Filed 6/18/26 Marriage of Alami and Nouri CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of ROYA ALAMI
and SIAMAK REZA NOURI.
ROYA ALAMI,
G065122
Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23D002524)
v.
OPINION
SIAMAK REZA NOURI,
Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Paul Minerich, Judge. Affirmed.
Siamak Rezanouri, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Law Offices of Lisa R. McCall, Lisa R. McCall and Erica M.
Barbero for Respondent.
1
Siamak Rezanouri appeals from the default judgment entered in
this marriage dissolution action. Rezanouri asserts the trial court erred by
not setting aside the default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
2
subdivision (b), and on other grounds. We conclude Rezanouri’s arguments
are unavailing and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2023, Roya Alami filed a petition and then an amended
petition for dissolution of her marriage to Rezanouri. Neither petition is in
the record on appeal. Rezanouri did not file a response, and in March 2024,
default was entered against him. Rezanouri appears to have filed a motion to
set aside the default in March 2024, but that motion also is not in the record
on appeal.
On July 18, 2024, Rezanouri filed his “responsive declaration in
support of petition to set aside default.” (Capitalization omitted.) In that
declaration, Rezanouri discussed, among other things, what he asserted were
grounds to set aside the default based on inadvertence, neglect, mistake, and
duress. On July 19, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, but the
record on appeal does not contain either a transcript of that hearing or a copy
of any order issued by the court on Rezanouri’s motion. We assume the court
1
At times in the record, appellant’s name is spelled “Siamak
Reza Nouri” or “Siamak Rezanouri.” Because appellant spells his last name
“Rezanouri” in his appellate brief, we use that spelling.
2
All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
3
denied the motion, because on July 30, 2024, Rezanouri appears to have filed
a second motion to set aside the default. It, too, is not in the record on appeal.
Also on July 30, 2024, Rezanouri filed a form responsive declaration to
request for order, which attached a new “responsive declaration in support of
petition to set aside default” (capitalization omitted) that was different than
4
his July 18, 2024 declaration, along with a number of exhibits.
On November 15, 2024, the trial court held a hearing, at which
Rezanouri and Alami appeared in person and Alami’s counsel appeared
remotely. The court heard argument from Rezanouri and denied his second
motion to set aside the default. The court proceeded to conduct a default
hearing, after first excusing Rezanouri from the hearing. The court heard
testimony from Alami and made various rulings and findings, including that
“[j]urisdiction was acquired over [Rezanouri] on July 28, 2023 by service.”
The court also entered judgment of dissolution. In the judgment, the court,
among other things, awarded Alami sole physical custody of the parties’ child
and awarded joint legal custody to Alami and Rezanouri. The court also noted
“[t]he parties have entered into a separation agreement and also a post
nuptial agreement,” which were attached to the court’s judgment, and “[p]er
the agreements, the parties have waived spousal support.” The court
awarded to Alami, as her sole and separate property, “100% interest” in a
specific real property in Toronto, “including all sale proceeds” from that
3
Alami’s respondent’s brief states the trial court denied
Rezanouri’s March 2024 motion. Rezanouri did not file a reply brief and thus
does not dispute this.
4
Alami appears to have filed responses to both of Rezanouri’s
motions to set aside the default, but those filings by Alami are not in the
record on appeal.
3
property. The court reserved jurisdiction over any community or separate
property not awarded in the judgment.
DISCUSSION
As our Supreme Court has recognized, “it is a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This
is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a
contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s
action will be made by the appellate court.’” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) An appellant “‘has the burden of providing an
adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’” (Id. at p. 609.)
“‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its
own seeking error.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[i]f a party fails to support an argument
with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed
to have been waived.’” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [noting a brief must “[s]upport
any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears”].) Moreover, “‘[w]hen an
appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’”
(L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (L.O.); see also Cal Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [noting a brief must “support each point by
argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].) A party appearing in
4
propria persona “‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants
must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu, at p. 1247.)
On appeal, Rezanouri argues the trial court abused its discretion
by not setting aside the default under section 473, subdivision (b). That
statute provides, in relevant part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be
just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the
party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for
this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading
proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted,
and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months,
after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (§ 473, subd.
5
(b).)
“‘The general underlying purpose of section 473[, subdivision (b),]
is to promote the determination of actions on their merits.’” (Austin v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928 (Austin).) “The
party seeking relief, however, bears the burden of proof in establishing a
right to relief. [Citation.] The burden is a ‘“‘double’”’ one: the moving party
‘“‘must show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and he must show diligence
5
Under certain circumstances where an attorney’s affidavit of
fault is filed, section 473, subdivision (b), requires that relief be granted, but
that mandatory provision is not applicable here. (See Esther B. v. City of Los
Angeles (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1100 [“the discretionary provision
applies to a party, including a party appearing in propria persona, and an
attorney representing a party, whereas the mandatory provision only applies
to an attorney representing a party”].)
5
in making the motion after discovery of the default.’”’” (Hopkins & Carley v.
Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410; see also Austin, at p. 928 [“the
moving party bears the burden of establishing a right to relief”].) “[F]or
inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant’s
neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably
prudent person under the same circumstances.’” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)
“A motion to vacate under section 473[, subdivision (b)] ‘“‘is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse . . . the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed
on appeal.’” [Citation.] The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’” (Austin, supra, 244
Cal.App.4th at p. 929.) “However, ‘[b]ecause the law favors disposing of cases
on their merits, “any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor
of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court
order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting
trial on the merits.”’” (Ibid.)
Here, Rezanouri’s argument on appeal regarding section 473,
subdivision (b), is unavailing. Rezanouri asserts he “showed excusable
neglect: he was self-represented, financially constrained, and misled about
deadlines.” As an initial matter, Rezanouri did not provide any record
citations to support this argument. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620
[“Because [the appellant] failed to appropriately cite the record, he forfeited
any argument that the challenged orders were erroneously issued”].) Indeed,
Rezanouri fails to provide any record citations throughout his entire
appellate brief.
6
Even if Rezanouri did not forfeit this argument by failing to
provide any supporting record citations, neither the fact that Rezanouri was
self-represented nor his assertion that he was “financially constrained”
establishes the trial court abused its discretion. As discussed, a party that
represents itself “‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’”
(Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247; see also Hopkins & Carley
v. Gens, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414 [“‘naïveté’ of lay litigants in
‘rely[ing] on themselves to protect their substantial legal interests’ does not
afford a ground for relief from adverse results”]; Hearn v. Howard, supra, 177
Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 [“‘It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an
action or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely and adequate
steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an undesirable
judgment’”].)6 Rezanouri’s vague assertion that he was “misled about
deadlines”—without citation to the record—also is insufficient. Rezanouri
does not identify what specific deadlines he is referring to or what specific
purported misrepresentations caused him to miss them.7
6
The Family Code contains provisions that address parties with
disparate financial means: Family Code sections 2030 to 2032 may provide
for an award of attorney fees in marriage dissolution proceedings. Based on
the record on appeal, Rezanouri did not seek attorney fees under those
provisions. Rezanouri’s asserted financial inability to retain counsel did not
require the trial court to set aside the default under section 473, subdivision
(b).
7
Citing Austin, Rezanouri asserts “[c]ourts consistently hold that
relief is mandatory where a party acts diligently and prejudice is minimal.”
Austin does not stand for that proposition. In Austin, the appellate court
concluded the trial court erred by refusing to consider the merits of a motion
under section 473, subdivision (b), because the motion was not signed under
7
Additionally, Rezanouri argues his “declaration demonstrates he
was deprived of clear notice due to [Alami’s] misrepresentation and
manipulation tactics,” and the judgment therefore violated due process as it
was obtained without proper notice. Rezanouri forfeited this argument by
failing to provide developed argument. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620.) As discussed, Rezanouri’s appellate brief contains no citations to the
record, and his vague assertion of “misrepresentation and manipulation
tactics” is insufficient, particularly given his failure to identify any specific
purported misrepresentation and manipulation that he claims deprived him
of notice. Rezanouri vaguely refers in his appellate brief to a lack of proper
notice, but he does not demonstrate he was not served with any specific
documents.8
Rezanouri also asserts he was entitled to relief from the default
judgment under Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 because of duress and
penalty of perjury. (Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 930–932.) The court
cited Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1343 for the
proposition that, “‘[w]hen the moving party promptly seeks relief [under
section 473, subdivision (b)] and there is no prejudice to the opposing party,
very slight evidence is required to justify relief.’” (Austin, at p. 932.) The
Austin court then noted that “it would not have been an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to grant relief under” section 473, subdivision (b). (Austin,
at p. 932.) Nevertheless, the court did not order the trial court to grant relief
under section 473, subdivision (b); instead, it remanded the matter for the
trial court to exercise its discretion and rule on the merits of the motion.
(Austin, at p. 932 & fn. 10.)
8
During oral argument, Rezanouri referred to duress, emotional
impairment, and coercive circumstances that he asserted warranted relief.
But he did not address, either in his appellate brief or his declaration, any
specific alleged conduct by Alami after he was served that would demonstrate
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion or otherwise show
he was deprived of due process.
8
emotional abuse. Under Family Code section 2121, subdivision (a), “[i]n
proceedings for dissolution of marriage, . . . the court may, on any terms that
may be just, relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any part or parts thereof,
adjudicating support or division of property, after the six-month time limit of
[s]ection 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure has run, based on the grounds,
9
and within the time limits, provided in this chapter.” (Ibid.) Based on the
record before us on appeal, however, Rezanouri did not seek relief from the
judgment in the trial court under Family Code sections 2121 and 2122.
Rezanouri cannot assert on appeal that the trial court erred by not setting
aside the judgment under these statutes when he did not ask the court to do
so. (See Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 [“‘issues not raised
in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal’”].)
Finally, Rezanouri contends default should have been set aside
because of the best interests of the parties’ child. Rezanouri’s argument in his
appellate brief for this point consists of only the following: “Family law
matters are unique; the child’s welfare is paramount. (In re Marriage of
Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051). Default judgments deprive the court of
full evidence regarding custody and support. Given the ongoing parent-child
relationship, justice requires that the case be heard on the merits.”
Rezanouri has forfeited this argument by failing to provide
developed argument, with citation to applicable authority and citation to the
record, explaining why the best interests of the parties’ child required the
default to be set aside. (See L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620) The case he
cites, In re Marriage of Stevenot, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, does not
9
Family Code section 2122 addresses “[t]he grounds and time
limits for a motion to set aside a judgment.” (Ibid.)
9
support his argument. It did not concern custody of a child. Nor did it
address, much less hold, that simply invoking a child’s best interest is
sufficient ground to set aside a default judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Roya Alami shall recover
her costs on appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
10