Filed 10/22/26 Marriage of Pallares and Rincon CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of PEDRO RINCON
PALLARES AND LAURA RINCON.
PEDRO RINCON PALLARES,
E085401
Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. FAMSS2003942)
v.
OPINION
LAURA RINCON,
Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Shannon Suber,
Commissioner. Affirmed with directions.
Leonard Chaitin for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
After a long term relationship (many years of cohabitation prior to a 10 year
marriage), husband Pedro Rincon Pallares (Pedro)1 filed for dissolution of marriage from
wife Laura Rincon (Laura). The parties stipulated to the custody and visitation of the
sole remaining minor child and the disposition of all property except the residence, for
which title was in Pedro’s name only, after a series of grant and quitclaim deed transfers.
The property had originally been purchased before the parties married with assistance
from Laura’s brother and Pedro’s brother because Pedro did not have adequate credit to
make the purchase. The property, in which Pedro, Laura and their children resided, was
transferred at one point to Pedro, Laura, and Pedro’s brother, and later, still prior to the
date of the marriage, another deed transferred title from Pedro and Laura as husband and
wife and as joint tenants to Pedro as his sole and separate property. The court found the
property was Pedro’s sole and separate property because it was acquired before marriage.
Laura appeals.
On appeal, Laura challenges the trial court’s failure to void the deed by which title
to the residential property to Pedro as his sole property, as well as its failure to apply
Moore/Marsden2 principles to determine the existence and extent of any community
1 We use the parties’ first names for clarity and convenience, intending no
disrespect.
2 Referring to In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366 (Moore), and In re
Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426 (Marsden).
2
property interest in the real property. We affirm with directions to correct the written
judgment so that it reflects the date of separation as determined by the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Because the crux of the appeal centers on the family residence, we focus our
summary on the evidence relating to the characterization of that property.
Pedro and Laura cohabited between 1994 and 2006. In fact, the couple continued
to live together in the residence up to and after the date of separation. All four of the
children of the couple were born by or before 2006. On August 31, 2000, Samuel Isidoro
(Samuel), Laura’s brother, and Jose Rincon (Jose) acquired title to the property located at
14728 Rosemary Drive, in Fontana, California (the Rosemary Drive property). Pedro
had always intended to purchase the property for his sole and separate property, but in
2000, he did not have adequate credit to purchase it himself, so title was originally held in
the names of Samuel and Jose.3
Samuel believed that Pedro and Laura were married at the time because they were
living together. In fact, Pedro and Laura had cohabited since at least 1994, when their
oldest child was born and the relationship produced four children, all of whom were born
before 2009, the date of marriage. It was Samuel’s intention that his interest in the
property would be used or transferred for the benefit of his sister Laura, although no
written agreement was made.
3 Jose was Pedro’s brother.
3
On August 26, 2003, Samuel transferred his interest in the property to Jose, and no
longer holds an interest in the property, although this deed was not made part of the
record on appeal.
In Pedro’s mind, the property was his. In 2006, Jose no longer wanted to be on the
title because he was going to be purchasing his own house. On April 27, 2006, a
quitclaim deed executed by Jose, transferred title to the Rosemary Drive residence to
Pedro and Laura, as husband and wife, and Jose, a single man, all as joint tenants.
On December 27, 2007, another deed was recorded by which “Pedro Rincon, a
married man, who acquired title as Pedro Rincon-Pallares and Laura Rincon husband and
wife and Jose Rincon, a single man, all as joint tenants” granted to “Pedro Rincon, a
married man as his sole and separate property.”4
Pedro and Laura married on July 29, 2009. In the written judgment, the date of
separation is indicated as February 20, 2020, although the parties continued to cohabit
after separation. In the oral ruling, the court stated that the date of separation was in June
2020.5
4 Although the grant deed is signed by Pedro, Laura, and Jose, nowhere does it
purport to transfer Jose’s interest or Laura’s interest in the property, although there was
testimony regarding a third and fourth page of the 2007 deed (exhibit 1), which was
omitted from the exhibit that is in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, the references in
the parties’ testimony and the reference to an exhibit which is not in the record, which
have not been challenged, require us to conclude that the transfers were duly made.
5 We will remand the matter with directions to correct the judgment to reflect that
date of separation found by the trial court.
4
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that the parties had a lower-
middle class standard of marriage, but that Pedro’s income was sufficient to maintain the
standard of living established during the marriage because he earned approximately
$1,750 at his current employment and he testified he volunteered as a priest. The court
noted there was unrebutted testimony provided by Laura that Pedro, in fact, received cash
as a priest for a number of different types of events up to $1,000, $2,000 a month.
The court found that Laura worked less than full-time, earning approximately $14
per hour, but that Laura’s marketable job skills were minimum wage jobs, whereas Pedro
demonstrated he had more than minimum marketable job skills. The court went on to
find that Laura can engage in full-time employment without interfering with the care of
her dependent child because that child was soon going to be 18 years of age. The court
issued a Gavron warning,6 finding there was a goal that the supported party should be
self-supported within a reasonable time, warning the parties that both have an interest in
supporting themselves without the assistance of the other and to make the best efforts to
become self-supporting. The court found that Laura took $11,400 in tax refunds, of
which Pedro received nothing, and that Pedro had nonetheless paid all household
expenses.
Regarding assets and debts, the court found that “on August 31, 2000, there was a
grant deed issued to each party’s brother, Samuel Isidoro for Respondent, Jose Rincon for
6 Referring to In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705, regarding the
prerequisite awareness of the judicial expectation of future self-sufficiency for supported
spouses.
5
Petitioner, and that in 2003, Mr. Isador quick-claimed [sic][7] his interest to Jose Rincon.
In 2006 Jose Rincon quick-claimed that interest to Pedro Rincon Pallares and Laura
Rincon as husband and wife—is what it says on the deed—and as joint tenants with right
of survivorship with Jose Rincon, that’s Exhibit B. [¶] Exhibit C shows that on
December 17, 2007 Petitioner and Respondent, as husband and wife, grant-deeded to
Jose Rincon and Petitioner, Pedro Rincon, as a married man, it says sole and separate
property. The real property at issue here located at 14728 Rosemary Drive in Fontana,
California.” The court concluded that there was no community property interest in the
property in Fontana, noting that it had found substantial evidence of a Moore/Marsden
claim by respondent (Laura), yet no claim had been made.
The court then awarded the 2019 Camry to Laura, and confirmed to her the
associated debt, while denying Pedro’s request to be reimbursed for payments he made
respecting that vehicle along with other expenses. The court ordered the parties to sell
the property located in Mexico and to evenly divide the proceeds. The court awarded the
parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor child in light of her age and ordered
child support in the amount of $77 payable by Pedro to Laura pursuant to the child
support guideline. As to spousal support, the court found an insufficient basis to order
support at the time, and set it at zero, but declined to terminate support due to the length
of the relationship. Based on the parties’ relative abilities to pay, the court found it would
be unreasonable to order that Pedro pay the attorneys’ fees for both parties.
7 We assume the court reporter misheard references to “quit claim.”
6
Judgment was entered on November 27, 2024, and notice of entry was issued on
December 9, 2024. On January 22, 2025, Laura timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Effect of the 2007 Transfer of Title
Laura argues that although the parties were not married at the time of the
execution of the 2007 deed, which transferred the family residence to Pedro as his sole
and separate property, public policy required the voiding of the quitclaim deed. We
disagree.
Factual findings that underpin the characterization of the property are reviewed for
substantial evidence. “ ‘Appellate review of a trial court’s finding that a particular item is
separate or community property is limited to a determination of whether any substantial
evidence supports the finding.’ ” (In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725,
734.) However, de novo review is appropriate where resolution of “ ‘the issue of the
characterization to be given (as separate or community property) … requires a critical
consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values, the
determination in question amounts to the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact
that is predominantly one of law.’ ’’ (Ibid.)
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court has broad jurisdiction to
inquire into, make orders, and render any judgment concerning the settlement of the
property rights of the parties. (Fam. Code, § 2010, subd. (e); see In re Marriage of
Ramirez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 336, 344 [family court has “ ‘broad powers to determine
7
and characterize community property and join third parties with an interest in such
property’ ”]; Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1452 [same].)
According to the “ ‘form of title’ ” presumption, the description in a deed as to
how title is held is presumed to reflect the actual ownership interests in the property. (In
re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 344 (Fossum).) “The presumption
is based on promoting the public ‘policy … in favor of the stability of titles to property.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 294.) The presumption may only
be overcome by clear and convincing proof. (Ibid.)
The form of title presumption does not apply when it conflicts with the
presumption that one spouse exerted undue influence over the other. (Fossum, supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at p. 345.) This presumption applies to transactions between spouses by
which one gains an advantage over the other (Fam. Code, § 721; Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353) and “is regularly applied in marital transactions in which one
spouse has deeded property to the other.” (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 712, 730 (Burkle).) However, Laura and Pedro were not spouses because
they were not married at the time of the transfer. For this reason, the public policy on
which Laura relies, does not apply, and the trial court was compelled to conclude there
was no spousal fiduciary relationship at that time. In other words, more evidence was
required to overcome the presumption and to establish undue influence.
The presumption of undue influence applies when the marital transaction is one in
which one spouse deeds his or her interest in community property to the other spouse, for
no consideration or for clearly inadequate consideration. (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th
8
at p. 731.) The parties were not married at the time of the transaction, so the presumption
does not apply and other evidence or proof was necessary.
In the trial court, counsel’s oblique argument that the only remedy available to his
client was to sue for fraud did not mention undue influence or fiduciary obligations. It
failed because the parties were not married at the time of the transaction, which prevented
Laura from relying on Family Code section 721, respecting fiduciary obligations among
spouses.
In this appeal, Laura relies on In re Marriage of Georgiou & Leslie (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 561, 570, in which the court noted there is a strong public policy of ensuring
the fair division of community property. But that case involved property acquired during
marriage. Laura’s assertion highlights the flaw in her argument: the title showed the
property was Pedro’s sole and separate property, rather than community property because
the parties were not married at the time of the transfer.
Laura also refers to the fact the deed described the parties as husband and wife,
inferring that this designation compels application of the laws imposing fiduciary duties
on spouses. However, any presumption arising from that designation evaporated once it
was established that the parties were not married at the time. As morally objectionable,
to use the trial court’s words, as Pedro’s actions may appear, Laura has cited no legal
authority supporting the imputation of fiduciary duties on unmarried persons.
Here, Laura testified that she signed a document at Pedro’s behest to remove her
name from the title, because she believed she could not be on the title due to her
immigration status. Pedro denied telling her that she should execute the title transfer for
9
this reason and there is no other evidence to support Laura’s testimony that she was
induced to sign by Pedro, so as to overcome the “form of title” presumption by clear and
convincing evidence at trial. Nor has Laura sustained her burden on appeal, by arguing
that she did not intend “to give away her interest in the property but simply [to] remove
her name from title.” “Appellant did not intend to lose the benefit of the property.”
Laura’s intentions at the time of the transfer were not in writing, which is required to
satisfy the statute of frauds. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3).) This argument does not
establish that the trial court erred in not voiding the deed.
Nor did Laura even request that the trial court void the deed, although the court
indicated that it would have done so if adequate evidence of undue influence had been
presented. Instead, Laura’s counsel argued at the close of evidence, “The Court heard the
evidence, your Honor. And it just legal point of contention as to the only remedy that my
client has in that situation is to sue in civil fraud, and it’s not—and the other issue is with
the statute of limitation, that simply does not—and, in fact, this—she testified that she did
not know. And now that she knows, she would have not done it. Otherwise, she would
have was justified. [sic] [¶] And besides from that need not be defined on issues of the
transputation (sic) and that sort. I trust the Court has copies now, and I submit on the
Court’s duty and judgment.”
Laura has not sustained her burden on appeal to show that the lower court erred by
not voiding the 2007 deed on its own motion, where no evidence to support such an
action was presented. As the trial court noted, the state of the title “appears to be perhaps
10
morally objectionable,” but that the decision had to be ‘‘based on the law rather than the
morals of the parties.” We agree with the trial court on both points and find no error.
2. Forfeiture of Reimbursement for the Community Property Interest in the Rosemary
Drive Residence Under Moore/Marsden Principles
Laura argues that at trial the evidence “showed that Moore/Marsden clearly
applied” such that the trial court’s finding that no claim had been made was erroneous.
We disagree. The discerning court recognized that Pedro’s earnings after the marriage in
July 2009 were community property, and that his community property earnings were used
to pay the mortgage payments for his separate property real estate, but at no time did
Laura’s counsel claim entitlement to reimbursement to the community for the pro tanto
interest in real property that Pedro acquired before marriage.
Pedro’s earnings during marriage were used to pay the mortgage for his separate
property, so the community had a pro tanto interest in it under the Moore-Marsden rule.
“Where community funds are used to make payments on property purchased by one of
the spouses before marriage ‘the rule developed through decisions in California gives to
the community a pro tanto community property interest in such property in the ratio that
the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made
with separate funds.’ ” (Moore, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 371-372.)
To determine the community’s interest in these situations, courts apply the so-
called “Moore/Marsden” rule. The community’s interest percentage is calculated by
dividing the amount of community funds which have been used to pay down the loan’s
principal by the purchase price. (Moore, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 373-374 [“The
11
community property percentage interest is found by dividing the amount by which
community property payments reduced the principal by the purchase price . . . ”].) When
the property is sold, the community’s interest is the sum of its percentage of the purchase
price plus its percentage of the appreciation of the property since the marriage. (Ibid.; see
Marsden, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 437 [holding that a spouse who holds a property
for a considerable period of time before marriage should be entitled to retain the full
amount of any appreciation recognized at the time of marriage].)
“Under the Moore/Marsden formula, a family court must go through the following
steps to determine the community property interest: [¶] (1) Determine the amount by
which the community property payments (typically, payments made from the date of
marriage until the date of separation) reduced the principal on the mortgage. [¶] (2)
Calculate the community property percentage share by dividing the amount determined in
step one by the purchase price. [¶] (3) Determine the appreciation in the value of the
house during the marriage (i.e., from the date of marriage until the date of dissolution).
[¶] (4) Multiply the appreciation during the marriage (the amount determined in step
three) by the community property percentage share (the percentage determined in step
two) to determine the community property share in the appreciation of the property. [¶]
(5) Add the community property share in the appreciation of the property (the amount
determined in step four) to the amount of community funds used to pay down the
principal on the mortgage (the amount determined in step one) to determine the total
community interest in the property at the time of dissolution.” (In re Marriage of Ramsey
& Holmes (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1046 (Ramsey & Holmes).)
12
The court in the Ramsey & Holmes went on to say, “As is obvious from the above
formula, in order to make these calculations the court must have the following
information: (a) the purchase price of the house; (b) the amount of community funds
used to reduce the mortgage principal (which in many cases, such as the present case, can
be determined by calculating the difference between the balance on the mortgage at the
start of the marriage and the balance at separation); (c) the market value of the house at
the start of the marriage; and (d) the market value of the house at dissolution.” (Ramsey
& Holmes, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1046-1047.)
In other words, the party seeking reimbursement has a burden of presenting
evidence from which the family law court may determine the amounts by which the
community should be reimbursed. Here, Laura introduced no evidence as to enumerated
items needed for determination of Moore/Marsden credits, so the trial court lacked any of
the information necessary to calculate the community’s interest. In fact, Laura’s counsel
never requested that Moore/Marsden credits be determined and applied. “ ‘[A]n
appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where
an objection could have been, but was not raised below. [Citation.] The policy behind
the rule is fairness. ‘‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the
opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider.’’ ’ ” (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 315,
citing In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826.)
The trial court did the next best thing by determining that the community’s interest
in the separate property was an omitted asset. As such, Laura’s remedy is to seek and
13
obtain a determination of the community’s pro tanto interest in the residence in the family
law court, by means of the appropriate motion, with adequate supporting documentation.8
The trial court did not err in declining to make a determination of the community’s
interest in the separate property residence where Laura failed to request such a
determination or introduce any evidence on which the court could make such a
determination.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the superior court to correct
the written judgment so that it correctly reflects the date of separation is June 2020.
Laura is responsible for her own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
CODRINGTON
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
8 In this respect, Laura would benefit by seeking the advice of an experienced and
competent family law practitioner.
14