. Wife appealed before the order was issued. This court ordered wife to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as premature and/or taken from a
nonappealable order. Wife responded that husband’s counsel did not prepare a formal
order, so she appealed from the minute order to protect her right to appeal. Wife’s
counsel represented that her counsel was waiting for the trial court to sign a FOAH that
had been prepared, which would be an appealable final order. Wife’s counsel later
submitted the FOAH the trial court had issued, and this court discharged the order to
show cause and took judicial notice of the FOAH.
18
Wife asks this court to reverse and remand with instructions to issue the DVRO.
The trial court is not required to issue a DVRO upon proof of an act of abuse; instead, the
DVPA states the court “may” issue a DVRO upon such proof. (§ 6300, subd. (a).) “[A]
trial court does have discretion to deny a [domestic violence temporary restraining order]
based on the totality of the circumstances even if the petitioner has made a facially
sufficient showing of abuse within the meaning of the DVPA.” (A.M., supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.) The same logic that A.M. applied to temporary orders
applies to DVROs. “Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether
to grant a petition for a restraining order under [the DVPA].” (In re Marriage of Fregoso
& Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)
Therefore, the appropriate course is to remand with instructions for the trial court
to consider evidence of husband’s TRO violations in determining whether to issue a
DVRO, considering the totality of the circumstances. (See N.T., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 603 [reversing order denying DVRO and remanding for the trial court “to make the
necessary findings and determine whether to issue the DVRO”]; F.M., supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 118 [remanding for new DVRO hearing where trial court
prejudicially failed to consider evidence of abuse occurring after filing of DVRO
petition].)
2. The trial court did not err in finding wife did not otherwise demonstrate
husband engaged in acts of abuse.
Wife argues that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in two ways
concerning her remaining allegations: “by using too narrow a view of DVPA abuse and
not properly considering the totality of the circumstances.” As to the first aspect of her
argument, she asserts “the trial court used the wrong definition of abuse by concluding
[husband’s] conduct was not abuse because he might have had additional intent behind
some of his behavior, while ignoring the effect of his behavior on [wife].” In the second
aspect of her argument, wife contends the trial court failed to consider all of husband’s
19
conduct because “the totality of the circumstances showed sexual abuse, harassment, and
disturbing the peace by [husband],” and the trial court erred by addressing only some of
her allegations in denying the DVRO petition. Husband denies any error by the trial
court in these respects, asserting the trial court did not find wife’s evidence of abuse
credible.
We find no error in the trial court’s application of the legal standards concerning
“abuse,” “disturbing the peace of the other party,” or “coercive control,” or in its
understanding that it was required to consider the totality of the circumstances in ruling
on the DVRO petition. The trial court did not specifically quote the definitions of
“abuse,” “disturbing the peace of the other party,” or “coercive control” in its ruling.
“We presume that the court applied the correct legal standard in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.” (G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, 421.) “ ‘It is the appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ashby v. Ashby
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509 (Ashby).)
Wife asserts the trial court erred in analyzing her allegations of disturbing the
peace and coercive control by focusing on husband’s intent rather than the effect of
husband’s actions on her. It is true that in determining whether a party has engaged in
conduct that disturbs the peace of the other party, courts apply a subjective standard
rather than an objective “reasonable person” one. (Parris J. v. Christopher U. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121 (Parris J.).) “[T]he relevant inquiry is simply whether the
person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in ‘conduct that, based on the totality
of the circumstances, destroy[ed] the mental or emotional calm of the other
party.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) However, wife’s petition centered on allegations of coercive
control—“a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a
person’s free will and personal liberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c), italics added.) To constitute
coercive control, the party must “unreasonably engag[e]” in any of the listed actions.
20
(Ibid.) Thus, the trial court did not err in discussing the reasonableness of husband’s
actions given the totality of the circumstances.
Wife’s argument focuses on two of husband’s alleged acts: his monitoring of the
marital home property with cameras, and the text messages in which he discussed
canceling her health insurance and not paying for her cell phone service. Examining the
context behind husband’s actions helps inform what “effect” husband’s actions would
reasonably have on wife. (§ 6320, subd. (c).) At several points in her declarations and at
the hearing, wife cited husband’s intent in asserting why the actions amounted to coercive
control. She declared that in continuing to come by the house unannounced and
recording her after moving out, husband “is engaging in this behavior intentionally to
intimidate and control me.” The memorandum by wife’s counsel accompanying the
DVRO petition asserted that husband’s various acts of alleged coercive control were
“almost entirely emotional with the intent to cause fear and intimidation to the abused
party.” Counsel argued that husband’s overall actions were done “with the intent to
intimidate, control, harass and belittle” wife. In her trial brief, wife’s counsel asserted
that husband’s alleged deprivation of medical insurance “was unreasonable, as he
intended to punish [wife] for not having sex with him to his satisfaction.” Thus, both
wife and her counsel recognized that husband’s intent was relevant in determining
whether his actions amounted to coercive control. Moreover, husband’s intent was
directly relevant to whether his actions “in purpose” unreasonably interfered with wife’s
free will and personal liberty. (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
The record does not demonstrate that the trial court considered husband’s state of
mind to the exclusion of considering whether husband’s actions “in effect” unreasonably
interfered with wife’s free will and personal liberty. (§ 6320, subd. (c).) The focus of the
trial court’s ruling was its finding that wife’s allegations were not credible. On appeal,
“[w]e do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” (Pope v. Babick
21
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246.) Thus, wife has not demonstrated the trial court
applied an incorrect standard.
Likewise, wife has not demonstrated any error in the trial court’s application of the
“totality of the circumstances” test. A court is required to consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether an act of abuse has occurred under the DVPA
(F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117), including whether a party has disturbed
the peace of the other party (§ 6320, subd. (c)) and whether a party was the victim of
coercive control (Parris J., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 128). The trial court also “shall
consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a
petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (d).) The record does not demonstrate the trial court
failed to comply with these requirements.
The trial court mentioned the totality of the circumstances test in its oral ruling,
stating that husband’s discussions of sex, insurance, and phone service “under the totality
of the circumstances” did not meet the definition of coercive control. In its FOAH, the
court likewise stated regarding “the allegations and discussions of cutting off either
insurance or telephones for lack of sex, the Court found that under the totality of the
circumstances, the family was in dire straits financially and there [were] insufficient
funds with which to pay these things.”
Wife argues the court failed to apply the totality of the circumstances test by not
discussing every instance of alleged abuse, but she points to no authority requiring the
court to do so. The trial court was only required to “provide a brief statement of the
reasons for the decision in writing or on the record.” (§ 6340, subd. (b).) The trial court
complied with this requirement, analyzing broad categories of alleged abuse that wife
raised and some specific examples of such alleged abuse. The trial court’s lack of
analysis as to every individual instance in which wife alleged a form of abuse occurred
does not demonstrate the court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances.
22
“The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (R.R. v. C.R. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1272.) The trial court correctly
stated wife had the burden to establish past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.
Wife argues the trial court erred in stating she had the “burden of proof to establish the
need for a [DVRO],” because it “improperly held [wife] to a non-existent burden to prove
a need for a DVRO.” However, as discussed above, the trial court is not required to issue
a DVRO upon a showing of past abuse. Instead, the trial court has discretion to decide
whether to issue a DVRO even if it finds abuse has occurred. (§ 6300, subd. (a); A.M.,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.)
The trial court’s use of the word “need” did not impose an additional burden on
wife; rather, the court simply recognized that it was required to consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether a DVRO should be issued. Reviewing courts have
similarly used the word “need” to reference the showing required for issuance or renewal
of a DVRO. (See In re Marriage of Hoch (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 80, 102 [“The need
for a DVRO does not disappear when the parties separate”]; Zachary H. v. Teri A. (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1142 [DVRO issuance affirmed where trial court found petitioner
“met his burden of demonstrating his need for a DVRO”]; Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at p. 515 [no error in renewing DVRO upon a finding that “current circumstances
evidence did not eliminate the need for a DVRO”].) Thus, we conclude wife has not
demonstrated that the trial court utilized an erroneous legal standard in denying her
DVRO petition.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellant S.L.’s petition for a domestic violence
restraining order is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to exercise its
discretion in the first instance to determine whether husband complied with the temporary
restraining order’s firearms relinquishment requirement. If the trial court finds husband
did not comply with this requirement, the trial court shall determine whether that
23
evidence constitutes abuse and shall consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether to grant or deny wife’s petition for a domestic violence restraining
order. (§ 6301, subd. (d).) In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
24
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Chung, J.*
H053230 R.L. v. S.L.
_____________
* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.