Filed 8/18/26 Marriage of Braff CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Marriage of ANDREA 2d Civ. No. B346988
and CHARLES BRAFF. (Super. Ct. No. 19FL-0051)
(San Luis Obispo County)
ANDREA BRAFF,
Appellant,
v.
CHARLES BRAFF,
Respondent.
After the dissolution of their marriage, Andrea Braff (wife)
and Charles Braff (husband) were unable to agree on the division
of their tangible personal property. Wife appeals the trial court’s
order approving an arbitrator’s division of the property. Both
parties are proceeding in propria persona.
Wife contends the trial court unlawfully compelled her to
engage in arbitration. She further contends the court and the
arbitrator committed numerous errors.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that wife consented to the arbitration. Wife fails
to comprehend the limited scope of judicial review of an
arbitrator’s award. In addition, the record on appeal is
inadequate for meaningful review of the award.
Factual and Procedural Background
According to husband, the parties were married in
September 2012 and separated in December 2018. The record
shows that in November 2020 a status-only judgment was
entered dissolving the parties’ marriage.
In August 2024 husband filed a Request for Order “for
Personal Property Arbitration to divide Parties’ household
furniture, furnishings, and personal effects.” Husband declared:
“[Wife] contends all personal property was divided at the time of
separation. This is not true.” Husband listed 51 items of
tangible personal property that were subject to division between
the parties.
In her response to husband’s Request for Order, wife said
the parties should use private mediation to try to resolve their
dispute concerning the division of property. “Should mediation
fail to resolve all issues, we will proceed to arbitration for
disputes.”
On October 16, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on
husband’s Request for Order. Husband was represented by
counsel. Wife appeared in propria persona. Two days before the
hearing, husband requested “a personal property arbitration
order assigning our Receiver, Theodore Lanes,” as the arbitrator.
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In August 2024 the trial court appointed Lanes “as Superior
Court Receiver to liquidate community assets and retire
community debt.”
At the October 16, 2024 hearing, wife objected to the
appointment of Lanes as arbitrator because his fee – $525 per
hour – was too high and because husband was trying “to litigate
[her] separate property that [she had] acquired post separation.”
Wife protested, “[I]t’s an attempt to bankrupt me.”
The parties agreed that the trial court would refer the
matter to the court clerk, who would arrange for low-cost
arbitration pursuant to local court rule 2:16. But the clerk
informed the court that rule 2:16 arbitration was no longer
available. The court told the parties that they must select an
arbitrator. If they were unable to agree on an arbitrator, the
court would select one. Wife did not object.
In a document filed five days later on October 21, 2024,
wife requested clarification. Wife said, “I do not have the
financial ability to pay for the costs associated with arbitration
and have not stipulated to arbitration.”
In a separate document also filed on October 21, 2024,
husband’s counsel declared: “I confirmed with Mr. Lanes that he
is qualified, willing and able to serve as arbitrator. He is familiar
with the Parties and the facts of the case. To address costs,
provided the arbitration is binding, [husband] agrees to pay the
first $3,000 of Mr. Lanes’ fees for his role as personal property
arbitrator, after which the Parties would share the costs equally.”
Wife did not object to this fee arrangement.
The next document in the clerk’s transcript is an order filed
on November 4, 2024, appointing Lanes “to serve as Arbitrator
over the issue of Personal Property Arbitration.” The order
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stated: “The scope of the arbitration shall be to characterize,
value and distribute the furniture, furnishings and personal
effects of the Parties. [¶] [] Provided the Parties stipulate that
the arbitration shall be binding, [husband] shall pay the first
$3,000 of Mr. Lanes’ fees as arbitrator, after which the Parties
shall share the cost equally. [¶] [] In the alternative, the Parties
shall stipulate to non-binding arbitration and each Party shall
pay the arbitrator's fees equally.” Wife did not object to the
court’s order.
The next document in the Clerk’s transcript is Lanes’
report filed on March 20, 2025. The report included the division
of the parties’ tangible personal property.
Wife objected to Lanes’ report in her lengthy declaration
that included exhibits. In addition, she filed 18 pages of
supporting points and authorities. The trial court “overruled” all
of her objections. It ordered the distribution of the parties’
tangible personal property pursuant to Lanes’ division of the
property. In accordance with Lanes’ report, it ordered wife to pay
husband “$14,015 to account for the difference in value of the
personal property.”
The Arbitration Is Binding
In her opening brief wife does not say whether she accepted
husband’s offer to pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee provided that
the arbitration would be binding. Wife suggests that the
arbitration is nonbinding. (See p. 7 [“Even if the appointment [of
Lanes] were valid as a non-binding reference, the court
committed a distinct, reversible error”]; see also p. 30 [“A court
conducting a genuine review of a non-binding report is obligated
to reject baseless findings”].)
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The record on appeal is inconclusive as to whether wife
accepted husband’s offer to pay the first $3,000. Husband
contends she accepted his offer, so the arbitration is binding. He
alleges, “Evidence of [wife’s] receipt of $3,000 advance is
identified in RECEIVER’S REVISED FINAL REPORT AND
ACCOUNTING, filed on December 12, 2025,” which wife did not
include in the record. Husband has not moved to augment the
record to include this document. “[M]atters outside the record
will not be considered on appeal.” (Gopal v. Yoshikawa (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 128, 133.)
In her reply brief, wife does not deny husband’s claim that
she accepted his offer to pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee and
that he in fact paid it. She contends the claim “is improper and
factually unsupported by the record on appeal.” Therefore, it is
“forfeited.”
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).)
If the arbitration were nonbinding, wife could have rejected
the arbitrator’s award and the trial court would have lacked
jurisdiction to confirm it. There would have been no need for
wife’s 98-page declaration of objections and 18-page points and
authorities. That she objected to the award instead of rejecting it
establishes that the arbitration was binding.
Standard of Review
“ ‘ “ ‘On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration
award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration
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award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that
the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed
factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those
issues.’ ” ’ ” (Roussos v. Roussos (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 962, 973.)
“The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely narrow because of the strong public policy in favor of
arbitration and according finality to arbitration awards.
[Citations.] An arbitrator's decision generally is not reviewable
for errors of fact or law.” (Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 21, 33.)
Wife’s Claim that Court
Erroneously Compelled Arbitration
Wife claims “the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by
compelling arbitration without [her] consent.” (Bold and
capitalization omitted.) Wife forfeited the consent issue because
she did not raise it in her declaration of objections or points and
authorities filed in the trial court. “It is well settled that the
failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on
appeal any claim of error based on that issue.” (Howitson v.
Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489; see also
Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127 [“A party
who fails to alert the trial court to an issue that has been left
unresolved forfeits the right to raise that issue on appeal”].)
In any event, wife’s claim fails on its merits. Whether wife
consented to arbitration is a factual issue that we review for
substantial evidence. (See ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard,
Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1269; Winograd v. American
Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “[T]he
power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination
as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
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uncontradicted,” to support the [express or implied] findings
below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit
of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its
favor . . . .’ ” ’ ” (David v. Hernandez (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 692,
702.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
finding that wife consented to the arbitration. In her response to
husband’s Request for Order, wife said, “Should mediation fail to
resolve all issues, we will proceed to arbitration for disputes.” At
the October 16, 2024 hearing, wife consented to low-cost
arbitration pursuant to local court rule 2:16. In her opening brief
wife states, “In response to [husband’s] proposal for an affordable
court-administered program to be heard by an attorney, [she]
gave conditional consent, stating, ‘I’m okay with that.’ ” Wife’s
only objection to Lanes was his fee.
After it was determined that the court-administered
arbitration program was no longer available, husband offered to
pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee provided that the arbitration
would be binding. We assume that wife accepted his offer. (See
the discussion, ante, at pp. 5-6.) She did not object to his offer or
the court’s subsequent order appointing Lanes. She participated
in the arbitration without objection.
Wife’s Claim that Trial Court and
Arbitrator Committed Numerous Errors
Wife claims the trial court “committed reversible error by
abdicating its duty of independent review and adopting Mr.
Lanes’ legally flawed report.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.)
In addition, the court’s order approving Lanes’ award “ratified a
property division based on a cascade of categorical legal errors.”
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“The most fundamental error” was Lanes’ alleged reliance on an
item’s cost basis instead of fair market value. “[T]he court
ratified a value devoid of substantial evidentiary support and
based on inadmissible, speculative hearsay.” (Capitalization and
bold omitted.)
Wife goes on to list numerous additional errors allegedly
committed by Lanes and the trial court. She also accuses Lanes
of engaging in “a pattern and practice of a biased process.” Wife
requests that we “correct” Lanes’ and the trial court’s errors and
direct the trial court “to enter a new, final money judgment
ordering [husband] to pay [her] a single, net payment of
$30,024.46. This amount corrects the dispositive financial errors
and makes [her] whole . . . .”
Wife misunderstands the applicable standard of review.
“When parties choose to forgo the traditional court system and
arbitrate their claims, it is assumed they wish to have a final and
conclusive resolution of their dispute. The Legislature has
recognized this underlying assumption of finality and has, by
statute, limited the grounds for judicial review of an arbitrator's
award. [Citation.] Consistent with this legislative intent, [the
California Supreme Court] recognized the general rule that ‘an
arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.’
(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 . . . .)”
(Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 981-982.) “[C]ourts will
not review the arbitrator’s reasoning or the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the award.” (Cooper v. Lavely & Singer
Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.)
“In Moncharsh, [our Supreme Court] held judicial review of
private, binding arbitration awards is generally limited to the
statutory grounds for vacating ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1286.2) or
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correcting (§ 1286.6) an award;[1] [it] rejected the view that a
court may vacate or correct the award because of the arbitrator's
legal or factual error, even an error appearing on the face of the
award. [Citation.] [It] further explained that arbitrators do not
‘exceed[ ] their powers’ within the meaning of section 1286.2,
subdivision (d) and section 1286.6, subdivision (b) merely by
rendering an erroneous decision on a legal or factual issue, so
long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy
submitted to the arbitrators. ‘The arbitrator's resolution of these
issues is what the parties bargained for in the arbitration
agreement.’ ” (Moshonov v. Walsh (2000) 22 Cal.4th 771, 775-
776.)
Pursuant to the principle that a trial court judgment is
presumed correct (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609), wife
was required to present meaningful legal analysis showing that
the alleged errors are cognizable on appeal. “ ‘[T]he party
asserting trial court error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion
of error but must present argument and legal authority on each
point raised. . . .’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
1193, 1207.) Wife failed to carry her burden. She makes no
attempt to show that the alleged errors are cognizable under
Moncharsh and its progeny. She does not mention Moncharsh or
sections 1286.2 and 1286.6. “We are not bound to develop [wife’s]
arguments for [her].” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
Wife “is not exempt from the foregoing rules because [s]he
is representing [her]self on appeal in propria persona. Under the
law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney.
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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[Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party
and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than
other litigants and attorneys. . . .’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
Moreover, wife failed to provide this court with an adequate
record of the arbitration proceedings. The record consists only of
Lane’s perfunctory report, wife’s declaration of objections to the
report, and her supporting points and authorities. The record
does not include all of the relevant evidence presented to the
arbitrator. In his report Lanes stated, “Both [parties] were given
adequate time and opportunity to provide receipts, images,
appraisals, etc. to defend their position on character, value and
possession.”
“ ‘ “[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the
appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the
burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 609.)
Disposition
The order filed on April 4, 2025, entitled “ORDER FOR
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY,” is
affirmed. Husband shall recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. McKAIG, J.*
* Superior Court of Ventura County, Ronda McKaig, Judge. (Assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art, VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
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Erin M. Childs, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Andrea Braff, in propria persona, for Appellant.
Charles Braff, in propria persona, for Respondent.