Filed 10/7/26 Marriage of Beckerdite CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of SHANNON
YVETTE and DANIEL LEE
BECKERDITE
SHANNON YVETTE A174577
BECKERDITE,
Appellant, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 22-FAM-01827-B)
v.
DANIEL LEE BECKERDITE,
Respondent.
Appellant Shannon Beckerdite appeals from the judgment entered in
this dissolution proceeding. She argues she was improperly prevented from
presenting evidence at the trial and was wrongly required to reimburse her
former spouse, respondent Daniel Beckerdite, the expenses he incurred on
behalf of her and the community during the years between the parties’
separation and dissolution (the post-separation period). We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Shannon and Daniel were married in 1991. In 2022, Shannon filed a
petition for a separation, and the marriage was dissolved in 2025, after a one-
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day trial. Before the trial, Daniel successfully moved to bar Shannon from
presenting witnesses or documentary evidence based on her failure to comply
with disclosure obligations. In the case Daniel presented, both Daniel and
Shannon testified. In the case Shannon presented, Shannon gave short,
narrative testimony but presented no other evidence and conceded she had no
other witness to call. In its final ruling, the trial court divided the marital
estate essentially on an equal basis. In rulings pertinent to this appeal, the
court ordered the sale of a rental property (the Grafton house) and two other
real estate parcels, with the proceeds to be shared equally, and it ordered
Shannon to reimburse Daniel $289,364.37 to equalize the parties’ charges
and credits during the post-separation period. The court explained that its
intent was “to use the proceeds of the sale of the three real properties to
make all equalizing payments, offsets, and reimbursements.”
II.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Shannon challenges the trial court’s order barring her
from presenting evidence at the trial and awarding Daniel reimbursements
for his post-separation expenses. She specifically asks “that this Court
reverse the reimbursement and property-sale orders.” We are not
persuaded by her arguments.
We begin with our standard of review. As an appellate court, we
presume a judgment or order of a trial court is correct. “ ‘All intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support [the order] on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant “has
the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v.
Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) “ ‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that
if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults
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and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American
Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) “[T]he
burden is on [the appellant] to demonstrate error—and also ‘prejudice
arising from’ that error.” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996,
1006.)
We evaluate both a trial court’s imposition of evidentiary sanctions
and an apportionment of community property under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. (See In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470,
1478 [evidentiary sanctions]; In re Marriage of Greaux & Mermin (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [apportioning community property].) “Under
that standard, we would reverse only if considering all the relevant
circumstances, the court has ‘ “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds under reason” ’ ” ’ or
‘ “ ‘no judge would reasonably make the same order in the same
circumstances.’ ” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Honer (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 687,
694.) We accept the trial court’s factual determinations as true if supported
by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) If the facts are undisputed and the issues
on appeal present questions of law, the standard of review is de novo. (In re
Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.)
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Evidentiary
Sanctions, and the Sanctions Were Harmless in any Event.
Shannon first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
barring her from calling witnesses and presenting evidence without
considering a narrower remedy. She concedes that “she failed to exchange
her final declarations of disclosure and did not submit a witness list, an
exhibit list, or an evidence binder before trial, notwithstanding a
continuance the court had granted for that purpose.” And she recognizes
that she engaged in a “genuine disclosure failure” and that the trial court’s
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order was “understandable [in] its underlying premise.” She nonetheless
contends that the order “swept far more broadly” than was warranted. We
do not agree.
To begin with, we lack a complete record to fully consider Shannon’s
argument. While we know that the trial court granted Daniel’s motions in
limine and thereby limited Shannon’s ability to present evidence, the record
does not include those motions, any other pleadings or documents filed by the
parties before the trial, or any transcripts of (or orders arising out of) any
hearings that occurred prior to the trial. Without these materials, we have
only a limited understanding of the circumstances leading up to and giving
rise to the court’s order. (See Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [appellant’s failure to provide adequate
record “ ‘requires that the issue be resolved against appellant’ ”].) We know
generally that a month before the trial, the trial court granted a continuance
to allow Shannon to comply with her disclosure obligations, and we know
that Shannon failed to comply notwithstanding the continuance. But we do
not know the details of Daniel’s motions, the arguments made in support of
them, or anything else about the relevant procedural history.
Similarly, although we know that the trial court previously had given
Shannon some directions and admonishments about her disclosure
obligations, we again do not know the details. On the first day of the trial,
the court noted that a conference had taken place the previous month in
which “the Court gave instructions that the parties were to follow the . . .
submission protocols for evidence for witnesses, et cetera, that were on the
FL-23 and the court’s website and also ordered [Shannon] to . . . exchange her
final declarations of disclosure with [Daniel].” When asked if that had been
done, Shannon replied, “No, it hasn’t.” The court confirmed it had not
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“received any sort of submissions for evidence, binders, exhibit lists, witness
lists, or anything like that.” The court said to Shannon, “I made it very clear
what you needed to do to prepare today. So the excuses won’t work with me
anymore.”
On this record, we simply cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion by barring Shannon from presenting evidence (other than her
own testimony) at the trial. Shannon argues that in the absence of a
history of litigation abuse, courts should ordinarily avoid “treating a curable
violation of local procedural rules as the basis for crippling a litigant's
ability to present his or her case.” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1337, 1364.) But here, the record suggests that there was a
history of litigation abuse, and the trial court had given Shannon at least
one opportunity to cure her disclosure failures, which Shannon failed to act
upon.
Finally, and in any event, the order barring Shannon from calling
witnesses and presenting evidence appears to have been harmless. At the
trial, Shannon declined to cross-examine Daniel, and she admitted that she
had no witnesses to present. After she gave her narrative testimony, the trial
court asked her directly, “[D]id you even have any other witness that you
intended on calling?” Shannon replied, “No, I didn’t have anything at this
time. No.” Neither in the trial court nor in this court has Shannon identified
any witness who she would have called or any document that she would have
sought to introduce if she had been allowed to present additional evidence.
She has accordingly failed to demonstrate any prejudice by the court’s ruling.
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2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Daniel
Reimbursements for His Post-Separation Expenses that Benefitted
Shannon or the Community.
Shannon next argues that the trial court erred by awarding Daniel
post-separation expenses. We are again unpersuaded.
Equalizing post-separation assets and debts is a matter committed to
the trial court’s discretion. (In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272.) “ ‘[A]s a general rule, a spouse who, after
separation of the parties, uses earnings or other separate funds to pay
preexisting community obligations should be reimbursed therefor out of the
community property upon dissolution.’ ” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979)
24 Cal.3d 76, 84 (Epstein); see Fam. Code, § 2626.) These reimbursements
are referred to as “Epstein credits.” Conversely, a spouse who after
separation continues to gain economic benefits from a community asset—
such as collecting rent from real estate held by the community—must
reimburse the community. (In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d
366, 373–374.) These reimbursements are referred to as Watts charges. The
“net effect of allocating ‘Epstein credits’ and ‘Watts charges’ in a division of
community assets should be (1) the equal sharing of ‘Epstein credits’ by both
spouses and (2) the equal bearing of ‘Watts charges’ by both spouses.” (In re
Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 548, 553.)
Although the appellate record leaves us unable to fully evaluate the
issue, nothing in it demonstrates that the trial court misallocated these
credits and charges. Daniel testified generally about the “money that [he]
spent to support Shannon over the time we’ve been separated.” His
testimony was based on exhibits, which included bank statements showing
the “money that [he] spent to support Shannon over the time [they were]
separated.” He testified that since the separation, he had paid “rent for
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Shannon, car payments up until . . . the truck was paid for, . . . utilities,
phone, . . . and then . . . payments to help with support.” He also testified
that he was making monthly payments on a consolidation loan taken out to
pay off Shannon’s credit card debt. And he testified that he had been paying
the entire mortgage on the Grafton house while Shannon had been collecting
all the rent payments. Summarizing his testimony, the trial court stated
“that he was, essentially, shouldering the expenses for two households . . .
throughout the entirety of the dissolution and . . . that it’s pretty much
admitted that . . . [Shannon] was receiving income both in the nature of
cash ― Well, I don’t know if I want to call it cash but as least money transfers
from [Daniel] of up to $500 per month, rental income of [$]2200 a month, and
. . . having all of her expenses paid . . . , which is a pretty significant amount
of imputed income to a party.”
Daniel testified that during the post-separation period the total amount
of expenses he paid on Shannon’s behalf, and the money she collected in rent
payments, was $377,515.07. His attorney later calculated that Daniel’s total
reimbursements should be $289,364.37, which would “take[] into account the
full reimbursement of separate property and cash paid to [Shannon] and then
[Daniel’s] community interest in the community expenses as laid out in the
exhibits.” In other words, this amount “has already taken half on the
community obligations versus 100% on the separate obligations.”
Shannon points to nothing in the record that demonstrates error. The
exhibits are not included in our record, and we therefore lack the information
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and calculations upon which Daniel’s testimony was based.1 When the
appellate record “does not contain the evidence before the trial court,” the
reviewing court must “conclusively presume[] that the evidence sustained the
[trial court’s] findings.” (Kubon v. Kubon (1958) 51 Cal.2d 229, 232; accord,
Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.)
In her appellate briefing, Shannon suggests it should matter that she
did not know she would be held financially accountable during the post-
separation period. She complains that the record does not show that the trial
court ever “resolved, or even directly addressed” her objection that she “had
received no advance notice of the cumulative reimbursement claim before it
was used to enter judgment against her.” But in fact, the record does show
that the court addressed the objection. The court expressly found that the
reimbursement expenses “were mentioned several times in the history of the
litigation. And so although [Shannon] may not have known about them at a
certain point in time, she bec[a]me aware that [Daniel] would be asking for
all of these expenses back.”
As to her contention that the real estate was wrongly ordered to be
sold, Shannon has forfeited it. Her briefing makes no reasoned argument on
the issue, much less one citing to the record or controlling legal authority.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)–(C); Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1245–1246 & fn. 14 [failure to present argument with
references to record results in forfeiture on appeal]; Ewald v. Nationstar
1 The trial court noted that “the reimbursements are listed in [Daniel’s]
trial brief starting at page 5, continuing through page 8. These were also
supplemented by testimony and evidence that was found in [Daniel’s] trial
binder, . . . at Exhibits C and G.” None of these materials are included in the
appellate record.
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Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [failure to provide adequate
legal authority and analysis results in forfeiture on appeal].)
Finally, because we conclude that Shannon failed to sustain her burden
to show that the trial court erred in any way, we reject her contention that
the judgment must be reversed due to cumulative errors.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Daniel is awarded his appellate costs.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
Beckerdite v. Beckerdite A174577
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