Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Pfaff CA4/1

Filed 9/17/26 Marriage of Pfaff CA4/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/17/26 Marriage of Pfaff CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of KENYON PFAFF D086904
and NIMFA PFAFF.

KENYON PFAFF,
(Super. Ct. 24FL003865N)
Appellant,

v.

NIMFA PFAFF,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Renee Stackhouse, Judge. Reversed.
Law Office of Stephen C. Pfaff and Stephen C. Pfaff for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
This case involves a dissolution action between Kenyon Pfaff and
Nimfa Pfaff. Kenyon retained his brother, attorney Stephen Pfaff, to
represent him pro bono. On its own motion, the trial court disqualified
Kenyon’s counsel after concluding that his argument during hearings and in
his filings strayed too far into witness territory and that he could be called to
testify as a witness. Kenyon appeals the disqualification order, contending
that the court erred in disqualifying his counsel of choice by failing to
consider the appropriate factors and make specific findings on the record as
required under the law. We agree and therefore reverse the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kenyon and Nimfa Pfaff were married for 16 years. Kenyon filed a
petition for dissolution of the marriage in April 2024. Kenyon originally
intended to resolve the case without private attorneys, using the services of
the North County Family Law Facilitator, given the parties’ limited financial
resources and assets. After Nimfa hired an attorney using the parties’ joint
credit card, Kenyon felt forced to ask his brother, an attorney, to assist him.
In June 2024, Kenyon’s brother Stephen Pfaff (counsel) substituted in as
Kenyon’s attorney, agreeing to take the case pro bono.
In September 2024, the court held a Family Resolution Conference
(FRC) hearing. The court received an FRC statement from Nimfa’s attorney
but not from Kenyon’s counsel, and Kenyon’s counsel did not appear at the
hearing. The court continued the FRC and set an Order to Show Cause
(OSC) for counsel’s failure to appear for October 2024, when the spousal
support hearing was set.
In October 2024, attorneys for both parties appeared before the trial
court, and the court made arrears and spousal support orders. The court
grew increasingly concerned during the hearing that (1) Kenyon’s counsel
may have “a financial interest in the case” because he stated that “he was
helping Petitioner out financially” and (2) he had a conflict because he could
be called to testify as a witness at trial. The court also “raised concerns that
Attorney Pfaff was not familiar with the rules of Family Law” and “cautioned
him that he should not risk his reputation [] engaging in the practice of law

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without competence, even if it was a favor,” as Rule 1.1 of the California

Rules of Professional Conduct1 requires competence. The main reasons the
court gave for its competence concerns—including that counsel had without
reason failed to appear for the FRC and allegedly failed to file an FRC
statement—turned out to be unfounded, as counsel provided proof that he
had (1) timely notified Nimfa’s attorney he could not attend the FRC and
requested an extension, and (2) timely filed the FRC statement.
In December 2024, Kenyon filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s spousal support ruling, with the hearing scheduled for May 2025. At
the May hearing, the court stated that it could not hear the motion, as it had
already noted that there was a conflict in representation and had expected a
substitution of attorney to be filed. The court thus found it would be
inappropriate for counsel to argue the motion. It advised counsel that his
argument at the previous two hearings “had crossed the line into testifying as
a percipient witness,” and it set an OSC regarding the perceived conflict sua
sponte.
In July 2025, Kenyon filed a response to the OSC supported by
declarations from Kenyon and counsel. Kenyon argued that there was no
conflict but that, even assuming a conflict, Rule 3.7 allows a client to provide
informed written consent. He further argued that he would be prejudiced if
counsel were disqualified, as he could not afford to hire another attorney.
After holding a hearing in August 2025, the court issued an order
adopting its tentative ruling and disqualifying counsel from representing
Kenyon. The court noted its concerns that counsel’s argument at hearings
and in his declarations had repeatedly “crossed the line into testifying as a

1 All further undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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percipient witness” and found that counsel “may well be called upon to testify
at trial” regarding Kenyon’s request for permanent spousal support. The
court further found that counsel’s failure to withdraw had “caused an undue
delay in the proceedings and an undue consumption of the Court’s time.” It
therefore disqualified counsel from representing Kenyon and set an OSC
regarding sanctions.
Kenyon timely appealed the disqualification order. Nimfa took no
position on the disqualification issue in the trial court and filed no
respondent’s brief on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
A trial court’s authority to disqualify an attorney comes from its
inherent power “to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all
other persons connected with its proceedings in furtherance of justice.” (Doe
v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 581 (Yim); Code Civ. Proc., § 128,
subd. (a)(5).) “Disqualification may be ordered as a prophylactic measure
against a prospective ethical violation likely to have a substantial continuing
effect on future proceedings.” (Yim, at p. 581.) The mere appearance of
impropriety by itself, however, will not support an attorney’s disqualification.
(In re Jasmine S. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 835, 843.)
A disqualification may be based on an attorney’s dual roles as an
advocate and a witness. Rule 3.7, the advocate-witness rule, provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an
uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the
nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer
has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Rules Prof. Conduct,

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rule 3.7(a), fn. omitted.) As Comment 3 to Rule 3.7 notes, the informed-
consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithstanding a client’s informed
written consent, courts retain discretion to take action, up to and including
disqualification of a lawyer who seeks to both testify and serve as an
advocate, to protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party
from being prejudiced.” (Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 813, 821–822 (Geringer).) But the “court’s discretion to
disqualify a likely advocate-witness notwithstanding client consent—the
exception to the exception—has been judicially interpreted to be permissible
only upon ‘a convincing demonstration of detriment to the opponent or injury
to the integrity of the judicial process.’ ” (Id. at p. 822, quoting Lyle v.
Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470, 482 (Lyle).)
In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to disqualify counsel
under the advocate-witness rule, the trial court “must consider”: (1) whether
the attorney’s testimony is genuinely needed; (2) the possibility that the
opposing party is using the motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons;
and (3) “the combined effects of the strong interest parties have in
representation by counsel of their choice, and in avoiding the duplicate
expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already
familiar with the case.” (Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior Court (1997)
60 Cal.App.4th 573, 580–581 (Smith); Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.)
“In light of the importance the law places on clients’ ability to retain an
attorney of their choice and waive any potential conflict, . . . trial judges must
indicate on the record they have considered the appropriate factors and make
specific findings of fact when weighing the conflicting interests involved” in
the potential disqualification. (Smith, at p. 582, citing Lyle, supra,
122 Cal.App.3d at pp. 482–483.)

5
We generally review the court’s decision to disqualify counsel for abuse
of discretion. (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.) We review any
disputed factual issues to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s fact findings. (Ibid.)
“The importance of the policy concerns underlying a disqualification
order mandates ‘careful review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Dino v. Pelayo (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 347, 352 [quoting People ex rel. Dept.
of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135,
1144].)
II
There is no indication from the record before us that the trial court
recognized the importance of Kenyon’s interest in being represented by the
attorney of his choice and his waiver of any potential conflict under Rule 3.7,
or that it otherwise considered the appropriate factors when contemplating
counsel’s disqualification under the advocate-witness rule. (Smith, supra, 60
Cal.App.4th at p. 582; Lopez v. Lopez (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 412, 424 (Lopez).)
First, the trial court did not grapple with whether counsel’s testimony
was “genuinely needed.” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580–581; Yim,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) The court instead focused on its finding
that counsel had, during prior hearings, “made representations to the court
based on his personal knowledge and personal actions in the case at hand.”
Further, the court found, counsel’s “declarations which accompany his
pleadings are under oath and are his testimony.” Specifically, the court
pointed to counsel’s “personal observations” in his declarations regarding
Kenyon’s medical issues and disability status. The court noted in passing
that counsel “may well be called upon to testify” regarding whether his client
had worked for him, as it could relate to the question of permanent spousal

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support, but otherwise did not address the issue of whether counsel’s
testimony was necessary.
We find there is no substantial evidence in the record demonstrating
that counsel’s testimony would be genuinely needed. (Smith, supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580–581; Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.) The
court made no finding that Nimfa intended to call counsel as a witness or
that he intended to testify. Any necessary testimony regarding Kenyon’s
work history or medical background could easily be provided by other
percipient witnesses, such as healthcare professionals, or Kenyon himself.
And even assuming counsel would be a necessary witness, this would not
automatically compel his disqualification. Absent prejudice to the opposing
party or risk of misleading the fact finder, an attorney is permitted to act as
both advocate and witness in a client’s case where the client has given
informed written consent, and “ ‘the fact that the client has consented to the
dual capacity must be given great weight.’ ” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
p. 580.) The trial court erred in failing to recognize this.
The second factor, the possibility that the opposing party is using the
motion to disqualify for purely tactical reasons, does not apply here. Nimfa
did not move to disqualify counsel or take a position on the issue; the trial
court raised the issue on its own. (See Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 583.)
Third, the trial court failed to address the strong interest Kenyon has
in representation by counsel of his choice, and “in avoiding the duplicate
expense and time-consuming effort involved in replacing counsel already
familiar with the case.” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 580; Geringer,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 822.) This is particularly important here, where
Kenyon repeatedly raised the issue of his lack of financial resources with the
court. In the disqualification order, the court recognized counsel’s concern

7
that he could not ethically substitute out of the case without finding someone
to take over Kenyon’s representation, which would be difficult given Kenyon’s
limited resources. But the court minimized this concern by asserting that
whether counsel should be disqualified and whether Kenyon could hire
counsel to replace him “are separate and distinct issues.” We disagree. The
decision to disqualify counsel under the advocate-witness rule required
consideration of the prejudice and financial hardship Kenyon would face if his
attorney of choice was disqualified. (See Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 427 [“court failed to demonstrate that it had properly considered
appellant’s heightened interest in remaining represented by [counsel], who
had gained mastery over the case by litigating it for over four years, and who
was providing his services pro bono or at a discounted rate”]; Lyle, supra, 122
Cal.App.3d at p. 482 [reversing disqualification order where trial court failed
to recognize the “substantial hardship which would befall plaintiff” if pro
bono counsel was disqualified].) Counsel’s declaration stated that he was
representing Kenyon pro bono and that Kenyon would not be able to afford
alternate representation. Kenyon’s declaration detailed his financial
hardship and that he was “forced to ask” his brother for help given his low
income—limited to monthly Social Security disability payments—and lack of
assets. The trial court does not appear to have taken this important fact into
consideration. We therefore conclude that the trial court failed to give
sufficient weight to Kenyon’s strong interest in representation by counsel of
his choice.
We also find that the trial court abused its discretion when it
disqualified counsel from the case without finding that the disqualification
would effectuate the rule’s purpose of avoiding fact finder confusion and

8
prejudice to the opposing party. (Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 424–
425.)
In rejecting Kenyon’s argument that he could provide consent to
overcome any potential conflict, the trial court relied on the exception in
Comment 3 to Rule 3.7 to conclude that it retained “the discretion to take
action” notwithstanding a client’s informed written consent. (Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 3.7(a), com. 3; see also Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581–
582.) But the court’s order failed to address the second requirement of the
exception: courts retain discretion to take action, but only “ ‘to protect the
trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.’ ”
(Ibid.) Here, “the court made no finding of a risk of fact finder confusion[.]”
(Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 425.) We find that any risk of confusing
or misleading the trier of fact at trial is substantially diminished, if not
eliminated, given that the fact finder here is the court.
Nor did the court make any finding of prejudice to Nimfa or the judicial
process should counsel continue to represent Kenyon, much less “ ‘a
convincing demonstration of detriment.’ ” (Geringer, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 822 [reversing disqualification order where it was unsupported by any
evidence of prejudice to the moving parties or detriment to the judicial
process].) Because the court’s disqualification of counsel was not supported
by reasoned findings concerning Rule 3.7’s purpose, we conclude it
constituted an abuse of discretion. (Lopez, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 425–
426.)
We appreciate the trial court’s concerns that counsel’s argument at
times strayed into “witness territory” where he made assertions based on his
personal knowledge. However, the court was required to weigh its concerns

9
against Kenyon’s strong interest in remaining represented by counsel before
ordering the severe remedy of disqualification.
DISPOSITION
The order disqualifying attorney Stephen Pfaff from representing
Kenyon Pfaff is reversed. Because the respondent did not appear in this
appeal, neither party shall recover costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(5).)

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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