Filed 8/24/26 Marriage of Ahuja CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re the Marriage of RENAKA H052683
CHAINANI AHUJA and MUKESH (Santa Clara County
AHUJA. Super. Ct. No. 16FL173747)
RENAKA CHAINANI AHUJA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MUKESH AHUJA,
Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal concerns the division of property between former spouses. Renuka
Chainani Ahuja (Chainani) and Mukesh Ahuja were married in 1999, and their divorce
was finalized in 2018. However, Chainani, the wife, and Ahuja, the husband, continued
to dispute how to divide their property. In 2022 an arbitrator ruled that the marital home
was community property, and in 2024 the trial court issued an order after trial rejecting
Chainani’s challenges to the arbitration award, ordering the home sold, and dividing the
remaining property in dispute.
In this appeal, Chainani challenges both the arbitration award and the order after
trial. She argues that the arbitration award should be vacated because she agreed to
judicial arbitration, not contractual arbitration, and timely requested a trial de novo under
the Judicial Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.10 et seq.). She also argues that the
trial court’s order should be vacated because the court abused its discretion in denying her
motion to continue trial because an expert witness had become unavailable. As explained
below, we reject both arguments.
Accordingly, the trial court’s order after trial is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties separated in 2015, and Chainani filed for divorce in 2016. Spousal
support was terminated the next year, and because the parties’ two sons were by then
adults, there were no custody issues. However, the parties continued to dispute division
of their property.
A. The Arbitration Order
On September 21, 2017, the parties informed the trial court that they had reached
an agreement to engage in arbitration before retired Judge Catherine Gallagher. The
parties represented that they “agree to obtain the services of Judge Gallagher for binding
arbitration.” They also informed the court that they had agreed that Chainani would pay
Judge Gallagher’s retainer, that discovery would remain open, and that the parties would
participate in a hearing for a minimum of four hours. Finally, the parties identified the
issues to be arbitrated. After questioning the parties under oath, the trial court determined
that they had reached a voluntary agreement, and it ordered Ahuja’s lawyer to prepare a
written order.
The trial court signed the proposed written order on October 26, 2017. The
arbitration order stated that “[t]he parties agree to work with Judge Gallagher (ADR, Inc.)
and engage in binding arbitration . . . .” The order also stated that four issues would be
arbitrated: “a. House owned during the marriage, its characterization, the issue of
transmutation (grant deed related to house) per wife and related defenses or counter
claims such as coercion, lack of consideration, breach of fiduciary duty by the husband.
[¶] b. Sale/buy out of the house and credits/reimbursement as it relates to the house,
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[¶] c. Property division, [¶] d. Stocks and their characterization.” The arbitration order
stated as well that “[d]iscovery will remain open,” Chainani “will advance the fees and
costs associated with binding arbitration with Judge Gallagher subject to re-allocation”
and the parties will participate “for at least a 4-hour long binding arbitration session.”
B. The Contempt Proceedings
Subsequently, Chainani refused to engage in arbitration, and Ahuja requested that
she be found in contempt. Claiming that she believed that the parties agreed to mediation
rather than arbitration, Chainani asked the court to clarify whether the parties had been
ordered to mediation or arbitration. Ahuja acknowledged that there was a brief reference
to mediation during September 21, 2017 hearing but said that this was a mistake that was
quickly corrected, and the arbitration order clearly stated that the parties had agreed to
binding arbitration, not mediation. Ahuja also asserted that the parties had agreed to
judicial arbitration, and therefore Chainani “may still exercise her right to trial de novo
against a ‘binding’ arbitration award.”
After a hearing, the trial court held Chainani in contempt. The court found that the
parties had clearly agreed to binding arbitration rather than mediation, that Chainani
willfully violated the order, and that she failed to cure the contempt. The court did not
agree with Ahuja’s assertion that the parties had agreed to judicial arbitration. Instead,
the court noted that “binding arbitration” is different from “ ‘judicial arbitration,’ ” that
“contract arbitration . . . is binding,” and that the parties had stipulated to “binding
arbitration.”
The trial court stayed imposition of sentence and gave Chainani 30 days to cure
the contempt. In late 2019, the parties commenced arbitration. However, Chainani
refused to pay the arbitration fees, and in January 2021 the trial court held her in
contempt.
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C. The Arbitration Award
In February 2021, the arbitrator conducted a hearing on the first issue submitted to
arbitration: the alleged transmutation of the family home into Chainani’s separate
property. In March 2021 the arbitrator issued an interim award.
The arbitrator found that Ahuja had executed a deed transferring the family home
to Chainani. However, this deed was executed as part of an agreement in which Ahuja
was to transfer the home to Chainani in exchange for Chainani assuming the mortgage on
the home and waiving her claims to Ahuja’s stock in various companies. Chainani failed
to do either, and, applying the presumption of undue influence in Family Code
section 721, the arbitrator concluded that the deed should be set aside.
After the interim award was issued, the parties informed the arbitrator that they
lacked the funds to arbitrate the remaining issues submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator
instructed Chainani’s counsel to inform the trial court of this development and inquire
whether the court would like the arbitrator to convert the interim award into a partial final
award. Counsel did so, and the trial court instructed JAMS to convert the interim award
to a partial final award, which was done.
D. Subsequent Trial Court Proceedings
In the trial court, Chainani requested a trial de novo under the Judicial Arbitration
Act. She also moved to vacate the arbitration award under the California Arbitration Act
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.). Nonetheless, the court scheduled a trial on the
remaining property division issues beginning on June 10, 2024.
On May 28, 2024, approximately two weeks before the beginning of trial,
Chainani moved for a continuance due to the hospitalization of a tax attorney that she had
retained to provide expert testimony concerning characterization of Ahuja’s tax
obligations as community property. The trial court denied the continuance, and the case
proceeded to trial as scheduled.
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After trial, the court issued an order. In it, the court rejected Chainani’s request for
a trial de novo under the Judicial Arbitration Act and her requests to vacate the arbitration
award under the California Arbitration Act. The trial court also rejected Chainani’s
claims that Ahuja breached his fiduciary duty to her in selling stock in one company,
failing to disclose interests in two other companies, forging her signature in connection
with the sale of stock from a fourth company, and not disclosing the sale of a fifth one.
Finally, the court rejected Chainani’s request for an alternate valuation date for the family
home, and it characterized the remaining property in dispute as either personal or
community. The court did not characterize Ahuja’s tax obligations because during trial
he withdrew the claim that they were community obligations.
Chainani filed a timely notice of appeal. Afterwards, Chainani attempted to move
for reconsideration in the trial court. This court stayed the appeal and remanded for
consideration of the motion, which the trial court denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Arbitration Award
Chainani argues that the trial court should have vacated the arbitration award and
conducted a trial de novo concerning ownership of the family home on the ground that
the parties agreed to judicial, not contractual, arbitration. We disagree. As explained
below, the arbitration order plainly required contractual arbitration.
1. Contractual and Judicial Arbitration
We begin by reviewing contractual and judicial arbitration, emphasizing the
differences between them.
As its name suggests, “contractual arbitration is a matter of contract.” (Century
City Medical Plaza v. Sperling, Isacs & Eisenberg et al. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 865, 875.)
In contractual arbitration, “ ‘[t]he scope of arbitration is . . . a matter of agreement
between the parties . . . .’ ” (Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8
(Moncharsch).) An arbitrator’s powers are “ ‘ “limited and circumscribed” ’ ” by the
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agreement of the parties (ibid.), who, if they choose, may dispense with the rules of
evidence and procedure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1282.2, subd. (d).) Absent agreement of the
parties, the scope of discovery in contractual arbitration is at the discretion of the
arbitrator. (Id., § 1283; id., § 1283.05, subds. (c), (e).) In addition, in contractual
arbitration, “[t]he parties themselves are responsible for payment of the arbitrator and
associated costs.” (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 402, fn. 5
(Blanton).)
Finally, in contractual arbitration awards are binding. As the Supreme Court has
observed, “it is the general rule that parties to a private arbitration impliedly agree that
the arbitrator’s decision will be both binding and final. Indeed, ‘[t]he very essence of the
term “arbitration” [in this context] connotes a binding award.’ ” (Moncharsh, supra, 3
Cal.4th at p. 9, fn. omitted.)
Judicial arbitration is different. Unlike contractual arbitration, judicial arbitration
is not a matter of contract, and it is not governed by the agreement of the parties. Judicial
arbitration is instead “a mechanism to resolve disputes more expeditiously and less
expensively than continued litigation” Mercury Insurance Group v. Superior Court
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 343-344 (Mercury Insurance) through a sort of “ ‘ “[e]xtrajudicial
mediation” ’ ” process (In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 907, fn. 7).
Judicial arbitration is mandatory in many cases in which the amount in controversy is less
than $50,000. (Mercury Insurance, at p. 343; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.11, subds. (a),
(b).) In addition, the parties are unable to limit the issues considered in a contractual
arbitration: Instead, in keeping with judicial arbitration’s goal of avoiding traditional
litigation, an award in a judicial arbitration “must determine all issues properly raised by
the pleadings.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.825(a)(1); see Dickens v. Lee (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 985, 989 (Dickens).) Furthermore, with only limited exceptions, in judicial
arbitration ordinary rules of evidence apply (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.823(b)), and
parties are entitled to conduct discovery to the same extent as they would in court (id.,
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rule 3.822(b)). Moreover, unlike in contractual arbitration, in judicial arbitration the
parties are not responsible for paying the costs of arbitration: Instead, “[t]he general
costs of arbitration are borne the public, not by the parties.” (Blanton, supra, 38 Cal.3d at
p. 402, fn. 5; but see Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.21 [noting that parties requesting trial de
novo may become liable for costs]).)
Finally, unlike contractual arbitration, judicial arbitration “generally does not
result in a binding or final decision.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 343.)
In keeping with the mediation-like nature of judicial arbitration, parties are free to reject
an arbitrator’s award: After issuance of an award, the Judicial Arbitration Act “allows a
trial de novo at the election of a party by timely request.” (Ibid; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1141.20, subd. (a) [“An arbitration award shall be final unless a request for a de novo
trial . . . is filed with 60 days” of an award’s issuance].)
2. The Arbitration Order
The arbitration order in this case plainly required contractual, not judicial,
arbitration, and Chainani’s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive.
a. The Plain Language of the Arbitration Order
The arbitration order expressly states that the parties agree to “engage in binding
arbitration,” and twice more references “binding arbitration.” (Italics added.) These
references plainly are to contractual rather than judicial arbitration. As noted above,
judicial arbitration “generally does not result in a binding or final decision” because the
Judicial Arbitration Act “allows a trial de novo at the election of any party by timely
request.” (Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 343.) By contrast, in contractual
arbitration the parties “impliedly agree that the arbitrator’s decision will be both binding
and final,” and therefore “ ‘[t]he very essence of the term “arbitration” [in this context]
connotes a binding award.’ ” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9, fn omitted.) Thus, in
stating that the parties agree to engage in “binding arbitration,” the arbitration order
plainly indicated that the parties had agreed to contractual, not judicial, arbitration.
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The conclusion that the arbitration order required contractual rather than judicial
arbitration is reinforced by three provisions in the order. First, the arbitration order
specifies the issues to be considered. This specification is consistent with contractual
arbitration but not with judicial arbitration. As noted above, in contractual arbitration,
“ ‘[t]he scope of arbitration is . . . a matter of agreement between the parties’ ”
(Moncharsch, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 8), and therefore the parties may “choose to limit that
scope.” (Ericksen, Arbuthonot, McCarty, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983)
35 Cal.3d 312, 323.) By contrast, specification of the issues to be considered is inimical
to judicial arbitration. As noted above, the rules governing judicial arbitration state that
an award “must determine all issues properly raised by the pleadings.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.825(a).) This requirement reflects the purpose of judicial arbitration, “to
avoid traditional litigation,” which is best served if the avoidance is “as complete as
possible, with the arbitrator deciding all disputed issues.” (Dickens, supra, 230
Cal.App.3d at p. 989.) Thus, while the arbitration order’s specification of issues is
perfectly normal for contractual arbitration, it is incompatible with judicial arbitration.
Second, the arbitration order states that Chainani “will advance the fees and costs
associated with binding arbitration.” Like the specification of issues, this cost allocation
is consistent with contractual arbitration, but not judicial arbitration. In judicial
arbitration the parties generally are not responsible for paying the costs of arbitration;
instead, as a general rule, “costs of arbitration are borne by the public, not by the
parties . . . .” (Blanton, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 402, fn. 5.) By contrast, in contractual
arbitration, “[t]he parties are themselves responsible for payment of the arbitrator and
associated costs.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, in contractual arbitration, it makes sense for the
parties to determine how to allocate those costs, as the arbitration order does. Thus, the
order’s cost allocation provision indicates contractual, not judicial, arbitration.
Third, the arbitration order provides that “[d]iscovery will remain open.” This
provision is also consistent with contractual arbitration, but incompatible with judicial
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arbitration. As noted above, in judicial arbitration all issues in a case must be resolved
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.825(a)), which means that in judicial arbitration there are no
issues for which discovery might be held open. By contrast, in contractual arbitration the
scope of the issues submitted to arbitration may be limited by the parties (see
Moncharsch, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 8), and if the parties choose to leave some issues for
litigation, it makes sense to leave discovery in the litigation open. Thus, like the issue
specification and cost allocation provisions, the arbitration order’s discovery provision
suggests contractual, not judicial, arbitration.
In sum, both the repeated references to “binding arbitration” and the provisions of
the arbitration order plainly show that the order required contractual, not judicial,
arbitration.
b. Chainani’s Arguments
Chainani urges a different interpretation. She contends that the arbitration order
required judicial arbitration because, in her view, the term “binding arbitration” is
ambiguous, several terms in the order suggest judicial arbitration, and the arbitrator acted
as if she was engaged in judicial arbitration. These arguments are unpersuasive.
Chainani asserts that “ ‘binding arbitration’ ” is ambiguous and does not, standing
alone, establish contractual arbitration. However, Chainani does not explain how judicial
arbitration is in any sense “binding.” As noted above, under the Judicial Arbitration Act,
after issuance of an arbitration award, parties are able to request a trial de novo (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1141.20, subd. (a)), and in light of this ability the Supreme Court has said
that judicial arbitration “generally does not result in a binding or final decision.”
(Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 343, italics added.) In asserting that “binding
arbitration” may refer to judicial arbitration, Chainani ignores both the ability to request a
trial de novo and the conclusion that the Supreme Court has drawn from that ability.
Indeed, Chainani fails to offer any persuasive explanation how a judicial arbitration
award can be understood to be “binding.”
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Instead, Chainani asserts that the term “binding arbitration” is ambiguous based on
three Court of Appeal decisions. While these decisions acknowledge that agreements to
engage in “binding arbitration” may refer to judicial arbitration, they do not help
Chainani. In each of them, the Court of Appeal found that an agreement to arbitrate may
refer to judicial arbitration despite use of the term “binding arbitration,” not because of
any ambiguity in that term.
For example, in Porreco v. Red Top RV Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 113, the
Court of Appeal expressly recognized that “private arbitration is by its essence binding
while judicial arbitration offers the opportunity for a de novo trial after arbitration has
been completed.” (Id. at p. 119.) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal found that the
agreement in that case contemplated judicial arbitration because other portions of the
agreement suggested judicial arbitration. The agreement in that case was entitled
“ ‘Stipulation for Judicial Arbitration,’ ” it referred to waiver of “trial de novo,” and it
provided for conducting arbitration pursuant to state and local rules, which are applicable
only to private arbitration. (Ibid., italics added.)
The other two decisions cited by Chainani are similar. Neither decision suggested
that the term “binding arbitration” is ambiguous. Instead, Pratt v. Gursey, Schneider &
Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1105 found a stipulation for “binding arbitration” ambiguous
because it had “hallmarks of judicial arbitration”: It referred to trial de novo, the Judicial
Arbitration Act, and rules for judicial arbitration. (Id. at p. 1110; see id. at p. 1109)
Similarly, Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624 found an
agreement ambiguous because it “intermingled characteristics of judicial and contractual
arbitration” such as “binding arbitration” and waiving “trial de novo.” (Id. at p. 627; see
id. at pp. 634-635.) Thus, none of the decisions cited by Chainani suggests that the term
“binding arbitration” itself is ambiguous.
Chainani also asserts that two provisions in the arbitration order suggest judicial
arbitration. In fact both provisions suggest contractual arbitration. First, Chainani points
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to the arbitration order’s specification of issues. She asserts that “[s]ubmitting only those
issues” is indicative of judicial arbitration because it shows that this “case was intended
to remain open and that the trial court would remain involved in its resolution.” In fact,
as shown above, the opposite is true: Because awards in judicial arbitration must
determine “all issues properly raised by the pleading” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.825(a)), the arbitration order’s specification of only four discrete issues for
consideration is inimical to judicial arbitration. However, the specification provision is
consistent with contractual arbitration because in such arbitration the parties determine
the issues considered. (Moncharsch, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 8.)
Second, Chainani points to the arbitration order’s discovery provision. Citing
Mercury Insurance, supra, 19 Cal.4th 332, Chainani asserts that this provision is
“characteristic of judicial arbitration.” In fact, Mercury Insurance merely observes that
in judicial arbitration there is “full and unconditional discovery.” (Id. at p. 344.) The
discovery provision in the arbitration order addresses a different issue: It states that
“[d]iscovery will remain open,” which we understand to refer to discovery in the
underlying litigation. As shown above, this provision is incompatible with judicial
arbitration because it contemplates that some issues will be considered in litigation rather
than arbitration even though in judicial arbitration all issues raised in a case are
considered. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.822(a).)
Chainani also tries to draw support from the arbitrator’s conduct. She contends
that the arbitrator conducted the arbitration in a manner suggestive of judicial arbitration
because the arbitrator involved the trial court in the arbitration. In fact, this involvement
was minimal. The arbitrator merely instructed the parties to inform the court that the
parties lacked sufficient funds to arbitrate more than one of the issues identified in the
arbitration order and to ask if the court wanted a final award issued on the issue the
arbitrator had resolved. We fail to see how this request suggests judicial rather than
contractual arbitration.
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Thus, Chainani has not shown any ambiguity in the term “binding arbitration” or
that any provisions in the arbitration order or the conduct of the arbitration suggested
judicial arbitration. To the contrary, both the term “binding arbitration” and the order’s
provisions contemplated contractual arbitration.
3. Ahuja’s Representation
The strongest support for Chainani’s contention that the parties agreed to judicial
arbitration comes from Ahuja’s representation in the contempt proceedings against
Chainani. In those proceedings, Ahuja stated that, although Chainani “agreed to binding
arbitration,” she “may still exercise her right to trial de novo against a ‘binding’
arbitration award.” Chainani contends that this statement shows that the parties intended
to engage in judicial arbitration and that Ahuja should not be permitted to change
positions on appeal and assert that the parties agreed to contractual arbitration. We agree
that Ahuja represented that the parties had agreed to judicial arbitration. Nonetheless, we
conclude that the parties agreed to contractual arbitration, and we reject Chainani’s
suggestion that Ahuja should be estopped from arguing otherwise on appeal.
Ahuja’s representation does not change our interpretation of the arbitration order.
Contrary to Chainani’s assertions, this representation is not “compelling evidence of the
parties’ objective intent.” The representation in the contempt proceeding was made in
August 2018, more than nine months after the arbitration order. Moreover, Chainani did
not agree with Ahuja’s representation that the parties had agreed to judicial arbitration;
she contended that she had not agreed to arbitration at all, only mediation. Chainani also
argued that this case is exempt from judicial arbitration.
Even more important, Ahuja’s representation is extrinsic evidence of intent, and
such evidence is immaterial where, as here, the text of the parties’ agreement is clear and
unambiguous. “ ‘It has long been established that extrinsic evidence is admissible to
prove what the parties intended by ambiguous language appearing in a . . . settlement
agreement incorporated and merged in a judgment . . . .’ ” (SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego
12
Unified Port Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284, 299.) However, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to explain the meaning of a written instrument only if “ ‘the offered evidence
is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible.’ ” (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 246;
see also Yahoo Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 58, 87 [“ ‘ “If
contractual language is clear, . . . it governs.” ’ ”].) Chainani has not shown that the
arbitration order is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that it ordered judicial
arbitration. To the contrary, as demonstrated above, by its plain language the order
required contractual arbitration.
Chainani also contends that Ahuja cannot be allowed to contend that the
arbitration order required contractual arbitration after asserting that it required judicial
arbitration in seeking to hold her in contempt. As Chainani cites the Supreme Court’s
discussion of judicial estoppel in New Hampshire v. Maine (2001) 532 U.S. 742, 749, we
understand this argument to invoke judicial estoppel. However, under California as well
as federal law, judicial estoppel generally applies only where a party changing positions
“succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position.” (Id. at p. 750;
see also Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 453 [noting that
since 2000 “the California Supreme Court has always included success as a necessary
element”].) Here, Ahuja did not succeed in persuading the trial court to accept his
contention that the arbitration order required judicial arbitration. Instead, the trial court
rejected that contention and found that the order required contractual arbitration.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Chainani’s request to
vacate the arbitration award and conduct a trial de novo.
B. The Motion to Continue
In addition to objecting to the arbitration award, Chainani objects to the trial
conducted on the issues not resolved in the award. In particular, she argues that the trial
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court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue trial in light of the illness
and consequent unavailability of her tax expert. This argument is not persuasive.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether good cause exists to grant a continuance of the trial.” (People v.
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.) In addition, where, as here, a continuance is
sought to secure the attendance of a witness, the party requesting the continuance must
establish, among other things, that “ ‘the witness’s expected testimony was material’ ”
and “ ‘the facts to which the witness would testify could not otherwise be proven.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Chainani has not shown that her tax expert would have testified to any facts that
could not otherwise be proven. In her opening brief, Chainani asserted that she lacked
any reasonable mean to present her expert’s testimony because she “did not have the
ability to present videotaped deposition testimony in place of [his] live testimony.”
However, she did not cite any evidence supporting this assertion. Even more important,
she did not assert that she could not have presented her expert’s testimony by deposition,
declaration, or other means. Moreover, when Ahuja pointed this out, Chainani did not
dispute that she could have presented the testimony by deposition or declaration. She
only said that she was not required to retain a backup expert. As a consequence, there
was ample basis for concluding that Chainani failed to show that she had no alternative
means of presenting her expert’s analysis and opinions.
Chainani also has not shown that her expert’s testimony was material to the issues
considered at trial or that she was deprived of a fair hearing as a result. (See Freeman v.
Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 [denial of a continuance is reversible error
“only when the denial . . . results in the denial of a fair hearing or otherwise prejudices a
party”].) In requesting a continuance, Chainani asserted that her tax expert’s testimony
was critical to countering Ahuja’s “purported community property liability for
Respondent’s tax obligations.” However, at trial Ahuja withdrew his tax reimbursement
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claim. In addition, although Chainani asserts in her opening brief that she was denied a
fair hearing and that “the trial court effectively denied her the opportunity to present
material testimony,” she has failed to identify what testimony her expert would have
presented, much less show that it was material. Similarly, while Chainani asserts that her
expert would have testified about Ahuja’s supposed “tax fraud” and “fraudulent
conveyance and concealment of community assets . . . which affected Ms. Chainani’s
claims for breach for breach of fiduciary duty and characterization of the stock,” she fails
to explain how this testimony is material to the issues considered at trial.
This failure is not surprising. Chainani’s fiduciary duty claims concerned stocks
and other interests in five companies: Kovair Software, Skyroam, Inc., Nexxus Ventures,
Boardwalk Tech, and Asia Links. None of these companies are mentioned in the
declaration submitted by Chainani’s tax expert. The declaration does mention one stock,
Ombrella Ventures, considered at trial. However, the declaration merely notes the terms
of Ahuja’s compensation from this company, including a supposedly false representation
by Ahuja, and says nothing related to characterization of the stock as either personal or
community. As a consequence, Chainani has failed to show that her expert’s testimony
was material to anything considered at the hearing and, thus, has not shown that the
expert’s absence deprived her of a fair trial.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive
Chainani of a fair trial in denying her request for a continuance.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of September 6, 2024 is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
WILSON, J.
Ahuja v. Ahuja
H052683