Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Mokhnatkina and Mokhnatkin CA6

Filed 10/20/26 Marriage of Mokhnatkina and Mokhnatkin CA6
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/20/26 Marriage of Mokhnatkina and Mokhnatkin CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of MARIA H052875
NIKOLAYEVNA MOKHNATKINA (Santa Clara County
and TIMOFEY EDUARDOVICH Super. Ct. No. 18FL002598)
MOKHNATKIN.

MARIA NIKOLAYEVNA
MOKHNATKINA,

Respondent,

v.

TIMOFEY EDUARDOVICH
MOKHNATKIN,

Appellant.

Appellant Timofey Eduardovich Mokhnatkin challenges a judgment
relating to the division of property and other financial issues stemming from
the dissolution of his marriage to respondent Maria Nikolayevna
Mokhnatkina. Timofey1 asserts he adequately rebutted the presumption of

1 For clarity we refer to the parties by their first names as they appear

in the briefing. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131,
1136, fn. 1.)
undue influence applicable to Maria’s relinquishment of her interest in their
family home and contends the trial court’s finding that he failed to rebut that
presumption was not supported by the evidence. He also argues that the
court made various errors relating to a home equity line of credit, attorney
fees, child support, temporary spousal support, and sanctions. For the
reasons we explain herein, we will modify the judgment to correct an error in
the calculation of temporary spousal support arrears and affirm the judgment
as modified.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties married in Russia in 2007 and moved to the United States
in 2008. They have two children together, born in 2008 and 2011. In 2013,
they purchased a house together. They separated in 2017 after just under 10
years of marriage. In 2018, Maria and the two children moved out of the
house. Maria petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, and the trial court
held a bench trial relating to financial issues in 2024.
A. TRIAL EVIDENCE
In 2012, the parties decided to buy a house and began applying for
mortgage prequalification. They learned that Maria’s credit score was lower
than Timofey’s. Maria testified that Timofey and a loan officer both told her
that her name could not be “on the loan.” Timofey testified that, even after
learning about Maria’s lower credit score, the parties continued exploring
“different options,” including a mortgage in Timofey’s name only; a mortgage
in Maria’s name only; or a mortgage in both parties’ names. Timofey was
unemployed at the time.
Timofey testified that, after he found employment in December 2012,
the parties met with a loan officer. According to Timofey, they discussed
interest rates and learned that the interest rate available to Timofey as a sole
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borrower was slightly lower than the rate available to both parties as joint
borrowers. Timofey denied the loan officer told the parties that Maria could
not be a borrower, or that it would make financial sense for Timofey to
purchase a house on his own. He stated that around the time of their
meeting with the loan officer, Maria told him she did not want to be included
on the mortgage.
In January 2013, the parties found a house, and Timofey applied for a
mortgage. He applied for the mortgage alone to obtain a lower interest rate,
at the recommendation of loan officer Jaime Del Bosque. Del Bosque also
told the parties that a “gift letter” would be necessary in order for Maria to
make part of the down payment. The parties made the down payment using
$44,932 from Timofey’s bank account and $90,000 from Maria’s bank account,
accompanied by a gift letter characterizing the $90,000 as a gift from Maria
to Timofey. In an e-mail to the parties’ credit union requesting that funds be
transferred for the down payment, Timofey wrote: “ ‘Me and my wife are
buying house and need to transfer money.’ ” Maria testified that she signed
the gift letter only because Timofey told her she had to. She said she believed
the house would be the parties’ “common property” and she would “have 50
percent.”
The parties, Del Bosque, real estate agent Dolores Marquez, and
escrow officer Jodi Holloway were present at the closing in February 2013.
At the closing, Maria signed an interspousal grant deed conveying her
interest in the property to Timofey. The grant deed included the phrase
“FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION,” which Timofey testified he did not
understand. Holloway, who notarized the grant deed, testified she would
typically tell the grantor that he or she was “signing off all right, title, and
interest to this property.” Maria testified that she “felt pressured” during the
3
closing, and Timofey rushed her through the signing process. Based on her
conversations with Timofey, she understood that her name would not be on
the title at the time of the purchase (because adding it would have prevented
the parties from obtaining a mortgage) but would be added at a later date.
Timofey denied promising to Maria before the closing that he would later add
her name to the title.
Deposition testimony by Del Bosque and Marquez was admitted into
evidence at trial in lieu of direct examination but is not part of the record on
appeal. After reviewing the transcript of Marquez’s deposition testimony, the
court asked Marquez whether it was her understanding that “the parties
were purchasing the home together” but were “putting the house in
[Timofey]’s name only, because it would give them a better interest rate on
their mortgage?” Marquez answered affirmatively. The court then
referenced deposition testimony in which Marquez had expressed her belief
at the time of the closing “that at some point, the parties were going to
refinance” the mortgage. When asked whether her belief was an assumption
or based on something she had been told, Marquez replied: “That was
between the lender and him. It was a recommendation for them to actually
refinance it, and at that point if she was going to be added at that point.”
Marquez said her understanding of the parties’ plan to refinance was based
on a conversation she had with the parties and Del Bosque.
The parties obtained a home equity line of credit (HELOC) as “co-
borrowers” in August 2013. Timofey acknowledged the HELOC was “a
common debt.” At the time of trial, the parties had stipulated that Maria
would reimburse Timofey $53,297 for money drawn from the HELOC
between September 2017 and June 2023, plus interest. An appraiser
testified that the house was worth $1.95 million as of May 2024.
4
B. PRETRIAL SUPPORT ORDERS
In September 2019, the trial court ordered Timofey to pay Maria $561
per month in child support. That order was based on a custodial timeshare
under which the children spent 34 percent of their time with Timofey. The
court also ordered Maria to pay Timofey $415 per month in temporary
spousal support, resulting in a net payment of $146 per month from Timofey
to Maria.
Maria was granted sole custody of the children in March 2020, and
Timofey was denied visitation rights. Timofey moved to modify support in
July 2020, stating that he had lost his job. Maria filed a response opposing
any increase in temporary spousal support and asserting that child support
should be increased, as the custodial timeshare underlying the 2019 support
order was no longer in place. While the request to modify support was
pending, Timofey was granted visitation with the children.
Following a hearing on the request to modify support, the trial court
issued an order on January 4, 2021 (January 4 order). Although the court
found Timofey had not made a sufficient showing to support a modification to
spousal support based on a change in income, it found modification of child
support appropriate given the change in the custodial timeshare. But, as of
the date of the order, there was “insufficient information for the [c]ourt to
calculate guideline support” because the parties had not yet “entered a
stipulated order reflecting the new visitation schedule.” The court said it
could not address the issue of temporary spousal support until first resolving
the issue of child support. It denied Timofey’s motion “without prejudice for
lack of sufficient information to cause a modification” and added: “The issue
of retroactivity need not be considered at this time.”

5
Maria moved for reconsideration of the January 4 order, asking: “Does
the [c]ourt intend to reserve the issue of retroactivity for [Ostler/Smith] child
support based on our actual custodial timeshare?” On January 13, 2021, the
trial court issued an amended order clarifying aspects of the January 4 order.
The amended order made no substantial changes to the portion of the
January 4 order that addressed child and spousal support. According to the
minute order from a hearing held in April 2021, the court found it had
“jurisdiction to modify the [January 4] order . . . retroactive to the date of
filing of the initial motion.” The minute order further stated that it would be
necessary to run a “Dissomaster calculation” using Maria’s base salary and a
“2 to 3 percent timeshare” for Timofey, and using Timofey’s “old salary” (with
a two-way Ostler/Smith table applied). In a July 2021 order, the court
reconsidered the January 4 order; directed the parties to “meet and confer
regarding giving [Maria] [Trainotti2] credits”; and “reserve[d] on the issue of
overpayment/underpayment of support.”
In October 2021, Maria moved for clarification of the July 2021 order
insofar as it addressed “child support and additional child support based on
an [sic] two way Ostler/Smith [b]onus schedule.” She again asked, “[d]oes
the [c]ourt intend to make a child support order based on our actual custodial
timeshare?” In February 2022, the trial court denied the motion for
clarification and directed Maria’s counsel to file a “proposed revised” order
“limited to what is contained within the minute orders.” No revised order
appears in the record.
In March 2023, Maria moved for modification of child support
(retroactive to March 2020) and for termination of temporary spousal

2 In re Marriage of Trainotti (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1072.

6
support. The trial court denied the request to terminate spousal support,
ordered Maria to pay Timofey $632 per month in temporary spousal support
(beginning in March 2023), and ordered Timofey to pay Maria $2,410 per
month in child support (also beginning in March 2023). The modification
order resulted in a new net payment of $1,778 per month from Timofey to
Maria. The court stated that any orders “not in conflict with” the
modification order were “to remain in effect.”
In June 2024, Maria again moved to terminate temporary spousal
support. That motion remained pending at the time of trial in August 2024,
at which point the parties “agreed for it to go off calendar,” and the court
vacated a scheduled hearing on the motion.
C. STATEMENT OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT
At an October 2024 posttrial hearing, the trial court confirmed the
parties’ agreement that Maria owed Timofey “[$]53,297 for home equity line
of credit debt from September 1, 2017, to June 30, 2023.” Timofey asserted
“there were additional charges from June 2023 to today and that’s an issue
that has to be decided as well.” The court considered that issue “waived”
because Timofey “didn’t raise it at trial” but said it would “let the parties
meet and confer if [Timofey] believes there’s other monies due on the HELOC
from [Maria].” Following a lengthy discussion about retroactive child
support, the court determined that another judge had “told the parties to
meet and confer and include the 2 percent for [Timofey]’s timeshare” and had
“used the word [Trainotti] credits because at that time there was still the
issue of all the spousal support that was due to [] [Timofey] by [Maria] that
hadn’t been paid.” The court noted that temporary spousal support would not
have extended beyond August 1, 2024, and that Timofey had not presented

7
any evidence at trial as to the amount owed for the period of April through
July.
The trial court issued a statement of decision and judgment in
December 2024. It first noted the issues resolved by agreement of the parties
before the end of trial, including that Maria would “be charged the amount of
$53,297 for her draws from the [HELOC] . . . plus interest from September 1,
2017 to June 30, 2023” and that “[c]ommencing August 1, 2024, the [c]ourt’s
authority and jurisdiction to order spousal support from either [p]arty shall
forever terminate.” As to the HELOC, the court stated in a footnote: “To the
extent the court ordered the parties to ‘meet and confer’ during trial, if no
agreement was raised and this issue was not again raised with the court, the
court finds [Timofey] waived his right to claim any additional equalization for
the HELOC.” The court then set forth its rulings on the issues disputed at
trial, which we summarize here as relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
1. Community Property Status of the Family Home
At trial, Maria argued that the home the parties purchased together
during the marriage was community property, while Timofey contended it
was his separate property following the interspousal grant deed transferring
Maria’s interest in the home to him. Under Family Code3 section 721,
subdivision (b), the trial court applied a presumption of undue influence to
the grant deed. The court found Timofey failed to rebut that presumption,
and the home was thus community property.
In support of its conclusion, the trial court noted that the home had
been purchased with community funds and that “initial communications with
the real estate professional involved in the purchase . . . documented that

3 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.

8
[Timofey] and [Maria] intended to purchase the home together.” The court
found credible Maria’s testimony that “the real estate professionals involved
in the transaction recommended that title . . . should be held in [Timofey]’s
name alone due to [Timofey]’s better credit score and to obtain a better
mortgage interest rate before refinancing in six months.”
The trial court “further found that [Maria]’s testimony was supported
by two independent witnesses, Dolores Marquez, the realtor . . ., and Jaime
Del Bosque, the loan officer.” In the court’s words, “Mr. Del Bosque credibly
testified that the expressed intent of [Maria] and [Timofey] was to apply as
mortgage borrowers jointly and it was only due to Mr. Del Bosque’s
recommendation, that the [p]arties purchased the . . . [p]roperty with
[Timofey] as the sole mortgage borrower and title holder. Mr. Del Bosque
further testified that he suggested to remove [Maria] from the transaction,
and that it was very rare for parties in real estate transactions to read every
document they are given at closing. Both [Maria] and [Timofey] testified
credibly that Mr. Del Bosque recommended [Timofey] take the loan in his
name only to obtain a better mortgage rate due to [Timofey]’s better credit
score. Ms. Marquez similarly testified credibly that it was her understanding
that the [p]arties intended to refinance the . . . [p]roperty within six months
to put [Maria]’s name on the title.”
Further explaining its ruling, the trial court quoted from an e-mail
Timofey sent to the parties’ credit union in February 2013: “ ‘Me and my wife
are buying a house and need to transfer money (down payment) to title
company. This is a domestic wire transfer from our MECU accounts ($44,932
from my [Timofey’s] account and $90,000 from [Maria’s] account.’ ” The court
found that, when testifying at trial, Timofey “was not able to articulate what
valuable consideration was given” in exchange for Maria’s interest in the
9
home. It also noted Timofey’s testimony that the HELOC obtained “in both of
their names as guarantors . . . was a ‘common debt.’ ”
The trial court concluded Timofey exerted undue influence on Maria by
“(i) failing to provide valuable consideration for [Maria]’s execution of the
Grant Deed, (ii) representing to [Maria] that the . . . [p]roperty would be
‘their home’; and (iii) rushing [Maria] through the process during closing.”
Although the court found credible the notary’s testimony that she had
explained the grant deed to Maria, it did not find based on that testimony
that Maria “believed she was signing away all right, title, and interest to the
. . . [p]roperty by signing that deed.” Rather, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Maria “was credible in her testimony that she
believed the [p]arties were purchasing the . . . [p]roperty together.” The court
emphasized that Maria “gave more money than [Timofey] from their
community property accounts to purchase the property” and “spent over
$15,869 of community property funds in an account in her name on various
remodeling after the purchase.” It “question[ed] why, if [Maria] intended to
gift the . . . [p]roperty to [Timofey], she would consent to put additional
monies into the property - it just does not make sense.”
2. Retroactive Modification of Child Support
The parties agreed that Timofey had satisfied his child support
obligations for the period beginning in March 2023, but Maria requested that
child support be modified retroactive to March 2020 “to reflect [Timofey]’s
actual timeshare with the children.” The court applied section 4009, which
provides that a child support order “may be made retroactive to the date of
filing the petition, complaint, or other initial pleading.” It found that, for a
three-year period beginning in March 2020, “the child support never reflected

10
the actual timeshare, despite multiple requests by [Maria] to modify the
orders.”
The court summarized the procedural history, beginning with Timofey’s
July 2020 motion to modify child and spousal support. As the court
recounted, that motion was addressed by multiple judges. “[O]n September
2, 2020, Judge Stoelker heard [Timofey]’s motion and took it under
submission. On January 4, 2021, the [c]ourt issued its [o]rder [a]fter
[h]earing, and found that modification of support was appropriate, but that
insufficient information was provided to calculate guideline support. The
[c]ourt denied [Timofey]’s motion without prejudice for lack of sufficient
information to cause a modification.” Maria sought clarification of the
January 4 order. “On April 26, 2021, Judge McCracken (the judicial officer
who took Judge Stoelker’s caseload after Judge Stoelker’s retirement) found
that she had jurisdiction to reconsider the January 4, 2021 order retroactive
to the date of filing of the initial motion – [Timofey]’s petition to modify
support dated July 9, 2020.” A third judge (Judge Pegg) presided over trial
and authored the statement of decision and judgment.
The trial court continued: “Judge McCracken’s minute order from April
26, 2021 states: ‘The [c]ourt finds that it has jurisdiction to modify the order
from January 4, 2021, retroactive to the date of filing of the initial motion,’
which the court finds to be [Timofey]’s motion to modify support dated July 9,
2020. The [c]ourt further notes that Judge McCracken’s minute order states:
“ ‘A DissoMaster calculation needs to be run with a base salary of [Maria]
inputted and a 2 to 3 percent timeshare for [Timofey]. [Timofey]’s old salary
should be inputted with a two-way [Ostler/Smith] table applied.’ ” In the
court’s view, it was “clear” from the minute order that “Judge McCracken
retroactively modified the support order to more accurately reflect [Timofey]’s
11
time share retroactive to July 9, 2020, the date [Timofey] filed [a request for
order] to modify both child and spousal support” and “ordered the parties to
run a DissoMaster calculation with a 2 to 3 percent timeshare for [Timofey].”
But the written order corresponding to that hearing “omitted the language
regarding the modified timeshare.” Instead, Timofey’s counsel (who prepared
the order) “added the language ‘the parties are ordered to meet and confer
regarding giving [Maria] Trainotti credits,’ which language is not reflected in
the minutes. The court then hand-wrote on the written order ‘The court
reserves on the issue of over payment/underpayment of support.’ ”
Based on its understanding of the procedural history, the trial court
found that “Judge McCracken ordered the parties to both modify the child
support order to reflect [Timofey]’s 2 to 3 percent timeshare with the
[c]hildren and to give [Maria] Trainotti credits for her payments for work-
related daycare and unreimbursed medical expenses.” As the court
characterized it, “Judge McCracken’s April 26, 2021, order reconsidered
Judge Stoelker’s findings on attorney’s fees and costs, ordered the [p]arties to
reconsider timeshare, and ordered retroactivity to the filing of [Timofey]’s
July 9, 2020 motion” (which the court found to be pending at the time of the
April 2021 hearing). The court found “credible evidence” that the parties
“were ordered to meet and confer and include the 2 [percent] for [Timofey]’s
timeshare retroactive to July 9, 2020.” It concluded Maria “should receive
child support for the actual accurate timeshare in the time period” beginning
when Timofey moved to modify support in July 2020, and ordered Timofey to
pay $48,762 in retroactive child support for that time period.
3. Sanctions Against Timofey
In her trial brief, Maria requested $200,000 in sanctions against
Timofey under section 271. At the outset of trial, Timofey’s counsel verbally
12
acknowledged Maria’s “request for [section] 271 sanctions.” Timofey also
filed a posttrial opposition to Maria’s request for sanctions. Acknowledging
Timofey’s “actions in both denying the community property nature of the
parties’ home and his refusal to accept Judge McCracken’s orders,” the court
ordered $5,000 in sanctions.
4. Interest on Spousal Support Arrears
The parties stipulated before trial that Maria owed Timofey $215,446
in spousal support arrears through 2022, reserving for trial the “issue of any
interest” to be added to that amount. Timofey requested “interest of $10,507
on the $215,446 spousal support [Ostler/Smith] arrears” owed to him. The
trial court denied the request, noting that Timofey “also delayed the payment
of child support and engaged in bad faith tactics.” Specifically, the court
found it “unreasonable” for Timofey “to take the position he took at trial
regarding Judge McCracken’s rulings regarding child support owed and
thereby deprived [Maria] of child support owed to her for her 100 [percent]
support of the [c]hildren.”
5. Timofey’s Request for Attorney Fees
Timofey requested need-based attorney fees under section 2030. At the
time of the request, Timofey had already been awarded “$40,062 in need-
based attorney’s fees and costs during the pendency of the action.” The trial
court found that Timofey owed his attorney $64,318 and Maria owed her
attorney $209,687. It described Timofey’s attorney fees as “very reasonable”
and expressed no opinion on the reasonableness of Maria’s “much” higher
attorney fees. The court noted that Maria’s monthly income of “$22,083 per
month plus $5,567 in bonus” exceeded Timofey’s monthly income of $14,165.
But the court also observed that Maria had “been paying all daycare-related
childcare expenses, extracurricular activities for the [c]hildren, and their
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healthcare since separation” (including “special services” for a child with
autism) and “presented evidence that she has paid over $80,000 for the
children” without assistance from Timofey.
The trial court concluded that Maria was not financially able to
contribute to Timofey’s attorney fees and Timofey did not have a financial
need, as his expenses were “lower than his income” and he had “been able to
pay his attorney’s fees throughout the litigation.” It again noted Timofey’s
“unreasonable positions over the years on issues in this litigation,” and
denied his request for attorney fees.
6. Termination and Calculation of Temporary Spousal
Support
The trial court noted that Maria had moved in June 2024 to terminate
temporary spousal support and that a hearing on that motion had been
“continued . . . to this trial.” It granted Maria’s motion, retroactive to June
30, 2024. Finding that Maria had initially failed to submit documentation of
her income in the second quarter of 2024, then submitted “a declaration
indicating that nothing had changed” between the first quarter of 2024 and
her June 24, 2024 motion, the court concluded “her income did not change
until July 1, 2024.” It imputed to Maria “her income from [q]uarter 1 to
[q]uarter 2 only through June 30, 2024” and determined she owed $19,042 in
temporary spousal support “for April and May 2024 for [q]uarter 2 2024” (in
addition to $28,563 in “arrears owed and offset for [q]uarter 1 2024”). Adding
those totals to the $68,525 Maria owed for the year 2023, the court ordered
her to pay Timofey a “total amount of $116,130” in temporary spousal
support arrears for 2023 and 2024. The court further ordered that Maria was
“to receive her community property monies due” in connection with the

14
family home before she would be required to pay Timofey “anything under
this order.”
II. DISCUSSION
Timofey challenges eight aspects of the judgment, contending the trial
court erred in treating the family home as community property; denying
attorney fees; not ordering additional HELOC reimbursement; modifying
child support retroactive to July 2020; terminating temporary spousal
support; imposing sanctions; denying interest on spousal support arrears;
and allowing Maria to withhold spousal support pending her receipt of
community property funds from the home.
“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on
appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133
(Arceneaux).) As to each issue raised on appeal, Timofey bears the burden to
both provide an accurate record and demonstrate error. (In re Marriage of
Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.)
A. PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE
In property-related transactions between spouses, section 721,
subdivision (b) “imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on
each spouse.” This duty stems from “the general rules governing fiduciary
relationships that control the actions of persons occupying confidential
relations with each other” and prohibits each spouse from taking “any unfair
advantage of the other.” (Ibid.) “ ‘If one spouse secures an advantage from
the transaction, a statutory presumption arises under section 721 that the
advantaged spouse exercised undue influence and the transaction will be set
aside.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 344.) An
advantage results to one spouse when that spouse gains or when the other
15
spouse is hurt by the transaction. (Gaines v. California Trust Co. (1941) 48
Cal.App.2d 709, 714.) A spouse obtains an advantage when the “spouse’s
position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise
gains, benefits, or profits.” (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 624, 629 (Mathews).) The presumption is rebuttable; the spouse
advantaged by the transaction must establish that the disadvantaged spouse
acted freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of all the facts and a
complete understanding of the effect of the transaction. (Fossum, at p. 344.)
Timofey contends that the trial court’s finding that he failed to rebut
the presumption of undue influence applicable to his acquisition of Maria’s
interest in the family home was not supported by the evidence. We reject the
contention for two independent reasons. First, Timofey has not provided an
adequate record for review of the issue. In finding Maria’s testimony credible
and concluding Timofey failed to rebut the presumption, the court relied in
part on testimony from realtor Marquez and loan officer Del Bosque.
Deposition testimony from those two witnesses, which was admitted at trial
in lieu of direct examination, has not been included in the record on appeal.
Timofey asserts in his reply brief that “[t]he [j]udgment shows that the
[t]rial [c]ourt based its decision on the witness’ trial testimony and not on
their deposition testimony.” But the record contradicts his characterization
of the judgment. Marquez and Del Bosque were briefly cross-examined at
trial, and the court engaged in limited questioning of its own. In questioning
Marquez, the court referenced her deposition testimony and attempted to
clarify portions of that testimony. The court stated in its written statement
of decision that Marquez “testified credibly that it was her understanding
that the [p]arties intended to refinance the . . . [p]roperty within six months
to put [Maria]’s name on the title.” The reference to a six-month timeframe
16
does not appear in the transcript of Marquez’s brief trial testimony and
suggests the court relied on portions of the deposition testimony in making
its findings. Without the deposition testimony, we must presume that
testimony supports the judgment. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609.)
Apart from these deficiencies, the appellate record supports the
judgment. Although Timofey characterizes the trial court’s finding that he
failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence as a factual determination
reviewed for substantial evidence, that characterization is misplaced. “In the
case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the
party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party
appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “Thus, where the issue on appeal
turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter
of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination
that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (I.W., at p. 1528.)
Timofey’s evidence was neither uncontradicted, nor so compelling as to
preclude the conclusion that he failed to rebut the presumption of undue
influence. He analogizes this case to Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 624,
where the presumption was adequately rebutted. The wife in Mathews
quitclaimed her interest in the family home at the time of purchase, and the
husband purchased the house alone to obtain a more favorable interest rate
17
on a mortgage. (Id. at p. 627.) But in Mathews, the trial court found no
undue influence by the husband on the wife’s quitclaim deed. (Id. at p. 628.)
The question on appeal in Mathews was thus whether the trial court’s finding
was supported by substantial evidence—not, as here, whether the evidence
compelled that finding as a matter of law. This case also differs from
Mathews in another key respect. “While the Mathews court mentioned in
passing that the wife ‘assumed’ or ‘believed’ she would be added onto the title,
there is no indication that her husband ever promised that would happen.”
(In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 287.) Here, Maria
(whose testimony the court found credible) testified that she had signed the
grant deed based on Timofey’s assurance that he would “ ‘add [her] to title
later.’ ” That distinction alone is “fatal” to Timofey’s contention that
Mathews compelled a finding in his favor. (Starr, at p. 283.)
For these reasons, Timofey has not persuaded us that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in its determination that he failed to rebut the
presumption of undue influence.
B. ATTORNEY FEES
Timofey contends the court abused its discretion in denying his request
for need-based attorney fees under section 2030. “When a request for
attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether
an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this section is appropriate,
whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether
one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the
findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall
make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
“[T]he proper legal standard for determining an attorney fee award
requires the trial court to determine how to apportion the cost of the
18
proceedings equitably between the parties under their relative
circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
964, 975 (Falcone & Fyke).) “Financial resources are only one factor for the
court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall costs of the
litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances”
(§ 2032, subd. (b)), and the parties’ litigation tactics may also be considered.
(Falcone & Fyke, at p. 975.) We will not reverse an order on a request for
need-based attorney fees “absent a showing that no judge could reasonably
have made the order, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in
support of the order.” (Ibid.)
Although Timofey appears to suggest the trial court did not make the
findings required under section 2030, subdivision (a)(2), the court’s decision
sets forth findings as to each of the statutory factors. The court found an
award of attorney fees inappropriate due in part to Timofey’s “unreasonable”
litigation tactics. It found no disparity in access to funds to retain counsel
where Timofey had “been able to pay his attorney’s fees throughout the
litigation.” And it found Maria was unable to pay for both parties’ legal
representation where she owed her attorney $209,687, Timofey owed his
attorney $64,318, and Maria had spent over $80,000 on expenses related to
the children without any financial contribution from Timofey. Construing
the evidence in favor of the trial court’s decision, as we must, we perceive no
abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Timofey’s request for additional
need-based attorney fees beyond the $40,062 already awarded.
C. HELOC REIMBURSEMENT
Before the August 2024 trial, the parties agreed that Maria would
reimburse Timofey $53,297 for money drawn from the HELOC between
September 2017 and June 2023. At an October 2024 posttrial hearing,
19
Timofey suggested for the first time that “there were additional charges from
June 2023 to today and that’s an issue that has to be decided as well.” The
court considered the issue “waived” because Timofey “didn’t raise it at trial”
but allowed for the possibility that the parties could “meet and confer if
[Timofey] believes there’s other monies due on the HELOC from [Maria].”
The record does not indicate that Timofey ever produced evidence of the
“additional charges” for which he sought reimbursement, or attempted to
meet and confer on the issue before the court issued its statement of decision
and judgment in December 2024. In its decision, the court again noted that
Timofey “waived his right to claim any additional equalization for the
HELOC.” Timofey now argues on appeal that the court “abused its discretion
in denying the final home equity line of credit true-up.” (Boldface &
underscoring omitted.)
The parties frame the issue differently, with Maria characterizing
Timofey’s posttrial objection as a request for discretionary reimbursement
under section 2626, and Timofey replying that he instead sought the equal
division of community debt under section 2550. The disagreement is of little
consequence to our resolution of this issue on appeal. Whatever the basis for
Timofey’s request, he bore the burden of making a specific request supported
by evidence. (See In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050,
1057–1058 [the party claiming a right of reimbursement has the burden of
proof]; In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 617, 625–626 [the
party seeking reimbursement must make a specific request]; In re Marriage
of Warren (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 777, 784 [the party asserting the existence of
a community debt has the burden of producing evidence of its existence].)
Where Timofey belatedly requested reimbursement for unspecified
“additional charges” and produced no evidence of those charges either during
20
trial or in the four months following trial, the court did not err in concluding
he had forfeited4 the right to request additional reimbursement.
D. RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
According to Timofey, his July 2020 motion to modify child support was
denied in January 2021 and was no longer pending at the time the trial court
eventually modified support. He contends support could only be modified
retroactive to March 2023 (when Maria moved to modify support), not July
2020 (when Timofey filed his motion). “An order modifying or terminating a
support order may be made retroactive to the date of the filing of the notice of
motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate, or to any subsequent
date,” subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. (§ 3653, subd. (a).)
We review a child support order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage
of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282.) Reversal is warranted only if
the record shows prejudicial error. (In re Marriage of Williams (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1233–1234.) We resolve any conflicts in the evidence
in favor of the trial court’s determination. (Id. at p. 1234.) When “the trial
court’s order . . . finds substantial support in the evidence, . . . no abuse of
discretion is shown.” (Dean v. Dean (1963) 59 Cal.2d 655, 657.)
In its decision, the trial court made factual findings concerning the
previous child support orders in the case. The court found Maria had made
“multiple requests . . . to modify the orders” beginning in 2020 before Judge
Stoelker and that in April 2021, “Judge McCracken (the judicial officer who

4 Although the trial court spoke in terms of “waiver,” the appropriate

term is “forfeiture.” “ ‘Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture
is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” ’ ” (People v.
Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, fn. 6.) This difference in terminology is
immaterial to our consideration of the issue on appeal.
21
took Judge Stoelker’s caseload after Judge Stoelker’s retirement) found that
she had jurisdiction to reconsider” Judge Stoelker’s January 4 order
“retroactive to the date of filing of the initial motion – [Timofey]’s petition to
modify support dated July 9, 2020.” The court’s understanding of the April
2021 hearing is supported by the minute order, which further states: “A
Dissomaster calculation needs to be run with base salary of petitioner
inputted and a 2 to 3 percent timeshare for [Timofey]. [Timofey]’s old salary
should be inputed [sic], with a [two] way [Ostler/Smith] table applied.”
Based on the April 2021 minute order, the court considered it “clear” that
“Judge McCracken retroactively modified the support order to more
accurately reflect [Timofey]’s time share retroactive to July 9, 2020, the date
[Timofey] filed [a request for order] to modify both child and spousal support”
and “ordered the parties to run a DissoMaster calculation with a 2 to 3
percent timeshare for [Timofey].” The minute order supports the court’s
conclusion and, to the extent Timofey contends it does not accurately reflect
what transpired at the April 2021 hearing, he has not met his burden of
providing an accurate record and affirmatively showing error.
The July 2021 order, which expressly reconsidered the January 4 order,
further supports the trial court’s conclusion that the July 2020 motion
(denied without prejudice in the January 4 order) remained pending when
support was modified. Following the April 2021 hearing, the July 2021 order
“omitted the language regarding the modified timeshare” contemplated in the
April 2021 minute order but included a handwritten provision “reserv[ing] on
the issue of overpayment/underpayment of support” that was raised in the
July 2020 motion. Timofey appears to disagree with that characterization of
the July 2021 order, seemingly suggesting that the handwritten provision
referencing “ ‘the issue of overpayment/underpayment of support’ ” concerned
22
the “Trainotti credits” awarded to Maria rather than the issue of retroactive
child support. In relying solely on this unsupported assertion, Timofey has
not met his burden of affirmatively showing error. Even assuming Timofey’s
characterization of the July 2021 order were accurate, that description would
not undermine the court’s conclusion that retroactive modification of child
support was addressed at the April 2021 hearing. We decide that nothing in
the record establishes that the court erred in modifying child support
retroactive to July 2020.
E. TERMINATION AND CALCULATION OF TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Timofey asserts the trial court “improperly terminated temporary
spousal support on June 30, 2024 based on a withdrawn motion” filed on
June 24, 2024. (Capitalization, boldface & underscoring omitted.) He also
argues that, despite terminating support retroactive to June 30, 2024 (not
May 31, 2024), the court failed to order support for June 2024.
A temporary spousal support order “may be modified or terminated at
any time except as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of
the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate.” (§ 3603.)
We review spousal support orders for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of
McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982–983.) “So long as the court exercised
its discretion along legal lines, its decision will not be reversed on appeal if
there is substantial evidence to support it.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1990)
225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480.) In reviewing for substantial evidence, we look to
the evidence supporting the order, and we indulge in all legitimate and
reasonable inferences to uphold the trial court’s decision. (Munoz v. Olin
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 629, 635–636; Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1133.)
Nothing in the record establishes that the trial court retroactively
terminated spousal support based on a “withdrawn” motion. Maria moved to
23
terminate temporary spousal support on June 24, 2024. In opposing the
motion, Timofey argued that “[t]he issue of spousal support will be decided at
the trial.” When the case proceeded to trial in August 2024, the parties
“agreed for it to go off calendar” and the court vacated a scheduled hearing on
the motion.
Timofey does not cite any authority or record support for his assertion
that, in agreeing to vacate a scheduled hearing on the motion given the
ongoing trial, Maria necessarily withdrew the motion such that the trial court
could no longer retroactively terminate support. The case law he cites
establishes that unless a court expressly reserves jurisdiction to amend a
temporary support order (In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th
1059, 1075), the court lacks jurisdiction to retroactively modify the order to
any date earlier than the filing of a proper pleading seeking modification of
the order. (In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 631.) Here,
Maria sought termination of the temporary support order on June 24, 2024,
before trial commenced in August. Where the record suggests an August
hearing on her motion was vacated because the issue was intended to be
addressed at trial, support could be terminated retroactive to the date the
motion was filed. (In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 481, 513.)
Although we reject Timofey’s contention that support could not be
terminated retroactive to June 30, 2024, we agree with his observation that
the trial court neglected to order a support payment for June 2024. The court
imputed Maria’s “income from [q]uarter 1 to [q]uarter 2 only through June
30, 2024” based on a finding that “her income did not change until July 1,
2024.” But despite ordering Maria to pay $28,563 in “arrears owed and offset
for [q]uarter 1 2024” ($9,521 per month), the court ordered her to pay only
24
$19,042 in temporary spousal support “for April and May 2024 for [q]uarter 2
2024” (also $9,521 per month). Because the court terminated support
retroactive to June 30, 2024, and found Maria owed $9,521 per month for the
first six months of 2024, we will modify the judgment to reflect the additional
$9,521 she owed Timofey for June 2024.
F. SANCTIONS
The trial court imposed $5,000 in sanctions against Timofey under
section 271. That section authorizes the court to “base an award of attorney’s
fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney
furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation
and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging
cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (Id., subd. (a).) An award of
attorney fees and costs under section 271 “is in the nature of a sanction.”
(Ibid.) It may not be imposed without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(Id., subd. (b).) “ ‘The imposition of sanctions under section 271 is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court’s order will be
upheld on appeal unless the reviewing court, “considering all of the evidence
viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences
in its favor, [determines] no judge could reasonably make the order.” ’ ”
(Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152; see also Falcone &
Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)
Timofey argues the court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions
“without notice, hearing, and facts warranting sanctions” when it tentatively
denied sanctions at a posttrial hearing before reconsidering and imposing
sanctions in the statement of decision and judgment. (Capitalization,
boldface & underscoring omitted.)

25
We disagree with his characterization of the record. Timofey was on
notice of Maria’s request for $200,000 in sanctions, which the parties litigated
before the trial court made its tentative ruling, and he cites no authority
suggesting the court’s tentative denial of sanctions precluded reconsideration
of the issue. As to whether sanctions of $5,000 were warranted based on the
evidence, Timofey asserts only that they were not because his arguments
concerning the family home and child support (which the court considered
unreasonable) were meritorious. Beyond reasserting the merits of his
arguments, Timofey does not meaningfully engage with the court’s express
finding that those arguments were reflective of bad-faith tactics. Having
rejected Timofey’s other arguments, we likewise reject his contention that the
court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.
G. DENIAL OF INTEREST ON SPOUSAL SUPPORT ARREARS
The parties agreed that Maria owed Timofey $215,446 in spousal
support arrears through 2022, reserving for trial the “issue of any interest” to
be added to that amount. After trial, the court denied Timofey’s request for
interest based on his “bad faith tactics” and delayed payment of child
support. Timofey challenges that ruling on appeal and cites only Code of
Civil Procedure section 685.010, subdivision (a)(1), which concerns the rate of
interest applicable to “ ‘the principal amount of a money judgment remaining
unsatisfied.’ ” He cites no authority, and makes no reasoned argument,
concerning whether interest must be applied to spousal support arrears
under the circumstances presented—including that the amount owed was not
known prior to the parties’ December 2023 stipulation, “which sets forth the
amount of support owed for prior periods of time” through 2022. (§ 155.) He
has therefore forfeited that issue for consideration on appeal. (Century
Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963.) Nor will we consider
26
arguments made for the first time in his reply brief. (Tellez v. Rich Voss
Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066; Doe v. California Dept. of
Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115.) We decide that Timofey has not
met his burden of affirmatively showing the court erred in denying interest.
H. OFFSET OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT ARREARS
Timofey asserts the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that
Maria must “receive her community property monies due” in connection with
the family home before she would be required to pay Timofey “anything
under this order.” He argues that, because temporary spousal support should
have been paid to him during the pendency of the proceeding under section
3600, the court acted unreasonably in allowing support payments to be
further delayed. But the court also found Timofey “was unreasonable in
refusing to sell or rent the property . . . and arguing that the home was his
separate property”; ordered Timofey to reimburse Maria “ ‘for the exclusive
use of a community property asset’ ” under In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 366, 373; and found “it would be unreasonable for [Timofey] to
expect reimbursement” for housing expenses incurred during the nine
months Maria lived in the home after the parties’ separation. (See In re
Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84.) Where Timofey retained sole
possession of the family home (valued at $1.95 million in May 2024) despite
its community property status, and the court found that he had acted
unreasonably in refusing to sell or rent the home, the court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Maria to offset her $215,446 in spousal support arrears
against the community property owed to her.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect that Maria owes Timofey $28,563
(not $19,042) in temporary spousal support for the period of April through
27
June of 2024, and a total of $125,651 (not $116,130) in temporary spousal
support for the years 2023 and 2024. As so modified, the judgment is
affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

28
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________________
Wilson, J.

H052875
Mokhnatkina v. Mokhnatkin

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