Filed 9/28/26 Mangine v. Grossbaum CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
MARIE MANGINE, B345963
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. No. 22STRO02060)
MENACHEM MENDEL
GROSSBAUM,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura D. Cohen, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Marie Mangine, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
——————————
Plaintiff and appellant Marie Mangine appeals the trial
court’s February 13, 2025 order denying her request to renew an
elder abuse restraining order (EARO) under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 15657.03,1 protecting her from
defendant and respondent Menachem Mendel Grossbaum.
Mangine contends the trial court erred in denying her request to
renew the EARO. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Initial EARO
It is undisputed that Mangine is a tenant in a property
owned by Grossbaum, and so the two have a landlord tenant
relationship. Based on statements by the trial court at the
renewal hearing, we understand that during the hearing on
Mangine’s initial EARO request, videos showed Grossbaum and a
number of other people banging on Mangine’s door violently, and
some of them had a firearm. The trial court granted Mangine’s
initial EARO request in February 2023, for a period of two years,
expiring on February 15, 2025. The terms of the restraining
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
2 We disregard any factual assertions or arguments that
are unsupported by proper record citations. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 248; Fierro v. Landry’s
Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5.)
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order prohibited Grossbaum from continuing any abuse, but
permitted Grossbaum to contact Mangine at her address on
landlord tenant issues only.
B. EARO Modification Request
On May 22, 2024, Mangine filed a request to modify the
February 15, 2023 restraining order to delete the provision
permitting Grossbaum to contact Mangine about landlord tenant
issues, and to add a 50-yard stay away order. The hearing on the
modification request was continued a number of times. At a
hearing on January 15, 2025, when Grossbaum’s counsel sought
a continuance because of the impact of the fires in Los Angeles,
Mangine noted that the restraining order would be expiring soon,
and she would be seeking a renewal.
C. EARO Renewal Request
On January 22, 2025, Mangine filed a request to
permanently renew the EARO. In her renewal request, Mangine
alleged that Grossbaum repeatedly and willfully employed
formidably large, strange men who attempted to bully and use
force to gain entry to her home. Recounting interactions that
took place before the initial EARO was issued, Mangine alleged
that on July 26, 2022, Grossbaum caused Mangine’s vehicle to be
towed from Los Angeles to Gardena, leading her to become so ill
she had to be transported to a hospital by ambulance. Describing
Grossbaum’s behavior after the initial EARO was issued,
Mangine identified specific dates on which Grossbaum
“attempted to take financial advantage of me by pressuring me
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for money that I already paid,” and “employed a formidable in
size stranger to come to my home demanding access for
illegitimate purposes.” Mangine alleged that on November 15,
2024, “two hefty strange men forced entry inside my home. The
perpetrators came to my home with the intent to and did force
entry.” Mangine also alleged that Grossbaum caused her
emotional harm in 2023 and 2024 by making thuggish demands
by email and making disparaging and humiliating remarks.
Finally, she alleged Grossbaum filed multiple lawsuits against
her in 2024, all of which were either decided in her favor or
voluntarily dismissed.
The hearing on Mangine’s renewal request took place on
February 13, 2025. The trial court explained to the parties that
it was considering Mangine’s request to renew the restraining
order, and that under section 15657.03 and the cases of
Gordon B. v. Gomez3 and Ritchie,4 Mangine had the burden of
proving she had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The
court admitted the statement supporting Mangine’s renewal
request as part of her testimony, and reviewed each of the
exhibits Mangine had filed with the court. Among the exhibits
were a two-day order to repair from the Housing Department and
at least two notices of entry that Mangine argued were defective
or deficient, as well as a screenshot of an image on a doorbell
camera showing two men at Mangine’s door.
During the hearing, Mangine objected to being cross-
examined before she had the opportunity to examine Grossbaum,
3 Gordon B. v. Gomez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 92 (Gordon B.).
4 Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275 (Ritchie).
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and the court permitted Grossbaum’s attorney to conduct the
cross-examination. During the exchange, Mangine argued that
the attorney was also abusing her by blocking her entry into the
courtroom, and the court stated that the renewal request was
only being sought with respect to Grossbaum. In addition,
Mangine objected to the documents Grossbaum’s attorney had
shown her during cross-examination, arguing that the initial
EARO’s carve-out for landlord tenant issues required Grossbaum
to follow landlord tenant law, and instead Grossbaum was
posting non-compliant notices and sending people to her
apartment to harass her. The court clarified that the current
hearing was not a forum to address landlord tenant laws. The
court recalled that at the initial hearing, there were videos
showing people violently banging on the door, and one person
with a firearm, and now the court was asking Mangine to explain
why she felt she still needed a restraining order. Mangine
responded that the initial EARO said Grossbaum had to comply
with landlord tenant laws and that he could not abuse the right
of access, but he was doing so. When Mangine attempted to
recite to the court what it had said at the prior hearing on the
initial EARO, the court noted that the parties were not present to
dispute what was said at the time the initial order was issued,
and the written order spoke for itself. The court again noted its
responsibility to consider all the evidence and the original
findings, together with whether Mangine’s apprehension was
genuine and reasonable. It noted that landlord and tenants’
rights were outside the scope of what the court was considering.
Grossbaum’s attorney argued that Mangine’s stated
apprehension was not reasonable. He pointed out that Mangine
acknowledged that 10 to 15 notices were given, and the evidence
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before the court included orders from the housing department
showing that Grossbaum had valid reasons to give Mangine
notices of entry and valid reason to access the apartment to
conduct the required repairs. Counsel argued that Grossbaum
had not been to the property and had stepped back from
involving himself with Mangine. Despite his efforts to coordinate
repairs required by the housing department, Mangine had used
the EARO to refuse permission to conduct those repairs.
According to counsel, the initial EARO had allowed Mangine to
perpetrate a vicious cycle of refusing to permit repairs. When
counsel argued Mangine had not paid rent, Mangine objected
that there was no evidence of nonpayment of rent.
After noting that the court had given the parties an hour
and a half of time, and that Grossbaum’s counsel had submitted
based solely on his questioning of Mangine and presenting
argument, the court again reviewed its obligation to consider the
evidence and findings behind the initial EARO as well as any
significant changes. The court pointed out that the initial EARO
had been issued very narrowly, and both sides had made efforts
related to the rental agreement. The court agreed with
Grossbaum’s argument that Mangine’s apprehension was not
reasonable, and that Mangine was using the EARO as a sword
rather than a shield. It denied Mangine’s request to modify the
restraining order and also denied her renewal request, and
Mangine timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mangine contends on appeal that the trial court erred in a
number of ways, including applying an incorrect legal standard
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in evaluating the EARO renewal request, ignoring evidence of
her apprehension, and instead relying on the argument of counsel
to conclude Mangine was using the EARO as a sword rather than
a shield. Grossbaum has not filed a respondent’s brief, but
Mangine still bears the burden to show reversible error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [appellant must
demonstrate error justifying reversal].)
A. Standard of Review
“[T]he issuance of a protective order under the Elder Abuse
Act is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings
necessary to support such a protective order are reviewed under
the substantial evidence test. [¶] We resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of respondent, the prevailing party, and indulge
all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the
trial court’s findings. [Citation]” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137−1138 [because language of § 15657.03 is
identical to language in the Domestic Violence Protection Act
(Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), the same standard of review
applies].) “However, the question of ‘whether a trial court
applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its
discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo
review.’ ” (Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 560
(Cueto); see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 98.) The
challenging party must show that the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing the order. (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1140.)
“ ‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner” ’ [citation] or ‘when its
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ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason” ’ [citation].” (People v.
Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) The California Supreme
Court has emphasized: “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced
from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
B. Elder Abuse Restraining Orders and Restraining
Order Renewals
For issuing an initial EARO, section 15657.03 authorizes
the court to enjoin a party “from abusing, intimidating,
molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, including, but not
limited to, making annoying telephone calls as described in
Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property,
contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of,
the petitioner, and, in the discretion of the court, on a showing of
good cause, of other named family or household members or a
conservator, if any, of the petitioner[.]” (§ 15657.03 subd.
(b)(4)(A).) A protective order under this statute “may issue on the
basis of evidence of past abuse, without any particularized
showing that the wrongful acts will be continued or repeated.”
(Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137; Rodriguez
v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 823.) The trial court’s
findings are to be made by a preponderance of the evidence.
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(Gdowski, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 137, see also Bookout,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138.)
Once issued, an EARO “may be renewed upon the request
of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a
showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original
order, subject to termination or modification by further order of
the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on
the motion of a party. The request for renewal may be brought at
any time within the three months before the expiration of the
order.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (i)(1).)
As the court in Gordon B. explained, “[b]ecause no reported
case has addressed the showing required to renew an elder abuse
restraining order, we rely on cases applying the statutory
provision for renewing a domestic violence restraining order,
which is virtually identical to that for renewing an elder abuse
restraining order: ‘These orders may be renewed, upon the
request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a
showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original
order, subject to termination or modification by further order of
the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on
the motion of a party. The request for renewal may be brought at
any time within the three months before the expiration of the
orders.’ (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).)” (Gordon B., supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at p. 98.)
“[B]oth statutes permit a party to request the court to
renew a restraining order ‘without a showing of any further
abuse since the issuance of the original order.’ (Fam. Code,
§ 6345, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03, subd. (i)(1).) A
leading case interpreting Family Code section 6345, subdivision
(a) explained: ‘It would be anomalous to require the protected
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party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal
of that original order. If this were the standard, the protected
party would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved
ineffectual in halting the restrained party’s abusive conduct just
to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order. Indeed[,] the fact
a protective order has proved effective is a good reason for
seeking its renewal.’ (Ritchie[, supra,] 115 Cal.App.4th [at
p. 1284.) Thus, ‘a trial court errs when it requires a party to
show a violation of the restraining order as a condition to
renewing that order.’ (Cueto, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.)
[¶] Instead, a ‘trial court should renew the protective order, if,
and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
protected party entertains a “reasonable apprehension” of future
abuse. So there should be no misunderstanding, this does not
mean the court must find it is more likely than not future abuse
will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means
the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a
sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party’s
apprehension is genuine and reasonable.’ (Ritchie, supra, 115
Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.)” (Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 98–99.)
Under Ritchie, the inquiry into whether it is more probable
than not that there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the
protected party’s apprehension is genuine and reasonable begins
by considering the “evidence and findings” that supported the
issuance of the original restraining order to appraise the risk of
future abuse. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290; see
also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.) The trial court
should also consider whether there have been “any significant
changes in the circumstances” by asking, for example, “have the
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restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far
that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has
diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the
order?” (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, see also
Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.) “ ‘Also relevant are
the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves
potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order
imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job
opportunities.’ [Citation.]” (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 170, 180; Ritchie, at p. 1292).
“In challenging a renewal order, the restrained party is not
permitted ‘to challenge the truth of the evidence and findings
underlying the initial order.’ ” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 319, 333; see also Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1290.)
C. Analysis
Mangine contends that the trial court erred because it
applied a framework inconsistent with section 15657.03 and
Gordon B., and because she presented evidence of a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse; she further contends that the
court’s errors were prejudicial. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1290; see also Gordon B., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 99.)
First, our review of reporter’s transcript assures us that the
trial court thoughtfully and correctly applied the standards
required under Gordon B. and Ritchie. At least twice, the court
explained to Mangine that it was considering the evidence and it
was her burden of proof to show that she had a reasonable
apprehension of future abuse.
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Second, the court correctly determined that Mangine had
the burden to show not just actual apprehension, but that the
apprehension was reasonable. Further, while accepting that
Mangine was subjectively fearful of continued harassment and
abuse by Grossbaum and his agents, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in deciding that Mangine’s subjective apprehension
was not sufficiently reasonable to support granting her renewal
request. The court’s decision to deny the renewal took into
account the evidence and findings supporting the issuance of the
original order, but also the change in circumstances after the
original order was issued. The court had before it evidence that
the housing department was requiring Grossbaum to make
repairs, that he personally stayed away from her, and that his
agents came to make those required repairs. Although Mangine
acknowledged that notices had been posted on door, she refused
to permit workers to enter, claiming she found some inadequacy
in the notices. In the court’s view, any apprehension of abuse
Mangine was experiencing when Grossbaum was contacting her
for landlord tenant issues or when workers were attempting to
access the apartment to make repairs, was not reasonable under
the circumstances. The question of whether the notices were in
technical compliance with landlord tenant law was something the
trial court reasonably determined could be presented in a
separate landlord tenant dispute, but was not of a nature that
supported renewal of a restraining order that had already carved
out contact between the parties for precisely such issues.
Mangine’s final argument is that the trial court denied her
due process. She posits that because the trial court did not
formally admit or exclude her exhibits before announcing its
decision, it “bypassed the evidentiary phase altogether and
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resolved a contested renewal request as though no evidence had
been presented.” We find no due process violation on the record
here. The court heard testimony by both Mangine and
Grossbaum, and considered the exhibits offered by Mangine.
Grossbaum objected to two videos Mangine attempted to
introduce, and those were excluded because they were not
exchanged ahead of the hearing. Beyond those exclusions, we
can reasonably infer that the court considered all of Mangine’s
proffered evidence in reaching its conclusion.
DISPOSITION
The court’s February 13, 2025 order denying plaintiff and
appellant Marie Mangine’s request to permanently renew the
restraining order against defendant and respondent Menachem
Mendel Grossbaum is affirmed. As Respondent Menachem
Mendel Grossbaum made no appearance in this appellate court,
no costs are awarded on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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