Filed 6/23/26 Marriage of Parker CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of ALEYDA and
DANIEL PARKER.
ALEYDA PARKER,
E085096
Respondent;
(Super.Ct.No. FLHE2005758)
DANIEL PARKER,
OPINION
Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark A. Madio, Judge.
Dismissed.
Daniel Parker, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In this legal separation action, the husband appeals from the trial court’s rulings
denying (1) his request to register and validate a divorce decree that he purportedly
obtained in the United Arab Emirates after the wife initiated this case and (2) his motion
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to quash the wife’s legal separation petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the husband challenges nonappealable interim rulings on bifurcated issues, we
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Marriage of Loya (1987)
189 Cal.App.3d 1636, 1638-1639.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Daniel Parker and respondent Aleyda Parker have been married since
1993.1 On December 4, 2020, Aleyda filed a petition for legal separation. Daniel was
represented by counsel early in the proceedings. While represented by his first counsel,
Daniel filed (1) a response to the petition, asking the court to order that their family home
in Temecula be listed for sale and consenting to an order of spousal support “reduced by
the amount [he was] paying monthly in mortgage payments, insurance, and property
taxes on the family home”; and (2) a request for a divorce on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences.
On September 13, 2021, the trial court ordered Daniel to pay Aleyda $2,358 a
month in temporary spousal support. About a week after that order, Daniel changed
counsel. Through his new attorney, on December 14, 2021, Daniel filed a request asking
the court to register a divorce decree from the United Arab Emirates, dated March 3,
2021. The request alleged that “[t]he parties have already terminated their marital status
as of March 3, 2021 and the parties should be deemed divorced (status-only) as of this
date.”
1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names. No disrespect is intended.
2
Daniel began representing himself a few days later and, on December 17, 2021, he
filed a motion to quash Aleyda’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, terminate
the temporary spousal support award, and dismiss the case. Daniel attached to his motion
a document purporting to contain the original divorce decree (in Arabic) and a “legal
translation” of the decree into English. The translated version of the decree, which bears
the title, “Substantiation of First Revocable Divorce,” states that on March 3, 2021,
Daniel appeared before a “judge of Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance” and “declared that
he divorced his wife saying to her on 01/06/2020 AD: ‘I divorce you.’ ” The translated
version further states: “In view of the foregoing, it is substantiated that [Daniel] divorced
his wife [Aleyda] the first revocable divorce today on 03/03/2021 AD and declared that
he did not reinstate the marriage within the waiting period, and whereby he may not
reinstate the marriage with her except with a new marriage contract with its Sharia
conditions, accordingly she shall count her waiting period as of today according to her
status for lack of adequate evidence on the divorce date, along with reservation of the
divorcee rights resulting from such divorce.” At Daniel’s request, the trial court found
good cause to bifurcate the issues of “the effect of a purported divorce decree from the
United Arab Emirates . . . and the extent of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”
On November 23, 2024, after a trial that took place over 11 days between
November 2022 and August 2024, the court issued a statement of decision denying
Daniel’s request to register the foreign divorce decree and denying his motion to quash
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court articulated the following four
independent grounds for its rulings: (1) the foreign, “revocable” divorce decree was
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inadmissible because Daniel failed to authenticate it; (2) even if the decree was
admissible, there was no evidence that it was final under the law of the United Arab
Emirates; (3) even if the decree was admissible and final, it would not be enforceable in
California because Daniel and Aleyda were domiciled in California when the decree was
issued; (4) the decree was unenforceable for the additional reason that it violated
California public policy because Aleyda was not given notice of the proceedings.
The statement of decision was filed on November 25, 2024. On December 2,
2024, Daniel filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing from a “[j]udgment
after court trial” that was entered on November 25, 2024..
DISCUSSION
Representing himself on appeal as he did during the bifurcated trial, Daniel
contends that the court erred by refusing to register the foreign divorce decree and to
quash Aleyda’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the rulings
Daniel challenges are not appealable, we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of his
arguments.
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an
appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset); Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) “ ‘ “There is no
constitutional right to an appeal; the appellate procedure is entirely statutory and subject
to complete legislative control.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
1429, 1432 (Lafkas); see Griset, at p. 696.) “A trial court’s order is appealable when it is
made so by statute.” (Griset, at p. 696.)
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“ ‘California is governed by the “one final judgment” rule which provides
“interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’
from the final judgment.” [Citation.] The rule was designed to prevent piecemeal
dispositions and costly multiple appeals which burden the court and impede the judicial
process.’ ” (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 418 (Grimes).)
Thus, “[i]f there are unresolved causes of action between the parties, the judgment is not
final and an appeal therefrom must be dismissed.” (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1432.)
This appeal is not from a final judgment. In his opening brief, Daniel argues that
we have appellate jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(1), because the “appeal arises from the entry of a final judgment following a court
trial on a petition for legal separation.” But Daniel misunderstands the purpose of the
bifurcated trial, which was not to adjudicate the merits of the petition but to resolve
preliminary issues that Daniel himself raised regarding a divorce decree he purportedly
obtained in the United Arab Emirates in March 2021, three months after Aleyda filed for
legal separation in California. The court’s rulings on those preliminary issues do not
constitute the final judgment. The main issues in this case—marital status, spousal
support, and property division—remain to be determined.
Family Code section 2025 provides a method for appealing interim rulings in
marital dissolution or separation actions. (In re Marriage of Nicholson & Sparks (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 289, 291, fn. 1.) That provision allows a court to bifurcate trial and
certify a ruling on a bifurcated issue for immediate appeal (Fam. Code, § 2025; Cal.
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Rules of Court, rule 5.392), but Daniel did not avail himself of this remedy in the trial
court by following the procedure set forth in that statute and corresponding court rule.
(In re Marriage of Doherty (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 895, 898.) As a result, we must
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Daniel has an adequate appellate remedy by
way of an appeal from the final judgment.
It bears noting that, even if the challenged rulings had been appealable, we would
have been required to affirm because Daniel failed to provide an adequate appellate
record. On appeal, we presume that challenged judgments and orders are correct, and an
appellant, even one representing himself, bears the burden of demonstrating error.
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) “In order to demonstrate
error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported
by legal analysis and citation to the record” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287), as well as “an adequate record to assess error” (Maria P.
v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295; see generally Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.120,
8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C)). The appellate record contains only four of the 11 days of trial,
which is reason alone to resolve the issues against Daniel. (Riles, at p. 1296.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Daniel is to bear his own costs on appeal.2 (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
Acting P. J.
We concur:
RAPHAEL
J.
MENETREZ
J.
2 We do not award costs to Aleyda because she did not make an appearance in
this court.
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