Filed 7/2/26 Marriage of Haile CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of EDEN and
TSEGAI HAILE
EDEN HAILE,
Respondent,
A174445
v.
TSEGAI HAILE, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SFL-090902)
Appellant.
Appellant Tsegai Haile appealed after a judgment of dissolution was
entered dividing property between him and respondent Eden Haile.1 He
challenges several aspects of the proceedings below. To the extent his
arguments concern the judgment, we reject them and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
This is the third time this court has addressed an appeal in this
dissolution action. Tsegai and Eden were married in January 1996 and have
three children. Eden filed a divorce petition in April 2022, and the parties
litigated several issues, including the date of separation. This court affirmed
1 We refer to the parties by their first names in the interest of clarity.
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an interim order in October 2023. (Haile v. Haile (Oct. 26, 2023, A167562)
[nonpub opn.] (Haile I).)
Litigation continued in the trial court. As discussed in further detail
below, Tsegai sought a change of venue, which the trial court denied in
March 2024.
In August 2024, Tsegai filed a document titled “DECLARATION” that
stated, “Due to my current medical problem, I’m hereby submitting the
attached LTR to preserve my right/privilege to appear, and or to attend by
zoom. See attached Ltr.” The declaration attached a letter from a doctor that
stated, “Due to [Tsegai’s] current medical problems it would be best for my
patient to attend appointed court dates via zoom.”
It is unclear whether the trial court ever took any specific action on
Tsegai’s declaration. The court continued to issue orders. In July 2025 we
affirmed orders that (1) denied a claim of exemption by Tsegai, (2) awarded
Eden attorney fees, and (3) declared Tsegai a vexatious litigant and imposed
a prefiling requirement. (In re Marriage of Haile (July 22, 2025, A171590,
A171891, & A171979) [nonpub opn.] (Haile II).)
While Haile II was pending, the trial court in March 2025 issued a trial
setting order scheduling the matter for trial on July 22, 2025. The court
ordered that all parties be personally present. Tsegai filed a brief in May, a
supplemental brief in June, and a declaration in July, all of which referred to
the July 22 trial date along with the correct time and location of trial. A
handwritten notation at the end of Tsegai’s 19-page trial brief filed in May
stated, “Dr.’s NOTE to have me accommodated to Attend via ZOOM Due to
my medical condition’s FILED ON 8/27/24.”
Tsegai did not appear at trial and, according to the trial court’s ruling
issued after the trial, did not make a specific request to appear remotely. The
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court concluded that Tsegai had voluntarily absented himself from the
proceedings, and trial proceeded in his absence.
The record contains a form order appointing an official court reporter
pro tempore for the July 22 trial. But Tsegai’s notice designating the
appellate record listed only two hearings from August 2024 that addressed
his claim of exemption, one of the subjects of Haile II. Thus no reporter’s
transcript of the trial that is the subject of this appeal is contained in the
appellate record.
We know from the trial court’s order issued after trial that Eden
testified and presented documentary evidence regarding the division of
community property. The court found her to be credible and concluded that
her position was supported by the evidence presented. The court also
concluded that the date of separation was April 8, 2022. As for Tsegai’s claim
that the date of separation occurred 20 years earlier, in 2002, the court
concluded that this assertion “lack[ed] credibility and [was] inconsistent with
the evidence presented at trial.”
The same day as the trial, Tsegai filed a document titled “FAMILY
PLEADING ON FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE” stating that he had been
waiting “on the Court’s ZOOM awaiting for the host from 08:45 am to
10:15 am, there was no response.” He claimed that he had been denied a
reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities involved in court
proceedings (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100).
A judgment of dissolution was entered declaring the marriage
terminated as of July 22, 2025. The property order attached to the judgment
divided the parties’ community and separate property.
Tsegai appealed. In this court, he has repeatedly, and unsuccessfully,
sought to have two justices removed from the panel.
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II.
DISCUSSION
As he did in Haile I and Haile II, Tsegai has filed a rambling opening
brief that complains about almost all aspects of the proceedings below but
has little connection to the order that is the subject of the appeal. He
focuses on events that occurred years ago, in 2022 and 2023, that are not
properly before us. He also refers to unrelated cases he has apparently filed
in federal court. The brief includes long passages that are unsupported by
citations to the record or caselaw and which we thus need not consider.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C) [appellate briefs must be
supported by citations to record, argument, and, if possible, legal authority];
see also In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 [parties’ briefs are
required to include argument and record citations, and the absence of these
elements allows the appellate court to treat issues as waived].) Tsegai also
complains about the findings after trial, including the trial court’s
conclusion that the date of separation occurred in April 2022. But since the
record lacks a reporter’s transcript of the trial, Tsegai has failed to provide
a record that is adequate for review. (Osgood v. Landon (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [it is appellant’s affirmative duty to demonstrate
error, and appellant defaults if record is inadequate for review].)
It is clear from Tsegai’s statements at oral argument that he believes
Eden’s failure to file a respondent’s brief means he prevails automatically.
“In fact, if a respondent in a civil case files no brief at all, we still examine the
record to see if it supports any claims of error made by the appellant.”
(Griffin v. The Haunted Hotel, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 490, 505; see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2) [where respondent fails to file a brief, court
may decide the appeal on the record, opening brief, and any oral argument].)
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To the extent that Tsegai articulates specific arguments, we reject
them.
1. The Trial Court Did Not Deprive Tsegai of a Reasonable
Accommodation.
As we have said, the trial court’s order setting forth its findings after
trial states that the parties were ordered to appear personally at trial and
that Tsegai “did not make a request to appear remotely at trial as required
per Sonoma County Local Court Rule 1.9.D. and CRC 3.672(h).” That local
rule provides that for bench trials, “parties and witnesses must appear in
person unless the Court has granted prior express authorization for a remote
appearance.” (Sonoma Co. Local Rules, rule 1.9.D. (Civil Evidentiary
Hearings and Trials), italics added.) The rule further provides that unless
ordered by the court, trials will be held in person. (Id., rule 1.9.B. (General
Provisions Regarding Remote Appearances).) And the local rule repeatedly
refers to California Rules of Court, rule 3.672(h), which sets forth the notice
requirements for seeking to appear remotely for trial.
Tsegai claims on appeal that the trial court’s conclusion that he did not
request to appear remotely at the trial is “false[]” and “refuted” by documents
he filed in the trial court―a reference to his handwritten note on a trial brief
referring back to a declaration filed around nine months earlier. Haile does
not direct us to anywhere in the record where he complied with the applicable
California Rules of Court or local rules seeking to appear remotely. His
oblique handwritten reference to a previously filed declaration falls far short
of these requirements. Nor does he direct us to any indication that the trial
court ever entered an order allowing him to appear remotely. If Tsegai had
filed a proper request to appear remotely or for a reasonable accommodation,
the request may well have been granted. But he directs us to no document
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indicating he undertook either action, and since no order was entered on the
non-existent request, he has no basis to complain that the court conducted
the trial without his remote participation. In short, Tsegai has not
demonstrated that he was denied a reasonable accommodation.
2. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction over the Proceedings.
Tsegai’s brief includes a section titled “Trial Court Lost Jurisdiction
Ab Initio, This Trial was w/o Subject Matter Jurisdiction!” It is
unclear why Tsegai contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction. He argues,
“Restating the retalatory [sic] objectives, this case is a SLAPP, brought to
chill my valid exercise of constitutional rights of freedom of speech & petition
for redress of grievances through abuse of judicial process (CCP 425.16(a));
CCP 428,10 (b)(1)), altering the status quo of the DVTRO, disregarding the
DVPA[2] laws. It’s legally dismissed by my unopposed motion for sanctions.
Proceedings are in complete absurdity & travesty of justice.” Later in his
opening brief, Tsegai claims that Eden (who he refers to as his “[p]urported
wife”) lacked standing, since she “can’t show any injury traceable by my
actions.” We may deem these arguments to be abandoned since they lack
coherence. (Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
522, 524–525.)
To the extent that Tsegai argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction
during the pendency of Haile II, he is mistaken. Is settled that “[t]he court in
[a] dissolution action [does] not lose its authority to proceed with dissolution
of the marriage because of [a] pending appeal” that embraces a separate
issue. (Faught v. Faught (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 875, 878.)
2 “DVTRO” and “DVPA” are presumably references to the domestic
violence restraining order he sought in 2002. The trial court denied the
request in August 2002, and Tsegai did not appeal from the denial.
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3. Tsegai Challenges Orders that Are Not the Subject of this Appeal.
As we have said, Tsegai complains about almost every aspect of the
proceedings below. This includes challenging orders that are not currently
before us. Tsegai argues that (1) the denial of his application for a domestic
violence restraining order, (2) the order denying his claim of exemption,
(3) an award of $5,000 in attorney fees, and (4) the order declaring him a
vexatious litigant are all void. Again, Tsegai did not appeal from the denial
of a restraining order. The denial of the claim of exemption (filed in response
to an award of $5,000 in attorney fees), as well as the order declaring Tsegai
a vexatious litigant, were the subject of Haile II and are thus not before us.3
4. Even If the Order Denying a Change of Venue Is Properly Before
Us, Tsegai Has Not Established Error.
Finally, Tsegai argues that the March 2024 denial of his motion to
change venue (Code Civ. Proc., § 397) should be reversed. Review of the
denial of a motion to change venue is by petition for writ of mandate within
20 days after service of a written order (Code Civ. Proc., § 400), relief that
Tsegai did not seek. (See K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004)
120 Cal.App.4th 490, 496, fn. 6 [“An order granting or denying a motion to
transfer venue is reviewable only be petition for writ of mandate.”].) At least
one case has suggested that review is available following a final judgment.
(See Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39, 42
[“no exigent reasons why review of the venue ruling should not, as is usual,
await the rendition of a final judgment”], disapproved on another ground in
3 Tsegai also argues generally that the award of attorney fees in this
case is void. Once again, we reject this argument because it lacks coherence.
(Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 524–
525.)
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K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 888, fn. 6.) But
we review such an order for an abuse of discretion (Malloy v. Superior Court
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 543, 551), and Tsegai falls far short of showing such an
abuse. He does little more than summarize general case law and make
conclusory statements saying why he was harmed. We reject these
unsupported arguments.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Eden Haile is awarded her
costs, if any, as she did not file a respondent’s brief.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
In re the Marriage of Eden and Tsegai Haile A174445
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