Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

Marcus v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/1

Filed 10/29/26 Marcus v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/29/26 Marcus v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL D. MARCUS, B345973

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP01215)
v.

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR
VEHICLES,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael D. Marcus, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant
Attorney General, Jodi L. Cleesattle and Rishi S. Bhatt, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Michael D. Marcus appeals from the trial court’s denial
of his petition for an administrative writ requiring respondent
California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV or the department)
to reinstate his suspended driver’s license. Marcus argues the
trial court erred by (1) concluding a post-suspension hearing
before a DMV employee afforded Marcus due process, (2) finding
the evidence supports the DMV decision to sustain the suspension,
and (3) denying Marcus’s motion for discovery and overruling his
objections to the administrative record.
We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Suspension of Marcus’s Driver’s License and
Related DMV Administrative Proceedings
1. One of Marcus’s Treating Physicians
Requests the DMV Reexamine Marcus’s
Driving Privileges
On September 7, 2023, Dr. Brandon Koretz, a
geriatric specialist treating Marcus, submitted a “request
for driver reexamination” form to the DMV. (Capitalization
omitted.) Koretz reported Marcus has a “cognitive impairment”
and asked the DMV to “reevaluate [Marcus’s] ability to drive
safely.”
In a September 22, 2023 “notice of reexamination”
(capitalization omitted), the DMV instructed Marcus to “have
the enclosed [driver medical evaluation (DME)] form[ ] completed
by [a] doctor most familiar with [his] medical history.” It further
informed Marcus: “[I]f your medical condition indicates an
immediate risk to the public safety, your driving privilege will be
withdrawn and you will be notified by mail.”

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2. Marcus’s Internist Provides an Assessment
of Marcus’s Ability To Drive Safely
Marcus selected Dr. Mark Grossman, his internist,
to execute the DME form. Marcus “authorize[d]” Grossman “to
answer any questions from the DMV, or its employees, relating
to [Marcus’s] physical or mental condition, . . . and to release
any related information or records to the DMV or its employees.”
Marcus also “authorize[d] the DMV to receive any information
relating to [his] physical or mental condition . . . and to use the
same in determining . . . [his] ability to operate a motor vehicle
safely.”
On the DME, Grossman identified “mild cognitive
impairment” as a “disorder characterized by lapses of
consciousness, [or] dementia” for which Grossman was treating
Marcus. (Capitalization omitted.) He identified “memory issues”
and “mild vision impairment” as the “manifestations” of the
diagnosis. (Capitalization omitted.)
Crucially for our purposes on appeal, Grossman
checked “yes” in response to the following three questions:
“Does your patient’s medical condition currently affect safe
driving?”; “Do you currently advise against driving?”; and
“Would you recommend a driving test be given by [the] DMV?”
(Capitalization omitted.)
In a section of the form addressing “dementia or cognitive
impairments” (capitalization omitted), Grossman checked
the box for “other dementia,” adding the following description
of Marcus’s condition: “mild cognitive impairment based
on neuropsych[iatric] testing and geriatric consultation.”
(Capitalization omitted.) This section of the form also
asked Grossman to “rate the severity” of various “cognitive

3
impairments” in Marcus by checking either “none,” “mild,”
“moderate,” “severe” or “uncertain,” “[u]sing the definitions
given” for these terms on the form. (Capitalization omitted.)
Grossman checked “moderate” for two of the listed impairments:
“memory loss” and “depression, secondary to dementia.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The form defines a “moderate” level
of impairment as having the following effects: “Independent
living is hazardous and some degree of supervision is necessary.
The individual is unable to cope with the environment and
driving would be dangerous.”
For all other impairments on the form’s list—
“diminished judgment,” “impaired attention,” “impaired
language skills,” “impaired visual spatial skills,” “impulsive
behavior,” “problem solving deficits,” and “loss of awareness of
disability” (capitalization omitted), Grossman checked “mild.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The form defines a “mild” impairment
as having the following effects: “Judgment is relatively intact
but work or social activities are significantly impaired. Ability
to safely operate a motor vehicle may or may not be impaired.”
For “overall degree of impairment,” Grossman checked both
“mild” and “moderate.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Grossman faxed the fully executed DME to the DMV on
November 6, 2023.

3. The DMV Investigates and Suspends
Marcus’s License in a Single Day
A DMV “investigation report” dated the next day—
November 7, 2023—reflects a “decision” to “impose revocation
effective [November 11, 2023] pursuant to [Vehicle Code

4
section] 13953.”1 (Capitalization omitted.) It bears the
signature of DMV employee Omar Ruiz. The report describes
the investigation leading to this decision as follows: “A
driver safety investigation was conducted on [that day] at the
El Segundo office to investigate . . . [whether Marcus’s] ability to
operate a motor vehicle safely is affected because of a physical
disability. [¶] The driver was unaccompanied.” (Capitalization
omitted.) The report describes the “department’s presentation”
(boldface, capitalization & underscoring omitted) as comprised of
a “driving record printout dated 11/7/2023,” the Grossman DME
form, and Koretz’s request for reexamination. (Capitalization
omitted.) The report lists “respondent’s presentation” (boldface,
capitalization & underscoring omitted) as “N/A.” The report
concludes that “[b]ased on the medical information provided,
cause exists to revoke [Marcus’s] driving privilege. If allowed
to continue to drive with a moderate degree of impairment he
may cause a traffic collision that may harm himself or others.”

4. The DMV Gives Marcus Written Notice
of the Suspension
Also on November 7, 2023, Ruiz sent Marcus an “order
of suspension/revocation” (boldface & capitalization omitted),
informing Marcus that his driver’s license was being suspended
under section 13953 effective November 11, 2023 because
“[his] medical information was not favorable” and he was
“unable to operate a motor vehicle safely because of . . . mild
cognitive impairment.” (Capitalization omitted.) The order
further informed Marcus he “[had] a right to request a hearing”

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Vehicle Code.

5
at which he could present witnesses and other evidence and be
represented by counsel. (Boldface omitted.) It also explained
Marcus could “obtain copies of the [DMV’s] proof ” before the
hearing and that the DMV would assist him in subpoenaing
witnesses to appear at the hearing.

5. The DMV Holds a Telephonic Hearing on
the Suspension
DMV employee “C. Rubio” conducted a telephonic
suspension hearing on December 19, 2023, acting as a “driver
safety hearing officer” appointed to “hear [the] matter.” Marcus
was the only other participant in the hearing. Marcus “objected
to [Rubio] presiding over the case due to conflict of interest as
[Rubio] is employed by the DMV.”
Rubio marked as exhibits the November 7, 2023 order of
suspension and all documents listed in the investigation report.
Marcus stated he had no objection to the admission of these
documents. Marcus offered no documentary evidence and called
no witnesses other than himself.
Marcus argued that the DME Grossman executed was
neither credible nor sufficient to establish that Marcus could not
safely operate a motor vehicle. He argued Grossman had based
his answers solely on Koretz’s notes, rather than Grossman’s own
observations, that Grossman’s answers were inconsistent, and
that Grossman “did not rely upon the DMV definitions [of mild
and moderate] in the [DME].” As support for these arguments,
he read into the record a November 20, 2023 email in which
Grossman writes to Marcus: “I received your letter of concern
about your DMV privileges. I completed the DMV form strictly
from information from Dr. Koretz’s notes and your recent
neuropsychiatric testing assessment. I am not an expert in the

6
areas of memory issues, and only used these documents to
complete the DMV forms. You would need to reach out to the
psychologist who performed the memory/cognitive testing and
Dr. Koretz who made the mild cognitive impairment diagnosis for
any disagreements with their findings.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Rubio informed Marcus that Marcus would need to offer
“new medical information” to support this argument and/or
to undermine the conclusions in Grossman’s DME. Marcus
contended he did not need to provide any new evidence, because
the burden of proof was on the DMV, and the DMV had not
satisfied it. He therefore “declined the opportunity to have
[Koretz or another physician] fill [out] and submit another
[DME].”
Marcus made an “offer of proof that [he has] no deficits,”
testifying that he has been working as an arbitrator and
mediator for the past 20 years and is “recognized as a leader
in [his] field.” He testified to various accolades and qualifications
in his professional life.
Marcus told Rubio he would like to take a driving test.
Rubio stated the DMV would provide him a testing date for the
written exam that one must pass before taking a driving test.

6. The DMV Sustains the Suspension
In a “notice of findings and decision” (boldface &
capitalization omitted), the DMV informed Marcus it had
sustained the suspension of this license, because his “medical
information was not favorable.” The DMV “hearing report”
notes Marcus’s argument that “Grossman was incorrect in
his judgment and relied upon another doctor’s assessment.”
(Capitalization omitted.) It concludes, however, that “another
[DME] by [Dr.] Grossman reporting his error or from another

7
doctor that had the opportunity to better assess [Marcus]
is needed to establish none or mild cognitive impairment
and to indicate whether driving is advised or not. [¶]
[Dr.] Grossman advised against driving therefore, without
new medical information to consider, there is a traffic safety
concern at this time.” (Capitalization omitted.)

7. The DMV Requests, and Koretz Files
a DME
On January 9, 2024, the DMV informed Marcus
that he “would need a favorable medical evaluation prior to
scheduling . . . any written or driving tests.” (Capitalization
omitted.) Because Marcus’s “current [DME] show[ed] a moderate
overall degree of impairment for dementia,” the DMV sent
Marcus a DME form to be “completed by the doctor most familiar
with [Marcus’s] medical history.” The DMV informed Marcus that
once it received and reviewed the updated DME, Marcus would
“be notified if a reinstatement interview is necessary or if [his]
license will be reinstated.”
On January 17, 2024, the DMV received a DME executed
by Koretz. The second page of the form—which asks whether
the physician advises against driving—was missing from the
document. In the pages Koretz did provide, he reported Marcus
suffers from “other dementia” specifically “mixed— [illegible]
[and] Alzheimer’s.” (Capitalization omitted.) Koretz assessed
Marcus as having a “mild” “overall degree of impairment.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Koretz checked boxes
indicating that all but three of the specific impairments listed
on the form were “mild” in Marcus. Koretz reported that Marcus
did not suffer at all from the remaining three impairments

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(“depression, secondary to dementia,” “impaired attention,”
and “impulsive behavior”). (Capitalization omitted.)

8. Telephonic Appointment with DMV
Hearing Officer
The DMV scheduled a remote “hearing appointment,”
to be conducted before DMV “hearing officer” Jose Trinidad on
January 22, 2024. (Capitalization omitted.) The notice thereof
informed Marcus: “The hearing officer will develop the facts and
render a final decision on your matter but does not advocate on
behalf of the [DMV].” (Capitalization omitted.) In the weeks
leading up to that date, Marcus sent several letters to the DMV
objecting to any hearing conducted by a DMV employee, rather
than an administrative law judge (ALJ).
Trinidad and Marcus spoke at the appointed time on
January 22, 2024. Trinidad referred to the interaction as an
“interview,” to which Marcus repeatedly objected. Trinidad
also explained that the purpose of the “interview” was to allow
Marcus to contest the “action that was taken” against “[his]
driving privileges.”
Trinidad asked Marcus to provide the missing second page
of the Koretz DME form. Trinidad acknowledged the DMV had
not yet provided Marcus with discovery, offered to reschedule
the hearing in light of this if Marcus desired, and agreed to
provide the discovery the next day. Marcus refused to proceed
with Trinidad acting as a hearing officer. He also refused to
reschedule except before an ALJ.
On January 26, 2024, Trinidad provided Marcus with the
DMV’s discovery in the matter. This discovery consisted of the
documents entered into evidence at the December 2023 hearing,
as well as a “hearing report,” “response letter,” “interview report,”

9
and the incomplete Koretz DME. (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.)
Marcus did not provide the DMV with the missing page
of the Koretz DME.

B. Writ Proceedings
1. Petition
Marcus filed a petition for writ of mandate ordering
the DMV to vacate the suspension of his license.2 Through his
petition, Marcus argued the DMV had denied him due process,
and that Grossman’s DME report could not support the DMV’s
decision.
Marcus filed declarations with his opening brief and reply,
but did not move the court to augment the administrative record
with them.

2. First Motion To Augment the
Administrative Record
In July 2024, Marcus moved the court to augment the
administrative record with the following: (1) medical records
that Koretz “gave [to] the DMV and which the DMV did not
include in its administrative record”; (2) internal DMV records
“discussing the conflict of interest issue raised by Marcus” and
“all DMV policies that discuss” how to handle such conflict of
interest concerns; and (3) all documents that reference Trinidad’s

2 The petition also sought a writ ordering the DMV to
destroy medical records Marcus argued the DMV had unlawfully
obtained. On appeal, Marcus does not dispute the trial court’s
resolution of this request.

10
use of the term “interview” during his appointment with Marcus.
(Capitalization omitted.)
The court denied the motion as to all but one of Marcus’s
requests. It explained he had not “establish[ed] that [the DMV]
has possession of any specific documents responsive to those
categories,” nor that “the unspecified documents at issue were
admitted into evidence, were ruled inadmissible by a hearing
officer and excluded, or were otherwise considered by or
presented to . . . decisionmakers during the administrative
process.” The court also questioned the relevance of these
categories of documents.
As to the request for additional Koretz medical
records provided to the DMV, because “[t]he court [could not]
determine . . . whether such records exist, . . . the court order[ed]
the DMV to augment the administrative record to include any
of [Marcus’s] medical records from . . . Koretz that are in the
DMV’s possession.” The order further required that, if the DMV
had none other than those already provided, the DMV must file
“a declaration to that effect from a custodian of records.”
In response to this order, the DMV filed a declaration
of Sallyann Castro, a “driver safety manager II in the driver
safety appeals/ court review and litigations unit, legal affairs
division.” (Capitalization omitted.) She declared she is “familiar
with the certified administrative record in this case,” and that
“the DMV has no additional records relating to [Marcus’s case],
other than those contained in the certified administrative
record.” (Capitalization omitted.)

3. Motion To “Compel” Discovery
In August 2024, Marcus filed a “motion to compel
respondent to produce discovery” citing Government Code

11
section 11507.6. (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) The
motion sought to compel the DMV to produce the following
five categories of documents: (1) all documents that the DMV
relied on in determining that Marcus’s driving license should be
suspended; (2) the names of DMV personnel who were involved
in the DMV’s decision to suspend Marcus’s license; (3) all legal
authority that the DMV relied on in suspending Marcus’s
license; (4) all documents describing how Rubio and Trinidad
were selected; and (5) all documents that the DMV relied on
concerning the admissibility of evidence at the December 19,
2023 hearing.
In denying the motion, the court explained that
Government Code section 11507.6 and related statutes on which
Marcus relied “do not govern civil discovery before a court of law.”
The court construed the motion as one “seek[ing] leave to conduct
discovery pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5[,
subdivision] (e).” Applying the standards applicable to such
requests, “the court [found] that [Marcus] has not shown grounds
to conduct [the desired] discovery.”

4. Second Motion To Augment
In November 2024, Marcus moved to augment the
administrative record with a December 12, 2023 note from
Koretz. The trial court granted the motion. The note reads in
its entirety as follows: “(1) I would have completed the DMV form
exactly as Dr. Grossman. [¶] (2) Your legal thinking may remain
perfectly OK. I can’t speak to this and have no mechanism to
check it. [¶] (3) This is a major loss of independence. [¶] (4) I
wish I could be supportive of the DMV appeal. Because I share
Dr. Grossman’s perspective, it would be incorrect for me to state
otherwise. [¶] (5) I have found that by using Lyft my patients

12
can maintain a remarkable opportunity to remain vital. I
agree that Lyft is not perfect but it is a great tool. [¶] (6) My
suggestion is for you to ask the DMV to administer a driving
test.” (Italics added.)

5. Hearing and Ruling on Writ Petition
On February 14, 2025, the court heard the petition. The
court posted a detailed tentative order in advance of the hearing.
No witnesses testified, and the only documentary evidence
offered was the administrative record, as augmented. The court
heard arguments from both parties and took the matter under
submission.
On February 18, 2025, the court denied the petition.
The court found the weight of the evidence supported the DMV’s
findings that Marcus’s “ability to safely operate a motor vehicle
is affected by a mental condition.” The trial court also rejected
Marcus’s due process arguments. It found nothing suggested
Rubio had acted with bias or engaged in advocacy for the DMV.
The court declined to consider Marcus’s declarations,
because they were not part of the administrative record. The
court noted, however, that it “would reach the same decision even
if the court [had] considered the declarations.”
Marcus appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
1. Driver’s License Suspension Under
Section 13953
Section 13953 creates an exception to the general rule
that the DMV may not suspend or revoke a driver’s license

13
without providing the licensee prior notice and an opportunity
to be heard. (§ 13953; see §§ 13950, 13951 & 13953.) The
exception applies if (1) the DMV conducted a “reexamination”
or an “investigation,” based on which it concluded that (2) “the
safety of the [licensee] . . . or other persons upon the highways
require[s] such [suspension or revocation],” and (3) “in [the
DMV’s] opinion[,] because of the mental or physical condition of
the person[,] such immediate action is required for the safety of
the driver or other persons upon the highways.”3
The DMV may initiate an investigation or re-examination
under various circumstances, including “upon receiving
information or upon a showing by its records [¶] . . . [¶] (f) [t]hat
any ground exists for which a license might be refused.” (§ 13800
& subd. (f).) Such grounds include, as most relevant here, when

3 The section provides in full: “In the alternative to
the procedure [of requiring prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard], and in the event the department determines upon
investigation or reexamination that the safety of the person
subject to investigation or reexamination or other persons
upon the highways require such action, the department shall
forthwith and without hearing suspend or revoke the privilege
of the person to operate a motor vehicle or impose reasonable
terms and conditions of probation which shall be relative to
the safe operation of a motor vehicle. No order of suspension
or revocation or the imposition of terms or conditions of
probation shall become effective until 30 days after the giving
of written notice thereof to the person affected, except that the
department shall have authority to make any such order effective
immediately upon the giving of notice when in its opinion because
of the mental or physical condition of the person such immediate
action is required for the safety of the driver or other persons
upon the highways.” (§ 13953.)

14
the licensee has “any physical or mental disability, disease, or
disorder which could affect the safe operation of a motor vehicle
unless the department has medical information which indicates
the person may safely operate a motor vehicle.” (§ 12806,
subd. (c).) In determining whether this is the case, the DMV
“may rely on any relevant information available to [it].” (Ibid.)
One of the ways the DMV might receive such information is
from a physician who, as Health and Safety Code section 103900,
subdivision (a) authorizes, reports “a patient’s condition” to
the DMV because the physician “reasonably and in good faith
believes [doing so] will serve the public interest.” (See McNair v.
City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154,
1165.)
After the DMV suspends a person’s driving privilege
under section 13953, if the person so requests, the DMV must
hold a post-suspension hearing. (§ 14100, subd. (a).) At the
hearing, the DMV “shall consider its official records and may
receive sworn testimony.” (§ 14104.7.) Inter alia, “[r]eports
of attending or examining physicians and surgeons” “may be
submitted as evidence concerning any fact relating to the ability
of the applicant or licensee to safely operate a motor vehicle.”
(§ 14104.7 & subd. (a).) “Upon the conclusion of a hearing, the
hearing officer or hearing board shall make findings and render
a decision on behalf of the [DMV] and shall notify the person
involved.” (§ 14105, subd. (a).)

2. Trial Court Review of Suspension via
Writ Petition
In ruling on a petition for writ of mandate challenging a
DMV suspension order, the “trial court is required to determine,
based on its independent judgment, ‘ “whether the weight of the

15
evidence supported the administrative decision.” ’ [Citations.]”
(Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456–457 (Lake); see also
Cisneros v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
381, 418 [because “[s]uspension or revocation of an issued
driver’s license affects a vested, fundamental right,” superior
court exercises independent judgment in its review of the
administrative order].) In so doing, the trial court must
“ ‘weigh the evidence and make its own determination as to
whether the administrative findings [should be] sustained.’
[Citation.]” (Gananian v. Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 634,
638.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court
must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning
the administrative findings, and the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court
that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)

3. Appellate Review
On appeal from an order denying an administrative writ
petition, we “need only review the record to determine whether
the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
(Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10; accord, Lake,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 456–457.) In addition, we will overturn
a court’s decision denying a writ of mandate “when the trial
court’s decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law.”
(Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 53.)
When an appellant challenges a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings in considering such a petition, however, we review
“under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Miyamoto
v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1210,
1217.)

16
Finally, to the extent the writ of mandate is based on
a due process challenge (see California DUI Lawyers Assn. v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 529
(California DUI Lawyers) [“ ‘ “[a] driver’s license cannot be
suspended without due process of law” ’ ”]), it presents a question
of law decided de novo on appeal. (Brown v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 206, 212; Knudsen v. Department
of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 196 (Knudsen).)

B. Due Process Challenges
Marcus argues the DMV administrative proceedings denied
him due process in multiple ways. We disagree.

1. Lack of Pre-Suspension Notice and
Hearing
Marcus argues due process prohibits suspension of his
license “without a prior opportunity to be heard[,] unless
compelled . . . by the plain language of [a] statute” to proceed
without such an opportunity. (Ratliff v. Lampton (1948) 32
Cal.2d 226, 230.) He acknowledges “section 13953 provid[es]
for immediate suspension without notice,” but argues that section
“does not apply here because of conflicting statutes.” (Boldface
& capitalization omitted.)
Marcus identifies sections 13950, 14100, subdivision (a),
and 14101 as conflicting with section 13953. They do not.
Section 13953 expressly instructs that its procedures are
“[i]n the alternative to the procedure under [s]ection[ ] 13950.”
Section 14100, subdivision (a) entitles an individual whose
license has been suspended under section 13953 to a
post-suspension hearing upon request. And section 14101
requires such post-suspension hearings be conducted using the

17
same “hearing procedures” as apply to pre-suspension hearings.
There is no statutory conflict. Section 13953 permits post-
suspension notice and a post-suspension hearing under the
circumstances set forth therein.
Marcus next argues section 13953 does not apply, because
the DMV “did not conduct [the] investigation or re-examination
of [Marcus’s] mental or physical capabilities” the section requires
as a prerequisite to suspension. The sole basis for his conclusion
is that “no time passed between [the DMV’s] receipt of . . .
[the Grossman’s DME] . . . and [the DMV investigation] report,
which was written the next day.” Marcus does not explain why
the investigation or reexamination section 13953 requires must
take any particular length of time. Nor do we perceive any
basis in the statutory scheme or case law for such a restriction.
Section 13953 applies here and permits post-suspension hearing
and notice.

2. DMV Hearing Officer Acting as DMV
Advocate During Hearing
a. Right to an impartial agency
adjudicator
Due process guarantees the right to an impartial
adjudicator. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County
Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 215 (Today’s Fresh
Start).) “Absent a financial interest, adjudicators are presumed
impartial. [Citations.] To show nonfinancial bias sufficient to
violate due process, a party must demonstrate actual bias or
circumstances ‘ “in which experience teaches that the probability
of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too
high to be constitutionally tolerable.” ’ [Citations.] The test is
an objective one.” (Id. at p. 219.)

18
“ ‘[B]y itself, the combination of investigative, prosecutorial,
and adjudicatory functions within a single administrative
agency does not create [such] an unacceptable risk of bias and
thus does not violate the due process rights of individuals who
are subjected to agency prosecutions.’ ” (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 221, italics added.) “To prove a due
process violation based on overlapping functions thus requires
something more than proof that an administrative agency has
investigated and accused, and will now adjudicate.” (Id. at
p. 221.) Instead, “[the party claiming bias] must come forward
with ‘specific evidence demonstrating actual bias or a particular
combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk
of bias.’ ” (Ibid.) Put differently, the party must identify
circumstances that could tempt an average adjudicator to favor
one side, based on a “ ‘ “realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness.” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010)
50 Cal.4th 401, 457 (Cowan).)

b. Dual DMV adjudicator/advocate
role as a proxy for unconstitutional
risk of bias
Applying these principles, California DUI Lawyers,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 517, assessed the constitutionality of
a DMV policy requiring the DMV employee presiding over
an administrative per se (APS) license suspension hearing to
also act as an advocate for the DMV at the hearing. (Id. at
pp. 523–524.) The Court of Appeal concluded that “[a]lthough
procedural fairness does not prohibit the combination of
the advocacy and adjudicatory functions within a single
administrative agency, tasking the same individual with
both roles violates the minimum constitutional standards of

19
due process.” (Id. at p. 532, italics added.) “Accordingly, . . .
combining the roles of advocate and adjudicator in a single
person employed by the DMV violates [federal and California
state] due process.” (Ibid.) The court “permanently enjoined
[the DMV] . . . from having its APS hearing officers function as
advocates for the position of the DMV in addition to being finders
of fact in the same adversarial proceeding.” (Id. at p. 538.)
After California DUI Lawyers, the DMV changed its policy
requiring the dual hearing officer/advocate role. Under the new
policy, “the hearing officer acts only as a neutral trier of fact,
does not represent or advocate for the department, and is not
tasked with preparing the [DMV’s] case. Hearing officers are
instructed to introduce any relevant evidence received from
law enforcement, ask clarifying questions if necessary, and rule
on objections. Since 2022, all hearing officers are instructed
on this policy and are trained not to advocate on behalf of the
[DMV] when conducting a hearing.” (Chi v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 473, 479 (Chi), as modified
Apr. 7, 2026 & review granted May 13, 2026, S296201.)
“As a taxpayer challenge, [California DUI Lawyers]
applied constitutional principles to theoretical circumstances . . . .
That is, [it] assumed that a hearing officer would actually act as
an advocate in addition to acting as an adjudicator, as required
by policy.” (Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 206, italics
added.) Subsequent decisions have applied California DUI
Lawyers to assess the constitutionality of hearings conducted
both before and after the DMV policy change in 2022. (See
Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1002 (Romane), review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291093; Clarke v.
Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1276–1277 (Clarke), review

20
denied Dec. 11, 2024, S287770; Knudsen, supra, pp. 206–207.)
These decisions have observed that “it may be that a public
hearing officer did not actually act as an advocate,” because
“the necessary facts to revoke a license may often be established
through the submission of documents” without traditional
forms of advocacy. (Knudsen, supra, at p. 206.) Therefore,
“to determine whether a particular driver’s due process right
to an impartial adjudicator was violated” under California DUI
Lawyers, these decisions “assess[ed] the administrative record
and the revocation decision to see if the public hearing officer
actually acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, or
merely acted as an adjudicator and a collector and developer
of evidence.” (Id. at p. 193, italics omitted; accord, Clarke, supra,
at pp. 1276–1277; Romane, supra, at pp. 1015–1016.) Under
this approach, whether the hearing officer acted as a DMV
advocate is a proxy for partiality and resolves the due process
challenge: “If the relevant documents demonstrate that the
public hearing officer did not act as an advocate, then the
driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator was not
violated, and the constitutional issue is resolved. If the relevant
documents demonstrate that the public hearing officer actually
acted as an advocate, then the driver’s due process right to an
impartial adjudicator is violated.” (Knudsen, supra, at p. 193;
accord, Romane, supra, at p. 1021 [because hearing officer “did
not, in fact, advocate” but rather “merely collected and developed
the evidence and rendered a decision . . . there was no denial
of . . . due process rights”]; Clarke, supra, at pp. 1276–1277
[looking to “the function, or functions, the employee actually
perform[ed] during the [administrative] hearing . . . [to] decide
the issue”].)

21
Chi, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 473, rejected the advocacy-
focused approach reflected in these decisions as straying
too far from the Supreme Court’s guidance on establishing an
unconstitutionally biased agency adjudicator. According to the
Chi court, the dual role of a hearing officer who also acts as a
DMV advocate “does not [under all circumstances] incentivize
the officer to favor the department.” (Id. at p. 484.) An
advocacy-based approach thus does not consider whether that
dual role “ ‘created[ed] an unacceptable risk of bias’ ” under
the circumstances of the particular case, as our state Supreme
Court has instructed should be the test. (Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 221, italics added; see Chi, supra, at
pp. 486–487.) Chi further explained its disagreement with
the advocacy-focused approach as follows: “[T]he focus is on
appearances rather than disqualifying interests. The court
scrutinizes the adjudicator’s actions and characterizes them
as advocacy or not advocacy. If it looks like advocacy, the
implication is that the adjudicator appeared to favor the
department. But [such cases] . . . never identif[y], or analyze[ ]
evidence of, any circumstances that would tempt an average
adjudicator to favor the department. (See Cowan, supra,
50 Cal.4th at p. 457.)” (Chi, supra, at p. 486.) Chi describes
this approach as “effectively discard[ing] the presumption of
‘honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators’ ” because,
post-California DUI Lawyers, “[t]he [DMV] instructs its hearing
officers not to favor either side.” (Chi, supra, at p. 486, italics
omitted.) Although an “adjudicator’s conduct might evince a
personal bias against a driver[,] . . . that requires a disqualifying
interest and extraordinary facts,” not merely acts of advocacy.
(Id. at pp. 486-487.)

22
The Supreme Court has granted review in Romane—one of
the cases applying the advocacy-focused approach Chi rejected—
as well as in Chi. The high court limited briefing to the following
issue: “Under what circumstances does an administrative
per se hearing officer’s relationship with the [DMV] violate a
driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator by creating
an unacceptable risk of bias during a DMV driver’s license
suspension hearing?” (Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
S291093, Supreme Ct. Mins., Aug. 13, 2025, p. 1159; see Chi v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, S296201, Supreme Ct. Mins.,
May 13, 2026, p. 582 [deferring “[f]urther action in this
matter . . . pending consideration and disposition of a related
issue in Romane”].)

c. Marcus’s advocacy-based due process
arguments
Marcus contends Rubio served as both a DMV advocate
and the ultimate decision-maker at Marcus’s hearing, and
that Marcus was therefore denied the impartial adjudicator
due process requires under California DUI Lawyers, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th 517, Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 186,
Clarke, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, and Romane, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th 1002. Marcus’s argument assumes the high court
will adopt the approach reflected in these advocacy-focused cases
and reject the concerns in Chi that advocacy alone cannot end the
due process inquiry. Even if the high court does so, however, his
argument fails, because he has not established Rubio acted as an
advocate at the hearing.
The advocacy-focused cases applying California DUI
Lawyers provide helpful guidance in assessing what constitutes
advocacy in this context. Knudsen concludes the circumstances

23
of the hearing at issue “collectively demonstrate[d]” the hearing
officer “acted as an advocate for the DMV,” because the officer
questioned witnesses in a manner clearly designed to discredit or
change their testimony, rather than clarifying it, “inaccurate[ly]
characteriz[ed] . . . important testimony,” and misapplied
the law in a manner that “significantly benefited the DMV.”
(Knudsen, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 212.) In Clarke, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 1267, the court concluded that, “[c]onsidering
[the hearing officer’s] performance in its totality, . . . [she]
assumed the prohibited dual roles of both adjudicator and
advocate” by “marshall[ing], identif[ying], and offer[ing]
into evidence the DMV’s exhibits[,] . . . overrul[ing] Clarke’s
objections and admitt[ing] those exhibits[, then] . . . rigorously
cross-examin[ing] Clarke.” (Id. at p. 1277.) In Romane, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th 1002, by contrast, the court concluded “[t]he
hearing officer made clear that she understood her role was
limited to being a trier of fact, not an advocate.” (Id. at p. 1009.)
She “merely introduce[d] [into evidence] the documents that law
enforcement duly forwarded to the DMV, which are routinely
admitted into evidence at APS hearings” (id. at p. 1018),
admitted the licensee’s evidence without objection, “heard
uninterrupted argument from Romane’s counsel, and took the
matter under submission.” (Id. at p. 1019.) The Court of Appeal
concluded this reflected “collecting and developing evidence, not
advocating for the DMV.” (Id. at p. 1018.)
Like the hearing officer in Romane, Rubio entered routine
documents—DMV records and a standard medical form executed
by a physician Marcus himself selected—into evidence, accepted
Marcus’s evidence without objection, permitted Marcus to make
arguments without restriction, and did not argue on behalf of

24
the DMV. Further, unlike the hearing officers in Knudsen and
Clarke, Rubio did not cross-examine Marcus when he testified,
did not ask questions designed to discredit or contradict Marcus,
and did not overrule objections to the DMV documents. The
record does not support that Rubio acted as a DMV advocate.
In arguing to the contrary, Marcus points to several aspects
of the hearing which he claims establish advocacy. He makes
much of Rubio marking exhibits, which he notes a lawyer, not the
judge, would do in a court proceeding. Marcus does not explain
how—particularly in the context of an agency hearing—marking
exhibits is an inherent act of advocacy. (See Today’s Fresh Start,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 220 [“the due process clause does not
mandate importation of the adversary trial model into the
administrative context in all or even most cases”].)
Marcus further characterizes as revealing “the thought
processes of an advocate, and not an adjudicator” that Rubio
incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to Marcus, requiring
Marcus to prove he could safely operate a vehicle. (See Daniels v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 532, 536 [“[w]hen
an administrative agency initiates an action to suspend or revoke
a license, the burden of proving the facts necessary to support the
action rests with the agency making the allegation”].) Marcus
cites Rubio’s statements that the DMV would need new medical
information in order to reverse Marcus’s suspension.4 At the

4 For example, when Marcus asked about the burden of
proof, Rubio first noted Grossman’s DME: “The burden of proof
that we—that the individual that suspended your license in
the first place . . . relied upon the—the [DME] . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
the burden of proof for this administrative hearing is just any—
any new information that you may present. So, for example, if

25
time Rubio made these statements, however, the DMV had
already made a prima facie showing supporting its action:
Medical opinion of a physician that it was dangerous for Marcus
to drive. Understood in this context, Rubio’s statements reflect
an assessment that, in the absence of any additional medical
evidence suggesting Marcus could “safely operate a motor
vehicle” or Grossman retracting his DME, the only medical
opinion before the DMV supported suspension of his license.
(See § 12806, subd. (c) [“unless the department has medical
information which indicates the person may safely operate a
motor vehicle” DMV may refuse to issue a license to a person
suffering from a “disorder which could affect the safe operation
of a motor vehicle”] (italics added).) The record does not support
that Rubio applied the incorrect burden of proof.
Finally, Marcus argues we must infer advocacy
and/or bias from Rubio’s post-hearing decision to sustain the
suspension based on what Marcus views as insufficient credible
evidence. We address (and reject) Marcus’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence below. (See Discussion post, part C.)
More broadly, this argument confuses two separate issues.

you wish to present another [DME] from another physician or
another doctor, you may present that. Or you . . . will be given
the opportunity to obtain that document. [¶] So if you need time
to go to . . . obtain another [DME] that maybe better assesses
your . . . current condition, then . . . you’re allowed to present
that. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [F]or the purpose of this hearing, I’m not
here to disagree or agree with you. I’m just here to, you know,
allow the opportunity for you to present new information. So
with your particular case, it would be what I would need to—
for—in order to move forward and possibly change the previous
[hearing officer’s] decision is another [DME].”

26
Insufficiency of the evidence is a potential basis for reversal,
but it is not a basis on which to infer bias. (See Andrews v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 795
[“credit[ing] unsubstantial evidence while disregarding utterly
irrefutable evidence” is not a basis for inferring bias].) Nor do we
perceive anything in the reasoning of the decision that suggests
Rubio was partial to the DMV or otherwise approaching the issue
with the mindset of a DMV advocate.
Thus, even if the Supreme Court concludes advocacy by a
DMV hearing officer may serve as a proxy for unconstitutional
partiality, Marcus has not shown such a due process violation.

3. Other Possible Circumstances Creating
Unconstitutional Bias or Risk of Bias
It is unclear whether Marcus is arguing more broadly
that, separate and apart from any characterization of Rubio’s
actions as DMV advocacy, the record reflects “ ‘specific evidence
demonstrating [Rubio’s] actual bias or a particular combination
of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias’ ” in
Rubio. (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 221.)
To the extent he is, we are not persuaded. The high court
has already concluded that neither a DMV employee serving
as a DMV hearing officer, nor an agency playing investigative,
adjudicative, and advocacy roles in a single matter creates
such an unconstitutional risk of bias. (See ibid.) Nor does
anything else in the record support unconstitutional bias
or specific circumstances that “could tempt an average
adjudicator to favor one side, based on a ‘ “ ‘realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weakness.’ ” ’ ” (Chi,
supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 481; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 457.) “[D]ue process violations generally are confined to ‘the

27
exceptional case presenting extreme facts.’ ” (Today’s Fresh
Start, supra, at p. 219.) Marcus bears the burden of identifying
such facts. (See id. at p. 221 [challenging party “must lay a
‘specific foundation’ for suspecting prejudice that would render
an agency unable to consider fairly the evidence presented at
the adjudicative hearing”].) He has not done so. Accordingly,
the “presumption that agency adjudicators are people of
‘ “conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging
a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances” ’ will stand unrebutted.” (Id. at p. 222.)

4. Trinidad “Interview”
Marcus argues that by referring to the January 22, 2024
interaction with Marcus as an “interview,” Trinidad “convert[ed]
a calendared hearing, without notice, into a meaningless
interview, [and that] Trinidad abused his discretion and denied
[Marcus] the right to both a fair hearing . . . ‘. . . enabling (him)
to present (his) side of the story before a responsible government
official.’ ” Marcus does not explain why due process entitles him
to an additional hearing beyond the one held before Rubio on
December 19, 2023. But even assuming he is so entitled, Marcus
terminated the contact with Trinidad on January 22, 2024, and
further declined to reschedule unless the rescheduled hearing
would take place in front of an ALJ (something that neither due
process nor the code requires). Thus, even assuming due process
entitled Marcus to a second hearing, and further assuming
Trinidad’s mere use of the word “interview” on January 22, 2024
prevented his interaction with Marcus that day from constituting
a hearing, it was Marcus—not Trinidad or the DMV—who
declined to participate in further proceedings. This is not a lack
of due process or reversible error.

28
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
Marcus suggests the evidence before the court was
insufficient to support a finding that the DMV correctly
concluded suspending Marcus’s license was necessary to protect
his own safety and that of others on the road. (See § 13953.)
We disagree. In the November 2023 DME, Grossman—whom
Marcus selected to fill out the DME form and identified as
the physician most familiar with Marcus’s health—opines that
Marcus’s “medical condition currently affect[s] safe driving”
and “advise[s] against [Marcus] driving.” In a December 2023
note, Koretz expressly supports Grossman’s assessment. No
evidence suggests Grossman ever retracted that assessment.
This constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
decision.
Marcus argues the court erred in assessing the credibility
of this evidence and in weighing it against other evidence in
the record. For example, he deems it “nonsensical” that the
court gave Grossman’s November 2023 DME more weight than
the court gave the November 2023 email from Grossman. He
further argues Grossman could not be credible in his assessment
that Marcus suffered from a “moderate” overall impairment,
because Grossman assessed several specific impairments as only
“mild” and purported to rely entirely on the notes of Koretz, who
assessed Marcus as having only mild impairments. To the extent
Marcus identifies conflicting evidence, “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[w]e must resolve
[this and] all evidentiary conflicts . . . in favor of the trial court’s
decision.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Anderson v. Davidson (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
136, 143–144 (Anderson).) To the extent Marcus asks us to
make different credibility determinations than did the trial
court, we may not do so. (See Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.

29
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 49 [“we generally defer to such credibility
determinations” in reviewing for substantial evidence].)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘We may overturn the trial court’s factual findings only if
the evidence before the trial court is insufficient as a matter of
law to sustain those findings.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Anderson, supra, at p. 144.)
It is not.5

D. Denial of Motion To Compel
Marcus argues the court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to compel discovery, which he contends the court
should have analyzed under Government Code section 11507.6.
That section “provide[s] the exclusive right to and method of
discovery as to any” “adjudicative proceeding of an agency . . .
unless the statutes relating to the proceeding provide otherwise.”
(Gov. Code, §§ 11507.5, 11501, subd. (b); see Petrus v. Department
of Motor Vehicles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1244; Brown v.
Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1549.) The section
permits broad, general discovery requests in most agency
adjudications. (See, e.g., id., § 11507.6, subd. (e) [“[a]ny other
writing or thing which is relevant and which would be admissible
in evidence”].) We do not disagree with Marcus that this section

5 Marcus also argues the evidence is insufficient to
“establish[ ] a causal connection requirement between [his]
memory deficit and an accident.” Relying on cases involving
license suspensions for driving under the influence, he contends
his suspension thus “violated both [his] due process right and the
right to a fair hearing.” This argument fails for the same reason
his general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.
The substantial evidence identified above supports the requisite
causal connection between Marcus’s impairment and the public
safety risk the suspension addresses.

30
may have permitted at least some of his discovery requests,
had he made them in an “adjudicative proceeding of an agency.”
(§11501, subd. (b).) However, he did not.
Rather, Marcus first requested these materials during
the superior court writ proceedings. As the trial court correctly
noted, Government Code section 11507.6’s broad discovery
rights do not apply in that context. Indeed, “there is no express
[statutory] provision allowing discovery in an administrative
mandamus proceeding.” (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center
v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 (Pomona Valley
Hospital), italics added.) This is because “ ‘ “[a]n administrative
mandamus action, . . . reviews the administrative record[,] which
should contain all evidence the parties consider necessary to the
resolution of contested issues.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Courts have nevertheless interpreted the statute
permitting augmentation of an administrative record—Code
of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e)—as also
permitting limited discovery requests in writ proceedings, if
the requests are “ ‘ “calculated to yield evidence which through
no fault of the offeror does not appear in the administrative
record,” ’ ” and with which the court could augment the
administrative record. (Pomona Valley Hospital, supra, 55
Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) The court correctly applied this Code
of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e) framework to
analyze Marcus’s discovery requests.
The court also correctly concluded the requests do not
satisfy “[t]he stringent requirements” of this framework. (See
Pomona Valley Hospital, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.) The
requirements include, inter alia, “show[ing] that either (a) any
[of the requested] relevant, additional evidence was improperly

31
excluded at the administrative hearing, or (b) it could not have
been produced at the hearing with the exercise of reasonable
diligence. (§ 1094.5, subd. (e).)” (Pomona Valley Hospital, supra,
at p. 102.) Marcus made no effort—either in the trial court
or in his briefing on appeal—to establish this: “If the moving
party fails to make the required showing” under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e), “it is an abuse of the
court’s discretion to allow posthearing discovery.” (Pomona
Valley Hospital, supra, at p. 102.) We thus can and do affirm
the court’s denial of Marcus’s discovery motion without
considering the court’s numerous other bases for denying the
motion and Marcus’s arguments in response.

E. Sufficiency of Administrative Record
Marcus argues the court abused its discretion by overruling
Marcus’s objections to the administrative record.
First, he argues the DMV director’s certification thereof
under Evidence Code sections 1530 and 1531 does not satisfy
Evidence Code section 1280, the business records exception
to the general inadmissibility of hearsay, because the director
is not a custodian of records. Marcus does not identify any
specific reliability concerns resulting from the director of
the DMV, rather than a DMV custodian of records, certifying
the administrative record. To the extent Marcus is arguing
the record does not include authentic, accurate copies of
the documents it purports to contain, the Evidence Code
sections 1530 and 1531 certification addresses this concern.
“[C]ertification of an official writing, under [those sections] . . .
establishes its reliability in the absence of evidence overcoming
the presumption that it is a true and correct copy. Thus, the
statutory certification process is a ‘means provided by law’

32
establishing that the official writing is the writing that the
proponent of the evidence claims it is.” (People v. Skiles (2011)
51 Cal.4th 1178, 1187, quoting Evid. Code, § 1400, subd. (b).)
The certification here complies with these sections’ requirements,
and Marcus does not argue otherwise. To the extent Marcus is
arguing the record is incomplete, motions to augment the record
are the proper means for addressing any such deficit. As we
conclude above, the court did not err in its rulings on Marcus’s
motions to augment or seek discovery.
Marcus further argues that because Sallyann Castro was
also not a custodian of records, her declaration that the DMV
did not possess undisclosed medical records was invalid. This,
he contends, supports inferences that the DMV is withholding
documents from the administrative record, and that the withheld
documents are favorable to Marcus. He argues the court abused
its discretion by rejecting these arguments below. We disagree.
The sole basis for a requirement that a custodian of records be
the one to attest to the lack of additional medical records in the
DMV’s possession is the court’s order on Marcus’s first motion
to augment. We cannot say the court abused its discretion
in deeming the Castro declaration an alternative means of
satisfying a requirement the court itself created.

F. Marcus’s Declarations
Marcus argues the court abused its discretion by refusing
to consider the declarations attached to his petition. But
Marcus never sought to augment the administrative record
with these documents. As noted above, the scope of the record
in administrative writ proceedings is the administrative record,
potentially augmented with materials that the proponent
establishes meet the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure

33
section 1094.5. Marcus did not below and does not now attempt
to establish his declarations meet those requirements.
Moreover, the trial court concluded that the declarations
would not have affected its decision. Because the declarations
do not provide medical testimony to counter that on which the
DMV relied, we agree. In arguing to the contrary, Marcus notes
that his declarations established he was not, in fact, present
for the November 7, 2023 investigation conducted by Ruiz in
the El Segundo DMV office, and that Ruiz’s investigation report
suggests he was present. Marcus claims his declarations would
thus have impeached Ruiz’s credibility. We disagree that the
investigation report necessarily indicates Marcus was present.
But even assuming it does, the court’s statement that it would
have reached the same conclusion, had it considered Marcus’s
declarations, is tantamount to the court rejecting them as
meaningfully impeaching Ruiz’s credibility. We must defer to
that credibility determination.

34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

35

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