Filed 9/1/26 Marriage of Cervantes and Rodriguez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of JOSEFINA
RODRIGUEZ CERVANTES and
JOSE RODRIGUEZ. D087798
JOSEFINA RODRIGUEZ
CERVANTES,
(Riverside Super. Ct.
Appellant, No. IND101232)
v.
JOSE RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Kristi Kirk, Judge. Affirmed.
La Quinta Law Group and Timothy L. Ewanyshyn, for Appellant.
Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica M. Barbero,
for Respondent.
Josefina Rodriguez Cervantes (Josefina) and Jose Rodriguez (Jose)
divorced in 2011. They reached a marital settlement agreement, which was
incorporated into the judgment of dissolution and included a handwritten
order concerning the marital home. More than a decade later, the trial court
determined the language of the order and the parties’ postjudgment conduct
indicated the parties intended for Jose to keep the home after the divorce.
We see no basis to disturb the court’s ruling and therefore affirm its order
denying Josefina a share in the net proceeds from the sale of the property.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fifteen years into their marriage, in December 2001, Josefina and Jose
purchased a home on Verona Road in Cathedral City. They separated several
years later, in April 2010, and judgment on the dissolution of their marriage
was entered in June 2011. According to their settlement agreement
incorporated into the judgment, Josefina would receive an SUV and a Chase
account as her share of the community property, while Jose would receive a
truck, a Bank of America account, a Chase account, and retirement accounts
from the Roman Catholic Archdiocese (his employer) and Country Villas
(her employer). The marital home was not listed in either the community
property or community debts sections of the agreement. Instead, the
agreement included the following handwritten entry under “Miscellaneous
Orders”:
“Reserved: Residence located [on] Verona Rd, Cathedral
City, CA. Respondent to have exclusive use and possession
and to pay all mortgage debt and insurance. Petitioner
agrees to cooperate as necessary when Respondent is ready
to refinance.”
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Not long after the divorce, in June 2013, Josefina quitclaimed the
property to Jose. More than a decade after that, in July 2024, she became
aware that Jose was selling the property. Josefina requested an emergency
order mandating that any sale proceeds be placed in a separate account while
the court divided the property. She asserted that although Jose had “full
control of the house,” “informed [her] on multiple occasions that he plan[ned]
to keep all the profits,” and “claimed that [she had] no right to any profit or
equity in the house,” the house was in fact community property.
In a responsive declaration, Jose explained that at the time of their
divorce, the parties mutually understood that he would keep the house, which
meant he would assume a significant debt because the house had no equity
at the time. Two years later, the parties “renegotiated” the terms of their
property division out of court. Jose agreed to let Josefina keep her Country
Villas retirement account that he was awarded in the divorce. In return, she
agreed to deed the house to him. He also noted that, since the divorce, he
had been solely responsible for paying the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and
maintenance costs, and had made significant improvements that increased
the value of the property.
The trial court heard the matter on August 6, 2024. At the hearing,
Josefina stated that she did not know whether the house was “upside down”
at the time of the divorce and she was unaware of the Country Villas
retirement account. She conceded that she had not paid any bills for the
property since the divorce and that she quitclaimed the property to Jose in
2013. She seemed to believe, however, that signing the deed would modify
the mortgage payment without affecting her ownership.
As the court interpreted the judgment, the parties bargained for Jose
to take over the house, pay for it, and eventually refinance in his name.
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The court “reserved jurisdiction” to the extent of ensuring that Josefina
cooperated with the refinancing process, not to give her money for the
property. Based on the language of the judgment and the parties’
postjudgment conduct—specifically, that Jose had paid the mortgage and
taxes for more than a decade and made improvements on the property,
whereas Josefina had paid nothing and deeded the property to him—the
court found the parties intended the residence to be awarded to Jose and
deemed it his separate property.
In August 2024, Jose sold the house for $450,000 and received
$223,027.84 in profits. Soon thereafter, Josefina, now represented by
counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration. She requested Watts charges
to reimburse the community for all the years Jose exclusively used and
possessed the property at its fair rental value. (See In re Marriage of Watts
(1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 372–374.) At the same time, she recognized that
Jose would be entitled to Epstein credits for his payments on the property
from the time of the divorce until the sale of the property. (See In re
Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 80, 82–84.)
The court granted the request for reconsideration and held an
evidentiary hearing on May 7, 2025. Josefina testified that at the time
of the divorce she did not believe she was giving the house to Jose. She
acknowledged, however, that she agreed Jose would keep the property
because she could not afford it on her own. Josefina also conceded that
she had not made any financial contributions toward the property since
the divorce and that she never asked Jose to pay her rent or sought
reimbursement through the court. On the latter point, she explained
that she did not attempt to seek reimbursement for her share of the property
until now because she “didn’t know [her] rights” or “that there was something
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for [her].” She also did not want to disturb Jose, who had a history of
violence toward her. Josefina maintained that she signed the quitclaim deed
believing it would help Jose modify the mortgage but not remove her from
title. She noted that he was “harassing” and “bothering” her to sign it. As
to the Watts claim, the parties stipulated that the fair rental value of the
property between June 2011 and August 2024 totaled $278,900.
According to Jose, when they divorced, Josefina told him to keep
the house. She did not want anything to do with it. When he signed the
judgment in 2011, he believed he owned the house. The parties stipulated
that at the time of their divorce, the property was subject to an interest-only
fixed rate note with a principal amount of $214,000.00. In the years that
followed, Jose paid $247,585.66 for the mortgage and taxes alone. In
addition, he testified that he spent about $26,500 on upgrades and repairs—
$15,000 to replace the air conditioner, $4,000 to install new cabinets, $6,000
to repair leaky pipes, and $1,500 to fix the garage door. He did not seek
contributions from Josefina for these amounts because “it was [his] house.”
The court ultimately decided that Josefina was not entitled to share
in the sale proceeds. Upon reexamining the language of the judgment—
giving Jose exclusive use and possession of the property, requiring him to
pay the mortgage debt and insurance, and directing Josefina to cooperate
when Jose was ready to refinance—the court surmised that the property
was a debt assigned to Jose. Even assuming the judgment was ambiguous,
the parties’ intent became clear when Josefina executed the quitclaim deed,
relinquishing all her rights to the property.
In any event, the court would not award Watts charges to Josefina.
It noted there was no indication in the judgment that the parties wished to
reserve jurisdiction on Watts or Epstein issues, Josefina’s testimony made
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clear she never intended to collect rent from Jose (until now), and any Watts
charges would be offset by the Epstein credits owed to Jose—both parties
would be entitled to roughly the same amounts.
DISCUSSION
Josefina maintains she is entitled to share in the sale proceeds of the
property. She argues the judgment of dissolution did not award the property
to either party, and therefore characterizes it as an unadjudicated asset.
As we understand its ruling, the trial court determined that the parties
intended for Jose to receive the property at the time of their divorce. In other
words, the property was accounted for in the martial settlement agreement
incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. Accordingly, we observe that
such agreements “are construed under the statutory rules governing the
interpretations of contracts generally.” (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) “ ‘The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give
effect to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518.) “When the
language of the judgment incorporating the marital settlement agreement
is clear, explicit, and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the court will
enforce the express language.” (Iberti, at p. 1440.) When a term of the
agreement is ambiguous, however, the court may accept extrinsic evidence
to prove the parties’ intent, provided the evidence supports a meaning to
which the language is reasonably susceptible. (Id. at p. 1439.) We review the
language of a written agreement independently (Simundza, at p. 1518), and
the trial court’s findings based on extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence
(see In re Marriage of Trearse (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1195).
In our view, the judgment of dissolution is ambiguous as to what the
parties intended with respect to the property. The handwritten entry under
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the “Miscellaneous Orders” section of the judgment could be construed as
reserving jurisdiction over the eventual adjudication of the parties’ respective
interests in the property. Or, as the trial court read the entry, it could be
interpreted as giving the property to Jose but reserving jurisdiction to ensure
that Josefina formally transferred title at a later date. The last sentence of
the handwritten entry—requiring Josefina to cooperate as necessary when
Jose alone was ready to refinance—reasonably supports an inference that the
parties intended Jose to be the sole owner. Indeed, other than the vague
reservation of jurisdiction, there is no language in the judgment suggesting
the parties were contemplating selling the house and sharing in the proceeds.
To the extent the judgment was ambiguous, the trial court found the
extrinsic evidence confirmed the parties’ intent that the property to be given
to Jose, and substantial evidence supports that finding. The evidence showed
that at the time of their divorce, the parties had zero equity in the property
and were making interest-only payments. It makes sense, then, why
Josefina would be willing to let it go. Two years later, consistent with the
handwritten entry, Josefina deeded the property to Jose, allowing him to
refinance in his name. In the decade that followed, Josefina did not take any
action consistent with believing she retained an interest in the property—she
did not attempt to collect rent from Jose directly or through the court, nor did
she contribute to the property in any manner. It was not until the house was
selling at a profit that she asserted an interest. Although Josefina claimed at
the evidentiary hearing that she did not take action sooner because she did
not know her rights or “that there was something for [her]” in the house, the
court could reasonably conclude she would have known she retained an
interest in the property if that was the parties’ understanding at the time
of the divorce.
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Resisting this conclusion, Josefina argues it does not make sense that
Jose would give her the Country Villas retirement account in exchange for
her signing the deed if he was already entitled to the deed under the
judgment. Based on evidence that Jose was “bothering” and “harassing” her
to sign the deed, however, the trial court could have fairly inferred that she
was reluctant to sign the deed, and Jose let her keep the retirement account
to persuade her to sign instead of forcing him to return to court to enforce the
judgment.
Insofar as the judgment assigned the property—a debt—to Jose, there
was no occasion to award Watts charges. (See In re Marriage of Falcone &
Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 978 [“ ‘Where one spouse has the exclusive
use of a community asset during the period between separation and trial, that
spouse may be required to compensate the community for the reasonable
value of that use’ ” (italics added)].) Moreover, the record supports the trial
court’s finding that the claimed Watts charges ($278,900 fair rental value)
were almost exactly offset by the estimated Epstein credits ($247,585.66 for
the mortgage and taxes plus $26,500 for repairs totals $274,085.66).
Even if we were to accept the premise that the property was
unadjudicated in the judgment of dissolution, this would not necessarily
entitle Josefina to an equal share in the sale proceeds. When a party seeks
adjudication of a community estate asset or liability not adjudicated by the
judgment, “the court shall equally divide the omitted or unadjudicated
community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds upon good cause
shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset or
liability.” (Fam. Code, § 2556, italics added.) On the record in this case, it
would not be a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court to award Jose all of
the sale proceeds in the interests of justice. (See In re Marriage of De Prieto
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(2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 748, 759 [decisions made in the interests of justice are
reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Jose took the risk of keeping the property
when it was “upside down.” By holding onto the property for several years,
making regular payments, and investing in necessary repairs, Jose managed
to sell the property at a profit. It hardly seems fair to allow Josefina to
collect half of those proceeds after deeding the property to Jose and otherwise
remaining unconcerned with the property for more than a decade.
Josefina also makes multiple arguments centered around the 2013
quitclaim deed. Specifically, she asserts that any agreement she made to
deed the property to Jose in exchange for the Country Villas retirement
account is invalid because the account does not exist, the agreement was not
in writing, and Jose failed to establish the transaction was not the product of
undue influence. We need not address these arguments in detail. The trial
court (and this court) treat the deed as evidence that the parties intended
Jose to keep the property, not as the sole reason Josefina is not entitled to
share in the sale proceeds. We note, however, that that the judgment plainly
identifies the Country Villas retirement account as a community asset
originally awarded to Jose. And the authorities on which Josefina relies
(Fam. Code, § 852; In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096; In re
Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277) concern transactions between
spouses, yet Josefina executed the deed years after their divorce.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the postjudgment motion to divide the property is
affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
KELETY, J.
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