Filed 9/23/26 Marriage of Angelica G. and Joshua G. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re the Marriage of ANGELICA G.
and JOSHUA G.
ANGELICA G., D085644
Respondent,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. D563325)
JOSHUA G.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Danna W. Nicholas, Judge. Affirmed.
Joshua G., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
Joshua G. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
prohibiting him from abusing, contacting, or coming near his ex-wife,
Angelica G. Joshua challenges the DVRO on three grounds: there is
insufficient evidence that he abused Angelica, he was denied his right to
present evidence at the DVRO hearing, and the court abused its discretion
in setting the DVRO for a three year term. On the limited record before us—
which does not include a reporter’s transcript—we affirm the trial court’s
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Joshua and Angelica divorced in 2017. They have since shared joint
legal and physical custody of their son Josiah. In January 2025, Angelica
requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) as well as sole legal
and physical custody of Josiah, who was then 11 years old.
In her sworn request, Angelica stated that during a custody exchange
two days prior, Josiah expressed feeling unsafe and afraid of his father.
Joshua attempted to grab Josiah and force him into his car and screamed at
him. Angelica and Josiah ran back to her car and locked the doors. Joshua
and his wife proceeded to pound on the car windows and continued screaming
and shouting. Angelica also described two instances of past abuse by Joshua
that had been reported to the police—sexual abuse around 2011 and a
choking incident in 2015.
In support of Angelica’s request, her brother and sister-in-law, who
witnessed the custody exchange, submitted declarations. Her sister-in-law
stated that she walked Josiah over to Joshua to express “how he was feeling”
which caused Joshua to scream and attempt to grab Josiah. When Joshua
refused to calm down, Angelica and Josiah ran to her car and locked the
doors. The sister-in-law called the police because Joshua “was close to the
car and acting agressive [sic] with Angelica.” Angelica’s brother similarly
stated that Joshua became aggressive, tried grabbing Josiah, and screamed
at Angelica. Angelica and Josiah were “terrified” and Joshua continued
shouting at them once they were locked inside her car.
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Joshua filed sworn responses opposing all requested orders. In a
declaration supporting his opposition, he stated that at the custody exchange
Josiah appeared “very sad and hesitant” and told Joshua he did not want to
go with him. As Joshua attempted to reassure him, Angelica and her family
began yelling that Josiah was afraid of him, saying he was abusive, and
calling him derogatory names. When Josiah began approaching Joshua,
Angelica grabbed him and pulled him into her car. Joshua walked toward
the car, stopped about 20 feet away, and called out to Josiah. Angelica’s
brother then put his hand on Joshua’s chest and warned him not to get any
closer. Angelica’s brother then removed his sweater and reached toward his
belt as though he were preparing to fight. Joshua’s brother-in-law intervened
and then Joshua returned to his car to wait for the police.
Joshua’s wife, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law filed declarations
supporting his opposition. They concurred that Angelica and her family
were the instigators during the exchange, claiming that Josiah was afraid,
saying “horrible things” about Joshua in front of the children, and refusing
to let Josiah go. They attested that Angelica’s brother took off his sweater,
removed everything from his pockets, and squared up to fight Joshua, but
then the family intervened. They maintained that Joshua remained calm
during the incident and never touched Angelica’s car.
The court held a hearing in February 2025. Since neither party
requested a court reporter, there is no verbatim record of the hearing.1
1 Upon request, the trial court must give indigent civil litigants access to
an official verbatim record by providing an official court reporter or through
alternative means, such as electronic recording. (See Family Violence
Appellate Project v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Aug. 10, 2026,
S288176) 20 Cal.5th 564, 576 [346 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, 854].)
3
According to the minute order of the hearing and a settled statement, both
parties were sworn under oath and addressed the court. Angelica’s sister-in-
law, Joshua’s mother-in-law, and Josiah’s school counselor testified.
The court did not recall the specifics of any testimony given or objections
made. The parties did not offer any exhibits into evidence.
The court ultimately granted a three year DVRO prohibiting Joshua
from abusing, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of Angelica. The
finding that Joshua perpetrated domestic violence triggered a presumption
that granting him joint custody would be detrimental to Josiah’s best interest
(see Fam. Code,2 § 3044), and the court found that Joshua had “not yet”
rebutted that presumption. It ordered Joshua to attend conjoint therapy
with Josiah for 10 to 12 sessions and, if the therapists agreed, allowed him
to have professionally supervised visits on alternating Saturdays. The court
otherwise awarded Angelica sole physical and legal custody of Josiah.
DISCUSSION
Joshua primarily argues there is insufficient evidence that he abused
Angelica. He accordingly asks that we reverse the DVRO and custody order
or at least remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing.
The purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) “is to
prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for
a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period
sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the
violence.” (§ 6220.) Under the DVPA, the trial court can issue a restraining
order if an affidavit or testimony “shows, to the satisfaction of the court,
reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The court
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
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may issue a restraining order “based solely on the affidavit or testimony of
the person requesting the restraining order.” (Ibid.; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2015.5 [declarations may be offered in lieu of affidavits].)
The DVPA defines “abuse” to include “any behavior that has been
or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) In
turn, the behavior described in section 6320 includes molesting, attacking,
threatening, harassing, destroying personal property, or disturbing the peace
of the other party. (Id., subd. (a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other
party’ ” means “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
grant a request for a restraining order under the DVPA. (In re Marriage of
Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) “On review of an order
granting or denying a protective order under the DVPA, we consider whether
the trial court abused its discretion. ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the
trial court.” ’ We accept as true all evidence tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in the
evidence in favor of the judgment. Under the substantial evidence test,
the pertinent inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding—not whether a contrary finding might have been made.” (Ibid.,
citations omitted.)
Here, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Joshua
committed at least one act of abuse against Angelica. In her sworn request
for a DVRO, Angelica stated that Joshua became “aggressive” during a
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custody exchange. When he refused to calm down, Angelica and Josiah
retreated to her car and locked the doors. Joshua and his wife pursued
them, “banging and pounding on [her] car windows screaming and shouting
for [Josiah] to get out.” Angelica’s brother and sister-in-law agreed that
Joshua was aggressive with Angelica and screamed at her, leaving her and
Josiah terrified. The sister-in-law was concerned enough to call the police.
The court could have reasonably found that Joshua destroyed Angelica’s
“mental or emotional calm” with this behavior.
In his brief, Joshua emphasizes the fact that no exhibits were offered or
admitted into evidence at the DVRO hearing, there is no reporter’s transcript
of the testimony given, and the court was unable to recall the testimony in its
settled statement. Given this “evidentiary vacuum,” Joshua contends we
must conclude the DVRO is not supported by the evidence. But the opposite
is true. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) This means that when there is
no reporter’s transcript and no error is apparent on the face of the existing
record, “it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would
demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
973, 992.) We therefore presume that the sworn statements3 and testimony
3 Joshua seems to believe that because no exhibits were offered or
admitted at the hearing, the court did not consider the declarations the
parties and witnesses submitted. But these declarations —signed under
penalty of perjury under California law—were filed directly with the court
and were not objected to, as far as the record shows. The declarations were
not exhibits accompanying live testimony that needed to be admitted at the
hearing for the court to consider them.
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given by Angelica and her sister-in-law at the hearing supported the court’s
finding that Joshua abused Angelica. We likewise defer to the trial court,
who was able to observe the witnesses firsthand, in finding Angelica’s version
of events more credible. (See Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
1276, 1285–1286.)4
Joshua further argues he was “denied due process and the statutory
right to present relevant evidence when the trial court limited the proceeding
and did not permit testimony from listed witnesses … .” To be sure, the
record indicates he intended to present four witnesses—his wife, his mother-
in-law, his brother-in-law, and Josiah’s school counselor—but only his
mother-in-law and the school counselor testified at the hearing. But section
217, the statute Joshua relies on, does not grant him an unfettered right to
present however many witnesses he wishes. It generally requires the court
to “receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the
scope of the hearing” but at the same time allows the court to refuse to
receive live testimony for good cause. (§ 217, subds. (a) & (b).) Without a
record explaining the reason only two of Joshua’s witnesses testified, we
must presume the court properly excluded the remaining two. On the record
we do have, which reflects that Joshua addressed the court, presented two of
his witnesses, and cross-examined Angelica’s witness, we cannot say he was
denied his right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (See In re Marriage
of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935 [“Due process requires ‘the
right to be heard in a meaningful manner’ ”].)
4 Although the court could not recall the specifics of the testimony by
the time it issued the settled statement, we must presume that testimony
supported the DVRO at the time the court made its decision.
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Finally, Joshua asserts the court abused its discretion in setting the
DVRO for three years because there was no evidence of an ongoing danger,
escalation, stalking, repeated harassment, or an inability to comply with
custody-exchange protocols. He suggests an order less onerous—such as one
requiring supervised custody exchanges—would have sufficed. But the court
may issue a restraining order based on evidence of a past act of abuse; the
petitioner is not required to establish a probability of future abuse. (R.R. v.
C.R. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1275.) The court otherwise has discretion
to choose the duration of the DVRO, with three years being the default.
(§ 6345, subds. (a) & (c).) On the limited record before us, which generally
depicts a nonpeaceful relationship between Joshua and Angelica that
involved physical violence in the past, we cannot say the court abused its
discretion in setting the DVRO for the typical three year term.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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