Filed 6/30/26 Marriage of A.G. and C.G. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of A.G. and C.G.
A.G.,
G064515
Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 24D005311)
v.
OPINION
C.G.,
Respondent.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
William E. Weinberger, Judge. Affirmed.
A.G., in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance by Respondent.
C.G. filed an ex parte request for emergency temporary orders to
modify existing child custody and visitation orders in this family law case.
Her request was brought on grounds her former spouse, A.G., violated the
terms of such orders and had engaged in harassing behavior in violation of
the domestic violence restraining order protecting C.G. and the parties’ minor
child (the child). The trial court granted C.G.’s request and issued emergency
temporary orders that awarded C.G. sole legal and physical custody of the
child, modified A.G.’s parenting time from unmonitored to monitored, and
sanctioned A.G. in the amount of $6,000 pursuant to Family Code section
271.1
A.G. asserts several challenges to the trial court’s orders. He
argues, inter alia, the court lacked jurisdiction, the orders were void due to
clerical error, he had not been properly and completely served with C.G.’s
request, the orders violated sections 3064 and 217, and the orders should be
reversed due to cumulative error. For the reasons we explain post, we reject
each of A.G.’s contentions of error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT ISSUES A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST A.G. IN THE PARTIES’ MARITAL DISSOLUTION
ACTION
In 2012, A.G. filed a petition for the dissolution of the parties’
marriage in the Los Angeles Superior Court. That same year, the trial court
in that case issued an 18-month domestic violence restraining order
protecting C.G. and the child with respect to A.G.
In February 2019, the trial court granted C.G.’s request to renew
the domestic violence restraining order and this time the court made it
1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code, unless
otherwise specified.
2
permanently effective (the DVRO). The DVRO prohibited A.G. from, inter
alia, contacting, harassing, or disturbing the peace of either C.G. or the child
and also required A.G. to stay at least 100 yards away from them except for
“[b]rief and peaceful contact” with C.G. and peaceful contact with the child
“as required for court-ordered visitation” with the child. The DVRO also
provided that “text and e-mail communication only regarding [the] child
allowed when not at exchange of [the] child.”
II.
THE CHILD WELFARE ACTION
During the pendency of the parties’ family law case, the parties
had an open child welfare case in the Orange County Juvenile Court until
October 27, 2021, when final judgment was entered (the child welfare
judgment). In the child welfare judgment, the juvenile court awarded the
parties joint legal custody of the child and awarded C.G. sole physical custody
of him, with parenting time for A.G. on the first, third, and fifth weekends of
the month. The child welfare judgment also included a holiday schedule for
the parties’ respective time with the child and stated, “Any modifications to
the above schedule [are] to be agreed upon by [the] parents in writing. If both
parties cannot agree, the above schedule remains.”
The child welfare judgment included the following notice: “The
juvenile court has terminated jurisdiction over [the child]. All requests for
modification or termination of these orders must be brought in the family
court case in which these orders are filed.”2 It expressly acknowledged the
2 The child welfare judgment also provided: “If any party seeks to
modify these orders, the Orange County Juvenile Court file may be reviewed
to determine the original allegations leading to dependency, the findings
concerning prior allegations, the disposition of the case, and the reason for
terminating dependency.”
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validity and effectiveness of the DVRO issued by the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ORDERS THE FAMILY LAW CASE TRANSFERRED TO ORANGE
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND SANCTIONS A.G.
After a hearing in January 2024, in light of A.G. having moved to
Orange County, the trial court granted C.G.’s request to change venue of the
family law case from the Los Angeles Superior Court to the Orange County
Superior Court, “effective upon payment of transfer fees to the clerk’s office.”
The trial court also sanctioned A.G. $1,500 under section 271, finding “he
frustrated the policy of the law encouraging settlement and reduction of fees,
and based on evidence of failure to meet and confer in good faith, and upon
evidence that the representation to the court that venue had already been
decided was in bad faith causing [C.G.’s] attorney to have to further respond.”
IV.
C.G. FILES A REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY ORDERS CHANGING THE
CUSTODY AND VISITATION ORDERS
On April 30, 2024, C.G. filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court a
request for emergency temporary orders to change the existing orders
regarding child custody and visitation set forth in the child welfare judgment.
She stated the requested orders were in the child’s best interest for the
following reasons: “Since losing the [request for order] to transfer venue to
Orange County (the case still has not been transferred), [A.G.] ha[d]
escalated his violations of the DVRO regarding custody. Over Easter[,] he
kept [the child] without permission. Yesterday, he drove to my home dur[i]ng
my custodial time and picked up [the child] across the street from my home
without telling me. This is a violation of the stay away orders and the
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visitation schedule. He ha[d] been making unfounded accusations about my
mental health [on a messaging platform] (also a violation of the lifetime
DVRO) but now [the child] comes home from visits making the same
accusations. [The child] also is a protected party and should not be subject to
this manipulation.”
C.G. filed a declaration providing details of these incidents. In
her declaration, she described how A.G. had been communicating with the
child in violation of the DVRO and had “engaged in a pattern of harassment
regarding [her] mental health and [was] manipulating [the child] into that
campaign.” (Capitalization omitted.) She explained A.G. had been sending
her communications “with inappropriate, harassing messages regarding [her]
mental health,” which not only violated the DVRO but constituted “an
independent pattern of harassment and coercive control.” She attached copies
of such messages as an exhibit to the declaration. She requested the trial
court sanction A.G. in the amount of $5,000 “as a deterrent against future
actions taken in direct violation of [the child welfare judgment],” as A.G. had
not paid the court-ordered sanctions imposed at the prior hearing.
The trial court set the matter for hearing on May 10, 2024. The
court issued an order shortening time for service until the hearing, providing
that the request for order must be served and filed by May 3, 2024, and a
responsive declaration to the request for order must be served on or before
May 8, 2024. The court order also stated: “Pending further order of the
[c]ourt, all visitation and contact between [the child] and [A.G.] is
suspended.”
The day after C.G. filed her request for emergency temporary
orders, A.G., on May 1, 2024, filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order against C.G. in the Orange County Superior Court.
5
On May 10, 2024, A.G. filed a responsive declaration to C.G.’s
request for emergency temporary orders. He explained he was unable to
respond earlier because he was out of town until May 9, 2024.
V.
THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT GRANTS C.G.’S REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY
TEMPORARY ORDERS, MODIFIES THE PRIOR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ORDERS,
AND SANCTIONS A.G.
On May 10, 2024, both A.G. and C.G. appeared at the hearing on
C.G.’s request for emergency temporary orders. The trial court’s minute order
of that same date (the May 2024 order) stated, “Notice and opportunity to be
heard were given to [A.G.] and [C.G.] as provided by the laws of the State of
California” and “[t]he parties [were] sworn and testif[ied]” at the hearing.
That order indicated: “The [c]ourt orders the custody and visitation order[s]
previously issued are modified as follows: [A.G.] shall have monitored visits
on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th weekends of the month on Saturday from 9AM to
6PM and on Sunday 9AM to 6PM, with the cost of the monitor to be paid for
by [A.G.]. . . . [¶] [C.G.] is awarded sole legal custody of the minor child.” In
addition, the court “grant[ed] the request for sanctions in the amount of
$6,000 payable by [A.G.] to [C.G.’s] counsel within 30 days.”
On June 3, 2024, the trial court issued its signed findings and
order (the June 2024 order) in which it reiterated the findings and orders set
forth in the May 2024 order and added the following findings: (1) A.G.
violated the DVRO “by engaging in harassing messages on [a messaging
platform] that disturb [C.G.]’s peace” by “[s]pecifically . . . sen[ding]
unnecessary and harassing messages regarding [C.G.]’s mental health”;
(2) A.G. also violated the visitation orders; and (3) “The [c]ourt does not find
[A.G.] credible regarding [his] claim to only speak well about [C.G.] in
6
the . . . child’s presence given the way that [A.G.] communicates on [a
messaging platform] and [his] claim to the [c]ourt that [his] communications
in [the messaging platform] are appropriate.”
A.G. filed a notice of appeal indicating he appealed from both the
May 2024 order and the June 2024 order.
DISCUSSION
I.
JURISDICTION
A.G. argues the May 2024 order and the June 2024 order must be
reversed because the Los Angeles Superior Court “lacked jurisdiction to issue
any non-emergency orders once the case was transferred to Orange County.”
The record shows in March 2024, the trial court ordered the
family law case transferred from Los Angeles Superior Court to Orange
County Superior Court, effective upon the payment of transfer fees in the
clerk’s office. The record also shows C.G. immediately paid the transfer fees
in the clerk’s office.
It is true “[t]he court to which an action or proceeding is
transferred . . . shall have and exercise over the action or proceeding the like
jurisdiction as if it had been originally commenced in that court, all prior
proceedings being saved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 399, subd. (c).) However, “the
court transferring jurisdiction of a family law action . . . shall, if another
court has not assumed jurisdiction over the action or proceeding, retain
jurisdiction to make orders designed to prevent: [¶] . . . Immediate danger or
irreparable harm to a party or to the children involved in the matter.” (Id.,
§ 399, subd. (d).) Specifically, “Until the clerk of the receiving court sends
notice of the date of filing, the transferring court retains jurisdiction over the
matter to make orders designed to prevent immediate danger or irreparable
7
harm to a party or the children involved in the matter.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.97(e).)
In his appellate brief, A.G. acknowledges it was not until August
2024 that the clerk of the Orange County Superior Court sent notice of
receipt and transfer of the action to the Orange County Superior Court. Thus,
the transferring court, that is, Los Angeles Superior Court, indisputably had
jurisdiction to issue the May 2024 order and the June 2024 order to the
extent those orders were designed to prevent immediate danger or
irreparable harm to a party or the child within the meaning of Code of Civil
Procedure section 399, subdivision (d)(1) and rule 5.97(e) of the California
Rules of Court.
The record supports the Los Angeles Superior Court’s exercise of
such jurisdiction in this case. The trial court’s orders, which modified custody
and visitation, were based on its findings A.G. disturbed C.G.’s peace by
sending her unnecessary and harassing messages regarding her mental
health, messages A.G. considered to be appropriate, in violation of the DVRO.
The court also found A.G. violated the then in effect visitation order and
spoke poorly of C.G. in the child’s presence. A.G. does not argue any of the
court’s underlying factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.
As the record shows the trial court’s orders modifying custody
and visitation were designed to prevent immediate danger or irreparable
harm to C.G. and/or the child, which was posed by A.G.’s continued harassing
conduct and violations of the visitation order within the meaning of Code of
Civil Procedure section 399, subdivision (d)(1), we find no error.
8
II.
SECTION 3064
A.G. argues the trial court erred by issuing emergency temporary
orders because there was no showing of immediate harm to the child or a
credible risk of abduction within the meaning of section 3064. Section 3064,
subdivision (a) provides: “The court shall refrain from making an order
granting or modifying a custody order on an ex parte basis unless there has
been a showing of immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the
child will be removed from the State of California.” Subdivision (b)(1) of
section 3064 provides that “‘[i]mmediate harm to the child’ includes, but is
not limited to . . . [¶] (A) Having a parent who has committed acts of domestic
violence, if the court determines that the acts of domestic violence are of
recent origin or are part of a demonstrated and continuing pattern of acts of
domestic violence.”
Abuse, as defined in the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(§ 6200 et seq.) at section 6203, subdivision (a)(4), includes conduct that
“‘disturb[s] the peace of the other party’” whereby “based on the totality of the
circumstances, [it] destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party”
(§ 6320, subd. (c)). Here, the trial court expressly found A.G. disturbed C.G.’s
peace within the meaning of section 6320 by recently sending unnecessary
and harassing text messages regarding her mental health. The court,
therefore, did not violate section 3064 by issuing emergency temporary orders
modifying custody and visitation.
III.
A.G.’S CONTENTION OF CLERICAL ERROR
In his appellate brief, A.G. argues: “Clerical and administrative
errors within the court have caused judges in both Los Angeles and Orange
9
County to issue orders without jurisdiction to act.” (Boldface and some
capitalization omitted.) In support of his argument, A.G. cites the notice
contained in the child welfare judgment stating, “All requests for
modification or termination of these orders must be brought in the family
court case in which these orders are filed.” In accordance with that notice, he
argues the clerk should have filed the child welfare judgment in the parties’
family law case pending in Los Angeles Superior Court but did not.
Consequently, he contends he was led “to sincerely believe that Orange
County was the proper venue to file for custody related issues” and to
thereafter, “in good faith[,] . . . attempt[] to file his custody-related pleadings
on May 1, 2024,” in the form of a request for a domestic violence restraining
order against C.G., in the Orange County Superior Court. A.G. further states
he was improperly sanctioned by the Los Angeles Superior Court for his good
faith attempt to comply with the terms of the child welfare judgment by filing
his May 1, 2024 request in the Orange County Superior Court.
According to the June 2024 order, the trial court sanctioned A.G.
based on the findings he “misrepresented the status of the previously ordered
transfer”; “did not disclose that the pending case in Orange County is based
on [A.G.’s] [May 1, 2024] request for a temporary restraining order”;3 and
“misrepresented the status of his appeal while accusing [C.G.] of said
misrepresentations.” (Capitalization omitted.) Thus, the record shows A.G.
3 The record indicates that after A.G. filed his request for a
temporary restraining order, he filed a request for order in the Los Angeles
Superior Court family law case seeking an order canceling the hearing on
C.G.’s ex parte scheduled for May 10, 2024, rescinding C.G.’s temporary
emergency orders, and requiring C.G. to refile her request for temporary
emergency orders in the Orange County Superior Court, which he contended
“has jurisdiction over this case.”
10
was not sanctioned because he filed his May 1, 2024 request for a temporary
restraining order in Orange County Superior Court instead of in the Los
Angeles Superior Court, but for making misrepresentations and failing to
make disclosures to the trial court in its consideration of C.G.’s request for
emergency temporary orders. A.G. does not address the court’s stated basis
for sanctioning him in his appellate brief.
In any event, the record does not show A.G. explained to the trial
court he was in fact confused about where to file his request for a temporary
restraining order. It is noteworthy that according to the register of actions in
the Los Angeles Superior Court, since the child welfare judgment was
entered, A.G. has filed requests for orders seeking a modification of custody
and visitation orders in that court in September 2022, a request dismissed
without prejudice due to a lack of change in circumstances, and again in
August 2023. The register of actions shows C.G. too had previously filed
requests for orders regarding custody and visitation in the Los Angeles
Superior Court family law case. To the extent A.G. suggests on appeal he was
confused about where to file his May 1, 2024 request for a temporary
restraining order in light of the notice in the child welfare judgment, it is not
supported by the record.
As the trial court did not sanction A.G. for attempting to comply
with the notice in the child welfare judgment, or due to any alleged clerical
error with respect to venue, his contention of error on those bases fails.
IV.
SERVICE
A.G. also challenges the May 2024 order and the June 2024 order
on the ground he did not receive “complete or proper notice” of C.G.’s ex parte
filings but the “[trial] court proceeded anyway, depriving [him] of due
11
process.” The only portion of the settled statement addressing any service
issue states: “[A.G.] objected on the grounds that [C.G.]’s sanctions request
was never served.”
A.G., however, filed a responsive declaration to C.G.’s request for
order on May 10, 2024, in which he responds to C.G.’s request for emergency
temporary orders and the factual basis for her request contained in her
declaration. Specifically, in his responsive declaration, he raised the venue
issue, and argued, “[S]upporting evidence [was] conspicuously absent from
[C.G.’]s filing,” and stated there was “no evidence of irreparable harm or
immediate danger to justify [her ex parte] request.”
Absent from A.G.’s responsive declaration is any statement he
failed to receive complete or proper service of C.G.’s request for emergency
temporary orders. On appeal, A.G. does not specify which portions of C.G.’s
“ex parte filings” he never received proper notice of, or what he considers to
be proper notice.
In any event, the trial court stated in both the May 2024 order
and the June 2024 order A.G. had been given proper notice.4 A.G. appeared at
the hearing, was sworn in, and testified. Even if he showed he had not been
provided complete and proper notice of some aspect of C.G.’s request for
emergency temporary orders, he has made no attempt to explain how the lack
of such notice was detrimental to him. We find no error.
4 The May 2024 order and the June 2024 order each state: “Notice
and opportunity to be heard were given to [A.G.] and [C.G.] as provided by
the laws of the State of California.”
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V.
LIVE TESTIMONY
A.G. argues the trial court violated section 217 by “refusing to
receive live testimony” at the hearing on C.G.’s request for emergency
temporary orders. (Capitalization omitted.) Section 217, subdivision (a)
provides: “At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion
brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding
of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live,
competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and
the court may ask questions of the parties.”
The record does not show A.G. filed a witness list before the
hearing identifying witnesses and describing their anticipated testimony as
required by section 217, subdivision (c). (Ibid. [“A party seeking to present
live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the
hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the
anticipated testimony”].)
The settled statement sets forth A.G. had “objected to the
proceedings on the grounds that none of the law enforcement witnesses were
available to testify given the ex parte nature of the proceedings.” But the
record does not show A.G. requested a continuance of the hearing to enable
any absent witness to testify. (§ 217, subd. (c) [“If the witness list is not
served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief
continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the
continued hearing”].)
The settled statement also indicates: “The trial court ignored
[A.G.’s] reminder that [his current wife] had not testified yet and was still
waiting in the hallway per the trial court’s instructions.” Even if the court
13
erred by “ignor[ing]” A.G.’s reminder that his wife had not yet testified, A.G.
has failed to address the nature of his wife’s anticipated testimony and how
its absence prejudiced him. We find no violation of section 217.
VI.
SANCTIONS
A.G. argues “the sanctions order must be reversed because it was
issued without jurisdiction, without notice, and without required findings.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Each of A.G.’s arguments is without merit.
First, for the reasons we have already explained ante, the Los
Angeles Superior Court had jurisdiction in this matter.
Second, with respect to notice, as also discussed ante, in both the
May 2024 order and the June 2024 order, the trial court stated A.G. had been
provided notice and the opportunity to be heard. In addition, according to the
settled statement, “[a]t the commencement of the hearing, the [c]ourt stated
its tentative ruling,” which expressly included the court’s tentative decision
to award sanctions against A.G. pursuant to section 271 “for conduct
frustrating the policy to reduce the cost of litigation, by, among other things,
misrepresenting to the [c]ourt the status of the transfer of the case from the
Los Angeles [Superior Court] to the Orange County Superior Court and how
the [May 22, 2024] hearing was set in the latter court (based on [A.G.’s
temporary restraining order] request), and misrepresenting that [C.G.] had
misrepresented the status of [A.G.]’s appeal.” The settled statement also
provides that after A.G. testified at the hearing, the court adopted its
tentative as the court’s order “after modifying it to increase the sanctions
amount and combine it with unpaid sanc[ti]ons ordered [in January] 2024.”
The record thus unequivocally shows A.G. was on notice the trial
court was considering issuing sanctions against him no later than at the time
14
it issued its tentative ruling at the beginning of the hearing. A.G. fails to
provide any legal authority or analysis suggesting such notice was
insufficient under section 271.
The record also shows A.G. had the opportunity to be heard and
testified at the hearing. Nothing in our record shows A.G. raised any
objection to the tentative decision to award sanctions, was prevented from
presenting any evidence on the issue of sanctions, or requested a continuance
on that issue. Furthermore, A.G. does not challenge the amount of sanctions
awarded against him, just the fact they were imposed against him in the first
place.
Third, A.G.’s assertion the trial court “made none of the findings
required by [section] 271” is belied by the June 2024 order. In that order,
under the heading “Sanctions” (underscoring omitted) the court stated:
“Pursuant to [s]ection 271, the [c]ourt finds that [A.G.’s] conduct has
frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where
possible, to reduce the cost of litigation.” (Italics added.) As discussed ante,
the court added, “[i]n particular,” the court found A.G. had:
(1) “[m]isrepresented the status of the previously ordered transfer”; (2) “[d]id
not disclose that the pending case in Orange County is based on [A.G.’s]
[r]equest for a [t]emporary [r]estraining [o]rder”; and (3) “[m]isrepresented
the status of his [a]ppeal while accusing [C.G.] of said misrepresentations.”
A.G. does not address those findings in his appellate brief. A.G.’s argument
the trial court was not permitted to issue sanctions in the context of a request
for emergency temporary orders such as the one at issue is without legal
support. Section 271 imposes no such limitation.
In addition, A.G. argues the trial court’s orders and the settled
statement do not show the court made a finding of his ability to pay
15
sanctions. Section 271, subdivision (a) provides: “In making an award
pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence
concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not
impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable
financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed.”
Nothing in our record suggests the trial court misapprehended the applicable
law, failed to consider all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets
and liabilities, or imposed an unreasonable financial burden on A.G. by
issuing the sanctions award against him. Again, A.G. did not argue below
and does not argue on appeal the sanctions award in fact imposed an
unreasonable financial burden on him. We find no error.
VII.
NO CUMULATIVE ERROR
A.G. argues the cumulative impact of errors in this case compels
reversal of the May 2024 order and the June 2024 order. “In examining a
claim of cumulative error, the critical question is whether defendant received
due process and a fair trial. [Citation.] A predicate to a claim of cumulative
error is a finding of error. There can be no cumulative error if the challenged
rulings were not erroneous.” (People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037,
1068.) Because we have found no error for the reasons explained ante, we find
no cumulative error. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1030.)
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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. No party shall recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
17