Filed 9/21/26 Marriage of Besh CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of AMIRRA and
BASIL R. BESH.
AMIRRA ELGAMIEL,
Respondent, A175160
v.
(Alameda County Super. Ct.
BASIL R. BESH,
No. HF21089492)
Appellant.
Following the status-only dissolution of their marriage, Basil R. Besh
and his former wife, Amirra Elgamiel, executed a marital settlement
agreement (MSA) resolving all reserved issues including the disposition of
the marital home. Nine months later, Elgamiel filed an enforcement motion
seeking to remove her name from the home mortgage and deed, which the
trial court granted. Besh now appeals from the trial court’s “Findings and
Order After Hearing,” arguing the court misinterpreted the MSA. We treat
all of Besh’s contentions as forfeited for failure to comply with briefing
requirements on appeal and affirm.1
1 On June 17, 2026, two days after the filing of the reply on appeal and
the case being deemed “fully briefed,” Besh filed a “Motion for Judicial
Notice” in which he asks this court “to take judicial notice of the real world”
1
BACKGROUND
Elgamiel and Besh married in 2003 and have four children together.
They ran a medical practice, with Elgamiel acting as chief financial officer
and administrator and Besh working as a doctor and the chief executive
officer. Elgamiel filed for dissolution in February 2021.
Over the next three years, Elgamiel and Besh attended numerous court
status conferences, coordinated expert reports, and agreed to attend
mediation.
On March 8, 2024, at the parties’ request, the court entered judgment
of dissolution for status only. After continued negotiation, the parties signed
the MSA on September 9; on December 20, 2024, the court entered judgment
on the reserved issues including property division and incorporated the MSA.
As relevant here, Article 7B of the MSA required Besh to remove
Elgamiel’s name from the mortgage and deed for their former marital
residence within 30 days from the December 20, 2024, entry of judgment.2
and attaches a series of unauthenticated materials that include purported
market summaries, legislative digests, consumer advisories, and articles
from the internet. First, this motion appears to be an unauthorized effort to
submit additional briefing and argument to this court in violation of the
California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a). Second, even if this motion was a
properly filed request for judicial notice, the items submitted are either not
the proper subject of judicial notice or are not relevant to the issues to be
decided on appeal, so we exercise our discretion to deny Besh’s motion.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252; Evid. Code, § 459; In re Kenneth D. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1087, 1106 [“ ‘ “Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial
notice of evidence not presented to the trial court” absent exceptional
circumstances’ ”]; Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 835 [“ ‘A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial
notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute’ ”].)
2 Article 7B of the MSA provided in relevant part: “1. The real
property and improvements thereon located at [address], including but not
limited to all furniture, furnishings, and equipment, subject to any and all
2
Besh did not do so, and on June 20, 2025, following months of unsuccessful
“meet and confer” efforts, Elgamiel filed a request for order to enforce the
judgment that also included a request for prevailing party attorney’s fees and
sanctions under Family Code section 271. In her accompanying declaration,
Elgamiel argued Besh had refused to comply with the “plain language” of
Article 7B of the MSA and remove her name from the mortgage and deed of
the residence. She explained that Besh’s preferred method of removing her
name from the mortgage—a process by which he would assume the loan
under his name—was not viable because the mortgagee bank had denied
Besh’s assumption application in March 2025 and instead suggested a
refinance. Thereafter, Besh refused to refinance the property and told
Elgamiel there were no other actions he could take.
Besh’s responsive declaration argued the MSA did not include an
agreement to refinance, he had never been asked to refinance the mortgage,
and he would not have agreed to refinance because the mortgage had a
“highly favorable 3% fixed interest rate.”
Elgamiel countered in a reply that explained there were at least four
methods by which she could be released her from the mortgage: release from
the lender, assumption, refinance, and payment of the outstanding balance.
debt, charge, obligation or liability associated with the property, except as to
[Elgamiel’s] property to be removed upon her move-out. In the event of a
dispute between the parties regarding her property, the parties shall meet
and confer as consistent with Article 3(b) above. Upon the date that
[Elgamiel] vacates the property (expected to be on or before September 8,
2024), [Besh] shall be solely responsible for the mortgage, insurance, and
property taxes and [Besh] shall hold [Elgamiel] harmless and defend her
against any claims related to the property and the mortgage encumbrance
thereon, including removing [Elgamiel’s] name from the mortgage and deed
no later than 30 days from the entry of Judgment.” (Italics added.)
3
At the August 4, 2025 hearing on the request for order to enforce
judgment, the trial court interpreted the MSA to find the “obligation is for
Mr. Besh to take over the house, to take over the mortgage, to remove
[Elgamiel’s] name from the mortgage. And so he needs to take reasonable
action to effect that outcome.” The trial court determined Besh had not made
reasonable efforts to comply with the MSA “simply by applying to assume a
loan that he knew was going to be denied” and thus, required Besh to take
further reasonable action in compliance within 60 days, “whether that’s
refinancing, selling or buying out the home by paying off the rest of the
mortgage.” If one action was not successful then Besh was required “to
attempt one of the other methods of compliance.”3
On October 3, 2025, the court issued the written findings and order
after hearing, which stated the term “ ‘remove’ ” in the MSA was “not
synonymous with an assumption.” The court ordered Besh to take further
action “at his discretion, to effectuate removal of [Elgamiel’s] name from the
mortgage” and to provide documentation of his efforts on or before October 3,
2025 (60 days from the August 4, 2025 hearing). The court “made no finding
that [Besh] breached the Judgment or acted in bad faith; the deadline was set
solely to monitor future compliance.” Consistent with the court’s verbal
orders on August 4, the written order continued the matter for further
hearing to October 20, 2025.
On October 6, 2025, both parties filed supplemental materials:
Elgamiel filed a supplemental brief in support of her request for attorney’s
fees and costs,4 and Besh filed a supplemental declaration in support of a
3 The court reserved ruling on Elgamiel’s attorney’s fees and sanctions
request until the compliance hearing.
4 We do not substantively discuss or offer an opinion concerning
Elgamiel’s ongoing motion for fees and sanctions as it is not the subject of
4
“Motion for Reconsideration” of the court’s August 4 order. Besh represented
that on January 14, 2025, well before her June 2025 request for order to
enforce judgment, Elgamiel executed a deed removing her name from the title
of the property.5 Yet because Elgamiel and her counsel “advanced the fiction
that her name remained on both the mortgage and the deed,” they created a
“false narrative” that shaped the court’s August 4 order. On October 13,
2025, Besh filed the referenced motion for reconsideration because, he
argued, the court’s August 4 order was “based on factual representations
later shown to be false.”6
At a November 5, 2025 hearing, the trial court denied Besh’s motion to
reconsider, found Besh had complied with its prior order because he had since
applied to refinance the mortgage, and set a further hearing date for
December 18, by when Besh was to have completed the refinance or provided
a “valid explanation” as to why it had not been completed.
On December 3, 2025, Besh filed a notice of appeal and on December
18, sought an automatic stay pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916,
which the court granted on January 19, 2026.7
this appeal and was stayed by the trial court on January 19, 2026, pending
the outcome of this appeal.
5 Besh attached the January 29, 2025, grant deed to his declaration.
6 Besh also filed a “rebuttal” to Elgamiel’s supplemental brief and
sought his own sanctions under Family Code section 271.
7 The record on appeal does not include the transcript of the December
18 hearing or specify the status of the refinance at that time. However, at
the September 15, 2026 oral argument, Besh represented he abandoned
refinance efforts after his request for stay was granted. We offer no comment
on the propriety or scope of any stay issued and any subsequent conduct as
those matters are not before us in this appeal.
5
DISCUSSION
Fundamentally, a lower court’s rulings are presumed correct, and an
appellant bears the burden of affirmatively showing error. (Universal Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125.) To do so, the
appellant “ ‘must supply [us] with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu
Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153, quoting City of Santa Maria
v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.) Otherwise, “we may decide
that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not
supported by accurate citations to the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894.) These rules apply
equally to self-represented parties like Besh. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247 (Nwosu) [“as is the case with attorneys, pro.
per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure”].)
Rule 8.204 of the California Rules of Court provides in relevant part
that all appellate briefs must “Support any reference to a matter in the record
by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) “Further, an appellant’s
opening brief must ‘provide a summary of the significant facts limited to
matters in the record.’ ” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.) “Each
and every statement in a brief regarding matters that are in the record on
appeal, whether factual or procedural, must be supported by a citation to the
record. This rule applies regardless of where the reference occurs in the
brief.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 96, fn. 2.) “ ‘The
appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.’ ”
(Nwosu, at p. 1246.) “Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the
6
necessary citations to the record,’ ” the argument will be deemed forfeited.
(Ibid.)
Besh failed to adhere to the mandatory requirements of the court’s
briefing rules, and thus, we conclude he has forfeited his arguments on
appeal. Besh’s appellate briefs include minimal citations to the clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts and in no way comply with the requirement that “[e]ach
and every statement” have a citation to the record. (Lona v. Citibank, N.A.,
supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 96, fn. 2.) For example, Besh contends, “To
preserve the favorable existing rate, the parties agreed to assumption and
indemnification for missed mortgage payments in lieu of refinancing,” but he
provides no citation to any related evidence presented to the trial court.
Moreover, across five paragraphs on pages seven and eight of the opening
brief, Besh presents a purported summary of the “multi-month negotiation”
of the MSA to support his argument that refinance was not required but
includes only a single, improper record citation to his own declaration that he
filed in December 2025, over four months after the trial court’s challenged
August ruling, and in opposition to Elgamiel’s attorney’s fees and sanctions
request. In total, Besh’s more than 20 pages of argument in the opening brief
include only 10 citations to the appellate record, none of which link to the
evidence actually presented to the trial court.
Further, many of the record citations Besh did provide are inaccurate.
For instance, on pages 10 and 11 of his opening brief, Besh quotes the MSA,
repeatedly citing to a single page of the clerk’s transcript, but the page cited
is not to the MSA and instead is to the cover page of a “Notice of Entry of
Judgment” on reserved issues that does not appear to include any
attachments. Similarly, on page 12 of his opening brief, Besh claims the
mortgage matures on May 1, 2028, but the citation provided is to the first
7
page of his supplemental declaration filed on October 6, 2025, which does not
include any information about the mortgage or its date of maturity. We are
not required to search the record and verify the veracity of Besh’s claims, and
his inaccurate citations to a clerk’s transcript that is over 600 pages long are
insufficient to show any error by the trial court. (Nwosu, supra, 122
Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 [“ ‘The appellate court is not required to search the
record on its own seeking error’ ”].) Indeed, “Rather than scour the record
unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on
appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.” (WFG
National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 894.)
Even setting aside Besh’s failure to properly cite the record, his
statement of facts fails to “ ‘accurately and fairly state the critical facts’ ” and
evidence; these material omissions can result in the forfeiture of issues and
arguments on appeal. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1507, 1531 [“such ‘factual presentation is but an attempt to argue on appeal
those factual issues decided adversely to it at the trial level, contrary to
established precepts of appellate review. As such, it is doomed to fail’ ”].)
Besh’s opening brief presents a one-sided factual summary with multiple
inaccuracies. For example, in challenging the trial court’s order to refinance,
Besh repeatedly cites to his December 2025 declaration and an attached e-
mail from June 2024, that says, “Dr. Besh does not currently intend to
refinance the existing mortgage until current rates align with the existing
interest rate.” But, as stated, this declaration and its attachments were not
before the trial court in August 2025 and thus cannot be relied on now.8
8 Both parties also bicker about the significance of the court’s August
2025 statement repeated in the findings and order after hearing issued in
8
(Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1307
[appellate court must disregard documents not presented in the trial
proceeding as beyond the scope of review].)
The respondent’s brief on appeal complains of these deficiencies, yet
Besh fails to adequately respond in his reply, simply stating that his
“Opening Brief cites the record throughout, and Respondent’s brief identifies
no assertion in it that lacks a citation.” As discussed, these representations
are simply inaccurate. Offering this dismissive response rather than
correcting the noted deficiencies reflects Besh’s blatant disregard of the
appellate procedure necessary to informed appellate review. (Nwosu, supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247 [“as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants
must follow correct rules of procedure” and their failure to do so results in
forfeiture].)
Because Besh failed to develop or support his arguments with accurate
citations to the record and because he fails to “ ‘accurately and fairly state the
critical facts,’ ” Besh’s briefing is “in dramatic noncompliance with [the
appellate rules of procedure],” and thus, we treat the contentions in his
opening brief as forfeited. (In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 1531; Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1247.) As
such, Besh has failed to satisfy his burden of affirmatively showing error.
(See, e.g., Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson, supra, 51
Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)
October that it “made no finding that [Besh] breached the Judgment or acted
in bad faith.” Because the comment relates to the fees and sanctions requests
stayed pending appeal, we leave it to the trial court to clarify the meaning of
its comment if necessary to the ongoing proceedings not before us.
9
DISPOSITION
The October 3, 2025 order after hearing is affirmed.9 Respondent
Elgamiel is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)
9 The conclusion of Elgamiel’s responsive brief on appeal references an
“accompanying motion for sanctions.” We have not received such a motion in
this court and so do not rule on it.
10
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
STEWART, P. J.
MILLER, J.
In re Marriage of Besh (A175160)
11