Filed 9/16/26 Marriage of Atalla CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of JOSEPH
MINA and CHRISTINE ATALLA.
JOSEPH MINA ATALLA,
G064797
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 18D010159)
v.
OPINION
CHRISTINE ATALLA,
Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julie A. Palafox, Judge. Affirmed
Joseph Mina Atalla, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Cindy Lee Cannon and Cindy Lee Cannon for Respondent.
Joseph Mina Atalla (Father) appeals from a dissolution judgment
awarding sole legal and physical custody of minors K.A. and M.A. to his
former spouse, Christine Atalla (Mother). He contends the trial court erred by
striking the report and testimony of the child custody evaluator due to bias.
Father further contends the court denied him a meaningful opportunity to
present his case during the 15-day custody trial by improperly excluding his
expert and video evidence, restricting his examination of witnesses, ignoring
and misinterpreting evidence, and violating statutes governing findings and
presumptions.
We deny Mother’s motion to dismiss the appeal under the
disentitlement doctrine and affirm the judgment. Mother’s request for
judicial notice and both parties’ motions to augment the record are denied.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
PARTIES
Father and Mother married in January 2015. K.A. was born in
June 2015 and M.A. was born in March 2017. Father and Mother separated
in October 2018. Their contentious, high-conflict custody dispute began
almost immediately, with competing requests for domestic violence
restraining orders (both denied) and a child abuse allegation against Father
(deemed unfounded).
II.
PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS
A. First Custody Evaluation and Trial
In February 2019, the trial court ordered joint legal and physical
custody and set a schedule for Father’s monitored parenting time. The court
also appointed Stacey White Kinney to prepare a custody evaluation
2
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 (section 730). In July 2019, Kinney
recommended joint legal custody, sole physical custody to Mother, and
therapeutic parenting interventions for Father. The court subsequently
ordered Father and the minors to attend reunification counseling with
therapist Jessica St. Clair.
St. Clair began working with the family in June 2020 and made a
positive report to the trial court in July 2020. In a November 2020 report, St.
Clair opined reunification had been successful and recommended increasing
Father’s parenting time. She also recommended the minors attend individual
play therapy.
The matter proceeded to custody trial on November 16, 2020.
After Father and St. Clair testified, the trial court provided a tentative ruling
and continued trial for the parties to meet and confer and prepare a joint
statement of remaining issues. The parties resolved some matters, but
continued to dispute which parent should have primary physical custody.
Trial resumed June 17, 2021, after several continuances. On that
date, the trial court ordered additional reunification therapy with St. Clair,
individual therapy for K.A., and increased parenting time for Father.
In October 2021, St. Clair submitted a report expressing concern
for the minors’ mental health and recommending parent-child interactive
therapy (PCIT) for the family. After hearing additional testimony from
Father, Mother, and St. Clair on November 8, 2021, the trial court found the
parties failed to comply with the order for K.A. to attend therapy. The court
further found the two-year-old Kinney custody evaluation was too stale to be
of use and declared a mistrial.
3
B. Second Custody Evaluation
Following the mistrial, the trial court appointed a new section
730 custody evaluator, clinical psychologist Dr. Susan Jacob, Ph.D. The
February 2022 order appointing Jacob and setting forth the scope of her
evaluation is not in the appellant’s appendix. The court found Jacob “wrongly
believ[ed]” the order directed her “to consult with Jessica St. Clair in
formulating her opinions.”1
Jacob filed her confidential custody evaluation report in May
2022. Jacob relied on more than 800 pages of documents, “[h]undreds of
photos and short video clips documenting the various changes in the
children’s behavior,” St. Clair’s reports, in-person interviews with parents
and the minors, and 16 “collateral interviews” with “doctors, therapists,
teachers, court approved monitors, and family members.” Jacob concluded
the minors, then ages seven and five, were “in crisis” and diagnosed them
with dissociative identity disorder (DID)2 as well as “parent-child relational
problem[s]” and “parental relationship distress.” To ameliorate the crisis, and
restrict Mother’s ability to change or discontinue the minors’ therapies, Jacob
1 Father asserts in his opening brief “the court ordered Dr. Susan
Jacob, PhD [sic] to include Ms. Jessica St. Clair MS. LMFT” in the
evaluation, but does not provide any record citations to support that
assertion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We disregard factual
contentions that are not supported by citations to the record, even when a
party is self-represented. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514,
520.)
2 DID, formerly known as multiple personality disorder, is
characterized by “‘disruption in the usually integrated functions of
consciousness, memory, identity, or perception.’” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39
Cal.4th 826, 848 fn. 6 [quoting (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000, text rev.) p. 519].)
4
recommended sole legal and physical custody for Father, with limited
monitored parenting time to Mother “to be reevaluated after eighteen
months.” She further recommended the minors see a child psychiatrist to
treat their DID; Father and the minors resume therapy with St. Clair and
attend a reunification camp; and Mother participate in individual therapy
and PCIT with the minors.
C. Minors’ Psychiatric Assessment
Following receipt of Jacob’s report and with parents’ agreement,
the trial court appointed counsel for the minors. The court ordered minors’
counsel to arrange psychiatric assessments for them.
Dr. Lawrence J. Budner, M.D., assessed the minors in summer
2022. In addition to reviewing the previous custody evaluation reports and
other records, Budner spoke with Father, Mother, and St. Clair and observed
the minors in the presence of each parent. Budner observed positive
interactions between the minors and each parent. He did not see the minors
exhibit any dissociative symptoms. Both minors denied experiencing
dissociative symptoms when asked in age-appropriate language; they also
denied “a whole range of anxiety and depressive symptoms” and current
parental attempts at alienation.
Budner disagreed with Jacob’s diagnosis of DID, though he found
“her concern about the distress of the children seems warranted.” He opined
the minors’ reported dissociative symptoms were “consistent with shifts in
emotional state” rather than distinct personalities, and “were likely the
result of the high-conflict divorce situation they were experiencing,”
particularly “switches between homes.” Budner diagnosed both minors with
“[a]djustment disorder (severe) with mixed disturbance of emotions and
conduct . . ., related to the stressor of living within a high-conflict divorce
5
situation and frequent changes of residence.” Budner recommended PCIT for
both minors. Father filed, but ultimately withdrew, a complaint against
Budner with the Medical Board of California; he included confidential case
documents with the complaint.
The trial court ordered PCIT in September 2022. The family
attended five or six sessions before Father declined to proceed with the
treatment.
In March 2023, the trial court admonished Father for disclosing
confidential documents. In April 2023, it again ordered parents to comply
with earlier orders to enroll the minors in individual therapy.
III.
INSTANT PROCEEDINGS
The second custody trial began September 25, 2023 and
continued on September 26, 2023; October 16, 17, and 18, 2023; January 31,
2024; February 26, 28, and 29, 2024; April 9, 10, 15, and 16, 2024; and July 8
and 12, 2024. Father was represented by counsel for the first five days of trial
and subsequently represented himself. Mother and the minors had counsel
throughout trial.
A. Evidence Presented
Father and Mother both testified at length. Father also called St.
Clair, his office manager, and three of his friends. Mother called Budner,
Jacob, and her brother and mother.
With agreement of all parties, the trial court took judicial notice
of previous custody orders and findings and orders made after hearings. The
court admitted a total of approximately 35 exhibits from both parents,
including most of Father’s compilations of videos of the minors.
6
B. Evidence Excluded
1. Jacob Report and Testimony
Mother raised several concerns about Jacob’s custody evaluation
in her trial brief. Mother subsequently filed a motion in limine to exclude the
report and any testimony from Jacob as biased. Mother contended Jacob was
not a neutral evaluator for numerous reasons, including her collaboration
with St. Clair, reliance on evidence provided by Father and not disclosed to
Mother, and psychiatric diagnosis of the minors. Father opposed the motion,
asserting it would be “unjust” to exclude Jacob’s “well-analyzed” report at
this late stage of the proceedings, and the trial court could weigh the evidence
as it saw fit. The court took the motion under submission pending receipt of
evidence.
Jacob subsequently testified she understood the trial court’s
appointment order to require St. Clair to “help” her with the evaluation;3 she
reviewed St. Clair’s reports and had “valuable” conversations with her. Jacob
further testified she spent “a great deal of time” reviewing an 800-page
packet of documents Father provided. Jacob assumed without confirming the
packet had been prepared by both parents, and did not share its contents
with Mother. Jacob additionally testified Father texted her approximately
100 photos and videos of the minors, which she also failed to disclose to
Mother before they disappeared from Jacob’s phone around a year later.
3 The trial court appointed Jacob as a custody evaluator after a
previous evaluator became unavailable. The order appointing that evaluator
stated, “The children are to take a break from therapy with Jessica St. Clair
and for [sic] Jessica St. Clair to be a part of the [section] 730 process.” Jacob
was provided with a copy of that order, which she interpreted as requiring
her to collaborate with St. Clair. Jacob thought the order was unusual, as she
had never collaborated with anyone on a section 730 evaluation before, but
she did not seek clarification from the court.
7
Jacob acknowledged her role as a custody evaluator did not
necessarily encompass diagnosing the minors. She testified that although the
minors did not experience any dissociative symptoms in her presence, she
“became extremely concerned” when St. Clair, the minors’ teachers, and
Father’s former visitation monitors reported completely different behavior
from what she observed. Jacob did not consult with any medical doctors
before making the diagnoses, and acknowledged, “in hindsight,” that she
should have referred the minors to a psychiatrist. She explained she wanted
to provide a wake-up call to ensure the minors received assistance.
Following Jacob’s testimony, the trial court granted Mother’s
motion in limine and struck Jacob’s report and testimony. The court
concluded Jacob’s “misunderstanding the [c]ourt order that [St. Clair] could
be a collaborator was too prejudicial” and “tainted” Jacob’s report and
testimony with bias. The court further found the scope of its appointment
order was clear, and Jacob “stepped way out of her lane” by diagnosing the
minors. In addition to exceeding the scope of the order, the court found Jacob
“failed to operate within the limits of her training” and “made
recommendations she was not qualified to make” when she diagnosed the
minors with DID. The court concluded these “significant deficiencies . . . in
total and collectively” left the court with “no alternative” but to exclude the
report and testimony.
2. Shirin Testimony
Prior to the first custody trial, Father retained Dr. Kim K. Shirin
pursuant to Evidence Code section 733 to review and comment on Kinney’s
section 730 report. Shirin concluded Kinney’s report was biased and opined it
should be disregarded. The trial court later determined Kinney’s report was
stale and appointed Jacob to conduct a new custody evaluation.
8
During the second custody trial, Father included Shirin on his
witness list and attempted to call him an expert witness. Mother objected
Father had not responded to her demand for exchange of expert witnesses,
which the trial court received into evidence. The court confirmed that was
true, and further confirmed Father did not intend to call Shirin under
Evidence Code section 733 to opine on Jacob’s report. The court sustained
Mother’s objection, explaining to Father that he was required to “comply with
the requirements of the demand for exchange of expert witness information”
in Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.260. The court reiterated its ruling
several trial dates later, when Father again attempted to call Shirin.
3. Other Evidence
Father sought to introduce numerous videos of the minors he
recorded while they were in his care. The trial court told Father it would
“look at 30 minutes of videos” during trial. The court subsequently admitted
Father’s exhibits 37, 38, and 38-B, video compilations the court described as
“nearly two hours” of the minors “upset, crying, or dysregulating.” Father
also introduced exhibit 39, which he represented was the “180 degree
opposite” of the other video evidence and would show the minors “happy and
at play.” The court admitted approximately 10 minutes of the 50-minute
video, ruling additional footage of the minors playing would be cumulative
under Evidence Code section 352.
Father also proffered his ex-fiancée as a witness who could testify
about his background. The trial court told him that testimony was not
necessary. Father replied, “That’s fine.” Father did not attempt to call several
other witnesses identified on his witness list.
9
C. Findings and Ruling
The trial court set forth its credibility and factual findings and
legal conclusions in a 37-page final statement of decision. The court found it
was undisputed the minors loved and were bonded to both parents. It
accordingly gave no weight to either parent’s witnesses on this point—
Father’s friends and office manager and Mother’s family members.
The trial court concluded the “primary issues” were the nature
and causes of minors’ mental health struggles and what orders the court
could make to alleviate them. The court found parents agreed the minors
were struggling, but disputed the severity and causes of their symptoms.
Father “insisted” Mother and her family were “brainwashing, coaching, and
alienating the children,” whom he testified “‘act like zombies,’” “‘stare at him
blankly,’” “make robotic and disturbing statements,’” or otherwise “go into
altered states” approximately 20 percent of the time they are with him.
Father described the minors’ mood swings as being “‘like an electrocution,’” or
“‘hammers,’” or “‘spiking.’” Father believed the episodes were triggered by
contact with Mother and were indicative of DID or post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). He accordingly refused to communicate or co-parent with
Mother and was noncompliant with the court’s repeated orders to log into the
Our Family Wizard app daily and use it constructively.
Mother denied the minors experienced mood swings or altered
states while in her care. She believed the minors suffered from an adjustment
disorder due to parents’ ongoing conflicts, and their symptoms were
exacerbated by Father’s continual video recording, claims they suffered from
DID, and failure to comply with trial court orders regarding therapy and co-
parenting.
10
The trial court generally concurred with Mother’s assessment,
finding Father’s videos “mostly showed young children who were upset, tired
and emotionally overloaded” rather than “[z]ombies or in altered states as
Father alleged.” The court’s “impression” was “the children were having
trouble adjusting to Father’s home and routine as they missed their primary
caretaker.” It further found Father “failed to recognize his young children’s
needs for physical comfort and affection” and instead focused on “capturing
footage to support his case against Mother.” It also found he failed to comply
with the court’s orders regarding therapy for the minors, despite his
insistence they were suffering from severe mental health conditions, because
he believed therapy was “harmful” and PCIT was “‘weak science.’”
As previously noted, the trial court fully excluded Jacob’s
testimony and report. The court also gave no weight to St. Clair’s testimony,
finding her objectivity was compromised because she and Father “entered
into their own consulting relationship” after the court suspended her services
in 2021. The court accorded “the greatest weight” to Budner’s report and
testimony, which ruled out DID, diagnosed severe adjustment disorders, and
recommended PCIT and reducing the frequency of residence changes.
The trial court concluded parents were unable to respect one
another as parenting partners, which placed the minors “in the middle of an
ongoing loyalty battle” and left them with “significant emotional challenges.”
The court found the “cumulative weight of the evidence” showed these
challenges did not rise to the severe level of DID or PTSD, but rather were
“parent child relationship distress” or “adjustment disorder” remediable by
therapy. The court noted that it ordered various modalities of therapy “going
back to 2019,” and Father’s “recurring violations” of those orders was
“substantial evidence the [c]ourt cannot ignore.” The court also noted
11
“Father’s unrelenting campaign to malign Mother by telling everyone who
will listen Mother has a family history of mental illness and is the reason the
children have DID and PTSD”4 and elevation of “his own judgment over all
others,” both of which gave it “serious concerns about Father’s ability to act
in the children’s best interests.”
The trial court concluded joint legal custody had “been
unsuccessful the past six years” due to Father’s “unwillingness to engage”
with Mother and “disagreement over the causes of the children’s mental
health issues.” It found Father and Mother were “unable to co-parent,
communicate, or collaborate effectively,” and their struggles “disrupted the
children’s daily routine, structure, and consistent access to needed mental
health services.” It therefore concluded joint legal custody “of any kind” was
not in the minors’ best interests. Because Father “remain[ed] entrenched” in
his beliefs that Mother brainwashed the minors and caused them to develop
DID or PTSD despite “no competent evidence of either,” and refused to
comply with court-ordered therapy, the court found it was in the minors’ best
interests for Mother to have sole legal custody.
The trial court also awarded Mother sole physical custody. It
found the minors’ needs for stability, consistency, and ongoing mental health
treatment “outweigh[ed] an equal custody schedule.” Father failed to present
evidence that limiting the minors’ contact with Mother was in their best
interests, while Mother “understands the children are bonded to their Father
and . . . is willing to share alternating weeks with the Father in the summer.”
The court accordingly found it was in the minors’ best interests for Mother to
4 It is undisputed Father disclosed confidential case materials to
St. Clair, the Medical Board of California, and various personnel at the
minors’ school.
12
have sole physical custody. The court awarded Father weekly parenting time
and established a holiday and vacation schedule.
D. Judgment and Appeal
Father filed his notice of appeal from a minute order
documenting the trial court’s amendment and adoption of its tentative
statement of decision as its final ruling. The court subsequently entered
judgment and an amended judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
PENDING MOTIONS
A. Motions
After Father filed his opening brief, Mother moved to dismiss the
appeal under the disentitlement doctrine due to Father’s previous and
allegedly ongoing violations of trial court orders. In support of her motion,
Mother filed a motion to augment the record with the court’s final statement
of decision, the judgment, and the amended judgment. She also filed a
request for judicial notice of postjudgment records from the Our Family
Wizard app. Mother separately contends the appeal should be dismissed
because it was prematurely filed from a nonappealable order.
Father opposes both requests for dismissal. He contends we
should construe his appeal as properly filed under California Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(d) and decline to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement
doctrine. Father asserts disentitlement is an “extraordinary and narrow
remedy” and is inequitable here, where the alleged misconduct will not
interfere with this court’s ability to resolve the appeal and is remediable by
the trial court. Father additionally asserts the motion improperly “relies on
disputed facts and extra-record material,” though he did not file oppositions
13
to Mother’s motion to augment or request for judicial notice. Father moved to
augment the record with various trial exhibits and other case-related
documents. Mother opposes that motion.
B. Rulings
1. Motions to Augment
Mother’s motion to augment is denied as moot. Mother included
the documents at issue in her respondent’s appendix.
Father’s motion to augment is also denied. Although the record
may be augmented “[a]t any time” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)),
“[w]hether the motion is made within a reasonable time and is not for the
purpose of delay . . . are among the factors the reviewing court may consider
in ruling on such a motion.” (Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155.) Here, Father filed the motion two months after Mother filed her
response brief and offered no explanation for the delay. We accordingly find
the motion is untimely. Moreover, many of the proffered documents are not
appropriate subjects of augmentation, either because they are confidential,
already in the record, or filed after the appealed-from judgment. Father does
not cite or discuss the documents in his reply brief, indicating they are not
necessary for our resolution of this matter in any event.
2. Motion and Request to Dismiss
We also deny Mother’s motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to
the disentitlement doctrine and related request for judicial notice. “Under the
disentitlement doctrine, a reviewing court has inherent power to dismiss an
appeal when the appealing party has refused to comply with the orders of the
trial court.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 259, 265.) Disentitlement is discretionary and is applied where
equitable concerns render it an appropriate sanction, particularly where the
14
appeal arises out of the order the appellant has disobeyed. (See ibid.) Mother
contends the balance of equities favors disentitlement here because Father’s
repeated and allegedly ongoing violations of the trial court’s orders “directly
endanger the children’s stability and well-being.” We disagree.
“‘In a noncriminal context, courts routinely decline to disentitle
litigants on the basis of contempt, fugitive status, or noncompliance with
court orders when the issues raised by the litigant entail interest beyond the
personal of the individual petitioner, such as the welfare of minor
children . . . .’” (In re L.J. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136–1137 [quoting
Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 536].) We conclude
the equities do not warrant dismissal of the appeal here, where the minors’
interests are paramount. Although we do not condone Father’s defiant
behavior, it has not escalated to the point where disentitlement is
appropriate, such as absconding with the minors or seeking to evade
judgment. (See Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, supra, 238
Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266 [providing examples where disentitlement
applied].)
Finally, we deny Mother’s informal request to dismiss the appeal
as premature. California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) authorizes this court
to “treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its
intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately
after entry of judgment.” “In exercising our discretion, we liberally construe a
premature notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency.” (In re Marriage of
Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369, 375.) It is clear from the notice of appeal
that Father intended to challenge the trial court’s ultimate custody ruling,
and there is no indication Mother was misled or prejudiced by his procedural
misstep. (See ibid.) We accordingly proceed to the merits.
15
II.
EXCLUSION OF JACOB REPORT AND TESTIMONY
Father contends the trial court erred by granting Mother’s
motion in limine and excluding Jacob’s report and testimony. He argues the
concerns about bias “go to the weight, not the admissibility” of the Jacob
evidence. He further asserts the rulings “left Father without any expert
support for his position,” tainted the fairness of the proceedings, and resulted
in a final judgment “unsupported by any neutral, professional evaluation.”
We reject these contentions.
A. Standard of Review
Both parties assert we should apply the abuse of discretion
standard of review typically applied to evidentiary rulings concerning
experts. (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [“Except to the extent the trial court bases its
ruling on a conclusion of law (which we review de novo), we review its ruling
excluding or admitting expert testimony for abuse of discretion”].) In
substance, however, Mother’s request and the court’s rulings were not merely
evidentiary but concerned the removal of custody evaluator Jacob due to bias
under California Rules of Court, rule 5.220.
“It is unclear what standard of review applies to a court’s ruling
on a motion for removal of the evaluator.” (In re Marriage of Adams & Jack
A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1564 (Adams); see also Leslie O. v. Superior
Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1203–1204 (Leslie O.).) In both Adams
and Leslie O., the two leading cases to have considered the issue, the trial
court denied a motion to remove a custody evaluator for bias. (See Adams, at
p. 1564; Leslie O., at p. 1203.) Both Adams and Leslie O. determined the
“threshold inquiry” for purposes of appeal was whether the custody evaluator
16
exhibited bias prior to the filing of the removal motion. (Adams, at p. 1563;
Leslie O., at p. 1203.) After reviewing that factual finding for either
substantial evidence (if disputed) or de novo (if undisputed) (see Adams, at
pp. 1563–1564), both courts examined the totality of the circumstances and
concluded the trial court erred under even the most deferential abuse of
discretion standard of review. (See Adams, at p. 1564; Leslie O., at pp. 1204,
1212.)
Although we are presented with the opposite inquiry, whether
the trial court erred by granting the motion, we apply the same approach. We
first consider the court’s finding of bias. Then, we consider whether, on the
totality of evidence before it, the court erred in concluding it was necessary to
remove Jacob due to bias. We find no error, under even the most exacting de
novo review.
B. Analysis
“In the area of child custody, judges ‘order evaluations to obtain a
neutral mental health professional’s assessment of the family, each parent’s
capacity to parent, and the children’s needs and capabilities.’” (Adams, supra,
209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1562.) California Rules of Court, rule 5.220 governs
child custody evaluators appointed under section 730 and requires them to
“[m]aintain objectivity, provide and gather balanced information for both
parties, and control for bias.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(1).) “The
mandate that an evaluator be fair and impartial is nonnegotiable.” (Adams,
at p. 1565; see also id. at p. 1563 [“impartial objectivity is a critical
requirement for a section 730 child custody evaluator”].) “[B]ias cannot be
assessed on a sliding scale relative to the amount of work already expended
on the evaluation.” (Id. at p. 1565.)
17
Here, the trial court found Jacob “lost her objectivity and
neutrality” in three ways, all of which are amply supported by the evidence.
First, she impermissibly consulted with St. Clair, whom the court found lost
her own objectivity and neutrality by continuing to work with Father after
her court appointment ended. Father does not dispute the existence of either
consulting relationship, though he asserts the court ordered Jacob to consult
with St. Clair and an “evaluator’s compliance with the court’s own directive
cannot, as a matter of law, supply the bias predicate . . . .” There is no
evidence the court ordered Jacob to collaborate with St. Clair; the November
2021 order Father cites in his reply brief pertained to a previous evaluator
and pre-dated Jacob’s February 2022 appointment.
Father also argues Jacob’s collaboration with St. Clair was
authorized under California Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2)(F), which
provides that evaluators may “[c]onsult[ ] with other experts to develop
information that is beyond the evaluator’s scope of practice or area of
expertise.” It is not clear what information St. Clair, a therapist with less
formal training than Jacob, a doctoral-level clinical psychologist, could
provide beyond Jacob’s scope of practice or expertise. Jacob testified St. Clair
shared information about her work with the family. That is the information
Jacob herself was engaged to obtain in a neutral and balanced fashion.
Second, the trial court found Jacob exhibited bias by spending a
substantial amount of time reviewing Father’s evidence “and fail[ing] to give
Mother the same consideration, or even an opportunity to respond.” A
custody evaluator is required to “gather balanced information for both
parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(1).) It is undisputed Jacob spent
many hours reviewing approximately 800 pages of documents and 100 videos
and photographs Father provided and did not do the same for Mother.
18
Father asserts this was not indicative of bias because: the
documents were in the trial court file; the videos and photographs were
relevant to the evaluation; and the scope of the evaluation expressly included
“the effects of Father constantly videotaping the children in distress.” The
issue is not with the scope of the evaluation but rather the one-sided nature
of how Jacob obtained and reviewed the evidence for that evaluation. A child
custody evaluator must “consider each party in comparable ways.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2).) Jacob did not do that here. Her review of the now-
vanished videos and photographs in particular gives rise to concern she
“inappropriately stepped out of her role as evaluator and into the role of
guardian of [Father’s] litigation interests.” (Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1210.)
Third, the trial court found Jacob’s report “deficient” because it
concluded the minors “had dramatically different personalities based solely
on Father’s testimony when Mother denied the different personalities in her
home” and no collateral witnesses described “distinct and different
personalities.” Jacob also denied witnessing the children engage in
dissociative behavior. Custody evaluators are required to “substantiate (from
multiple sources when possible) interpretations and conclusions regarding
each child’s developmental needs.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2).)
They also must “[o]perate within the limits of [their] training and
experience.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(6).) Jacob acknowledged she
had limited experience with DID, had never encountered two siblings with
the same manifestation of the disorder, and she should have referred the
minors to a psychiatrist.
Father asserts, without citation to relevant authority,
disagreement with an evaluator’s diagnosis “goes to the weight of an expert’s
19
opinion, not to whether the expert was biased against a litigant.” The concern
was the manner in which Jacob made the diagnosis, not its accuracy. This is
analogous to Leslie O., which found biased an evaluator who relied on
“illogical speculation of unqualified persons” and disregarded objective
contrary evidence to suggest the mother suffered from Munchausen
syndrome by proxy. (Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1206, 1209.)
Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court
reasonably concluded Jacob lacked the objectivity required of a neutral
custody evaluator. “We recognize that evaluation is an art rather than a
science, and that different approaches may be required in different cases.”
(Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212.) Yet given the multiple serious
infirmities in this case, and the importance of impartial professional
assessments in custody determinations (see Adams, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1563), the court did not err in removing Jacob under any standard. (See
id. at p. 1567 [a custody order resting even in part on a biased report must be
reversed].)
III.
OTHER EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Father argues the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary
rulings that denied him a meaningful opportunity to present his case. We
review these claims in turn, for abuse of the court’s broad discretion. (Christ
v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447.) We reverse evidentiary
rulings only where the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd fashion. (Id. at p. 447.)
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A. Exclusion of Shirin
Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
his expert witness Shirin “based on procedural defects in expert designation.”
We disagree.
“Following a demand for the exchange of expert witness
information, each party must provide an ‘expert witness declaration’ . . . .”
(Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 885 [quoting Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2034.210, subd. (b)].) “The declaration must include certain information,
including ‘[a] brief narrative statement of the general substance of the
testimony that the expert is expected to give.’” (Ibid. [quoting Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2034.260, subd. (c)(2)].) “A trial court must exclude from trial any expert
testimony ‘that is offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to’
‘[s]ubmit an expert witness declaration.’” (Ibid. [quoting Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2034.300, subd. (b).)
Although Father included Shirin on his witness list, he did not
respond to Mother’s demand for the exchange of expert witness information.
Father’s suggestion he should have been excused from doing so due to his
self-represented status is not persuasive. “[S]elf-representation is not a
ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule
provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties
represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.”
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.)
Father also contends the trial court’s exclusion of Shirin
“contravenes the directive in Elkins [v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1337, 1366–1367] that family court procedures should not erect arbitrary
barriers to presenting relevant evidence.” Elkins is not on point. As Elkins
recognized, “marital dissolution trials proceed under the same general rules
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of procedure that govern other civil trials.” (Elkins, at p. 1345; see also id. at
p. 1354.) Elkins accordingly held it was error for the trial court to impose a
local rule restricting direct examination in dissolution proceedings and
requiring litigants in those proceedings to file detailed evidentiary
declarations prior to trial. (See id. at pp. 1346–1347, 1356–1360.) The
mandatory procedural rules the court enforced here were mandated by
statute and were not arbitrary. (See In re Marriage of Seagondollar (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120 [“The rules of procedure for reaching family law
decisions—contained in the Family Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the
California Rules of Court, and local court rules—are not mere suggestions.
The rules of procedure are commands which ensure fairness by their
enforcement”].)
B. Limitations on Video Exhibits
Father contends the trial court prevented him from introducing
video exhibits with “no coherent explanation.” This contention is not
supported by the record. Despite ordering Father to limit his presentation of
video evidence to 30 minutes, the court allowed him to play “nearly two
hours” of videos depicting the minors in various states of distress. The court
then limited Father to playing approximately 10 minutes of video depicting
the minors having fun. It explained it was not “necessary to watch an hour
video to know that the children can be happy too,” and emphasized it was
“trying to get this case done today,” the tenth day of Father’s case-in-chief.
This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Evidence Code section
352 vests the trial court with discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time . . . .” The court reasonably
balanced the minimal probative value of the evidence against the significant
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amount of trial time it would consume. The court also allowed Father to play
a portion of the video, despite recognizing that all parties had seen the video
and could “all stipulate” it “shows the children are happy.” This was an
appropriate balance for the court to strike.
C. Other Alleged Restrictions
Father contends the trial court “imposed severe restrictions on
Father’s witness examination and case-in-chief,” by “truncat[ing] his ability
to cross-examine adverse witnesses” and preventing him from calling several
“favorable lay witnesses.” Aside from providing the names of the favorable
witnesses he was allegedly prevented from calling, Father provides no
information about the alleged restrictions and rulings he is challenging. “‘In
order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.’” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) Father has not done that with respect to these alleged
evidentiary errors. “We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are
not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’” (Ibid.)
Even if we were to consider these claims, we would conclude they
lack merit. Two of the favorable witnesses Father claims he was precluded
from calling—Sherif Yacoub and Billie Jay—are not mentioned in the
reporter’s transcript. Father told the trial court he was “having a hard
time . . . reaching” another favorable witness, Jeanean Sapp, and did not call
Nancy McNamara despite the court ruling he could. The court told Father he
could not call only one of the witnesses he identifies here, Joelle Hayek, and
Father responded, “That’s fine.” Father therefore forfeited any claim of error
regarding that ruling. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 866 [“‘[A]
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reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an
objection could have been but was not made in the trial court’”]; see also Evid.
Code, § 354.) To the extent Father appears to contend the court should have
admitted declarations or letters prepared by these witnesses, he has not
demonstrated those documents would be admissible under the hearsay rule.
(See Evid. Code, § 1200.)
D. Other Evidentiary Contentions
Father asserts the trial court improperly ignored certain clinical
assessments and other reports, made unspecified misstatements and
misquotations of various exhibits, and relied on fabricated and contradicted
evidence offered by Mother. These claims of error are not properly developed
or supported by citations to the record. We do not consider them. (See United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
IV.
FINDINGS AND PRESUMPTIONS
Finally, Father contends the trial court failed to make statutorily
required findings and apply statutorily required presumptions, and the
statement of decision is deficient due to these omissions. We disagree.
Although parents made domestic abuse allegations against one
another, the trial court denied both their restraining order requests and did
not find domestic violence occurred. Family Code section 3044’s rebuttable
presumption against awarding custody to a parent found to have perpetrated
domestic violence therefore was not implicated. (See Fam. Code, § 3044;
Noble v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 567, 576 [“special
considerations come into play under the Family Code” where a restraining
order has issued or “there are other findings that domestic violence involving
the parties has occurred”].) The court was not required to make findings
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under this statutory provision. Family Code section 6320, which governs
protective orders, is equally inapplicable.
Father also claims the trial court failed to comply with Family
Code section 3011, subdivision (a)(5)(A). That statute requires the trial court
to make findings concerning minors’ best interests and safety if allegations of
abuse are brought to its attention and it awards the alleged abuser sole or
joint custody. (Fam. Code, § 3011, subd. (a)(5)(A).) The court did so here.
Even though it found no evidence supporting Father’s allegations that
Mother brainwashed or otherwise abused the minors, the court specifically
invoked section 3011 and considered the minors’ best interests in its
thorough and thoughtful 37-page statement of decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mother is awarded costs on appeal.
SERVINO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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