Filed 8/18/26 Marriage of De Light CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of LAURA AND
JOHN DE LIGHT.
LAURA DE LIGHT,
E079240 & E082476
Respondent,
v. (Super.Ct.No. RID1302119)
JOHN DE LIGHT, OPINION
Appellant;
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,
Respondent;
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Wendy M. Harris,
Commissioner, and John W. Vineyard, Judge. Modified and affirmed with directions.
John De Light, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Laura De Light, in pro. per., for Respondent.
1
No appearance for Respondent Riverside County Department of Child Support
Services.
This dissolution action was filed 13 years ago and is on appeal for the second time.
Appellant John De Light argues that the trial court committed several errors during and
after the 2021 trial. The arguments largely lack merit. We construe the trial court’s order
transferring the case to Iowa as a finding of inconvenient forum under Family Code
section 3427 and remand for the trial court to stay the action instead of transferring the
case. Also, for the avoidance of doubt, we strike from the judgment a paragraph
1
concerning attorneys’ fees. We otherwise affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
“In January 2008, the De Lights were married in Iowa. They eventually moved to
California for John’s work. On April 25, 2013, [respondent] Laura [De Light] moved
back to Iowa taking S.D. (born March 2009[]), and L.D. (born January 2012[])
(collectively, the [c]hildren) without advising John. She moved in with her parents and
then filed for divorce from John in California. John filed an ex parte application to have
the [c]hildren returned to California. That request was denied and divorce proceedings
ensued.” (In re Marriage of De Light (Sep. 6, 2018, E066256) [nonpub. opn.], fn.
omitted.)
1
We refer to the parties by their first name to avoid confusion. No disrespect is
intended.
2
After a 2016 trial on numerous issues, John appealed, and we agreed with him that
he “never had an opportunity to have a full hearing on the move-away to Iowa, and
custody and visitation.” (In re Marriage of De Light, supra, E066256.) We reversed the
judgment and remanded for further proceedings. (Ibid..)
A second trial took place in December 2021. The trial court granted Laura’s
request for a move-away. It awarded John and Laura joint physical and legal custody of
the children and gave John visitation the first, third, and fifth weekend of every month in
addition to a number of holidays and summer visits. It ordered John to pay Laura child
support and found that Laura paid a number of costs relating to childcare. An amended
judgment included the trial court’s orders from the 2021 trial and restated its orders on
2
spousal support, child support, and property from 2016.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Transfer Orders
John argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the case be
transferred to Iowa.
1. Additional Background
In January 2021, on its own motion, the trial court set a March hearing on
transferring the case to Iowa. Neither party initially filed an opposition. In March, the
2
Because John raises 17 distinct issues on appeal, we discuss additional
background relating to each issue as necessary.
3
court continued the motion until trial later that year, but at the December 2021 trial, it
again continued the motion.
In January 2022, Laura stated she did not object to the transfer given that she and
the children have been living in Iowa since 2013 and that John was “living a transient
lifestyle” and had no ties to California. John objected to the transfer, arguing that he “has
never abandoned California as his home state and has continually paid taxes in
California.” He attached California state income tax returns for 2017 through 2020, but
the forms he attached for 2019 and 2020 were titled “California Nonresident or Part-Year
Resident Income Tax Return.” The matter was continued again in February and April
2022. In June 2022, the court ordered the case transferred to Iowa.
John petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to vacate its
transfer order. We stayed the transfer order pending a determination on the petition. We
then denied the petition and ordered the stay to remain pending the resolution of this
appeal.
2. Discussion
John argues that the transfer motion was improper. We construe the transfer order
as a determination made under Family Code section 3427 (section 3427) that California
is an inconvenient forum and, so construed, find no reversible error. However, we
remand for the trial court to stay the proceedings instead of transferring the case.
Under section 3427, a “court of this state that has jurisdiction under this part to
make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if
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it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be
raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or request of another court.”
(Fam. Code, § 3427, subd. (a).)
Before making the determination, a California court must consider whether it is
appropriate for a court in another state to exercise jurisdiction. (Fam. Code, § 3427,
subd. (b).) It must allow the parties to submit information and consider all relevant
factors, including eight specifically enumerated in the statute: whether domestic violence
occurred and is likely to continue in the future; the length of time the child has resided
outside of California; the distance between the California court and the court in the state
that would assume jurisdiction; the degree of financial hardship to the parties in litigating
in one forum over the other; any agreement between the parties as to jurisdiction; the
nature and location of evidence required to resolve pending litigation, including the
child’s testimony; the ability of the court of each state to decide issues expeditiously and
the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and the familiarity of the court of each
state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation. (Ibid.)
If a California court determines that it is an inconvenient forum and another state’s
court is more appropriate, “it shall stay the proceedings upon condition that a child
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state and may impose
any other condition the court considers just and proper.” (Fam. Code, § 3427, subd. (c).)
5
Although the trial court did not style its order as one made under section 3427, it is
apparent that it intended to do what section 3427 allowed. By ordering the transfer to
Iowa, it in effect determined that Iowa, not California, was the most appropriate forum
for the case. Moreover, it allowed the parties to submit arguments and evidence, which
they did. John fails to demonstrate that a determination that Iowa would be a more
convenient forum was an abuse of discretion. (See In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 478, 513 [section 3427 orders reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
There is no dispute that Laura and the children have lived in Iowa for over a
decade. Although John claims he still lives in California, the two most recent tax returns
he submitted indicate he is either a nonresident or a part-time resident. He contended in
trial court that he was residing in Corona, but the evidence he submitted to corroborate
that was a guest folio from a motel there. The folio indicated that John stayed there for
less than two weeks and that he listed an Oklahoma address. Moreover, although the
dissolution action has been pending in California for some time, which weighs against a
finding of inconvenient forum, Iowa is likely the better location for any evidence required
to resolve pending litigation, given that Laura and the children live there and have for
over a decade. In sum, we cannot say that a finding that California was an inconvenient
forum was an abuse of discretion, although, pursuant to section 3427, subdivision (c), we
will remand for the trial court to order the case stayed instead of transferred, with any
appropriate conditions.
6
John’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He contends that the trial court
wrongly applied intercounty transfer rules instead of interstate transfer rules, but nothing
he cites to shows the trial court applied intercounty rules. He argues that he was deprived
of an opportunity to present evidence, but he not only had an opportunity to present
evidence, he did so. His argument that the motion compromised his right to a fair trial
ignores that both the briefs submitted by the parties on the motion and the order were not
filed until after the December 2021 trial. He claims that the trial court’s early
characterization of the transfer as “logical” shows that it had predetermined the transfer
issue, but, as discussed above, the order was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion.
And his argument that this court erred by ruling (in the prior writ proceeding) that the
stay we imposed would lift at the end of this appeal misunderstands the effect of that
ruling. It did not, as John appears to argue, mandate that the case would necessarily
transfer upon the end of this appeal, thereby denying him an opportunity to be heard on
3
the transfer. Rather, the stay preserved John’s ability to contest it in this appeal.
B. Striking Testimony and Evidence
John argues that the trial court abused its discretion by striking his direct
examination testimony.
3
John petitioned for review of the stay order, and the Supreme Court denied the
petition.
7
1. Additional Background
While John was on the witness stand during Laura’s case in chief at the December
2021 trial, the trial court repeatedly admonished him to answer the questions posed.
When the trial court at one point stated that there were no property disputes before it,
John, on the witness stand and represented by counsel, repeatedly objected. The trial
court responded by telling him it was at least the third time he had been admonished, and
that if he continued to refuse to submit himself to cross-examination, it would not allow
him to present his evidence. Later on, the trial court told John again that he was not
answering the questions posed and that it may conclude the trial as a result. Some time
later, after a short recess, the court reiterated its admonition. It repeated its admonition
again shortly thereafter, telling him that his answers were nonresponsive.
John then began his case in chief and took the witness stand again. He began
going beyond the scope of the questions posed to him. The trial court yet again
admonished him. A short time later, after the trial court sustained an objection, John
objected, telling the trial court that “[y]ou need to let me make my testimony.” The trial
court warned John again that it would strike his testimony if his behavior continued.
Later, when Laura objected to a question that John had begun answering, John stated,
“[d]on’t interrupt me.” The trial court stated that it would move to closing argument
before changing its mind and giving John yet another warning, telling him that it would
strike all his testimony from his case in chief if he continued. Soon after Laura began
cross-examining him, John, responding to a question, stated: “I think we should just stop
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this thing. It makes no sense for me.” Following a brief recess, the trial court stated that
it would do as it previously indicated and strike his testimony from his case in chief.
2. Discussion
“Where a witness refuses to submit to cross-examination, or is unavailable for
that purpose, the conventional remedy is to exclude the witness’s testimony on direct.”
(Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 735; see also People v. Sanders
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 543, 554 [“when the party testifying on his or her own behalf
unjustifiably refuses to answer questions necessary to complete the cross-examination,”
“the consensus is that the direct testimony must be stricken”].) A trial court’s decision to
strike a witness’s testimony on these grounds is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Reynolds (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 42, 47.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. John refused to answer questions on
cross-examination (“I think we should just stop this thing”), even after the trial court had
given him several warnings that it would strike his direct testimony if he did not submit
to cross-examination. (Cf. Magyar v. United Fire Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1330,
1331 [“the judge must give fair warning to the witness before striking his testimony”]
(Magyar).) John makes no developed argument to the contrary. Instead, he spends
several pages of his opening brief quoting case law and then conclusorily asserts that
striking his testimony was an abuse of discretion.
The case he quotes, Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 (Elkins), does
not help him. In Elkins, our Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its
9
discretion “in sanctioning petitioner by excluding the bulk of his evidence simply because
he failed, prior to trial, to file a declaration establishing the admissibility of his trial
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1363-1364.) Here, however, the trial court repeatedly warned
John, who did not comply with the admonitions and ultimately refused to proceed further
with cross-examination. This case is more analogous to Magyar, where the Ninth Circuit
found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to strike a plaintiff’s testimony.
(Magyar, supra, 811 F.2d 1331 [“Trial began in June 1985 and the first witness was Mr.
Magyar. His testimony was marred from the start by nonresponsive and argumentative
answers. On the second day of testimony, United began its cross-examination and Mr.
Magyar’s testimony became even more nonresponsive. The district court finally warned
Mr. Magyar that, if his answers continued to be nonresponsive, she would strike his
testimony altogether. Mr. Magyar said he understood, but his very next answer was
nonresponsive. [Citation.] True to her word, the district judge struck Mr. Magyar’s
testimony in its entirety.”].)
John characterizes the trial court’s actions as an “immediate escalation,” but upon
reviewing the record, which shows how the matter unfolded over time, we do not agree.
We find no abuse of discretion.
C. Substantial Evidence
In a one-page section of his opening brief and citing Code of Civil Procedure
section 657 (pertaining to motions for new trials), John contends that the trial court
abused its discretion because the trial court’s decisions were not supported by sufficient
10
evidence. We reject the argument because John does not specify what factual findings he
claims lack substantial evidence. The only ruling John separately refers to is the trial
court’s ruling on the transfer order, which we have already determined was not an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion.
D. Move-Away
John argues that the trial court erred in preventing John from disputing, through
his direct testimony, the reasons for Laura’s move to Iowa with the children. He states
that he wanted to present testimony on “critical topics such as the financial circumstances
surrounding the move, religious differences between [John] and [Laura’s] family, and the
personal motives behind [Laura’s] decision to relocate to Iowa.” However, because we
have already found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s striking John’s direct
testimony, this argument about a subset of that testimony fails for the same reasons.
E. Child Custody Evaluation Costs
John argues that the trial court erred by allocating 100 percent of the costs of a
child custody evaluator to John, who had requested the evaluator.
In February 2020, the trial court appointed a child custody evaluator (Dr. Suiter)
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730, ordering John to pay 70 percent of the cost and
Laura 30 percent. In October, the trial court granted the evaluator’s request to be
relieved. The court ordered John to select three potential replacements. In January 2021,
John stated that he wanted to go to Child Custody Recommending Counseling (CCRC),
and the trial court informed him that CCRC would not proceed with a pending order for a
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child custody evaluation. When he reiterated that he wanted to proceed with CCRC, the
trial court vacated the order for the custody evaluation. In March, John stated that he did
not agree with the recommendations made in the CCRC report and again requested a
child custody evaluation. The trial court again appointed a child custody evaluator (Dr.
Shirin), this time ordering John to pay 100 percent of the cost while reserving jurisdiction
to reallocate the cost between the parties.
John fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion. John cites an
unpublished Court of Appeal opinion, “violat[ing] the general rule that an unpublished
opinion ‘shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or
proceeding.’” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1133, fn. 1; see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(a).) Accordingly, “we do not consider the unpublished opinion.”
(People v. Russo, supra, at p. 1133, fn. 1.) John states that California Rule of Court, rule
5.220(d)(1)(D) “mandates that custody evaluation costs should be allocated fairly
between the parties.” However, that rule simply states that the court must “[d]etermine
and allocate between the parties any fees or costs of the evaluation.” The rule does not
limit how costs or fees should be allocated between the parties. John also relies on
Family Code section 3112, subdivision (a), but that reliance is misplaced. That provision
states that “[w]here a court-appointed investigator is directed by the court to conduct a
custody investigation or evaluation pursuant to this chapter . . . the court shall inquire
into the financial condition of the parent, guardian, or other person charged with the
support of the minor.” (Fam. Code, § 3112, subd. (a), italics added.) However, in the
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form order appointing Dr. Shirin as the evaluator, the court checked the box indicating
that the evaluator was being appointed under the authority of Evidence Code section 730,
and the boxes indicating the appointment was under the authority of Family Code
sections 3111 or 3118 were left blank. Dr. Shirin was not appointed under the authority
of any Family Code provision, so Family Code section 3112, subdivision (a) does not
apply.
John requested a child custody evaluator after asking the trial court to vacate its
order for an earlier custody evaluation because he wished to pursue a mediation
recommendation he later disagreed with. John fails to show that the latter order’s cost
allocation was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
F. Stale Child Custody Evaluation Reports
John argues that, because no child custody evaluation was conducted after the trial
court allocated all of the cost to him, the trial court erred when it relied on stale child
custody recommendations from 2013 and 2014. (See In re Marriage of De Light, supra,
E066256 [describing earlier child custody recommendations].) However, John does not
show that the trial court ever relied on such recommendations in the 2021 trial. The part
of the trial transcript John relies on contains a colloquy where Laura seeks to admit the
2013 recommendations into evidence, but the trial court states that “all the reports are
extremely stale.” Although the court did not expressly deny the request, its statement
suggests it did not admit the reports. Laura did not press the matter, and John points to
no other portion of the record showing that the court relied on the 2013 and 2014
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recommendations in ruling on visitation at the 2021 trial. As a result, John’s argument
that the trial court wrongly relied on them fails, as does his related argument that the
evaluators who authored those recommendations should have been subject to cross-
examination.
John also argues that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of child custody
orders from January 6, 2015. That order is largely the final recommendations from the
2013 recommendation made into an order by the stamp and signature of the trial court.
John argues that the trial court should not have “admit[ed]” that order because the order’s
statements were hearsay and the evaluator making the recommendations was not subject
to cross-examination. John confuses judicial notice with the admission of evidence. In
any event, the 2015 order is in substance the trial court’s adoption of the 2013
recommendations, and John does not show that the trial court improperly took notice of
the truth of anything stated in the order. “‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the
same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its
meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not
take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.) John also does not identify any
statements in the order he believes were being accepted as true. We accordingly reject
the argument.
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G. Scope of Trial
John argues that the trial court improperly limited the issues at trial to the move-
away, custody, and visitation. According to John, this meant that he was barred from
addressing other, financial matters. However, as discussed below, the record shows that
the trial court did not limit the issues to non-financial matters. This is unsurprising given
that both parties had listed child support in their trial briefs as issues to be resolved at
trial. At the end of the December 2021 trial, the trial court ruled on child support (see
Fam. Code, § 4055) and reimbursement of childcare costs (see Fam. Code, §§ 4061,
4062, subd. (a)(1)). The fact that the trial court ruled on these matters does not
compound any error, as John contends, but shows that no error occurred.
H. Childcare Expenses
John argues that the trial court erred in not imposing any sanctions on Laura for
fraudulently claiming childcare expenses. John fails to show that such fraud occurred.
His contention is that even though the trial court in 2016 ordered John to pay $2,314 per
month for child support, two forms that Laura later filed showed that she incurred
childcare expenses far below that amount.
John’s argument conflates child support, which is ordered pursuant to Family
Code section 4055 and determined by a formula based on income, and “additional
support” (sometimes called “add-ons”), which is ordered pursuant to Family Code section
4062 and, at least here, based on expenses actually incurred. (See Fam. Code, §§ 4061
[“The amounts in [Family Code] Section 4062 shall be considered additional support for
15
the children”], 4062, subd. (a)(1) [“Childcare costs, if those expenses are actually
incurred . . . unless those costs are specifically included in the guideline calculation
itself”]; In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148 [referring to such
amounts as add-ons].) The two forms John relies on show the amounts Laura paid for the
children’s day care from 2013 through 2020. In Laura’s 2021 trial brief, she discussed
these amounts under the heading “Child Care Reimbursements,” separate from her
discussion on child support and citing Family Code section 4062, subdivision (a).
Laura’s claims for the childcare “add-on” do not show that she made any fraudulent
misrepresentations.
Under separate section headings, John argues that the trial court failed to address
erroneous equalization payments and his unjust loss of personal property. Both of these
arguments, however, are based on arguments that Laura fraudulently misrepresented her
childcare expenses. Because John has not demonstrated such fraud, we also reject his
4
arguments concerning equalization payments and personal property.
I. Wage Garnishment
John argues that the trial court failed to address his motion to stop illegal wage
garnishments. Although it appears that the trial court did not rule on the motion, John
4
John’s equalization payments argument is also based on a claim that Laura
failed to disclose other assets. John relies on Family Code section 2107, subdivision (d)
in making this argument. We discuss that provision in section II. K. below and reject
the argument here for the same reasons.
16
fails to demonstrate any likelihood that the trial court would have granted it had the
motion been addressed.
John’s motion argued that his wages should not be garnished because this court’s
earlier opinion vacated all child support orders. It is undisputed that our earlier opinion
vacated the child support order contained in the earlier judgment. John contends that
instead of the Riverside County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) reverting
to an earlier, temporary child support order and garnishing his wages based on that, the
county should have stopped garnishing his wages altogether because our earlier opinion
also vacated any such temporary orders. Neither John’s motion nor his appellate brief
cites any authority for this proposition. As a result, John does not demonstrate why the
trial court’s effective denial of the motion was erroneous. (See United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [“‘In order to demonstrate error,
an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by
legal analysis and citation to the record’”].)
J. DCSS Conduct
John contends that DCSS committed various acts of misconduct justifying
sanctions. DCSS, which is a respondent in this appeal, has not filed a brief. However,
John’s allegations of misconduct—including wage garnishment (which we have
addressed), failure to respond to discovery requests, and disregard for summonses—are
conclusory and lack any citations to the record. We therefore deem the arguments
forfeited.
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K. Disclosure of Financial Accounts
John argues that the trial court failed to act after Laura “repeatedly failed” to
disclose her individual retirement account (IRA) or 401(k) account, thus requiring the
judgment to be set aside. We are unpersuaded. John cites one moment, from the
December 2021 trial, when Laura discussed the accounts. She stated that she has “maybe
$2,000” in the IRA, and the trial court sustained a relevance objection to a question on
how much she had in the 401(k) account. John does not state on appeal what issues the
existence of those accounts would have pertained to. The trial court noted, for instance,
that “a 401(k) has no relevance for child support.”
John cites Family Code section 2107, subdivisions (c) and (d) for his argument
5
that the trial court must impose sanctions and set aside the judgment. However, John
does not show that he moved for sanctions or to set aside the judgment under these
5
Family Code section 2107, subdivision (c) states that “[i]f a party fails to
comply with any provision of this chapter, the court shall, in addition to any other remedy
provided by law, impose money sanctions against the noncomplying party. Sanctions
shall be in an amount sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct,
and shall include reasonable attorney’s fees, costs incurred, or both, unless the court finds
that the noncomplying party acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” Family Code section 2107,
subdivision (d) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subdivision, if a court
enters a judgment when the parties have failed to comply with all disclosure requirements
of this chapter, the court shall set aside the judgment. The failure to comply with the
disclosure requirements does not constitute harmless error. If the court granted the
complying party’s voluntary waiver of receipt of the noncomplying party's preliminary
declaration of disclosure pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), the court shall set
aside the judgment only at the request of the complying party, unless the motion to set
aside the judgment is based on [fraud or perjury].”
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provisions. Moreover, Family Code section 2107 is in a chapter concerning declarations
of disclosure, and John has not shown that Laura made misstatements in any such
declarations. In this regard, we note that the appellate record contains Laura’s property
declarations from 2014 and no updated or final property declarations, and that the second
trial took place in December 2021. It is entirely possible that Laura created the IRA and
401(k) accounts after her separation from John, and John does not show otherwise. As a
result, John does not show any error based on financial disclosures.
L. Discovery Requests
John argues that the trial court erred in issuing financial orders (such as child
support) without requiring Laura or DCSS to comply with his discovery requests. John
does not attempt to show what discovery he sought, that he moved to compel discovery,
or that any such motions were wrongly decided. “The simple failure to answer, or the
giving of an evasive answer, requires the propounding party to pursue an order
compelling an answer or further answer—otherwise the right to an answer or further
answer is waived and an evidence sanction is not available. ‘[T]he burden is on the
propounding party to enforce discovery. Otherwise, no penalty attaches either for the
responding party’s failure to respond or responding inadequately.’” (Saxena v. Goffney
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 334.) John’s contentions therefore lack merit.
M. Imputed Income
John argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing income of $10,000
per month to him for purposes of child support. At the end of the 2021 trial, the trial
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court imputed that amount of income to him based on a finding that John was “actively
turning down jobs.” It found that John “has the ability to earn $10,000 per month” and
noted three instances where John refused job offers: one at $63 per hour, one at $70 per
hour, and one that offered $120,000 per year.
“We review an order establishing or modifying child support based upon earning
capacity for an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] ‘[W]e consider only “whether the court’s
factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted
reasonably in exercising its discretion.” [Citation.] . . . “[W]e do not substitute our own
judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have
made such an order.”’” (In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1247.)
We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court struck John’s testimony, and
although John states that he provided the court with exhibits showing his earnings
6
history, those exhibits are not in the appellate record. His appellate brief contains a table
showing his employment history, but it includes employment past the December 2021
trial date, and the record does not show that the trial court saw evidence of this
employment history, which contains no salary information. There is therefore little to no
factual basis on which we could determine that $10,000 per month was unreasonable
based on the evidence before the trial court during the December 2021 trial. John
6
John states elsewhere in his brief that none of his trial exhibits were admitted
into evidence.
20
contends that Laura failed to conduct a vocational evaluation to show there were jobs
available at John’s previous earnings level, but John does not show that it was Laura’s
burden at trial to do so.
N. Arrearages
John contends that the trial court used “undisclosed income evidence” to calculate
child support arrears. His argument is that the trial court used his “income data,” which
was not disclosed to him prior to trial. Because the argument lacks any citations to the
record and is based on an unsupported factual claim (that the trial court used income
figures it never disclosed to John), we deem the argument forfeited.
John also contends that the trial court failed to hold a hearing on updated arrears
during the December 2021 trial. He states, without citation to the record, that the trial
court improperly incorporated its arrearage findings from the 2016 judgment into the
amended judgment and failed to consider tax returns he says he presented to the trial
court. John presumes, without citation to the record or legal authority, that a trial court
necessarily abuses its discretion if it receives additional financial information pertaining
7
to child support and does not modify its child support orders as a result. Since the trial
court reasonably excluded John’s testimony, there is ample reason why its 2021 child
support orders would have been in the same amounts as its 2016 child support orders for
7
John argues that the trial court’s error here encompasses both its child support
and spousal support orders and cites Family Code section 4320, which pertains to spousal
support orders, but the trial court did not award anything to either spouse for spousal
support.
21
any periods addressed by both judgments. Because John does not cite to the record here
or in any way show why information he presented to the trial court warranted a different
child support award for any period he was in arrears on, he fails to demonstrate error.
O. Travel Expenses
Without citing to the record, John argues that the trial court awarded him an
unreasonably low amount per month ($150) for travel expenses relating to visitation. The
trial court stated in its ruling at the end of the December 2021 trial that, in determining
John’s income for purposes of its child support order, it gave John a deduction of $300
per month “even though he presented no evidence” because it knew John “has to pay for
hotels during his time in Iowa.” Nothing in that portion of the trial court’s order shows
that it “awarded” John only $150 (as opposed to $300), and John in any event states only
in conclusory terms that the $150 was unreasonably low. On this record, John does not
show that the trial court abused its discretion with regards to travel expenses.
P. Attorneys’ Fees
John argues that the trial court erred by awarding Laura $10,000 in attorneys’ fees
following the December 2021 trial even though it had not been raised as an issue. John
again fails to cite the record in making this argument. However, the amended judgment,
which Laura prepared, states in paragraph IX.A that “[o]n January 14, 2016, the court
finds an award of attorney’s fees and costs is appropriate” and “orders” John to pay
$10,000 in attorneys’ fees. It appears that the amended judgment may simply be stating
that the prior 2016 judgment had made such an award, which we reversed. However,
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given the present tense language, it may also be construed as a second order for the same
amount. Laura agrees that the trial court did not award any attorneys’ fees as a result of
the 2021 trial. The amended judgment also states that Laura withdrew her 2021 request
for attorneys’ fees. Furthermore, in ruling on John’s objections to the proposed amended
judgment, the trial court ordered that the amended judgment “include orders for spousal
support, child support and property entered May 26, 2016 along with the orders made
December 13, 2021.” That order did not state that the amended judgment should include
the prior attorneys’ fee order. Thus, to avoid any doubt, we will strike the portion of the
amended judgment (paragraph IX.A) that describes the 2016 award.
Separately, John argues that the trial court failed to award him attorneys’ fees he
incurred in defending against Laura’s fraudulent representations and actions. Because
John has not shown that Laura committed any such fraud and because John does not cite
any portion of the record in making this argument, we find no error.
Q. Emergency Order
John contends, without citing the record, that he moved for an emergency order in
2021 and that the trial court erred in denying both it and a subsequent motion for
reconsideration pertaining to it. It appears that he intended to refer to a request for
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emergency order made in July 2023 and a motion for reconsideration filed on August 31,
8
2023.
We find no error. John argues only in conclusory terms that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying both his initial request for emergency order and his later motion
for reconsideration, which he filed more than a month after his initial request was
denied.9
8
John separately appealed these orders, and we ordered the appeal consolidated
with this one. We denied John’s request to file an oversized opening brief of 74,000
words and directed him to file an opening brief of no more than 28,000 words, which is
twice the standard word limit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1).) Approximately
five pages of John’s 122-page opening brief addresses the emergency motion and motion
for reconsideration.
9 We sent the parties our tentative opinion on June 29, 2026. On August 3, 2026,
the day before oral argument, John filed both a motion to file his intended trial exhibits
and a motion to transmit Laura’s trial exhibits. We denied both motions. On the morning
of oral argument, John also moved to disqualify the appellate panel. At oral argument,
we denied the motion to disqualify as well.
At oral argument, John requested supplemental briefing pursuant to Government
Code section 68081 to respond to our discussion of section 3427 and DCSS’s conduct.
Government Code section 68081 provides for supplemental briefing “[b]efore . . . a court
of appeal . . . renders a decision in a proceeding . . . based upon an issue which was not
proposed or briefed by any party to the proceeding.” We deny the request. John does
“not ‘have a right under [Government Code] section 68081 to submit supplemental briefs
or be granted a rehearing each time an appellate court relies upon authority or employs a
mode of analysis that was not briefed by the parties. The parties need only have been
given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court and the fact that a party does
not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or fairly included within
the issues raised does not implicate the protections of [Government Code] section
68081.” (Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 228, fn. 4.) Specifically as to his
request to address our discussion of DCSS, we note that John’s assertion that their
arguments must fail because they have not filed a brief is incorrect. Even when a
respondent does not file a brief in an appeal, an “appellant ‘still bears the “affirmative
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by striking paragraph IX.A. As modified, the judgment
is affirmed. The transfer order is vacated and the matter is remanded for the trial court to
stay the case upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
Iowa and on any additional conditions it considers just and proper under Family Code,
section 3427, subdivision (c). Respondent is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
P. J.
MENETREZ
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
burden to show error whether or not the respondent’s brief has been filed.”’” (In re
Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110, fn, 1.)
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