Filed 7/10/26 Marriage of Martinez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of ACELINA and H053538
STEVEN MARTINEZ. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 21FL01182)
ACELINA MARTINEZ,
Appellant,
v.
STEVEN MARTINEZ,
Respondent.
In this dissolution of marriage action, appellant Acelina Martinez
appeals from the judgment of dissolution following a bench trial to address
the division of property and questions of reimbursement, child support, and
spousal support. Acelina1 asserts that domestic violence dynamics materially
shaped the marriage and dissolution proceedings, yet the trial court failed to
consider this factor in deciding claims for postseparation reimbursement and
credits.
1 For clarity we refer to the parties by their first names as they appear
in the briefing. (See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131,
1136, fn. 1.)
On appeal, Acelina challenges the trial court’s denial of reimbursement
for her postseparation payments on community obligations and what she
characterizes as imposition of a rental value offset for her occupancy of the
marital home, denial of her breach of fiduciary duty claim, and denial of her
request for attorney fees. Steven has not filed a respondent’s brief. We
decide the appeal based on the record, opening brief, and oral argument by
Acelina. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Acelina and Steven married in 1997 and separated in 2022. They have
three children together. Both parties worked during the marriage. Acelina
obtained her physician assistant’s license and was the primary earner, while
Steven worked as a journeyman clerk and devoted more time to raising the
children.
In November 2021, Acelina filed a petition for dissolution of the
marriage. In July 2022, Acelina sought a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) for herself and the children, and the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order. The DVRO request sought a move-out order for Steven, as
2 After a comprehensive review of the record, we draw the facts and
procedural history from the clerk’s transcript on appeal. We observe, for the
benefit of appellant’s counsel, that the statement of facts in the opening brief
does not comply with the applicable rules of court. The rules require that
“any reference to a matter in the record [be supported] by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter appears” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)) and that the opening brief “[p]rovide a summary
of the significant facts limited to matters in the record” (id., rule
8.204(a)(2)(C)). Contrary to these provisions, the statement of facts
submitted by appellant’s counsel largely recites Acelina’s arguments
reflecting her position on appeal and contains record citations inadequate to
substantiate the stated assertions.
2
well as no-contact and stay-away orders. Acelina alleged that Steven
subjected her to “extreme verbal and emotional abuse” for most of the
marriage and that the abuse had escalated to physical abuse with the filing
of the divorce. Acelina described incidents of name calling, physical
intimidation, and emotionally abusive and manipulative behavior including
whispering threats in her ear at night, following her to work and yelling at
her from his car, and accusing her of cheating by claiming their youngest son
is not “ ‘his.’ ”
In July 2022, after Acelina filed her request for DVRO, Steven filed a
response and request for dissolution. Steven also filed a request for DVRO
against Acelina. The trial court twice granted continuances related to
Acelina’s DVRO request, keeping in place the temporary restraining order
against Steven.
In August 2022, the parties entered into a temporary “nesting”
arrangement in which each parent stayed with the children at the marital
home on alternate weeks. Meanwhile, the parties litigated issues in a series
of hearings that took place in 2023. The “nesting” arrangement ended in
December 2023. Steven moved out of the marital home, and the parties
agreed that Acelina would have primary physical custody of the children and
live in the marital home, with reasonable visitation for Steven.
In April 2024, Acelina sought a modification of temporary child and
spousal support orders. She argued that Steven’s move constituted a change
in circumstances warranting a reduction in her monthly payments to him,
since he had become a noncustodial parent and was spending, on average,
less than 20 hours per month with the children. Acelina’s modification
request also asserted that Steven had not yet provided his actual and
3
updated income and expense declaration, nor any supporting documents, to
the court in support of his request for spousal support.
Acelina also argued, in advance of an August 2024 hearing on her
request for DVRO, that Steven’s violations of the temporary restraining order
(including one incident that resulted in his arrest), litigious conduct in the
dissolution proceedings, and attempt to seek his own, retaliatory DVRO
against her demonstrated the likelihood of recurrence of future abuse.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the DVRO against Steven, as to
Acelina, with an expiration date of July 2027.
After an unsuccessful settlement conference in August 2024, the
parties submitted trial briefs, and Acelina submitted additional exhibits and
supplemental briefing.
Following a bench trial conducted on three dates in November 2024 and
January 2025, the trial court issued an order on February 3, 2025 (February
3 order). The February 3 order addressed the division of real property and
personal property (including the marital home, vehicles, furniture and
furnishings, hobby equipment, and work-related retirement accounts), child
support, spousal support, and claims for reimbursement, breach of fiduciary
duties, and sanctions. We review the court’s findings in detail in our
discussion of the issues on appeal, post. The court retained jurisdiction over
the question of arrears owed and referred Acelina and Steven to “child
custody recommending counseling” (capitalization omitted).
Following the February 3 order, Acelina requested a statement of
decision, asking the trial court to provide the factual and legal basis for its
rulings on each of the controverted issues at trial. Acelina later filed a
request for correction and/or clarification of the court’s order. The request
identified two primary issues for clarification: reimbursements and “Epstein
4
like credits”3 (italics added) for the mortgage-related expenses paid by
Acelina after Steven moved out of the marital home. Acelina also filed a
posttrial review hearing brief on arrears that reiterated her requests for a
statement of decision and for correction/clarification of the reimbursement
and Epstein credit issues in the overall order on spousal support and division
of assets.
The trial court did not issue a written statement of decision4 and
entered a judgment of dissolution on June 9, 2025, incorporating its February
3 order (judgment). In July 2025, the court filed an additional order after
hearing that responded to several issues raised by Acelina in her posttrial
filings.
Regarding the request for correction/clarification, the trial court
appeared to construe the request as a request for reconsideration (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1008) and questioned whether it was timely under the statute. As to
reimbursement, the court clarified that its decision to deny the request for
reimbursement “included Epstein credits and all claims made for
reimbursement at trial.” (Italics added.) It explained there was no material
change in the income of either party to warrant a modification of the child
support order and rejected Acelina’s request for modification. The court
additionally addressed matters not at issue in this appeal including adoption
of the child custody recommending counseling and execution of Acelina’s
qualified domestic relations order.
Acelina timely appealed from the June 9, 2025 judgment.
3 Referring to In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76 (Epstein),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of
Walrath (1998) 17 Cal.4th 907, 914.
4 The record does not provide an explanation for the trial court’s
implied denial of Acelina’s request for statement of decision.
5
II. DISCUSSION
Acelina raises four issues on appeal. She contends the trial court
abused its discretion and committed legal error by imposing a “Watts-type
rental value offset”5 against her, effectively penalizing her for remaining in
the marital residence under the DVRO and court-ordered custody
arrangements. (Italics added.) Acelina also challenges the court’s denial of
what she characterizes as Epstein-like reimbursements for postseparation
payments on community obligations, especially the mortgage, during the
period that Steven moved out of the marital residence. Acelina further
contends the court erred in denying her breach of fiduciary duty claim and
her request for attorney fees as a sanction.
We address the first two issues together, as they concern the same body
of facts and overlapping legal issues concerning credits and reimbursement
for community debts paid and costs carried after separation.
A. General Principles of Appellate Review
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609
(Jameson), citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the
record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 408 (S.C.).) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal “ ‘but fails to
5 Referring to In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366
(Watts).
6
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” (Nelson v.
Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862) or fails to
support it with appropriate record citations (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25
Cal.3d 877, 887; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)), this court may treat
the point as forfeited. We are not required to search the record for error
ourselves (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246), and “[w]e are
not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
B. Reimbursement and Rental Offset Claims
Acelina contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a
Watts-type rental offset against Acelina, the protected spouse, for the time
she occupied the marital home. She also contends the court erred by denying
Epstein reimbursements without addressing the domestic violence context for
Acelina having borne postseparation mortgage and other housing expenses
that preserved the marital asset and maintained stability for the children.
1. Additional Background
The trial court’s order on the issue of credits and reimbursements
states: “The court denies petitioner’s requests for credits or reimbursements
for the following expenses paid from July 2022 to the date of trial: water bill,
PG&E bill, children’s cell phones, AAA car insurance, mortgage payments,
tuition payments, gardener payments, health insurance payments, and
medical expenses. The court exercises its discretion over these expenses as
petitioner paid for half of the mortgage payment during this time and the
court is waiving any rental value that would be owed to the community by
the petitioner for her occupation of the home from July 2022 to the date of
trial.”
7
The trial court’s subsequent order after hearing (following Acelina’s
request for correction/clarification and other posttrial requests) declined to
modify its ruling. It states, “The court advises when it made the decision to
deny the request re reimbursements it included Epstein credits and all claims
made for reimbursement at trial.” (Italics added.)
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
California law vests trial courts with “broad statutory powers to
accomplish a just and equal division of marital property (Fam. Code, §§ 2550,
2553) and [with] ‘broad discretion to determine the manner in which
community property is awarded in order to accomplish an equal allocation.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Greaux & Mermin (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250
(Greaux).) In doing so, the court “may make ‘any orders the court considers
necessary’ to achieve the statutory mandate. (Fam. Code, § 2553.)” (Ibid.)
Absent questions of statutory interpretation or evidence that the court
applied an incorrect legal standard, appellate courts review orders on division
of marital property “only for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
In seeking to effectuate an equal division of community assets and
liabilities upon dissolution of the marriage (see Greaux, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 1250), trial courts may order reimbursement under Epstein
to a spouse for community debts paid postseparation with the spouse’s
separate property, or may issue credits to the community under Watts for a
spouse’s postseparation use of a community asset.
More specifically, trial courts have broad authority to order
reimbursement “for debts paid after separation but before trial.” (Fam. Code,
§ 2626.) In Epstein, “our Supreme Court held that a spouse may claim
reimbursement for amounts spent after separation on preexisting community
obligations.” (In re Marriage of Reilley (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1122–
8
1123 (Reilley).) A party must make an affirmative showing of the right to
reimbursement which “is not automatic, but involves the consideration of [] a
variety of factors.” (In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 617, 625;
see Reilley, at p. 1124.) Thus, a spouse’s expenditure of separate property
after separation to meet community obligations—such as a mortgage
payment—is generally entitled to reimbursement out of the community
property. (Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 80, 84.) However,
“ ‘[r]eimbursement should not be ordered if payment was made under
circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to expect
reimbursement.’ ” (Id. at p. 84.) One such circumstance is “ ‘where the
payment was made on account of a debt for the acquisition or preservation of
an asset the paying spouse was using and the amount paid was not
substantially in excess of the value of the use.’ ” (Id. at pp. 84–85.)
The latter situation may be addressed by Watts charges. When a
spouse postseparation has exclusive use of a community asset, like the family
residence, the community may seek reimbursement from the spouse for the
reasonable value of that use. (Watts, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 374; In re
Marriage of Garcia (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 885, 890 (Garcia).) “Watts charges
equitably compensate the community for one spouse’s use of a community-
owned home.” (In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, 790–
791.) “ ‘[R]eimbursement will usually not be ordered for payments on
obligations on the family home made by the spouse remaining in the home.’ ”
(Garcia, at p. 891; see In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d
1260, 1271 [explaining that reimbursement should not be ordered for one
spouse’s use of a community asset between separation and trial, “unless the
amount of the debt payment greatly exceeds the value of the use of the
asset”].)
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3. Analysis
Acelina states that the trial court erred in its application of the
reimbursement and credit/offset principles. However, Acelina’s appellate
briefing misstates the court’s order and fails to cite pertinent facts in the
record (citing in several instances to her own briefing in the trial court
proceedings, rather than factual findings made by the court). For example,
Acelina asserts that Watts credit exists to ensure that one spouse does not
obtain a postseparation windfall by exclusively occupying a community asset
(i.e., the marital home) without fair compensation to the community.
Further, she contends the court imposed a rental offset even though Acelina’s
occupation of the home was not exclusive (but rather a “nesting” arrangement
of alternating weeks) for a significant period from separation to trial, and
moreover was a result (at least in part) of Steven’s domestic violence.
Acelina’s record citations fail to support these assertions. Acelina
states that the trial court ordered the nesting arrangement in the context of
the DVRO proceeding, demonstrating the “order defines occupancy as a child-
stability mechanism,” as opposed to the prototypical Watts situation where
“one spouse voluntarily appropriat[es] a community asset for personal
benefit.” Although Acelina cites to the record and quotes from the purported
order, the citation is not to the court’s order; rather, it is to Steven’s request
for DVRO, filed in August 2022, and identifiable by its header stating,
“Visitation is requested as follows.” Thus, Acelina’s contention that “[t]he
court’s own custody/visitation order recognized that stability” created by
10
nesting “and required that arrangement” is unsupported by her record
citations.6
In another example, to support her assertion that the trial court
imposed a Watts-type rental offset that punished her as the protected spouse,
Acelina cites a “March 2025 ‘Clarification and Correction’ ” in which she
maintains the “court announced a rental-value accounting scheme” and
quotes from the purported order. But the order and quoted material do not
appear to exist in the record, and the record citation is to Acelina’s own
summary of her March 2025 request for order for correction and/or
clarification of the court’s order, as set forth in her April 2025 posttrial
hearing brief on arrears. Because we are unable to identify the source of the
quoted material that Acelina cites, she has failed to meet her burden on
appeal to support her argument with meaningful legal analysis and citations
to legal authority and facts in the record that substantiate her claims. (See
S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) She has therefore forfeited any claim
of error on appeal.
For her Epstein claim, Acelina contends the trial court’s ruling is
“internally inconsistent” (underscoring omitted) with the alleged imposition
of a rental-value offset, resulting in an inequitable windfall to Steven when
“Acelina alone carried the mortgage and housing cost burden.” These
arguments are again untethered to any verifiable record references. Acelina
purports to quote from the court’s order as stating, “ ‘Respondent waives any
6 Our independent review of the record confirms that the trial court’s
temporary restraining order filed on August 2, 2022, did order a nesting
arrangement “so that the children can remain in the marital residence.”
However, that is not the record citation provided in Acelina’s opening brief.
Moreover, Acelina’s contention that the court’s order recognized the stability
offered by a nesting arrangement fails to provide any coherent support for
her assertion that the court misapplied Watts.
11
right to Epstein credits.’ ” This language does not appear in the record.
Instead, the court’s order denied Acelina reimbursement for mortgage and
other household expenses, finding that she had “paid for half of the mortgage
payment during this time” and “waiving any rental value that would be owed
to the community by [Acelina] for her occupation of the home” for the period
after separation to trial. Acelina’s argument misconstrues the court’s order.
Even if we overlook these shortcomings and set aside any misquoted
references to the trial court’s order, we conclude Acelina fails to demonstrate
reversible error on the question of credits and reimbursements. Acelina
implicitly takes issue with the court’s factual finding that she paid “half” of
the mortgage payment by asserting that she paid “virtually the entire
marital standard of living,” including during the “nesting” arrangement in
which she “continued paying nearly all household expenses.” Although
Acelina provides record support for her asserted expenditures—citing to her
income and expense declarations and other documentation submitted to the
trial court—and asserts that the record shows Steven was dishonest in his
financial disclosures and about his alleged contributions, she does not
specifically challenge this aspect of the court’s ruling or point to record
evidence that contravenes the court’s findings.
As for the trial court’s application of property division principles, we
consider only whether the court abused its discretion in denying Acelina’s
requests for credit and reimbursement. (Greaux, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1250.) It was Acelina’s burden to establish entitlement to reimbursement
in the trial court, given the many factors relevant to the court’s exercise of
discretion in attempting to accomplish a just and equal property division.
(See ibid.; Reilley, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1124.) By finding that Acelina
paid for half of the mortgage and “waiving any rental value that would be
12
owed to the community” for her occupation of the marital home from July
2022, to the trial, the court recognized Acelina’s mortgage payments on the
marital property and declined to charge her (by requiring reimbursement to
the community) for her occupation of the home after Steven moved out.
Acelina disagrees with the trial court’s assessment. While she asserts
that her payment of mortgage and home carrying costs to preserve the
community asset required reimbursement under Epstein, nothing in the
court’s ruling contravenes the applicable legal principles. On the contrary, it
appears the court sought to achieve an equitable solution by declining to
compensate the community for Acelina’s use of the home after Steven left.
(See Garcia, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 891.) Acelina also cites no legal
authority to support her claim that the court’s resolution unfairly penalized
her for occupying the marital home with the children despite the need to
maintain stability given the allegations of domestic violence and issuance of a
DVRO against Steven.
In sum, Acelina’s arguments regarding Epstein reimbursements and
what she characterizes as Watts-type offsets offer only conclusory assertions
of error and fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court. We
conclude Acelina has failed to meet her burden on appeal of demonstrating
error. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.)
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Acelina contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to
find a breach of fiduciary duty. She complains that the court’s “ruling is
stated as a conclusion, not the result of legally sufficient analysis” and
maintains the judgment must be reversed and the court directed on remand
to apply “the correct fiduciary framework” and expressly consider “whether
13
Steven’s financial and litigation conduct constituted unfair advantage and
breach.”
The fiduciary obligations to which Acelina refers are not in dispute.
(See In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1475–1476
(Feldman) [citing spousal fiduciary obligations set forth in Family Code
section 721 and made applicable during dissolution proceedings by Family
Code section 1100, subdivision (e)].) “ ‘Each spouse shall act with respect to
the other spouse in the management and control of the community assets and
liabilities in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary
relationships which control the actions of persons having relationships of
personal confidence as specified in [Family Code s]ection 721, until such time
as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court.”
(Feldman, at pp. 1475–1476.) Among the spouse’s duties is a duty of
disclosure. (Id. at p. 1476; see Fam. Code, §§ 1100, subd. (e), 2110, subd. (c).)
A party’s failure to comply with any part of the statutory obligations related
to a spouse’s fiduciary duty of disclosure is sanctionable conduct. (See
Feldman, at p. 1477; Fam. Code, §§ 2103, 2107, subd. (c).)
Nevertheless, as with the reimbursement and offset claims, Acelina
fails to carry her burden on appeal of demonstrating that the trial court
committed reversible error. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609.) She
quotes the court’s order as stating that the court “ ‘does not find [r]espondent
in breach of fiduciary duty.’ ” But neither the record citation nor the quoted
statement is accurate. Instead, the court’s order states, “The court denies
petitioner’s request to find that respondent breach[ed] his fiduciary duties as
she did not provide relevant evidence as to this issue.”
Acelina does not address the finding that she did not meet her burden
of proof at trial by failing to provide relevant evidence with respect to the
14
breach of fiduciary duty claim. This finding dictates the standard of our
review. “On appeal from a determination of failure of proof at trial, the
question for the reviewing court is ‘ “whether the evidence compels a finding
in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Almanor Lakeside Villas
Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 (Almanor); see also
Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic).) “ ‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
. . . the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and
(2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic, at
p. 466.)
To prevail on this issue on appeal, Acelina must demonstrate that the
evidence presented to the trial court of Steven’s alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty was uncontradicted and unimpeached, and of such character and weight
as to compel a finding in Acelina’s favor. (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at
p. 466; Almanor, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 769.) She has failed to do so.
Acelina asserts that the record “supports a powerful financial-abuse
narrative” whereby Acelina paid “virtually” all expenses while Steven
“retained his income and attempted to characterize himself as the
household’s financial provider.” She contends that Steven’s actions violate
the disclosure statutes, which “exist to prevent a spouse from using
misrepresentation and concealment to obtain an unfair advantage in support,
property, or fee litigation.”
In support, Acelina cites Steven’s June 2022 income and expense
declaration in which he listed his income as approximately $3,400 monthly,
average monthly household expenses of approximately $14,000, and the
15
amount of expenses paid by others as “varies.” She points out that Steven
failed to submit any documentation supporting his financial disclosure. In
contrast, her February 2023 income and expense declaration included
substantial documentation and reflected that she was carrying substantially
all household costs under the nesting arrangement (leaving blank the
question about amount of expenses paid by others). Acelina criticizes
Steven’s disclosure for listing the household expenses as though they were his
responsibility and for representing only that the amounts paid by others
“ ‘varies.’ ” She further asserts (without record citation) that in a subsequent
income and expense declaration, Steven represented that no one else paid for
household expenses, even though she paid the bulk of expenses and had
submitted proof of this fact.
We disregard those assertions and contentions that lack any citation to
facts in the record supporting the claim. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 408.) As for the material cited by Acelina, it is unclear how Steven’s June
2022 financial disclosure—which clearly shows the earning disparity between
Acelina and Steven and shows Steven’s earnings and liquid assets were
insufficient to support the family’s financial obligations—supports an
inference of financial abuse or concealment in breach of spousal fiduciary
duties. Nor does Acelina offer any legal authority in support of her
contention that Steven’s alleged escalation of domestic violence (i.e., by
immediately seeking a retaliatory request for DVRO, or by showing up at the
marital home in violation of the restraining order “in a dangerous rage,”
ultimately resulting in his arrest) constitutes evidence of litigation abuse in
violation of his breach of fiduciary duty. Her argument that Steven’s filing of
a retaliatory request for DVRO is evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty
16
because “filing sworn pleadings premised on false inversion of the parties’
finances is an attempt to obtain an unfair advantage” is purely conclusory.
On this record, we decide that Acelina has not shown the evidence at
trial compels a finding in her favor as a matter of law (Almanor, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 769) and has not met her burden to establish reversible
error in the trial court’s determination that she did not submit evidence
sufficient to prove breach of fiduciary duty.
D. Attorney Fees as Sanction
Acelina contends the trial court erred by failing to impose sanctions
under Family Code section 271 despite “textbook” applicability based on
Steven’s litigation conduct, including the retaliatory request for DVRO,
unsupported financial disclosures, and litigation conduct that caused delay
and increased costs disproportionate to the assets at issue. She argues that
the domestic violence context for the dissolution must be considered because
Steven’s litigation tactics were used as “coercive control” and a means of
“weaponizing financial advantage.” Acelina asserts that reversal of the
judgment and remand is required for the trial court to properly analyze the
facts, including domestic violence dynamics, according to the statutory
framework.
As noted ante, the Family Code establishes strict rules of financial
disclosure and litigation conduct during dissolution proceedings and imposes
sanctions for noncompliance. (See Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1476–1477; Fam. Code, §§ 2103, 2107, subd. (c).) In addition, Family
Code section 271 authorizes the imposition of attorney fees as a sanction for
conduct that frustrates the statutory policy to promote the settlement of
litigation, reduce costs, and encourage cooperation. (Feldman, at p. 1494; see
Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a) [stating that the court may base an attorney fees
17
award “on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers
or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and,
where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation
between the parties and attorneys” and defining such an award of attorney
fees pursuant to this section “in the nature of a sanction”].) We review an
order on sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Feldman, at p. 1478.)
In a single sentence ruling in its order, the trial court denied Acelina’s
request for sanctions in the form of attorney fees pursuant to Family Code
section 271.
Acelina contests the trial court’s ruling but offers no basis for reversal
on appeal of the court’s discretionary decision. As with the breach of
fiduciary duty claim, Acelina’s request for attorney fees required her to
establish evidence supporting the relevant factors, including the other party’s
litigation conduct, corroboration of both parties’ income, assets, and
liabilities, and evidence that imposition of a sanction would not impose an
unreasonable financial burden. (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).) The court’s
denial of Acelina’s request for attorney fees under this provision implies a
finding that Acelina did not demonstrate a sanction of attorney fees was
warranted, and/or the court determined its imposition would impose an
unreasonable financial burden. Acelina offers no evidence to suggest that, in
arriving at its decision, the court applied an incorrect legal standard. We
therefore presume the court correctly applied the law. (Evid. Code, § 664;
People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 598; see Ross v. Superior Court
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913.)
Furthermore, although Acelina maintains the trial court erred by
denying the attorney fees sanction “without the required analysis,” she cites
no statutory or other legal authority that required the court to articulate the
18
basis for its decision not to impose sanctions under Family Code section 271.
In addition, it was Acelina’s burden in the trial court to demonstrate the
basis for a sanction of attorney fees pursuant to Family Code section 271, and
the court implicitly found that burden was not met. Thus, her burden on
appeal is from a determination of failure of proof at trial. (Almanor, supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at p. 769.) As Acelina does not point to any specific evidence
which “ ‘ “compels a finding in [her] favor of the appellant as a matter of
law” ’ ” (ibid.; Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466), we conclude she has
not shown reversible error.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of June 9, 2025, is affirmed. No costs are awarded
because Steven did not file a respondent’s brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(5).)
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______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H053538
Martinez v. Martinez