Filed 10/16/26 Marriage of Hemrajani CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of NATASHA B344353
and NAVIN HEMRAJANI.
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STFL11681
NATASHA HEMRAJANI,
Respondent,
v.
NAVIN HEMRAJANI,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ryan D. White, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Office of Greg May and Greg May for Appellant.
Joel S. Seidel for Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Navin Hemrajani (father) appeals the family court’s order
granting Natasha Hemrajani’s (mother) request to move with
their minor daughter to Palm Springs, California. Navin
contends the family court prejudicially erred by considering
inadmissible hearsay evidence and abused its discretion by
failing to properly weigh the factors for assessing a move-away
request set forth by the Supreme Court in In re Marriage of
LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 (LaMusga). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The judgment of dissolution
Natasha and Navin married on July 2, 2016, and separated
in October 2021. They have one daughter, M, who was born in
December 2016. On December 9, 2022, the parties stipulated to
share joint legal custody and joint physical custody of M, and on
January 30, 2023, the family court entered a judgment of
dissolution. Since at least April 1, 2023, M spent approximately
57 percent of her time with Natasha and 43 percent of her time
with Navin.
II. Mother’s request for an order modifying the
judgment
On September 28, 2023, Natasha filed a request for an
order allowing her to move with M from Los Angeles, California,
to Palm Springs, California. In her accompanying declaration,
Natasha stated she was relocating to Palm Springs because she
grew up there, it was her home for most of her life, her
immediate family and extended family lived there, she had a
strong support system there, and the cost of living was lower. In
contrast, she stated that neither she nor Navin had immediate
family in Los Angeles and the cost of living was more than she
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would be able to afford once her spousal support ended on
September 30, 2024. She further stated, “[I] really do not feel
like I belong [in Los Angeles].” She stated that she had always
been M’s primary caregiver “and the parent who primarily
attends to her physical and emotional needs.” Natasha described
M and Navin’s relationship as strained and not as strong.
Natasha asserted that moving to Palm Springs was in M’s best
interests and noted that M had spent a significant amount of
time in Palm Springs and had a strong community of family and
friends there.
Navin objected to the move, stating in his response that
Natasha failed to show that it was in M’s best interest to “leave
her school, her community since birth, and her therapist to move
to Palm Springs.” He asserted that Natasha was not acting in
good faith, and if Natasha moved to Palm Springs, M’s primary
residence should be with him in Los Angeles. He stated that he
had a “bonded and close relationship with [M] who has a happy
and stable life in Los Angeles, with her school, community,
friends and extra-curricular activities.”
III. The evidentiary hearing and statement of decision
The family court held an evidentiary hearing over three
days in December 2024 and January 2025. On January 13, 2025,
the family court issued a statement of decision granting
Natasha’s move-away request. The family court found Natasha
was a “very credible” witness and was “candid, fulsome, and
detailed in her testimony, and . . . was honest even when
confronted with negative information.” Conversely, the family
court found Navin was not credible at several points throughout
his testimony. The court stated Navin was “often evasive,
answering the question he wished to answer, not the question
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asked.” The family court further found Navin “minimized when
the testimony was not favorable to him,” “aggrandized when the
testimony was favorable to him,” and “at times gave answers
unsupported by the documentary evidence.”
The family court explained in detail its analysis of the
relevant factors for a relocation request under LaMusga, and
concluded, based on “the totality of the evidence” that granting
Natasha’s move-away request was in M’s best interest. The
family court found that M’s interest in stability and continuity of
custody (factor 1) favored the move, because even though M had a
“positive relationship with both parents,” she had a “deeper bond”
with Natasha. The family court added that M had “observed the
negative way in which [Navin] often treats other people and,
indeed, uses curse words directed at [M], which bothers her.” The
family court further found that Natasha’s testimony in this
regard was highly credible, and Navin’s testimony was less
credible. The distance of the move (factor 2) was neutral, since
“[i]f the [c]ourt were to deny the relocation request, [M] would
travel at least twice per month to Palm Springs . . . [and] if the
[c]ourt were to grant the relocation request, [M] would travel at
least twice per month to Los Angeles.” M’s age (then eight years
old) (factor 3) weighed in favor of the move since the court found
that at such a young age, M was “less committed to her ties in
Los Angeles than she would be at an older age,” and therefore,
“other than her separation from [Navin], [M] will likely adapt to
the move to Palm Springs quickly and well.” M’s relationship
with both parents (factor 4) weighed in favor of relocation, since,
although the testimony established that Navin was an excellent
father who was involved in M’s educational and social life, the
credible evidence established that M had a closer bond with
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Natasha. The family court found that the relationship between
parents (factor 5) was strained, and that both parents, at times,
acted in ways not in M’s best interest. Nevertheless, the family
court found that the credible evidence established that Natasha
was more cooperative than Navin, and more able to put M’s
interests ahead of her own, which favored the relocation request.
M’s wishes (factor 6) were neutral since she was not of sufficient
age and maturity for the court to consider her preference.
Mother’s rationale for the move (factor 7) was also neutral, since
the court found that the relocation request was made in good
faith and was not made to harm M’s relationship with Navin, or
for any other improper purpose. Accordingly, the family court
found that relocating M to Palm Springs with Natasha was in M’s
best interest, granted Natasha’s request to relocate, and set out a
detailed custody schedule. Navin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal principles governing a move-away request
The applicable legal standard to address a move-away
request depends on whether the relocating parent has sole or
joint physical custody of the child. Where, as here, parents
have joint custody, custody may be modified if it is in the child’s
best interests. (Fam. Code, § 3087; In re Marriage of Burgess
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 40, fn. 12 (Burgess).)
In determining whether to modify an existing custody
order, the family court is required to consider what have become
known as the LaMusga factors. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at
p. 1101.) Although not an exhaustive list, these factors include:
“the children’s interest in stability and continuity in the custodial
arrangement; the distance of the move; the age of the children;
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the children’s relationship with both parents; the relationship
between the parents including, but not limited to, their ability to
communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to
put the interests of the children above their individual interests;
the wishes of the children if they are mature enough for such an
inquiry to be appropriate; the reasons for the proposed move; and
the extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody.”
(Ibid.) Because there are no bright line rules, a court should
evaluate each case “on its own unique facts.” (Burgess, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 39.)
A. Standard of review
We review custody and visitation orders for an abuse of
discretion. (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) A trial court
abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis on which it
could conclude its decision advanced the child’s best interests or if
the court applied improper criteria or made incorrect legal
assumptions. (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) We
review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence
and its conclusions of law de novo, reversing only if its
application of law to facts is arbitrary and capricious. (In re C.B.
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) Moreover, on appeal, we
presume that a lower court’s judgment or order is correct, and we
indulge all intendments and presumptions in favor of its
correctness. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We do
not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses;
instead we defer to the court’s adjudication of the facts. (Pope v.
Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246.)
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B. The family court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that M’s out-of-court statement was
admissible
Navin argues that the family court erroneously admitted a
hearsay statement when the court admitted Natasha’s testimony
that she heard M tell Navin, “You use the F word on me. Is it
true that you use the F word on me? Tell my mom you used the F
word on me.” The family court overruled Navin’s hearsay
objection and admitted the statement. Navin asserts that the
statement was inadmissible hearsay and that no hearsay
exceptions applied. He further claims that this error was
prejudicial because the family court relied on the hearsay
statement in evaluating the first and fourth LaMusga factors to
show that M was not as bonded to father as she was to mother.
We conclude that the family court did not err in admitting M’s
statement because it was nonhearsay that circumstantially
proved M’s state of mind.
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code,
§ 1200, subd. (a); People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 821.)
“In contrast, a statement which does not directly declare a
mental state, but is merely circumstantial evidence of that state
of mind, is not hearsay. It is not received for the truth of the
matter stated, but rather whether the statement is true or not,
the fact such statement was made is relevant to a determination
of the declarant’s state of mind.” (People v. Ortiz (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 377, 389 (Ortiz).)
M’s statements were not hearsay. They were not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e. that Navin used the F-
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word with her. Rather M’s statements were offered as
circumstantial evidence of M’s state of mind—specifically, that
she believed her father spoke to her negatively and was bothered
by this belief. Because M’s statements were not hearsay, the
family court properly admitted them.
To the extent the family court relied on M’s statement for
the truth of the matter asserted (i.e. that Navin used the F-word
with M), we conclude that the family court erred. (Ortiz, supra,
38 Cal.App.4th at p. 389 [noting with declarations used as
circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s mental state, “the
declaration is not received for the truth of the matter stated and
can only be used for the limited purpose for which it is offered”].)
However, any error was harmless because it was not
reasonably probable the exclusion of M’s statement would have
resulted in a more favorable outcome for Navin. (See McCoy v.
Board of Retirement (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1054 [noting
error in admission of evidence “ ‘is not prejudicial if the evidence
“was merely cumulative or corroborative of other evidence
properly in the record,” or if the evidence “was not necessary, the
judgment [or order] being supported by other evidence.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]”.) The totality of the evidence supports
the family court’s finding that M had a deeper bond with Natasha
than with Navin, and that moving with her mother was in M’s
best interest. The family court found that Natasha served as M’s
primary parent since birth, and for most of M’s life Natasha was
the primary facilitator for her medical needs and the primary
organizer of her social environment. Furthermore, the family
court concluded that Natasha demonstrated a commitment to
and expertise in M’s educational, social, and medical needs. The
court found that Navin did not demonstrate the same
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commitment and expertise. Lastly, the family court found
“highly credible” Natasha’s testimony regarding her and Navin’s
relationships with M. The court found Navin’s testimony “less
credible” and self-aggrandizing. On this record, Navin fails to
show prejudice in admitting M’s statements for their truth.
C. The LaMusga factors
Our review of the record establishes that the family court
gave proper weight and consideration to each of the LaMusga
factors. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) Navin argues
that the family court erred in its finding for the second LaMusga
factor—the distance of the move. We disagree.
The family court determined that the impact on M of the
distance of the move was neutral, since regardless of whether the
court denied or granted the move-away request, M would still be
traveling at least twice a month between Palm Springs and Los
Angeles. The family court also noted that the travel time
between Los Angeles and Palm Springs was two-to-three hours,
depending on traffic, and emphasized that M had already been
making the journey frequently for several years.
In concluding that this factor was neutral, the family court
properly recognized that Natasha was, indeed, moving to Palm
Springs. (See Mark T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115,
1120) [“the trial court must proceed on the assumption that the
parent will in fact be moving, and must fashion a custody order
that is in the best interests of the minor accordingly”]. Under the
unique circumstances of this case, where M had already been
regularly commuting between the two cities and would continue
to do so regardless of which parent was granted physical custody,
the family court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
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the distance of the move did not alter the court’s “best interest”
analysis.
Navin also contends that the family court erred in its
analysis of the third LaMusga factor—M’s age. We disagree.
Navin argues that the court’s finding for M’s age minimized the
potential impact of being separated from her father. To the
contrary, the family court explicitly recognized that M “will face
challenges being away from [Navin]” since she will spend
significantly less time with him after seeing him weekly for
almost two years. Later in its decision, the family court
acknowledged that Navin is “an excellent father” and that “[M]
enjoys much of her time with [him], and being away from him
will be difficult for [her].” As the court acknowledged, however,
these types of challenges are an unfortunate reality in most
relocation cases. (See In re Marriage of Bryant (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 789, 794 [“Unfortunately where, as here, both
parents are competent and loving, there is frequently no solution
that is fair to everyone involved.”].)
Navin also posits that M is “too young to have developed
the type of relationship with father that can be maintained over a
distance.” In making this contention, Navin invites us to reweigh
the evidence to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the family
court. We cannot. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1093 [“The
weight to be accorded to such factors must be left to the court’s
sound discretion. The Court of Appeal erred in substituting its
judgment for that of the superior court.”].)
The family court considered all the evidence presented by
the parties and appropriately evaluated the LaMusga factors in
granting Natasha’s move-away request. We conclude that the
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family court did not abuse its broad discretion in modifying the
custody order.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order. Respondent Natasha Hemrajani shall
recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
ADAMS, P. J.
ASHWORTH, J.*
* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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