Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Murad CA4/2

Filed 11/5/26 Marriage of Murad CA4/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/5/26 Marriage of Murad CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of JODI and LAITH
MURAD.

JODI MURAD, E086973

Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. FAMSS1809446)

v. OPINION

LAITH MURAD,

Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven J. Singley,

Judge. Affirmed.

Laith Murad, in pro. per., for Appellant.

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Law Offices of Rebekah Ryan Main and Rebekah Ryan Main for Respondent.

Appellant Laith Murad (Husband) appeals from the denial of his request for order

(RFO)1 seeking to terminate spousal support paid to respondent Jodi Murad (Wife).

Husband and Wife had a long-term marriage; they were married in Husband and

Wife were married in 1998 and divorced in 2018. At the time of the dissolution, the

parties entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA), which included an agreement

on the payment of spousal support. Husband’s RFO sought to terminate the spousal

support, but the trial court denied the request, finding that the relevant language in the

MSA precluded terminating or reducing the spousal support obligation. Husband appeals

the denial of the RFO.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE AND MSA

Husband and Wife were married on June 12, 1998. They had one minor child,

born in 2014, who was four years old at the time of dissolution, and two adult children.

On December 14, 2018, a dissolution of marriage was filed that was effective May 6,

2019. The parties entered into the MSA as to issues of child support, child custody, and

as to spousal support.

1 Husband originally filed a petition for writ of supersedeas seeking relief and a
stay of the trial court order. The petition was denied along with the request for an
immediate stay by order of this court on October 6, 2025.

2
The MSA provided that commencing on November 1, 2018, Husband would pay

Wife $4,311 each month. It included that “Said amount shall continue until the death of

[Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a minimum of 14 years. The

party’s intent is that [Husband] agrees to pay [Wife] at least $4,311 per month, subject to

upward modification only. [Husband] shall also pay 40% of any gross bonus received to

[Wife], as and for additional Spousal Support, payable within 30 days of receiving said

bonus. [Husband] must report any significant change in his income to [Wife] within 30

days of said change.” The parties acknowledged that the parties enjoyed an upper-

middle-class lifestyle during the marriage. Wife had been a full-time homemaker

throughout the marriage and homeschooled their two older children. She was a full-time

caregiver for their four-year-old daughter.

In addition, Husband agreed to pay “up to 50% of any higher education tuition,

fees, books and supply costs for [Wife] to attend graduate school or training, not to

exceed” $20,000 toward Wife’s education. It further provided, “The amount shall not be

considered additional ‘Spousal Support’ but is a reasonable repayment as [Husband]

received an MBA degree during the marriage that is valued at over $100,000.”

There was a further provision that “The parties agree that [Husband] shall not

receive Spousal Support at any time from [Wife], and the Court shall terminate

[Husband]’s ability to request Spousal Support from [Wife] at any time. [Husband]

understands this may create a hardship to him, but agrees to terminate the Court’s

jurisdiction forthwith upon signing this judgment.”

The MSA was signed by both parties on December 1, 2018.

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B. RFO FILED BY HUSBAND

On April 17, 2025, Husband filed his RFO seeking a change in spousal support.

Husband stated in the RFO that the family court should change or end spousal support.

He alleged that Wife was a stay-at-home mom supported by him throughout the marriage.

In the MSA, he agreed to pay for a portion of her schooling so she could obtain a

master’s degree; she was given the family car; and he paid for moving expenses so she

could become self-sufficient without having to rely on him. Husband alleged that Wife

had a successful real estate career. In 2022, she earned $176,035. Husband alleged Wife

made a verbal agreement to lower spousal support based on her moving to Texas, which

had a lower cost of living. She had since “reneged” on her verbal agreement. Husband

was seeking a termination of the spousal support in its entirety. Husband also alleged to

have been unemployed for eight months, and the burden of spousal support would put

him in “debt for life.”2

Husband attached his own declaration to the RFO in lieu of in-person testimony.

Husband provided there was an existing judgment dated December 14, 2018, in which

there was a provision where he agreed to pay 50 percent of Wife’s higher education funds

so she could attend graduate school. The amount was not to exceed $20,000. He alleged

this was to further Wife’s ability to be self-sufficient. Husband stated that Wife had

completed her master’s degree in May 2022, and this “fulfilled his obligation” to make

2 Husband also requested other orders in the RFO but does not raise these issues
on appeal.

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her self-sufficient. He included language from the MSA regarding spousal support that

we have outlined, ante.

Husband admitted he owed Wife spousal support in the amount of $12,933. He

alleged that Wife had become a real estate agent and her gross income was $208,066.

Wife had become self-sufficient and it was “unfair” that he continue to provide spousal

support. Husband claimed he had lost his job in April 2020 and had difficulty finding

work. Wife agreed verbally to a reduction in spousal support but her attorney had

advised Wife that the spousal support could not be modified.

Husband referred to the language of the MSA that provided “ ‘Said amount shall

continue until death of [Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a

minimum of 14 years.’ ” Husband, relying on the language “further court order,” argued

that the trial court still had jurisdiction to terminate spousal support. He insists that

spousal support should be terminated because Wife was self-sufficient, there was a

change in Husband’s income that put a burden on him to pay spousal support, and his

attached income and expense declaration showed he was unable to provide for his own

needs.3

C. RESPONSE BY WIFE

Wife’s counsel filed a response to the RFO. Wife did not consent to the RFO. In

support of the response, Wife’s attorney declared that pursuant to the MSA, Husband

agreed to pay $4,311 each month for a minimum of 14 years. He had paid spousal

3 Husband included his income and expense declaration but such information is
not relevant to the issues on appeal, which involve interpretation of the MSA.

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support for less than seven years. Spousal support changes were for upward modification

only. Wife’s counsel requested that the RFO be denied and that the trial court order that

Husband comply with the existing orders.

Wife provided a declaration in support of the response in lieu of testimony. Since

the spousal support order was for 14 years, and it had only been seven years, the only

change could be upward modification. Unfairness to Husband was not a ground upon

which spousal support could be modified before the 14-year mark. Wife alleged that

Husband lived in a luxury three-bedroom apartment and had a luxury car. Wife stated

that Husband never paid fifty percent of her education costs and she had to obtain student

loans to pay for her education. Wife denied she ever verbally agreed to a reduction in

spousal support.

Wife’s attorney filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the

response to the RFO. Pursuant to Family Code section 3591, spousal support agreements

and orders are subject to modification or termination unless specifically agreed to the

contrary by the parties. The language in the MSA was “specific and unambiguous.” It

was clear based on the language that spousal support of $4,311 each month was subject to

upward modification only and Husband could not request a downward modification.

Wife filed a supplemental declaration on August 12, 2025. Wife declared that the

spousal support was structured based on Husband’s own proposal. Further, during their

20-year marriage, Wife raised their children and had no income. Husband acknowledged

during the dissolution proceedings that due to Wife being a stay-at-home mom, she had

no income and no savings. Husband had no physical or medical condition that kept him

6
from working.4 Wife also filed objections to Husband’s declaration based on lack of

foundation and hearsay. The trial court ruled on the objections by Wife to the declaration

provided by Husband; a majority of the objections were overruled. Those objections that

were sustained are relevant to the other issues raised in the lower court that are not issues

on appeal.

D. TRIAL COURT RULING

The RFO was heard on August 14, 2025. Both Wife and Husband were present.

Wife’s counsel argued that the evidence presented by Husband that he had no income

was insufficient. He had not provided appropriate documentation, and his income and

expense declarations had conflicting information as to whether he had any income. There

was not enough evidence presented to proceed to an evidentiary hearing. Further, there

was the legal issue as to whether spousal support could be modified. Wife’s counsel

argued that based on the plain language in the MSA, it could not be modified.

Husband responded that he was actively looking for employment. Further, the

language of the MSA provided that termination of spousal support was allowed by

further court order. Husband clarified that he was not asking for downward modification

as the language was clear that there could only be upward modification. He was seeking

a court order terminating spousal support. He insisted that the goal of the MSA was to

make Wife self-sufficient. She achieved that and spousal support should be terminated.

Husband began to argue about the items that Wife had been given, and the trial court

4 Wife and Husband submitted additional income and expense declarations that
are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

7
interrupted Husband and advised him that these were issues that would be addressed at

trial if the trial court set the matter for trial.

The trial court then asked Husband, “procedurally you are saying the language of

your MSA says it is non-modifiable whether up or down, but the termination language in

your MSA leaves room for support to be terminated?” Husband responded, “Yes.” The

trial court then confirmed that Husband was requesting termination of spousal support

and not modification. Husband confirmed he was seeking termination based on Wife

being self-sufficient.

The trial court noted that whether spousal support was subject to termination was

driven by the language in the MSA. The trial court allowed Husband to give his final

thoughts. Husband insisted he was actively looking for employment. He clarified the

statements in his income and expense declarations. The trial court took the issue under

submission.

A minute order from the hearing on August 14, 2025, provides the written ruling

submitted on the same day. The trial court ruled as to spousal support as follows: “The

court finds that [Husband] did not file a FL-157[5] with his RFO re. Spousal

Support/Other filed 4/17/25. More importantly, the court finds that the relevant language

in the parties’ MSA which reads ‘subject to upward modification only’ precludes

[Husband] from either reducing or terminating his Spousal Support obligation.

5 An FL-157 form is a spousal or domestic partner support declaration
attachment, which explains the facts that support a request for a spousal or domestic
partner support judgment. (https://selfhelp.courts.ca.gov/jcc-form/FL-157 (as of
November 4, 2026).

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[Husband]’s argument that he is seeking ‘termination’ as opposed to downward

‘modification’ misses the mark because this is a long-term marriage and the court cannot

‘terminate’ its jurisdiction over Spousal Support absent an expressed and unequivocal

waiver of support by [Wife] and no such waiver exists. Thus, all the court could do

would be to ‘modify’ the amount downward but the MSA precludes this. Therefore,

[Husband’s] request to terminate or reduce Spousal Support obligation is denied.”

Husband filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his RFO.

DISCUSSION

Husband claims the trial court erred as a matter of law by eliminating expressly

retained jurisdiction to terminate spousal support. He relies on the language in the MSA,

which he claims provides for three independent terminating events for spousal support:

his death, Wife’s remarriage, or further court order. He contends the amount of spousal

support was not restricted to 14 years but rather the inclusion of the “further court order”

preserved jurisdiction of the trial court to terminate spousal support prior to the 14 years.

Further, the limit of modification to only upward modification did not apply to the

duration of spousal support. He additionally contends that the provision Husband was to

provide his financial information to Wife if there was a significant change in his income

“presupposes continuing oversight and must be given independent effect.” Finally, he

contends the MSA structure reflected that spousal support was designed to end upon

Wife’s self-sufficiency. In addition, he argues the trial court denied him a meaningful

opportunity to be heard on a dispositive jurisdictional issue in violation of his due process

rights.

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A. INADEQUATE BRIEF AND RECORD

Wife argues that Husband provides an inadequate record on appeal and fails to

properly cite to the record in his opening brief. She also claims that Husband’s brief

“hallucinate[s]” authorities, making it appear the brief was prepared by Artificial

Intelligence.

“ ‘ “[A]n appealed judgment is presumed correct, and appellant bears the burden

of overcoming the presumption of correctness.” [Citation.] As a result, on appeal “the

party asserting trial court error may not ... rest on the bare assertion of error but must

present argument and legal authority on each point raised. [Citation.]” [Citations.]

When an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument and

citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.

(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; see also Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72

Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) “Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.”

(Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)

In addition, an appellant has the burden of “providing an adequate record.

[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be

resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; see also

Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575 [“a party challenging a judgment has the

burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record”].)

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Husband provides only a few citations to the record in his opening and reply

briefs. While we fault Husband for not providing a detailed statement of facts including

all the information that was provided to the trial court below, and the facts of the hearing

on August 14, 2025, the briefing is adequate as to the issue of whether the trial court

could terminate spousal support as argued in sections I, II, and III of the opening brief.

As for whether Husband provided an inadequate record, Wife contends that

Husband “fails to provide a record that could support many of the ‘facts’ he argues,

including his failure to include the parties’ judgment in the record.” We presume that

Wife is referring to the dissolution judgment and MSA. Husband brought a motion to

augment the record after the briefs were filed in this case, with the dissolution judgment,

including the MSA. We granted the request. There is no prejudice to Wife based on the

MSA being submitted after the briefs were filed as she repeatedly refers to the judgment

in her respondent’s brief. The record is adequate to review Husband’s claims on appeal

that the trial court erred by eliminating expressly retained jurisdiction, the upward

modification language only limited modification and not duration, and the MSA was

designed for eventual termination of spousal support.

However, the failure to include a complete recitation of the facts and reasoned

argument in support of his due process claim forfeits the claim on appeal.

Husband claims the trial court denied him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on

the jurisdictional issue. He claims he tried to explain to the trial court that he sought

termination of spousal support under the MSA’s “further court order” language and not a

modification of the amount. The trial court interrupted his argument and did not allow

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Husband to explain the jurisdictional distinction. He concludes that limiting a party’s

ability to present his or her case violates due process. This is the entirety of Husband’s

argument on this issue.

Husband fails to set forth the facts of the hearing where he claims the trial court

interrupted him several times, which he claims on appeal violated his due process rights.

In the opening and reply briefs, Husband merely cites to pages in the reporter’s transcript,

but does not set forth what had occurred at the hearing, only stating that he was

interrupted by the trial court. Merely citing to the pages of the reporter’s transcript with

no context for these citations and without providing a summary of all of the evidence is

not helpful to this court.

Husband also argues for the first time in the reply brief that many of his filings

were not reviewed by the trial court in a timely manner or rejected, and Wife’s

documents were immediately reviewed, showing that the process was not fair or “even-

handed.” Husband fails to cite to any part of the record to support this claim. “ ‘It is the

duty of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate reference to the

record, which includes providing exact page citations.’ ” (Duarte v. Chino Community

Hospital, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) “It is not our place to comb the record

seeking support for assertions parties fail to substantiate.” (Howard v. American

National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 534.) Such failure to properly cite to

the record and provide a summary of the facts waives the claim.

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Further, even if we ignore Husband’s failure to cite to the record, he merely

concludes that since he was interrupted, his due process rights were violated. As stated,

when an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument,’ ” we

treat the issue as waived. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p.

277.) Husband merely concludes that his due process rights were violated based on the

trial court interrupting him. This conclusive contention is not accompanied by reasoned

argument, and we find he has waived the issue.

Finally, Wife claims that Husband “hallucinate[s]” the legal authorities provided

in his briefs. Wife refers to the citation “Founding Members v. Motion Picture Assn.,”

cited by Husband, insisting it does not exist. In the reply brief, Husband explains that his

citation to Founding Members “inadvertently referenced the wrong reporter/year.” He

provides that the correct citation is Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country

Club v. Newport Beach Country Club (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, and it was a mere

typographical error in the opening brief. While the two citations are significantly

different, we will accept the representation and consider the new authority. Wife does

not identify any other citations to authority in Husband’s brief that do not exist to support

her claim, and we will not consider the opening brief to be inadequate based on one

incorrect citation.

B. DENIAL OF THE RFO

The provision of spousal support that is disputed states, “Said amount shall

continue until the death of [Husband], remarriage of [Wife], or further court order, for a

minimum of 14 years. The party’s intent is that [Husband] agrees to pay [Wife] at least

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$4,311 per month, subject to upward modification only.” There was also a provision that

Husband was to report any significant change in his income to Wife within 30 days of the

change.

“ ‘In marriages of “long duration” (presumptively 10 years or longer), the court is

deemed to retain spousal support jurisdiction “indefinitely” (notwithstanding the absence

of an express reservation of jurisdiction) absent written agreement of the parties to the

contrary or a court order terminating spousal support.’ ” (In re Marriage of Hibbard

(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014; see also Fam. Code § 4336, subds. (a), (b) & (c).)

“Nevertheless, a court’s spousal support jurisdiction is limited by other events set forth in

the statutory scheme. For example, as relevant here, a spousal support agreement ‘may

not be modified or revoked to the extent that a written agreement ... specifically provides

that the spousal support is not subject to modification or termination.’ ” (Hibbard, at p.

1014., fn. omitted; see also Fam. Code, § 3591, subd. (c) [“An agreement for spousal

support may not be modified or revoked to the extent that a written agreement, or, if there

is no written agreement, an oral agreement entered into in open court between the parties,

specifically provides that the spousal support is not subject to modification or

termination”].)

“ ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are

construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.’ ”

(In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) “We interpret a

contract to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties at the time they formed the

contract. [Citations.] We discern the parties’ intention based on the written contract

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alone, if possible, but may also consider the circumstances under which the contract was

made and its subject matter. [Citations.] We consider the contract as a whole, and

interpret contested provisions in their context, not in isolation, with the aim of giving

effect to all provisions, if doing so is reasonably possible. [Citations.] [¶] In interpreting

a contract, we give the words their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties or

usage have given the words a specialized or technical meaning.” (Camacho v. Target

Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 306.)

The trial court’s interpretation of a marital settlement agreement and jurisdiction,

if any, to modify the judgment are questions of law subject to de novo review. (In re

Marriage of Rosenfeld & Gross (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 478, 485.)

The language of the MSA provided that there could be a further court order on

spousal support. It also contained a provision that the only modification could be an

upward modification. While Husband argues that he was seeking “termination” and not a

“modification,” in essence his request would lead to a downward modification of support

to zero. This would be in direct conflict with the language of the MSA. “It is well

established that no specific formula or ‘ “magic” words’ are required to preclude

modification.” (In re Marriage of Hibbard, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017.) Here,

the agreement was that Husband would pay Wife $4,311 in spousal support with the only

possible modification being upward modification. The trial court was restrained by the

language in the MSA to not reduce spousal support to zero.

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Moreover, even if we were to consider that the request by Husband was for

termination and not modification, there is also language that Wife was entitled to a

minimum of 14 years of support. The trial court could not terminate spousal support

when the intent of the parties was clear that Wife receive spousal support for a minimum

of 14 years. This time was either set based on the duration of the marriage or possibly

the date upon which the parties assumed Wife would be self-sufficient, but nothing in the

MSA provides the intent of the parties other than that she receive spousal support for a

minimum of 14 years. There is no provision in the MSA that Wife must become self-

sufficient in order for spousal support to continue. A reasonable interpretation is that the

parties agreed that spousal support would continue for at least 14 years.

Husband argues in the reply brief that this interpretation would require the

payment of spousal support for a minimum of 14 years even upon the death of Husband

or the remarriage of Wife. We agree with Husband that this does present an ambiguity in

the MSA. “[A]n ambiguity in the language of a marital property agreement ... must be

decided in favor of the right to spousal support.” (In re Marriage of Vomacka (1984) 36

Cal.3d 459, 469 (Vomacka).) There was no extrinsic evidence presented by Husband as

to the meaning of this clause. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the MSA as providing

that the minimum of 14 years applied, assuming that Husband was not deceased and that

Wife had not remarried. Any further court order applied to extending spousal support

beyond the 14 years or an upward modification, assuming again that Husband was not

deceased and Wife had not remarried.

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Husband complains that if the MSA language is interpreted to find that the trial

court had no authority to terminate spousal support, it would render the provision that he

report any significant changes in income to Wife within 30 days surplusage. “An

interpretation that leaves part of a contract as surplusage is to be avoided.” (Rice v.

Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) Reasonably interpreted, the trial court

retained jurisdiction to extend the spousal support beyond 14 years or to modify the

spousal support upward. Reporting any significant changes in income could lead to an

upward modification of spousal support if requested by Wife. Based on the language in

the MSA, the parties did not contemplate that the spousal support would be terminated

prior to the minimum 14 years, or that it would be reduced.

Additionally, in considering the MSA as a whole, the child support provision

provided language that “Said support shall continue until further order of the court, or

until the child has married, dies, is emancipated, reaches the age of 19, or reaches the age

of 18 and is no longer a full-time high school student, whichever occurs first.” There was

no minimum duration set for child support, unlike the spousal support provision. This

further evidences the parties’ intent that Wife receive a minimum of 14 years of spousal

support.

Husband relies on Vomacka, supra, 36 Cal.3d 459, to support his claim that the

language “further court order” preserves jurisdiction to terminate support.6 The question

6 We note that Husband does not provide a pinpoint citation to Vomacka for this
point, but we will review the opinion despite his failure to provide an appropriate citation.
Husband also relies on In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978 for the
same proposition. He fails to provide a pinpoint citation, and our review of the case does

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resolved in Vomacka was whether a trial court has jurisdiction “to extend spousal support

payments past a date it has specified as the last opportunity the supported spouse may

request such payments?” The settlement agreement included language that the husband

was to pay the wife $275 of spousal support “each month thereafter until further order

from the Court, the death of either party, the remarriage of [the wife], or August 1, 1982,

whichever first occurs. The Court shall retain jurisdiction regarding spousal support

until September 1, 1984, at which time [the wife]’s right to request spousal support from

[the husband] shall terminate forever.” (Id. at pp. 461-462.) The trial court found that

the language of the agreement did not mean there was an absolute termination of spousal

support on September 1, 1984, but rather, that the wife could not request such support

after that date. It modified spousal support to $600 each month. (Id. at p. 462.) On

appeal, the husband complained that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by extending

spousal support beyond the agreed-upon termination date. (Id. at pp. 462-463.)

The Vomacka court found three policies favored modification of the settlement

agreement to extend spousal support beyond the September 1, 1984, date. First, it found

that orders for absolute termination of spousal support, “particularly [in] lengthy

marriages,” are disfavored unless it is shown that the supported spouse is self-supporting.

(Vomacka, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 468.) It further recognized that any ambiguity in a

not support his claim. Further, his citation in the opening brief to In re Marriage of Liss
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1456 is incorrect; it is 1426. He corrects the citation in the reply
brief but again he fails to provide a pinpoint citation. Further, the case only provides that
reservation of jurisdiction over spousal support “after a lengthy marriage is supported by
strong policy.” (Id. at pp. 1429-1430.)

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marital settlement agreement must “favor the right to spousal support.” (Id. at p. 469.)

Finally, it found the third policy favoring an extension was “that language in a spousal

support order suggesting that modification of its terms will be permitted is routinely

interpreted as a retention of the court’s fundamental jurisdiction to modify and, upon a

proper factual showing, to extend the spousal support provisions contained therein.” (Id.

at p. 470.) It concluded, “[T]he instant trial court’s retention of jurisdiction until

September 1, 1984, to hear [the wife]’s requests for spousal support implies that the court

retained the power to grant such requests. If the court was without jurisdiction to award

spousal support past September 1, 1984, its retention of jurisdiction until that date to hear

[the wife]’s requests for support would be meaningless. [Citations.] Accordingly, the

court’s retention of jurisdiction until September 1, 1984, to modify the spousal support

provisions of the interlocutory decree necessarily included a retention of its fundamental

jurisdiction to extend spousal support payments beyond that date.” (Id. at p. 471.)

Initially, we do not read Vomacka to mean that the language “further court order”

preserves the court’s jurisdiction to terminate support as argued by Husband. Rather,

Vomacka recognized that any further court order must comply with the policies of

providing spousal support and that it is restrained by the language in the marital

settlement agreement. Here, the trial court did not consider that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider a modification of spousal support. Rather, the trial court properly determined it

was restrained by the language in the MSA that the only modification was for upward

modification, and that the parties agreed that Wife would receive a minimum of 14 years

of spousal support. The trial court, in interpreting the MSA, had to consider the language

19
in the entire agreement in determining whether to modify or terminate spousal support.

Nothing in Vomacka changes this interpretation or result.

Finally, Husband argues the parties contemplated that the purpose of spousal

support was that Wife become self-sufficient, and once she was self-sufficient, spousal

support should be terminated. As previously noted, there is no provision in the MSA

providing that Wife must become self-supporting. Moreover, the MSA provides that the

amount paid to Wife for her education “shall not be considered additional ‘Spousal

Support’ but is a reasonable repayment as the father received an MBA degree during the

marriage that is valued at over $100,000.” The payment for Wife’s education was to

equalize the amount spent on education during the marriage. Nothing in the MSA

supports that termination of spousal support was required if Wife became self-supporting.

Although not raised as an issue in this case, we note for any possible future

disputes that the language of the MSA provides that before either party files a request for

order, the party is to first seek mediation. The MSA provides that if either of the parties

wishes to modify the MSA, they must first try to mediate the dispute by retaining the

services of a third-party neutral mediator. If after three sessions, they do not come to an

agreement, either party can file the appropriate motion or request for order to modify the

MSA. “Failure to follow the terms to engage in meaningful mediation may result in the

offending party having to pay attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party in the

future.”

The trial court did not consider this provision when Husband filed the RFO, and

Wife did not raise the issue in the trial court or in this court. This court merely points out

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this language to assist the trial court and the parties should any further disputes arise

requiring the filing of an RFO by either party.

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court denying the RFO is affirmed. Wife is awarded her

costs on appeal as the prevailing party.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MILLER
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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