Filed 11/4/26 Marriage of Greenberg CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of CHRISTINE and H052355
CLIFFORD GREENBERG. (Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. 20FL000227)
CHRISTINE M. GREENBERG,
Respondent,
v.
CLIFFORD M. GREENBERG,
Appellant.
Appellant Clifford M. Greenberg and respondent Christine M. Greenberg were
married for nearly 23 years. Christine1 filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Prior
to trial, in a January 31, 2023 stipulation and order, the parties agreed to participate in
binding arbitration regarding the disposition of one set of assets, which included several
vehicles and insurance proceeds from an airplane. In that same stipulation and order, the
trial court determined the character and value of a second set of assets, which included
several financial accounts, with the value to be factored into the property division and
ultimate equalization payment.
1
As the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for
sake of clarity.
It appears that the parties proceeded to trial regarding the remaining issues, which
included the division of a third set of assets, such as two community property businesses.
The court thereafter filed a purported judgment encompassing only the issues determined
at trial. Relevant to this appeal, the judgment (1) reserved jurisdiction on the issue of
terminating marital status at Christine’s request, (2) awarded Clifford the two community
property businesses and ordered that he pay Christine for her community property share,
(3) ordered that he pay permanent spousal support, and (4) ordered that he pay attorney
fees and costs to Christine’s counsel. The purported judgment also specified that the
court “reserves jurisdiction over the issues contained in the January 31, 2023 stipulation
and order” and “reserves jurisdiction over the final equalizing payment.”
On appeal, Clifford contends that the trial court erred in reserving the issue of
marital status instead of dissolving the marriage. He also argues that the court erred in
awarding the two community property businesses to him and requiring a payment to
Christine when he does not have sufficient funds on hand. Finally, because the spousal
support order and the attorney fees order “hinged on” the disposition of the community
property businesses, Clifford contends that those orders must be reversed as well.
For reasons that we will explain, we determine that appeal must be dismissed for
lack of appealability.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties married in 1997 and separated in 2020. They have two children, who
are both now adults. One of the children has special needs and lives full time with
Christine. Christine petitioned for dissolution of marriage in 2020, shortly after the
parties separated.
2
Prior to trial, on January 31, 2023, a stipulation and was filed, which addressed
some of the parties’ property issues.2 First, the parties agreed to participate in binding
arbitration regarding certain personal property assets (including household furnishings,
vehicles, boats, and insurance proceeds from an airplane) as to characterization,
valuation, and disposition, as well as the amount and terms of any equalizing payment
owed from the division of those assets. Second, certain other personal property assets
and debt (including a vehicle, financial accounts, and credit card debt) were characterized
and valued in the stipulation and order. As to some of those items, the stipulation and
order indicated that the value would be factored into the property division and ultimate
equalization payment. Third, the court reserved jurisdiction over the parties’ interests in
two investments that were determined to be community property assets, with any
payments from the investments to be shared equally by the parties.
The trial was conducted over the course of several days. The issues to be decided
at trial included: (1) the value of two community property businesses, (2) permanent
spousal support, (3) the disposition of certain financial accounts and a vehicle, (4) life
insurance, (5) requests for reimbursement, (6) attorney fees and costs, (7) sanctions, and
(8) termination of marital status.
Relevant to this appeal, regarding the value of the two community property
businesses, the trial court determined that one business was worth $3.4 million and the
other business was worth $488,600. Clifford was the sole shareholder of both businesses,
which were “technological companies” that provided “nearly all the income for the
marriage.” The court determined for various reasons that the businesses should be
awarded to Clifford, and that he must pay Christine $1,944,300, which represented her
2
We note that an earlier stipulation and order from 2022, awarded a community
property residence, a vacation home in Shasta County, to Clifford. He was ordered to
pay Christine her one-half interest in the property. At trial, Christine testified that
Clifford still owed her $665.
3
one-half community property share. Regarding permanent spousal support, after
considering various factors including those set forth in Family Code section 4320,3 the
trial court ordered Clifford to pay $10,000 per month to Christine. The trial court also
awarded Christine attorney fees and costs in the amount of $75,000 under sections 2030
and 2032.
Christine requested that the trial court reserve jurisdiction regarding the final
equalization payment to be made pursuant to the agreed upon arbitration for their
remaining community property. The court agreed, “reserv[ing] jurisdiction over the
issues contained in [the parties’] January 31, 2023 stipulation and order.” The trial court
also reserved jurisdiction on the issue of terminating marital status at Christine’s request.
A purported judgment was filed on May 31, 2024, in accordance with these
findings and orders. Relevant here, the purported judgment specified that the trial court
“reserves jurisdiction over the issues contained in the January 31, 2023 stipulation and
order” and “reserves jurisdiction over the final equalizing payment.” Two weeks later,
Clifford filed a notice of appeal from the purported judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
Clifford contends that the trial court erred in reserving the issue of marital status,
and that the court should have dissolved the marriage instead. He also argues that the
court erred in the disposition of the two community property businesses by “forcing
[him] to take the businesses and pay Christine nearly $2 million when he has no such
funds on hand,” which “results in an unequal division of the businesses . . . .” Clifford
further contends that because the spousal support order and the attorney fees order “both
hinged on the order for the disposition of the community businesses, this Court should
reverse those decisions as well.”
3
Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
4
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding appealability and
which issues, if any, raised by Clifford in his opening brief may properly be considered
by this court in this appeal.
Clifford in supplemental briefing first contends that the purported judgment filed
on May 31, 2024, “is . . . a final judgment on all property issues.” He also argues that the
trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction over marital status is appealable. Second, Clifford
contends that some of the trial court’s orders are appealable as “collateral, final orders.”
Third, he requests that this court “treat the matters at issue as appealable bifurcated
issues” under section 2025. Fourth, if this court determines that any order is not
appealable, he requests that this court treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.
Christine initially in supplemental briefing “join[ed] in Clifford’s request that this
court treat the trial court’s financial decision as a writ petition.” but she did “not join in
Clifford’s request” regarding “the separate issue concerning marital status.” At oral
argument, Christine’s counsel stated that they had changed their position and no longer
believed the appeal should be treated as a writ.4
A. General Legal Principles Regarding Appealability
“ ‘ “There is no constitutional right to an appeal; the appellate procedure is entirely
statutory and subject to complete legislative control.” ’ [Citations.] Appellate
jurisdiction cannot be created by consent, waiver, or estoppel. [Citations.] ‘A reviewing
court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or
4
Although the last-minute change in position by Christine and/or her counsel does
not affect the disposition in this case, we note that such conduct in a future case might
result in this court declining to consider any argument in support of a newly changed
position. (See People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 960, fn. 7 [declining to address
argument raised for the first time at oral argument]; Avila v. Citrus Community College
Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 163, fn. 8 [taking “a dim view of counsel’s decision to wait
until oral argument to apprise [the] court that a claim is being abandoned,” as “the proper
course is promptly to advise opposing counsel and the court”].)
5
(2) an appealable judgment.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007)
153 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1432 (Lafkas).)
“In civil cases there normally can only be an appeal from a final judgment.
[Citation.] If there are unresolved causes of action between the parties, the judgment is
not final and an appeal therefrom must be dismissed. [Citations.]” (Lafkas, supra,
153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432.) The “ ‘one final judgment” rule’ ” is “ ‘designed to prevent
piecemeal dispositions and costly multiple appeals which burden the court and impede
the judicial process.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 406, 418 (Grimes).)
In a family law appeal, “[d]isputes over the division of marital property may be
litigated separately from the proceedings to dissolve the marriage. [Citation.] An
interlocutory judgment dissolving a marriage, and collateral issues decided with finality
that are embodied in the judgment of dissolution, are appealable. [Citation.]” (Lafkas,
supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.)
“A family law court may bifurcate trial on one or more issues, including division
of property or child custody, if resolution of the bifurcated issue is likely to simplify the
determination of the other issues. [Citations.]” (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1433 [citing Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 5.175, now rule 5.390], fn. omitted.)
Even if an issue is bifurcated however, generally “an order on a bifurcated issue is not
separately appealable . . . .” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
“Although an order on a bifurcated issue is not separately appealable, the family
law court may [pursuant to section 20255 and the California Rules of Court] certify in its
5
Section 2025 states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the court
has ordered an issue or issues bifurcated for separate trial or hearing in advance of the
disposition of the entire case, a court of appeal may order an issue or issues transferred to
it for hearing and decision when the court that heard the issue or issues certifies that the
appeal is appropriate. Certification by the court shall be in accordance with rules
promulgated by the Judicial Council.”
6
order that there is probable cause for immediate appellate review of the issue, or it may
do so in response to a party’s motion made 10 days after mailing of the decision.
[Citations.] ‘If the certificate is granted, a party may . . . file in the Court of Appeal a
motion to appeal the decision on the bifurcated issue.’ [Citation.]” (Lafkas, supra,
153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [citing Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 5.180, now rule
5.392], fns. omitted.)
B. Analysis
In this case, we determine that this appeal must be dismissed. First, the purported
judgment filed on May 31, 2024, is not appealable. Although “[a]n interlocutory
judgment dissolving a marriage, and collateral issues decided with finality that are
embodied in the judgment of dissolution, are appealable,” the purported judgment in this
case did not dissolve the marriage. (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433.)
Further, the purported judgment only addressed certain property issues. The
record reflects that other property issues are still pending and remain to be decided. For
example, according to the January 31, 2023 stipulation and order, the characterization,
valuation, and disposition of several personal property assets (including vehicles and
insurance proceeds from an airplane), as well as the amount and terms of any equalizing
payment for those assets, remain to be decided. The parties agreed that these issues
would be resolved in binding arbitration. The January 31, 2023 stipulation further
indicates that although the trial court characterized and valued certain other personal
property assets, the court still needs to factor the amounts into the property division and
ultimate equalization payment, which is also dependent on the outcome of the arbitration.
(See Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433 [explaining that orders resulting from a
bifurcated trial on one or more issues, including the division of property, are generally
not separately appealable].) Indeed the trial court in its statement of decision and in the
purported judgment acknowledged that issues remained to be decided under the
January 31, 2023 stipulation and order, including the “final equalizing payment.” “Thus,
7
the [purported judgment] appealed from is merely preliminary to a final order
characterizing, valuing, and dividing all the marital assets.” (Ibid.)
Clifford’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He contends that because
“virtually all of the financial issues” have been resolved in this case, the purported
judgment is therefore appealable. However, the resolution of “virtually all” the issues in
a case is not the legal standard for appealability. Clifford also argues that the parties have
“informally divided” some or all of the remaining assets, those remaining assets “are of
de minimis value in comparison to the rest of the community estate,” and the parties “will
not return to the trial court for such issues.”6 However, “[a]ppellate jurisdiction cannot
be created by consent, waiver, or estoppel. [Citations.]” (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1432.) Further, Clifford’s reliance on In re Marriage of De Guigne (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 1353 does not advance his position that the trial court’s order reserving
jurisdiction over marital status is appealable. In De Guigne, unlike in the instant case, the
appeal was filed after a judgment of dissolution was entered by the trial court. (Id. at
p. 1359.)
Second, the trial court’s disposition of the community property businesses is not
appealable as a collateral final order. “An ‘exception to the “one final judgment” . . . is
the so-called collateral order doctrine. Where the trial court’s ruling on a collateral issue
“is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding” [citation], in
that it leaves the court no further action to take on “a matter which . . . is severable from
the general subject of the litigation” [citation], an appeal will lie from that collateral order
even though other matters in the case remain to be determined.’ [Citation.]” (Grimes,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 418.) Here, Clifford himself acknowledges that the
“resolution of the businesses is not collateral to the general subject of the litigation . . . .”
6
We note that Christine in her supplemental briefing states that she “does not
subscribe to the truthfulness of any outside record facts Clifford details in his own”
supplemental briefing.
8
Indeed, “[t]he collateral order doctrine does not apply here because the trial court’s ruling
on the [community property businesses] was not collateral to or ‘truly “distinct and
severable from the general subject of the litigation.” ’ [Citation.] Instead, the trial
court’s ruling was a necessary step to the ultimate division of the parties’ entire marital
estate. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 419.)7
Assuming the spousal support order and the attorney fees order are separately
appealable, Clifford does not raise an issue specific to either order. He only challenges
these orders to the extent they “hinged on” or are “impacted” by the issues he raises in
connection with the disposition of the community property businesses, that is, the award
of the community property businesses to him and the payment to Christine for her
community property share. For example, Clifford contends that if he has to borrow
money to pay Christine for her community property share of the businesses, he
“undoubtedly” would not be able to “cover [his] spousal support obligation, his own
basic expenses, and debt service” on the loan. Because Clifford’s only challenge to the
spousal support and attorney fees orders is based on a property division that is not yet
final, his challenge is premature.
7
We note that Clifford attached his own declaration to his supplemental briefing
filed in this court. Further, he attached as an exhibit to his declaration a December 1,
2025 stipulation and order regarding an “order to show cause re contempt” that had been
sought by Christine. Clifford did not obtain this court’s permission to file the declaration
or additional evidence.
Even if we considered Clifford’s declaration and the attached December 2025
stipulation and order, they do not advance his arguments in this appeal. In his
supplemental briefing, Clifford states that “Christine initiated a contempt proceeding to
collect the sums due” under the May 31, 2024 judgment. The December 1, 2025
stipulation and order attached to Clifford’s declaration reflects that Clifford paid the
ordered attorney fees. With respect to three remaining counts “related to Clifford’s
failure to pay equalizing payments owed by him pursuant to the May 31, 2024
Judgment,” Clifford did not pay the amounts, “Christine agree[d] to withdraw the three
counts,” and the counts were “dismissed with prejudice.”
9
Third, although Clifford requests that this court “treat the matters at issue as
appealable bifurcated issues, pursuant to section 2025,” he did not comply with the
requisite procedure. Section 2025 “allow[s] an interlocutory appeal on a bifurcated
issue.” (In re Marriage of Ellis (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 400, 403.) However, there are
“strict procedures and deadlines” (Ellis, supra, at p. 404), including the requirement of a
certificate of probable cause from the trial court, in order to “to invoke the appellate
jurisdiction of this court” (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433). (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.392 [formerly rules 1269.5 and 5.180].) As the record does not reflect that
the procedure was followed here, “we have no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” (Lafkas,
supra, at p. 1434.)
Fourth, we decline to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. “Although
an appellate court has discretion to treat an imperfect appeal as a petition for writ of
mandate, the power should be exercised only in unusual circumstances. [Citations.]
‘Generally, a writ must be issued in all cases “where there is not a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The interests of clients,
counsel, and the courts are best served by maintaining, to the extent possible, bright-line
rules which distinguish between appealable and nonappealable orders.’ [Citation.]”
(Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434.) “Routine granting of requests to treat
improper appeals as writs where there are no exigent reasons for doing so would only
encourage parties to burden appellate courts with reviews of intermediate orders.”
(Estate of Weber (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 22, 25.)
Here, Clifford does not present a compelling reason for treating the appeal as a
petition for writ of mandate. He “has an adequate appellate remedy by an appeal from
the final judgment.” (Lafkas, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1434-1435.) Further, the
parties have already litigated the disposition of the two community property businesses.
Consequently, treating this appeal as a writ would not save the parties from future trial
proceedings. (See Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 400-401.) Moreover, as we have
10
explained, the businesses are “not the only asset that must be characterized, valued, and
divided before the proceeding can reach a final conclusion.” (Lafkas, supra, at p. 1435.)
A ruling regarding the propriety of the trial court’s decision “would leave unresolved . . .
issues concerning other marital assets.” (Ibid.) Such a scenario does not provide “a
compelling reason to grant immediate appellate review.” (Ibid.) Marital status has also
not been terminated. In this regard, Clifford is not precluded from requesting the
termination of marital status in the trial court, where the trial court will have the
opportunity to decide in the first instance whether or under what conditions the parties’
marital status should be terminated.8 We are also not persuaded by Clifford’s contention
that this appeal involves an issue of first impression warranting writ review.
Having concluded that this appeal must be dismissed for lack of appealability, we
deny as moot Christine’s motion to dismiss the appeal, and also deny as moot the parties’
requests for permission to file further briefing relating to her motion.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent
Christine M. Greenberg. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
8
The Legislature has intended that “ ‘the dissolution of marriage should not be
postponed merely because issues relating to property, support, attorney fees or child
custody [are] unready for decision.’ [Citation.] Complying with that legislative intent,
courts have encouraged bifurcation of marital status from other issues. [Citations.]”
(Gionis v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 786, 788.) “Consistent with the
legislative policy favoring no fault dissolution of marriage, only slight evidence is
necessary to obtain bifurcation and resolution of marital status. On the other hand, a
spouse opposing bifurcation must present compelling reasons for denial.” (Id. at p. 790.)
11
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________________________
Danner, J.
______________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052355 Greenberg v. Greenberg