Filed 6/26/26 Marriage of Eletr CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re the Marriage of SARA
SAMY ELETR and TAREK
ELETR.
SARA SAMY ELETR,
Respondent, A174390
v.
(Alameda County
TAREK ELETR,
Super. Ct. No.
Appellant. HF21109221)
Tarek Eletr, appearing in propria persona, appeals from
the trial court judgment dissolving his marriage to Sara Samy
Eletr.1 He argues that the trial court violated his due process
rights by excluding him from the decisive stage of trial and that
the judgment contains a factually incorrect finding that he was
present in court. Tarek’s arguments do not justify reversal of the
judgment, so we affirm.
1 For clarity, we refer to the parties by their first names. In
doing so, we mean no disrespect.
1
BACKGROUND
When the trial court set this marital dissolution proceeding
for a long-cause trial in February 2025, it allowed Tarek to
appear remotely because he was in Egypt.2 Tarek was not
represented by counsel. The trial court repeated that order in
another pre-trial hearing. The trial court’s minutes for the first
day of trial on April 29 show that Tarek appeared remotely but
that the trial court ordered Tarek to appear in person at the next
hearing. The minutes were entered on May 8.3
Despite the trial court’s order, on May 12, Tarek filed a
request to appear remotely. His application stated that his
passport was nearing expiration and, relying on the trial court’s
previous approval of a remote appearance and believing in-person
attendance would not be required, he had submitted it for
renewal. He said the standard processing time for renewal was
six to eight weeks.
Sara opposed the request.4 According to Sara, when the
trial court ordered Tarek to appear in person at the next trial
date, he said he would not be there because he was taking care of
2 All events mentioned in this opinion occurred in 2025.
3 We can only speculate about the trial court’s reasons for
changing course. Although the trial court minutes indicate that a
court reporter was present, Tarek has not provided a reporter’s
transcript.
4 Tarek did not include Sara’s opposition when he
designated items for the clerk’s transcript. We augmented the
record with this document on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
2
his father in Egypt. She noted that the lack of a passport, even if
true, was the result of Tarek’s own actions.
Tarek filed a response.5 He disagreed with certain
statements Sara had made but did not respond to her assertion
that at the end of the first day of trial on April 29 the trial court
had ordered him to appear in person. He also attached a copy of
a receipt for the payment of the passport renewal fee. That
receipt showed he paid the renewal fee on May 4.
On May 14, the trial court denied without prejudice Tarek’s
request for remote appearance. It said it would reconsider the
issue if Tarek submitted a copy of his passport with a visible
expiration date and documentation concerning his renewal
application, including the date the application was submitted and
any confirmation of receipt and processing of the application. It
ordered all parties to appear in person who had previously been
ordered to do so and warned that a failure to comply could result
in sanctions.
On May 15, Tarek filed a second request to appear
remotely. He said he could not submit a copy of his passport
showing the expiration date because he had submitted it with his
renewal application. He again attached a copy of the renewal fee
receipt showing he paid the fee on May 4.
5 Tarek did not include his response when he designated
items for the clerk’s transcript. We augmented the record with
this document on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1).)
3
Sara opposed Tarek’s second request.6 She pointed out that
Tarek had not submitted a copy of his passport or confirmation of
receipt and processing of his renewal application, which the court
had previously required. She asserted that his renewal fee
receipt did not show the date his application was submitted. She
also pointed out that the May 5 receipt date suggested Tarek had
submitted his renewal application after the court had ordered
him on April 29 to appear in person at the next day of trial.
Tarek filed a response on May 19.7 He asserted that the
renewal fee receipt was the only documentation provided by the
United States Embassy in Cairo. He did not respond to Sara’s
assertion that he had submitted his renewal application after the
trial court had ordered him on April 29 to appear in person at the
next day of trial.
In an order dated May 19 and filed on May 21, the trial
court denied Tarek’s second request.8 But the court said it would
6 Tarek did not include Sara’s second opposition when he
designated items for the clerk’s transcript. We augmented the
record with this document on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
7 Tarek did not include his second response when he
designated items for the clerk’s transcript. We augmented the
record with this document on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
8 Tarek listed this order when he designated items for the
clerk’s transcript, but it was omitted from the transcript.
Remarkably, despite its centrality to his appeal, Tarek
apparently took no action to correct the omission. (See Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.155(b)(1).) We therefore augmented the record
with this document on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a)(1).)
4
consider a request for a short continuance to give Tarek sufficient
time to receive his new passport, if Tarek were to submit such a
request.
According to the trial court’s case register, Tarek did not
file a request for a continuance.9 Instead, on June 12, the same
day as the second day of trial, he filed a motion for
reconsideration of his request for remote appearance. The trial
court’s minutes for the trial state that Tarek did not appear and
the court made a record regarding his failure to appear in person.
The trial court minutes also indicate that a court reporter was
present, but Tarek has not submitted a reporter’s transcript. The
trial court then found that Tarek had notice and an opportunity
to appear and proceeded in Tarek’s absence. It took the matter
under submission.
Tarek made an ex parte request to vacate the submission
and reopen the hearing to permit his remote presence.10 He
claimed that he had been on Zoom during the hearing and was
prepared to participate, and he faulted the trial court for not
addressing his motion for reconsideration. He did not mention
his failure to take advantage of the trial court’s invitation to
apply for a continuance. The trial court denied the ex parte
request.
9 The register of actions is a required part of a clerk’s
transcript, but it was omitted from the transcript. We
augmented the record with this document on our own motion, but
only as to events preceding Tarek’s notice designating the record.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)
10 For reasons that are unclear, the copy of the ex parte
request in the record does not show a filing date.
5
On July 30, with Tarek appearing remotely, the trial court
denied as moot Tarek’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of
his request for remote appearance.
The trial court entered judgment in August. The judgment
stated that the proceeding was heard on April 29 and June 12
and checked boxes indicating Sara and Tarek were both present
in court. Tarek filed a motion in September to set aside the
judgment. The record does not contain a copy of the court’s
ruling on the motion, but Tarek represents that the trial court
denied it.
DISCUSSION
Tarek first contends the trial court violated his right to due
process by excluding him from the trial. “ ‘The essence of due
process is the requirement that “a person in jeopardy of serious
loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to
meet it.” ’ [Citations.] The opportunity to be heard must be
afforded ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”
(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of
Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 367.75 and rule 3.672 of the
California Rules of Court11 currently allow courts to hold
proceedings remotely, including evidentiary hearings and trials.
(§ 367.75, subd. (d)(1); rule 3.672(a), (c)(5); see rule 5.9(a) [until
January 1, 2027, rule 3.672 applies in family court cases in lieu of
11 All subsequent statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure, and all subsequent undesignated rules citations are to
the Rules of Court. Section 367.75 will sunset on January 1,
2027. (§ 367.75, subd. (m).)
6
rule 5.9’s rules for telephone appearances].) Both the statute and
the rule allow courts to require in-person appearances. (§ 367.75,
subd. (b)(3); rule 3.672(d)(1).) Rule 3.672(d)(3) also states, “If, at
any time during a remote proceeding, the court determines that
an in-person appearance is necessary, the court may continue the
matter and require such an appearance.” Alameda County
Superior Court has established by local rule that evidentiary
hearings and trials are held in person unless the court grants
permission for a remote appearance. (Super Ct. Alameda
County, Local Rules, rule 5.11(a)–(b) [hearings other than status
and settlement conferences are conducted in person unless the
court orders otherwise].)12
Tarek asserts that he complied with all procedural
requirements and was ready to participate in trial but the trial
court excluded him. This is inaccurate. The trial court denied
Tarek’s request to appear remotely. According to the applicable
rules, Tarek was therefore obligated to appear at trial personally.
(Rule 3.672(d)(1); Super Ct. Alameda County, Local Rules, rule
5.11(a)–(b).) As he failed to do so, he did not comply with the
rules and the trial court did not exclude him.
We surmise from Tarek’s brief that he believes the trial
court was required by due process to allow him to appear
remotely, despite his non-compliance with the rules, and the
12 This rule was adopted effective July 1, 2023, and
amended in certain respects not relevant here effective January
1, 2026. (Super Ct. Alameda County, Local Rules, rule 5.11.) For
convenience we cite to the current version of the rule.
7
court’s failure to do so constitutes structural error. He contends
the issue is reviewed de novo.
Accepting for the sake of argument Tarek’s proposed
standard of review and his theory that a trial court’s failure to
allow a remote appearance can violate due process, we find the
record fully supports the trial court’s rulings. Only after the trial
court ordered him on April 29 to personally appear at the next
day of trial did Tarek submit his passport for renewal on May 4.13
Despite the trial court’s request for more information in its denial
of Tarek’s first request for a remote appearance, Tarek never
identified the expiration date of his passport, even by declaration,
so the record does not show that his passport’s expiration was so
imminent as to require immediate renewal. Moreover, even if his
passport did require immediate renewal, the trial court made
clear in its order denying Tarek’s second request for a remote
appearance that the court was prepared to continue the trial for a
short period to allow Tarek to receive his new passport. This was
consistent with rule 3.672. (Rule 3.672(d)(3) [“If, at any time
during a remote proceeding, the court determines that an in-
person appearance is necessary, the court may continue the
13 The trial court entered its minutes on May 8, after Tarek
submitted his passport renewal application. But the minutes
reflect actions taken on April 29. Tarek has failed to provide a
reporter’s transcript or substitute to show what transpired in
court on April 29, so we must assume the trial court’s minutes
are accurate. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“ ‘In
the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions
in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court.’ ”].)
8
matter and require such an appearance.”].) Tarek does not
mention this aspect of the trial court’s order at all, much less
explain why he did not ask for a continuance in the three weeks
between the May 21 denial order and the June 12 second day of
trial. The allowance for a continuance eliminated any potential
unfairness in the denial of Tarek’s request for a remote
appearance and satisfied due process.
Tarek next contends the judgment is voidable because it
states he was present in court, even though the trial court’s
minutes from the June 12 day of trial show that he was not
present. Tarek contends this constitutes an extrinsic mistake.
Extrinsic mistake is “a term broadly applied when circumstances
extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on
the merits. [Citations.] ‘Extrinsic mistake is found when [among
other things] . . . a mistake led a court to do what it never
intended.’ ” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.)
Accepting for the sake of argument that extrinsic mistake
could justify reversal of a judgment on appeal, there was no
extrinsic mistake here. The trial court was under no
misapprehensions about Tarek’s appearance at the second day of
trial, since the same judge that denied Tarek’s request to appear
remotely also signed the judgment. The trial court fully intended
to enter a judgment despite that non-appearance. The recital on
the form FL-180 judgment that Tarek was present in court is, at
most, a simple error in the judgment, and most likely a clerical
9
error at that.14 (Estate of Douglas (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 690, 695
[“ ‘ “The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is
‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in
recording the judgment rendered.’ ” ’ ”].) Tarek fails to establish
how any such error is prejudicial to him. (Century Surety Co. v.
Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [“we cannot presume
prejudice and will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an
affirmative showing there was a miscarriage of justice”].) “To
establish prejudice, a party must show ‘a reasonable probability
that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to [it]
would have been reached.’ ” (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1148, 1161.) Tarek does not explain how the judgment would be
more favorable to him if the box noting his presence in court were
not checked.
DISPOSTION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
SWEET, J.
In re Marriage of Eletr (A174390)
14 Arguably, it was not an error at all, since Tarek did
appear at the first day of trial. But we need not resolve this point
due to Tarek’s failure to demonstrate prejudice.
Judge of the Superior Court of Marin County, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
10