Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marriage of Copeland CA5

Filed 11/19/26 Marriage of Copeland CA5
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/19/26 Marriage of Copeland CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of EBELIA and ROBERT
JAMES COPELAND, JR.

EBELIA COPELAND, F089697

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 690319)

v.

ROBERT JAMES COPELAND, JR., OPINION

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Sweena
Pannu, Judge.
Samuel P. King, Jr., for Appellant.
LaMontagne & Amador and Eric A. Amador for Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Ebelia Copeland appeals from an order denying her motion to set aside a
stipulation for judgment of legal separation (judgment) in a marital dissolution action
with her husband, Robert James Copeland, Jr. 1 Ebelia argues the family court failed to
apply the proper legal standard by failing to consider the parties’ fiduciary relationship in
finding Robert did not commit extrinsic fraud. She contends the evidence shows Robert
committed fraud by misrepresenting the judgment to her and inducing her to terminate
her attorney-client relationship with her attorney. Ebelia also argues the court
erroneously found that she failed to file her motion to set aside the judgment within one
year of discovering Robert committed fraud against her.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Dissolution Proceedings and Stipulation for Judgment
Ebelia and Robert married on June 10, 2011. They had a son, R.C., in 2012.
On July 30, 2013, Ebelia petitioned for divorce. The family court ordered Robert
to pay Ebelia $2,500 per month for temporary child and spousal support commencing on
August 1, 2013. This amount increased to $3,000 per month on October 1, 2013.
In 2014, Robert petitioned to modify the amount of temporary child and spousal
support. On September 16, 2014, the family court ordered the amount of support
modified to a combined total of $1,880 per month commencing on May 1, 2014.
On November 6, 2014, Ebelia’s attorney, Patricia Torres, petitioned to withdraw
as counsel of record due to a reported breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and
Ebelia’s failure to pay fees. On November 12, 2014, a substitution of attorney was filed
reflecting Torres was no longer Ebelia’s attorney and Ebelia was proceeding in propria
persona.

1 As is customary in family law cases, we refer to the parties by their first names for
clarity. No disrespect is intended. (Kuehn v. Kuehn (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 824, 828, fn. 2
(Kuehn).)

2.
In January 2015, the parties executed the judgment. The judgment specified that
both parties waived their right to receive spousal support from the other. The judgment
set forth the division of property and resolved “all property issues” between Ebelia and
Robert. Robert agreed to pay an equalizing payment of $16,000 to Ebelia as part of the
judgment. Exhibit B attached to the judgment identified the assets and liabilities to be
awarded to each party. Ebelia was awarded “[a]ll household furniture [and] furnishings
in her possession”; and “[a]ll bank accounts in her name.” Several assets were awarded
to Robert with additional assets confirmed as his separate property.
The judgment stated in relevant part: “Each party acknowledges he or she has
made his or her own determination regarding the fairness, appropriateness and
desirability of the settlement.” The judgment identified Robert’s attorney and reflected
that Ebelia was without counsel. The judgment stated: “Both parties acknowledge they
have discussed this matter with attorneys and/or have had ample opportunity to do so.”
The judgment further stated the parties “acknowledge and conclusively agree they have
carefully read this [judgment] and that they have willingly negotiated the terms of [the
judgment], and presently executed this [judgment], both without any duress, pressure or
undue influence from any source, including the other party, and fully understand its terms
and conditions.”
The judgment contained a reconciliation provision stating that “any reconciliation
between the parties shall not cancel, terminate, or modify the force and effect of any
provision of this [judgment] dealing with the present assets or obligations of either or
both of the parties, including lists of assets, provisions for partition, division or other
disposition of these assets or past gifts, list of these obligations, provisions for the
assumption or other disposition of these obligations, and warranties, promises of
indemnity, and other provisions for any consideration to be given or received in exchange
for the assumption or other disposition of these obligations. The fact that the parties may
reside in the same residence does not mean that they have reconciled. Nor shall the

3.
resumption of sexual relations between the parties mean that they have reconciled.” The
judgment included a finding that “each of the parties have entered into this [judgment] by
his or her own volition, without any undue influence or duress, and with full knowledge
of it[s] legal effect.”
The judgment bore Ebelia’s notarized signature dated January 9, 2015. The
judgment was also signed by Robert and his attorney. On January 28, 2015, the family
court entered notice of entry of judgment based on the executed judgment.
B. Request for Order to Set Aside the Judgment
In October 2023, Ebelia, through her new attorney, filed a request for order (RFO)
to set aside the judgment on the grounds of actual fraud under Family Code2
section 2122. Ebelia alleged Robert misrepresented the judgment to her as only
protecting his business interests 3 and unrelated to their marriage. She also alleged Robert
interfered with her attorney-client relationship with her former attorney, Torres. 4
In 2024, the family court held a three-day bench trial on Ebelia’s RFO. Ebelia and
Robert both testified and presented documentary evidence.
1. Ebelia’s Evidence
Ebelia met Robert in 2009 when she was working at a bank in Modesto. At the
time, Ebelia was a single mother with a daughter from a prior relationship and lived in an
apartment with her sister. Robert also had a daughter from a previous relationship.
Robert reached out to Ebelia after she stopped working at the bank and they began
dating. Ebelia was brought up in the Pentecostal faith and religion was the most
important thing in her life when she met Robert. While they were dating, Robert and
Ebelia discussed religious issues including their understanding of a proper relationship

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
3 Robert reportedly had a mortgage broker business when the judgment was executed.
4 The RFO and its supporting documentation were not included in the clerk’s transcript as
will be further discussed herein.

4.
between a man and a woman when married. Robert believed, and Ebelia agreed, that a
man is the head of the house and a woman is to submit in all things according to the
Bible. Based on this understanding, Ebelia stopped working after Robert proposed to her.
Once they married, Robert was the head of the house and paid the bills. Ebelia stayed at
home to cook, clean, and perform “the wife duties.”
Ebelia became pregnant with R.C. about a month and a half after she and Robert
married. Robert was angry about the pregnancy because he thought it would affect his
daughter.
There was tension in the marriage, and the couple were in counseling before and
after R.C. was born. Ebelia was depressed throughout the marriage. She and Robert
talked about divorce all the time though Ebelia believed divorce was not an option in the
Christian faith.
Ebelia used a credit card paid by Robert to hire an attorney to pursue a divorce.
She filed for divorce on July 30, 2013. On that day, she and Robert had an argument
because Robert wanted to take R.C. somewhere without Ebelia. She called the police to
try to resolve the fight and keep R.C. at home. Robert alleged Ebelia assaulted him and
she was arrested. The criminal case was ultimately dropped by the prosecutor.
After this incident, Robert kept R.C. from Ebelia and sought a restraining order
against her. The family court returned R.C. to Ebelia’s custody at the same time Robert
was ordered to pay temporary child and spousal support in 2013. Ebelia moved out and
lived in a friend’s house for a while. Robert allowed her to rent one of his places for a
time but then kicked her out. She rented a home from a friend using her temporary
support from Robert.
Ebelia testified that she and Robert attempted to reconcile during the entirety of
the divorce process. She would occasionally stay at his place, and they took trips
together. It was Robert’s idea to try to reconcile. He told Ebelia she had no right to
divorce him biblically, i.e., there had been no adultery.

5.
Dr. Strangio performed a child custody evaluation in the divorce proceeding and
submitted a report in June 2014. Ebelia agreed with Dr. Strangio that she had high needs
for affection and feared abandonment, which resulted in her usually being submissive.
She testified Robert was a “very self-centered, unaware, controlling, manipulative man”
during the entirety of their marriage. According to her, the core of every issue in the
family’s home was that Ebelia was to submit in all things.
On July 15, 2014, Ebelia emailed her former attorney, Torres, that she would like
to cancel an upcoming court appearance because she and Robert were attempting
reconciliation. On August 19, 2014, Ebelia emailed Torres that she and Robert did not
need to proceed with a court hearing the following week because they “have decided to
reconcile and are once again residing together.” She sent another email on August 22,
2014, stating she and Robert “would like to dismiss the matter.”
Robert’s attorney sent Ebelia’s attorney a proposed settlement offer on
September 9, 2014. At the time, Ebelia was pregnant with her and Robert’s second child.
Ebelia panicked when she learned that month that the family court had reduced her
temporary support from Robert. Robert was going to further decrease the amount of her
support by $800 to pay back the arrearages. Ebelia worried about how she would provide
for her children and started to consider Robert’s proposal to reconcile.
On September 19, 2014, Torres sent a letter to Ebelia to memorialize a telephone
conversation between them the previous day. During the call, Torres and Ebelia
discussed the settlement proposal from Robert and the family court’s decision regarding
Robert’s support. Torres had repeatedly advised Ebelia against signing any agreement
with the terms set forth in the proposal. Torres had also explained the need to retain a
forensic accountant to show Robert’s income was different than he presented to the court,
and for further discovery prior to trial. Ebelia had informed Torres that Robert told her
“ ‘your attorney’ does not want to work with you anymore.” Torres assured Ebelia “no
such information was ever said, relayed, or discussed about you or your case.” Ebelia

6.
had expressed to Torres her willingness to sign an agreement under the terms proposed
by Robert despite Torres’s advice. If Ebelia wished to enter into the agreement under
those terms, Torres insisted Ebelia relieve her as attorney of record as she strongly
recommended against the agreement.
In early November 2014, Ebelia and Robert exchanged text messages. Robert had
given Ebelia the judgment to look over and she believed there were things in it that they
had not discussed. Ebelia testified she and Robert had discussed they were going to
terminate all action, reconcile, and the judgment was to protect his company and business
interests. He told Ebelia the judgment was apart from the marriage, and he needed it to
be sure she was not staying with him for money.
In the text messages, Robert asked Ebelia if she was still using an attorney or not.
Ebelia messaged that she was agreeing to discontinue being represented by an attorney
and settle directly with Robert if in return she can move back in with her daughter.
Robert replied he did not care “whether you fire your attorney or not. Quite frankly it
would probably be better if you kept her so understand it makes no difference to me
whether you keep her or fire her.” He messaged his understanding that they would “put
together a post-nuptial agreement that will deal with any future financial issues in the
way we have previously discussed. Once that agreement is in place if you want to move
here that is fine.”
Ebelia and Robert continued to message back and forth about whether they should
divorce. Ebelia characterized their discussions during this period as “crazy” with the
parties talking about whether to divorce or reconcile within the same day. She was
seeking clarification from Robert on “whether we were going to be able to move back
into the home regardless of divorce or roommates.” Ebelia testified she “didn’t
understand why he would want to separate and remain married if we’re not going to live
as a married couple.” She messaged Robert suggesting they “just divorce” and “that will
terminate everything.” Ebelia claimed that at the time she “wasn’t in [her] right mind” as

7.
she was pregnant and “trying to figure out where to live.” Having a home for her
children was “the only thing on [her] mind.” Ebelia let Robert know she would agree to
the judgment because she wanted a home for her children but would “not … look at him
as a husband with the honor and respect that you would in a biblical marriage.” Robert
messaged Ebelia that if she wants to “live here then it will have to be as a wife with me as
the head of the household.” She understood that to mean that once they moved in
together, she and Robert were resuming the marriage. At one point, she messaged
Robert: “Let the ‘sin’ fall on me.” Ebelia testified Robert had told her the sin would be
on her if she divorced him, “just like his other wives. Whoever divorces the sin is on. So
they are going to be judged by God, and he’s free to remarry without the sin following
him.” She felt he pressured her into coming back and being a stay-at-home mom when
they discussed their unborn second child.
Torres subsequently filed her motion to be relieved as counsel on November 6,
2014. The substitution of attorney was filed on November 12, 2014, after which Ebelia
no longer had an attorney.
In late November 2014, Ebelia and Robert exchanged text messages about the
judgment. She felt he was pressuring her to read and sign it and gave her a time limit.
Ebelia messaged Robert that she was not feeling well and had not thoroughly read the
judgment. She had “skimmed through it and it seems there is a lot more there than we
talked about.” She testified that he led her to believe during in-person talks that the
judgment was for protecting his business. Ebelia reported being confused when she and
Robert were texting because the judgment did not match what they had talked about.
After further back and forth, Robert messaged Ebelia that she had “until 7:00 tomorrow”
to return the judgment to him signed or he was retracting the offer. Though she
“skimmed” the judgment, she testified she felt unable to understand its language. Ebelia
messaged Robert seeking clarification on whether she and her daughter could move back
in if the judgment was not signed. She understood from their exchange that only by

8.
signing the judgment would she and her children be allowed back in the home.
Ebelia confirmed she signed and initialed the judgment and recalled a notary’s
involvement. She denied reading the paragraphs she initialed before doing so. Ebelia did
not have an attorney when she signed the judgment and denied having an opportunity to
consult with an attorney. When she signed the judgment, she did not understand that she
might be giving up her rights to property division and spousal support in a later divorce
proceeding. Ebelia was unaware the judgment was going to be filed in court as a
judgment. She did not appear in court to be questioned by a judge about whether she
understood the judgment.
Ebelia moved back into Robert’s house in Modesto after the judgment was signed
in January 2015. Ebelia gave birth to a daughter in April 2015, and the family moved to
Hawaii in the summer of 2015. Ebelia did not want to move to Hawaii because she
wanted to stay in Modesto near her extended family.
Robert and Ebelia continued to have marital problems in Hawaii. Around
December 2018, Ebelia started considering divorce and consulting with attorneys about
applying for divorce in Hawaii. The judgment and how it affected her rights under a
divorce in Hawaii were first explained to Ebelia by her current attorney in January 2023.
She filed the action to set aside the judgment in October 2023.
On cross-examination, Ebelia confirmed that she elected not to proceed with a
forensic accountant or further discovery despite Torres’s advice to do so. She believed
she and Robert were reconciling. Regarding Robert’s text message that it “would
probably be better” if Ebelia kept her attorney, Ebelia testified Robert “says things in
person and writes things differently.”
Ebelia confirmed Robert gave her the judgment to review. She read portions of
the judgment but not all of it. Ebelia did not understand the judgment and there were
things in it she and Robert had not discussed. She had the judgment from November 3,
2014, until she signed it on January 9, 2015. Ebelia never talked to Robert’s attorney

9.
about the judgment or requested changes. She did not take the judgment to an attorney to
get legal advice. Ebelia thought the judgment was solely for protection of Robert’s
company based on Robert’s explanation of it to her. She confirmed no one made threats
against her if she did not sign the judgment.
In 2019, Ebelia contacted three or four attorneys for legal advice about her
marriage. She spent four years, from 2019 through 2022, reaching out to various
attorneys to obtain advice. Ebelia believed she gave at least two attorneys a copy of the
judgment. She testified her current attorney was the first person who offered to help her.
On redirect examination, Ebelia testified she had shared with Robert that her
attorney advised her not to take the original settlement offer. Robert would tell Ebelia
that her attorney would not continue representing her, that she had no money, and “would
not be able to pursue this.”
Ebelia testified Robert did not explain to her that the judgment affected her legal
rights in a potential future divorce. He reportedly “said it was very separate from our
marriage,” and “was only for protection of his company.” She did not believe the
judgment affected their marriage.
2. Robert’s Evidence
In his testimony, Robert denied that he encouraged or discouraged Ebelia’s
retention of Torres as her attorney. He further denied that he encouraged Ebelia to
terminate Torres’s or any other attorney’s services. Robert testified he thought it would
be best if Ebelia kept her attorney and encouraged her to retain Torres’s services. He had
no contact with Torres and had nothing to do with the financial arrangements between
Ebelia and Torres.
On April 11, 2014, Robert filed a preliminary declaration of disclosure. He
confirmed the declaration contained a full and accurate list of his community and
separate property including his businesses as of that date.

10.
Robert and Ebelia met on November 3, 2014, to discuss and negotiate settlement
terms. The sum of $16,000 was negotiated between them based on the amount Ebelia
told Robert she needed to pay off all her debt at the time. Robert wanted to settle his case
and testified Ebelia appeared from their discussions to want to settle as well. Ebelia told
Robert she “wanted to end the fight” and intended “to withdraw her divorce petition.”
Robert paid Ebelia the equalizing payment provided for in the judgment and
otherwise fully complied with its terms and conditions. He denied providing Ebelia with
any legal advice pertaining to the judgment’s terms and conditions.
Robert did not want to divorce and testified he and Ebelia “didn’t really know if
[they] were going to divorce or not. [They] were looking for something in the middle.”
He saw the legal separation as setting aside all the financial issues and ending the custody
battle for R.C. because Ebelia and R.C. would move back in. Robert was unwilling to
allow her to move into his house without the legal separation and made that clear.
On cross-examination, Robert denied that he and Ebelia were reconciled or
reconciling in July and August 2014 at the time Ebelia emailed Torres.
Robert confirmed that he and Ebelia met in a park to talk on November 3, 2014.
Ebelia was willing to drop the divorce if she could move back in, but she and Robert
would live separate lives. Robert opposed this plan. He was unwilling to live with
Ebelia after a divorce, and he did not want to get divorced. Robert was also unwilling to
allow her to move back in without legal assurances. He proposed to Ebelia that they
enter into an agreement where she would waive any right to alimony and future
accumulation of assets.
Robert gave Ebelia the proposed judgment on November 20, 2014, after receiving
it from his attorney. Ebelia wanted to move back into the house without signing the
judgment, but Robert would not agree to that. According to Robert, Ebelia’s “sole
objective was to move in regardless of the outcome.”
Robert did not understand there was a fiduciary relationship between a husband

11.
and a wife. He did not explain to Ebelia that the judgment was a legal separation. When
asked if he mentioned to Ebelia that the judgment’s purpose was to protect his business,
Robert responded, “[a]mong many other things.” Robert testified they mutually agreed
neither would pursue the other in terms of separate assets.
C. The Statement of Decision
On February 19, 2025, the family court issued a tentative statement of decision
denying Ebelia’s RFO to set aside the judgment. The court found the judgment clearly
stated the nature of the document and its purpose and both parties understood it was a
legal separation and not a document taking care of Robert’s businesses separate from the
marriage. Citing Ebelia’s text messages, the court concluded Ebelia knew the judgment
was a legal separation and she had her own reasons to enter into an agreement including
her desire to move back into the house and the $16,000 equalizing payment she received.
The family court found Ebelia was not credible in her assertions that Robert
interfered with her attorney-client relationship with Torres. The record reflected Torres
withdrew as Ebelia’s attorney because Ebelia refused to take her advice and failed to pay
her attorney fees. Additionally, the judgment included a waiver of counsel and reflected
that Ebelia had read and understood the contents and legal effects of the judgment and
entered it freely and voluntarily.
The family court concluded Ebelia’s claim of actual fraud was time-barred and
beyond the statute of limitations in section 2122, subdivision (a). The court found Ebelia
knew the facts about the alleged interference with her attorney-client relationship in
2014. The court also found she knew she was waiving all rights to spousal support at the
time of the judgment’s execution based on the judgment’s provisions. This was not an
after-discovered fact because there was no concealed evidence that was discovered later
in 2023. The only new fact was that Ebelia learned the effect of the judgment from her
new attorney in January 2023. On this last point, the court found Ebelia’s testimony was
not credible because she acknowledged in the judgment that she understood its legal

12.
effects and the parties individually and mutually requested to enter the judgment after
thoughtful consideration.
The family court concluded Ebelia failed to meet her burden of proof to show
Robert committed actual fraud. The court found the following: Ebelia’s claims of being
under financial pressure may amount to duress; her failure to understand the judgment
may amount to a mistake of fact or law; and her failure to read the judgment due to her
pregnancy or monetary pressures may amount to, at best, a capacity issue. The court
found all these claims did not show actual fraud and were beyond the statute of
limitations. The court also found no grounds to apply the presumption of undue
influence or duress.
Neither party objected to the family court’s statement of decision. Accordingly,
judgment denying Ebelia’s RFO was entered on March 25, 2025.
Ebelia timely appealed. 5
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Augment the Record
As a preliminary matter, we address Ebelia’s motion to augment the record to
include the RFO and its supporting documentation, and the parties’ pre-trial briefs.
In May 2025, Ebelia filed a notice designating the record on appeal. She did not
request inclusion of her RFO or the parties’ pre-trial briefing. 6 The clerk’s and reporter’s
transcripts were filed on October 23, 2025.
On November 25, 2025, Ebelia filed her opening brief. After several extensions
and a substitution of attorney, Robert’s new counsel filed a respondent’s brief on April 7,

5 An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment is appealable as an order after
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)
6 “Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, an appellant must serve and file a notice
in the superior court designating the record on appeal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121(a).) “If
the appellant elects to use a clerk’s transcript, the notice must … designate the documents to be
included.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121(b)(1)(B).)

13.
2026. In his brief, Robert argues in relevant part that Ebelia waived her arguments on
appeal because she failed to provide an adequate record for review by omitting from the
clerk’s transcript a copy of her original moving papers by which she sought relief from
the judgment. Robert also contends Ebelia waived her arguments about Robert’s alleged
breach of fiduciary duty because she did not raise this issue before the family court.
On April 20, 2026, Ebelia filed a motion to “supplement” the record on appeal.
Ebelia sought to include her original RFO to set aside the judgment with its supporting
documentation and the parties’ pre-trial briefing. Her motion was expressly filed in
response to Robert’s arguments about the adequacy of the record and alleged waiver of
the issue of fiduciary duty. Four documents were attached to Ebelia’s motion: (1) the
RFO to set aside the judgment and its attachments; (2) respondent’s trial brief; (3)
appellant’s hearing brief; and (4) respondent’s supplemental trial brief. The attached
documents had reportedly been filed with the family court but were not certified copies.
Ebelia subsequently filed her reply brief on the merits on April 27, 2026.
On April 28, 2026, Robert filed an opposition to Ebelia’s motion to supplement
the record arguing the motion was untimely, sought prejudicial relief, lacked good cause,
and in improper form.
On May 15, 2026, this court issued an order deferring decision on Ebelia’s motion
to supplement the record and granting Ebelia’s request to reply to Robert’s opposition to
the motion. Ebelia filed her reply to Robert’s opposition on May 18, 2026.
A trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct, and the appellant bears
the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) It is therefore also the appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record to
assess error. (Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
538, 546.) An appellant’s failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires the
reviewing court to resolve the issue against the appellant. (Foust v. San Jose
Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) Additionally, the appellant’s

14.
failure to raise an issue at the trial level generally results in waiver of that issue on appeal.
(Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1381.)
The record on appeal may be augmented to include omitted documents. “At any
time, on motion of a party or its own motion, the reviewing court may order the record
augmented to include: [¶] (A) Any document filed or lodged in the case in superior
court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) In this court, however, appellants
should file requests for augmentation within 40 days of the filing of the record. (Ct.
App., Fifth Dist., Local Rules, rule 1(b), Augmentation of Record and Correction of
Omissions from Record.) “Thereafter, motions to augment will not be granted except
upon a showing of good cause for the delay.” (Ibid.)
Augmentation is not a matter of right but is instead within the court’s discretion.
(Russi v. Bank of America (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 100, 102.) Augmentation is not a
substitute for adequate record preparation. (Ibid. [augmentation may be denied for
inexcusable neglect].) A request to augment the record generally will not be granted
absent a showing of good cause for failure to adequately designate the record previously.
(Regents of University of California v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1 [late
motions to augment denied for lack of good cause]; Courtell v. McEachen (1956) 147
Cal.App.2d 219, 221 [augmentation denied for lack of good cause for omission].)
Requests for augmentation may also be denied where the appellant fails to show “unusual
or unavoidable circumstances giving rise to the delay” in submitting the request. (People
v. Preslie (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 492.)
Ebelia’s motion to augment is untimely and she has failed to show good cause for
the delay. Her motion was not filed until nearly six months after the record on appeal had
been filed. Ebelia did not seek to augment the record until after Robert filed his
respondent’s brief asserting deficiencies in the record and waiver of the issue of fiduciary
duty. She expressly sought to augment the record to counter Robert’s arguments while
simultaneously arguing the additional documents were unnecessary for the record on

15.
appeal or this court’s consideration of the issues raised by her appeal. Ebelia does not
explain her failure to designate the missing documents at the outset or justify the delay in
moving to augment the record. We therefore deny the motion to augment.
In any event, we are not persuaded that Ebelia waived her arguments on appeal.
The appellate record is not inadequate despite the omission of Ebelia’s RFO and its
supporting documentation. Though preferable and prudent to designate the original
moving papers as part of the record, the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts adequately
reflect Ebelia’s grounds for seeking to set aside the judgment. Her attorney repeatedly
argued to the family court that Robert committed extrinsic fraud by allegedly
misrepresenting the judgment to Ebelia and interfering with Ebelia’s relationship with her
former attorney. Contrary to Robert’s contentions, the record shows the bases for
Ebelia’s theories of relief even without the RFO.
Additionally, the record reflects Ebelia did raise the issue of Robert’s alleged
breach of his fiduciary duty in the family court. Ebelia’s post-trial brief, which is in the
clerk’s transcript, expressly raises this issue. The court’s statement of decision
demonstrates its understanding Ebelia was arguing Robert breached his fiduciary duty to
her and specifically addresses the issue. This issue was preserved for appeal and will be
addressed on the merits.
II. Motion to Set Aside
Ebelia moved to set aside the judgment of legal separation between her and
Robert. A “judgment of legal separation (formerly a decree of separate maintenance) is
designed to resolve the financial issues between the parties, including division of
community assets and liabilities and determination of support obligations. [Citations.] A
judgment for legal separation, however, is not an interim order. It serves as a final
adjudication of the parties’ property rights .…” (Estate of Lahey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
1056, 1059.)

16.
A. Governing Legal Principles
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides that a court may
relieve a party from a judgment or order taken against the party through mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect if the application for relief is made “within a
reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment … was taken.”
Section 2122 sets forth the exclusive grounds for setting aside a judgment in a
marital dissolution action after the period for seeking relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473 has expired. (In re Marriage of Kieturakis (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 56, 87.) “Under section 2122, there are six grounds to set aside a judgment,
or portion thereof, including actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake, and
the failure to fully disclose the value of assets under section 2100 et seq.” (In re
Marriage of Georgiou & Leslie (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 561, 571 (Georgiou); § 2122,
subds. (a)–(f).)
“The party moving for relief under section 2122 bears the burden of proving
entitlement to relief.” (In re Marriage of Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 566
(Diamond).) In addition to one of the six grounds for relief in section 2122, the party
seeking relief must establish “that the facts alleged as the grounds for relief materially
affected the original outcome and that the moving party would materially benefit from
the granting of the relief.” (§ 2121, subd. (b).) Section 2123 limits relief as follows:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, or any other law, a judgment may
not be set aside simply because the court finds that it was inequitable when made, nor
simply because subsequent circumstances caused the division of assets or liabilities to
become inequitable, or the support to become inadequate.”
As relevant here, a set-aside motion based on actual fraud requires showing “the
defrauded party was kept in ignorance or in some other manner was fraudulently
prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.” (§ 2122, subd. (a).) “Extrinsic
fraud occurs where a party is deprived of the opportunity to present her claim or defense

17.
to the court, or in some manner fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the
proceeding.” (Kuehn, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 832.) “Examples of extrinsic fraud
are: concealment of the existence of a community property asset, failure to give notice of
the action to the other party, convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the
matter will not proceed (and it does proceed).” (In re Marriage of Varner (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 128, 140, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Rubenstein v.
Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1144, fn. 7 (Rubenstein).) In contrast, “ ‘[f]raud
is intrinsic and not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been
given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect
himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary, but has unreasonably neglected to do
so.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. Standard of Review
A family court’s ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment under section 2122 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th
673, 682.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712,
fns. omitted.)
Though the substantial evidence standard generally applies to the family court’s
factual findings, “a different standard applies where, as here, the appellant had the burden
of proof in the family court. ‘ “In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or
implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and
that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.” [Citation.] “Thus, where the issue on
appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes

18.
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” ’ ”
(Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) “ ‘ “Specifically, the question becomes
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.; Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County
of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
“We do not reweigh the evidence or reconsider credibility determinations.
[Citation.] ‘[A] reviewing court, should not disturb the exercise of a trial court’s
discretion unless it appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Dandona & Araluce (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.)
C. Actual Fraud
We begin with Ebelia’s argument that the family court failed to apply the proper
legal standard by failing to consider the parties’ fiduciary relationship in finding Robert
did not commit extrinsic fraud.
“The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied.” (City
of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.) “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the issue at hand.”
(Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 85.) Whether the court applied
the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law
reviewed de novo. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 116.)
“Marriage creates a fiduciary relationship between spouses.” (In re Marriage of
Brewer & Federici (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Section 721, subdivision (b)
provides in relevant part that “in transactions between themselves, spouses are subject to
the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons
occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes
a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take
any unfair advantage of the other.” Section 1100, subdivision (e) further provides:

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“Each spouse shall act with respect to the other spouse in the management and control of
the community assets and liabilities in accordance with the general rules governing
fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons having relationships of
personal confidence as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and
liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court.” Spouses’ “fiduciary duties
expressly extend throughout dissolution proceedings.” (Georgiou, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 569; §§ 2100, subd. (c), 2102.)
Ebelia contends the family court improperly applied the following standard to
Robert’s fiduciary duty from In re Marriage of Trearse (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1189:
extrinsic evidence is “admissible to ascertain the intent of an agreed … judgment of
dissolution of marriage to the same extent such evidence would be admissible to ascertain
the meaning of any other written agreement.” (Id. at p. 1194.) She argues this principle
about contract disputes does not apply when construing a contract between divorcing
parties who owe each other a fiduciary duty. Ebelia challenges the continued validity of
Trearse as it predates sections 721 and 1100. She contends the correct legal standard for
spousal fiduciary duties is instead from In re Marriage of Brewer & Federici, supra, 93
Cal.App.4th at p. 1342: “The formulation of a marital settlement agreement is not an
ordinary business transaction, resulting from an arm’s-length negotiation between
adversaries. Rather, it is the result of negotiations between fiduciaries required to openly
share information.” (Id. at p. 1344.)
Nothing in the statement of decision indicates the family court misunderstood the
applicable legal standard to the disputed issues. As an initial matter, the court’s citation
to Trearse was not directed at construing the parties’ fiduciary relationship. The quoted
language from Trearse reflects the court’s understanding that extrinsic evidence is
admissible to ascertain the intent of the disputed judgment in this case to the same extent
such evidence is admissible in any contractual dispute. In other words, the court was
simply commenting on what evidence could potentially be considered in deciding if

20.
Robert committed fraud. Given Ebelia relied extensively on extrinsic evidence to support
her claim she misunderstood the judgment, the court appropriately addressed the
admissibility of such evidence.
Moreover, Ebelia is incorrect that the legal principles regarding extrinsic evidence
in interpreting contracts are not applicable to construe an agreement between divorcing
parties. Agreements entered between spouses that become part of a family law judgment
are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretation of written contracts.
(In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) When parties settle an
agreement in writing, their intent “is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if
possible.” (Civ. Code, § 1639.) Here, the family court correctly understood that, as with
other written contracts, extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the terms of a
judgment in a marital dissolution proceeding “only if ‘it supports a meaning to which the
language is reasonably susceptible .…’ [Citation.] ‘As a matter of substantive law,
extrinsic evidence cannot be relied on to support a meaning to which the agreement is not
reasonably susceptible.’ ” (In re Marriage of Thorne & Raccina (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
492, 503 (Thorne).) Though Trearse predates the enactment of sections 721 and 1100 as
Ebelia observes, the Trearse court’s holding regarding the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence in a marital dissolution proceeding remains legally sound. (E.g., Thorne, at
pp. 503–504 [discussing admissibility of extrinsic evidence in interpreting terms of 1999
judgment in a marital dissolution proceeding].)
Applying the correct legal principles, the family court found the judgment’s plain
language was not reasonably susceptible to Ebelia’s understanding the judgment was
directed solely at protecting Robert’s business. The record supports this finding. The
judgment expressly stated the parties agree it “shall be entered as a Stipulation for
Judgment of Legal Separation.” It included provisions regarding child support, spousal
support, and division of property, all of which were clearly titled as such. The judgment
specified that “each party waives any right to seek or receive spousal support from the

21.
other,” and “the division of property set forth herein resolves all property issues between”
the parties. This language is unambiguous. In the absence of ambiguity in the
judgment’s terms, Ebelia’s extrinsic evidence could not support an understanding of the
judgment contradicted by its plain language. (See Parsons v. Bristol Development Co.
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865 [extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret an agreement, but
not to give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible].)
Ebelia seems to suggest the parties’ fiduciary relationship lends greater weight to
the extrinsic evidence about her understanding of the judgment than the judgment’s
language itself. No supporting authority is given for this implied notion. In any event,
the extrinsic evidence was in conflict about whether Ebelia misunderstood the judgment.
Though Ebelia testified Robert misrepresented the judgment to her as only protecting his
business, other evidence shows she understood the judgment covered more. In the
parties’ text messages, Ebelia stated the judgment contained “a lot more” “than we talked
about.” Her messages show that she knew the parties were agreeing to a legal separation.
Specifically, Ebelia messaged: they “[c]an legally separate and settle”; “[i]f we go
through the legal separation process through court in January will you no longer allow
Bella and I back in the home once we are legally separated?”; “[i]t is you requiring that
we be legally separated before we move back in”; and “[y]ou are the one wanting the
legal separation now.”
The family court found the parties’ text messages credibly established that Ebelia
knew the judgment was a legal separation, not a document to take care of Robert’s
business interests and nothing to do with the marriage. Ebelia has not shown that finding
was in error. “When the competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires
resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction will be upheld if it is
supported by substantial evidence.” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country
Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.)
Ultimately, Ebelia had the burden of proving she was “kept in ignorance” about

22.
the nature of the judgment due to Robert’s alleged misrepresentation. (§ 2122, subd. (a).)
“Where a confidential relation exists between the parties and one of the parties signs an
instrument without reading it in reliance on false representations as to its contents by the
other party, the instrument may be avoided. [Citation.] It is a question of fact whether a
party has been induced to sign a document by the fraudulent misrepresentations of
another party about the nature of the document.” (In re Marriage of Grissom (1994) 30
Cal.App.4th 40, 47.) The family court expressly found Ebelia failed to meet her burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Robert committed actual fraud. Ebelia
has not met her high burden on appeal to show that her evidence was uncontradicted and
unimpeached or of such character and weight that there was no room for the court to
make this finding. As discussed above, the text messages demonstrated Ebelia was not
ignorant about the nature of the agreement she was entering—she understood it was a
legal separation and covered more than Robert’s business. As the court observed, Ebelia
had her own reasons for agreeing to the judgment including her desire to move back into
the house and the $16,000 equalizing payment.
Ebelia argues that Robert did not understand the judgment’s language any more
than she did while simultaneously arguing he breached his fiduciary duty to explain the
judgment and its effect to her. These arguments are paradoxical. If Robert did not
understand the judgment, it is unclear how he could have explained it to anyone,
including his wife. Ebelia also misreads the record. During his testimony, Robert
correctly identified the portion of the judgment stating the parties were waiving their
right to spousal support for all time. Robert testified he did not “understand the legality”
of the judgment as his “attorney put it together.” (Italics added.) When asked how
Ebelia could understand the judgment “without a lawyer” if Robert did not, he responded,
“I read it, and she can read it.” He then expressly denied saying he did not understand the
judgment and the transcript supports that assertion.
Ebelia essentially claims the spousal fiduciary relationship extends to providing

23.
each other with legal advice by arguing Robert was obliged to explain to Ebelia the
judgment’s potential legal ramifications. This claim is meritless. Fraud allegations based
on a breach of fiduciary duty most commonly arise from a spouse’s concealment of
assets. (E.g., Georgiou, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 568 [wife alleged husband deceived
her about the size of his potential lawsuit referral fee]; In re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 34, 41 [wife intentionally concealed lottery winnings which were
community property]; Kuehn, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 833 [husband allegedly did not
disclose several community assets during the marital dissolution].) Here, neither the
judgment’s contents nor its effects were concealed. As stated above, Ebelia knew this
was a legal separation and not restricted to protecting Robert’s business. The judgment
expressly stated the parties “carefully read” and entered into the judgment “with full
knowledge of it[s] legal effect.” We are not convinced Robert’s fiduciary duty obligated
him to disclose to Ebelia what she could learn herself by reading the judgment or
consulting with counsel. Regardless of what Robert may have told Ebelia, she had the
judgment in her possession for approximately two months before signing it. She
therefore had ample opportunity before signing the judgment to guard against waiver of
her rights to spousal support and marital property. Her failure to do so does not
constitute extrinsic fraud on Robert’s part. (See Thorne, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 505
[wife’s decision not to consult with independent counsel about her rights was mistake
attributable to her and not grounds for setting aside judgment].)
We recognize, as the family court did, that Ebelia’s claims of being under pressure
due to her finances and fear of being homeless prior to signing the judgment may amount
to a claim of duress. Although “the Family Code does not define ‘duress,’ ” “in the
context of section 2122, courts have found ‘ “ ‘ “[d]uress … includes whatever destroys
one’s free agency and constrains [him or her] to do what is against [his or her] will, [and]
may be exercised by threats, importunity or any species of mental coercion
[citation] .…” ’ [Citation.] It is shown where a party ‘intentionally used threats or

24.
pressure to induce action or nonaction to the other party’s detriment. [Citation.]’
[Citations.] The coercion must induce the assent of the coerced party, who has no
reasonable alternative to succumbing.” ’ ” (Diamond, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 571;
Civ. Code, § 1569 [defining duress].)
We are sympathetic to Ebelia’s concerns about her financial stability and
providing a home for her children when she was deciding whether to settle. The record
does not, however, support a claim of duress given Ebelia confirmed she was not forced
to sign the judgment under threat, and the evidence of Robert’s pressure to sign does not
amount to coercion. The fact that she had the judgment for at least two months before
signing militates against finding Ebelia did so under duress. (In re Marriage of Rosevear,
supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 685–686 [wife may have experienced “ ‘buyer’s remorse’ ”
but not duress where she had three months to reflect or obtain advice before signing
stipulated judgment].) Furthermore, a motion to set aside based on duress is subject to a
two-year statute of limitations (§ 2122, subd. (c)) and any claim of duress brought by
Ebelia in 2023 would be untimely.
We turn to whether Robert committed extrinsic fraud by interfering with Ebelia’s
attorney-client relationship. Extrinsic fraud may “encompass almost any set of extrinsic
circumstances which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing” (Thorne, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 505) and includes convincing the other party not to obtain counsel.
(Kuehn, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 832; In re Marriage of Varner, supra, 55
Cal.App.4th at p. 140, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in Rubenstein,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144, fn. 7.)
The record supports the family court’s finding that Robert did not interfere with
Ebelia’s attorney-client relationship. The primary basis for the alleged interference was
Robert’s comment to Ebelia that “ ‘your attorney’ does not want to work with you
anymore.” But the court concluded Ebelia was not credible in her assertions that this
comment interfered with Ebelia’s attorney-client relationship. Torres expressly denied

25.
that any such talks had occurred in her 2014 letter to Ebelia. That letter and Torres’s
petition to withdraw as counsel instead shows the breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship was caused by Ebelia’s refusal to follow Torres’s advice and failure to pay
her fees. The evidence shows Robert did not pressure Ebelia to get rid of her attorney
given his text messages illustrate his indifference to whether she fired her attorney.
Robert expressly messaged Ebelia it would “be better if [she] kept” her attorney. To the
extent Ebelia is claiming the court should have found her testimony credible, we may not
reassess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence on appeal. (Diamond, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; In re Marriage of Boswell (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1175
[“We do not judge credibility on appeal.”].)
D. Timeliness of Motion
Ebelia argues the family court erred in finding that even if Robert committed
extrinsic fraud, the RFO was untimely because she should have discovered the fraud
more than one year before filing her RFO. She contends she timely filed her RFO in
October 2023 because she did not discover until January 2023 the fraudulent “effect” of
the judgment that she was not entitled to property division or alimony in her Hawaii
divorce proceeding.
A claim of actual fraud is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. (§ 2122,
subd. (a).) “The one-year period begins to run from the date on which the plaintiff either
discovered, or should have discovered, the facts constituting the fraud.” (Rubenstein,
supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.)
A party is generally entitled to challenge a judgment for fraud under section 2122
within one year of learning “new facts” that “did not exist [or were unknown] at the time
the underlying matter was adjudicated.” (Rubenstein, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)
For example, in Rubenstein, the husband denied in the marital dissolution proceedings
that he had an ownership interest in Jimi Hendrix’s recordings for purposes of
community property. (Id. at p. 1137.) Five years later, the wife sought to set aside the

26.
judgment for spousal support after she discovered the husband had claimed he did have
an ownership interest in Hendrix’s recordings in his answer to a federal complaint. (Id. at
pp. 1138–1139.) The Court of Appeal rejected the husband’s arguments that the wife
should have discovered his fraud earlier because she suspected he had concealed and
misstated community assets. (Id. at pp. 1148–1149.) The court concluded the wife’s
“unsupported allegations fell far short of a showing” that the wife knew or should have
known the facts constituting the fraud. (Id. at p. 1150.) Because the evidence from the
federal action did not exist beforehand and could not have been discovered earlier, the
wife’s motion to set aside the judgment was not time-barred. (Ibid.; cf. Georgiou, supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571–572 [action filed in 2010 was time-barred under § 2122
where the wife discovered in 2008 the husband received a substantially higher lawsuit
referral fee than previously suggested was possible].)
Here, Ebelia does not point to any later discovered facts regarding the alleged
fraudulent conduct. She knew the set of facts supporting her basis for fraud as early as
2015. As the family court found, Ebelia knew in 2014 that Robert had allegedly
interfered with her attorney-client relationship by his comment that Torres did not want
to work with her and Torres’s letter expressing her intent to withdraw as counsel. If
Robert did misrepresent the judgment to Ebelia as only protecting his business, she knew
or should have known that she was waiving all rights to spousal support by at least 2015
as this was an express provision of the judgment she executed. The one-year statute of
limitations in section 2122, subdivision (a) had long since expired by the time Ebelia
filed her RFO in 2023.
Ebelia argues she did not discover the facts constituting the alleged fraud until she
learned of the judgment’s fraudulent effect from her attorney in 2023. This argument
misconstrues section 2122 and is unsupported by the record. The facts constituting fraud
under section 2122 are directed at the party’s conduct in committing the fraud, not the
fraud’s effect on the misled party. As discussed above, the judgment expressly states

27.
Ebelia read and understood what she was signing and entered the judgment “with full
knowledge of it[s] legal effect.” Such “avowals” in an agreement “should count for
something, at least where … the parties’ capacity is not in question.” (In re Marriage of
Kieturakis, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 90.) Accordingly, the family court did not err by
finding that even if Robert committed fraud, Ebelia’s motion to set aside the judgment
was time-barred under section 2122.
E. Evidentiary Ruling
Ebelia also contends the family court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her
to testify about her upbringing and background.
Toward the beginning of Ebelia’s testimony, her attorney attempted to ask
questions about her upbringing in Mexico. Robert’s attorney objected citing Evidence
Code section 352. Ebelia’s attorney argued the evidence was relevant because Robert
“knows all about my client’s growing up in a Mexican family with seven children, very
abusive, controlling father, and he used his knowledge about my client’s growing up to
be able to manipulate her and control her and eventually get her to sign a document she
knew nothing about.” The family court sustained Robert’s objections to this line of
questioning on the grounds of Evidence Code section 352 and relevance. Additional
questions about Ebelia’s upbringing resulted in more sustained objections.
We review the family court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion. (In re Marriage of Dupre (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525.) “A judgment
will not be reversed due to the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless it appears, upon
examining the entire cause, including the evidence, a miscarriage of justice has resulted.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.) A miscarriage of justice occurs only when
the reviewing court is convinced it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the
appellant would have been reached absent the error.” (California Crane School, Inc. v.
National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 24.)
Reasonable probability in this context means “ ‘a reasonable chance, more than an

28.
abstract possibility.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.)
Ebelia argues the excluded testimony about her background and upbringing
provided evidence she was easily manipulated by controlling males like her father and
was relevant to Robert’s ability to manipulate her and avoid his fiduciary duty towards
her. But Ebelia testified extensively about her asymmetrical relationship with Robert,
including his insistence that he was the head of the household and expected her to submit
in all things. She also testified to Dr. Strangio’s findings that she was usually submissive
because she has high needs for affection and feared abandonment, as well as her
perception that Robert was manipulative. Despite this evidence, the family court found
Ebelia freely and voluntarily entered the judgment and was not induced to do so by
Robert. We have already concluded the court’s findings are supported by the evidence
and Ebelia fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable result absent
the exclusion of her testimony. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their
own costs on appeal.

HARRELL, J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, Acting P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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