Filed 10/21/26 Makkouk v. Cal. Receivership Group CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ANNA MAKKOUK,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065623
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01404881)
CALIFORNIA RECEIVERSHIP
GROUP et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Affirmed.
Tahmazian Law Firm, Jilbert Tahmazian and Guinevere M.
Malley, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ervin Cohen & Jessup, Byron Z. Moldo and Kenneth P. Hsu, for
Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Plaintiff Anna Makkouk appeals from an order granting an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike her complaint against a receiver. She contends her
complaint did not arise from protected activity and she showed a reasonable
probability of prevailing.
We affirm. Makkouk’s claims arose from the protected activity of
a court-appointed receiver abating a public nuisance. And Makkouk cannot
prevail because the receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity.
FACTS
According to the complaint, the court appointed defendant
California Receivership Group as the receiver in a separate action by the City
of Cypress to abate a public nuisance at Makkouk’s home.1 Makkouk alleged
that defendants “willfully disregarded Makkouk’s efforts to abate the alleged
nuisance in her home and incurred excessive charges,” “made luxurious
updates to the Subject Property that are not necessary for habitability and
safety, rather for resale and increase in property value in an effort to secure
the repayment of their already excessive and inflated construction costs and
fees,” and “listed the property for an inadequately low[ ] price.”
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the court granted.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)2 First, it found “the Receiver’s conduct in
1 An order attached to the complaint clarifies that defendant
Mark Adams is the president of California Receivership Group. Defendants
supported their motion with a lengthy declaration from Adams describing his
work as the receiver for the property.
2 All further statutory references are to this code.
2
managing renovations for the property, listing it for sale, and selling it at the
price the court in the underlying action approved were all acts in furtherance
of the right of petition, as the Receiver was specifically authorized to do those
things under the appointment order and subsequent orders. And as the
appointment order was based on a governmental body seeking relief to abate
a public nuisance, the Receiver’s work was also plainly in connection with a
public issue.” Second, it found “[t]he Receiver and his agents have absolute
quasi-judicial immunity from damage claims arising from their performance
of duties in connection with the judicial process.”
DISCUSSION
Before we discuss the anti-SLAPP motion, we conclude Makkouk
timely appealed within 180 days of the January 2025 order. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).) We reject defendants’ contention that its service of
a “Notice of Ruling” attaching a tentative ruling triggered the 60-day
deadline. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) [shorter deadline when
party serves “‘Notice of Entry’” or filed-stamped copy of order].) “[S]erving a
notice of ruling is not the same as serving a copy of the order or a notice of
entry of the order, as contemplated by the rules governing the timeliness of
appeals.” (Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 399.)3
We turn to the motion, for which the “[r]esolution . . . involves
two steps.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) First, the defendant
must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.) Second, if the defendant makes the required
3 On the other hand, Makkouk cannot rely on her filing the notice
of appeal within 60 days of the April 7, 2025 judgment. “[A]s the order on the
anti-SLAPP motion is itself appealable, we are foreclosed from reviewing that
order on appeal from the judgment.” (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc.
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247.)
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showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a probability of
prevailing on the merits. (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s order granting an
anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
We conclude the trial court rightly granted the motion—and did
so a month before we published Semaan v. Mosier (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
460, 470 (Semaan). Our decision there only bolsters the court’s analysis.
First, the trial court correctly found the complaint arises out of
protected activity. “Section 425.16(e)(4) is a catchall provision protecting ‘any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.’” (Semaan, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.)
Makkouk states she is not suing over defendants’ “litigation conduct” but
over “the manner and method by which [defendants] carried out the orders”
appointing them as receivers. That conduct consists primarily of defendants’
allegedly incurring unnecessary receivership expenses, and selling the
property for too little. But defendants’ “conduct and decisions as a court-
appointed receiver [are] in furtherance of the exercise of a constitutional right
of petition.” (Ibid. [affirming order granting anti-SLAPP motion].)
Notably, this is not a case where the receiver was appointed to
manage a business pending resolution of a purely private dispute. To the
contrary, a government entity (the City of Cypress) requested the receiver to
abate a public nuisance. (Cf. Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v.
Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1149 [“government involvement and
oversight on an ongoing basis” of recycling program “demonstrates
widespread public interest”].) By definition, a public nuisance “affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number
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of persons . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3480.) “The public nuisance doctrine is aimed at
the protection and redress of community interests . . . .” (People ex rel. Gallo
v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1103.)
Second, Makkouk has not shown a probability of prevailing. “[A]
court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for the
receiver’s discretionary acts and decisions.” (Semaan, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th
at p. 465.) Nuanced decision-making over making repairs and improvements
and determining a sales price calls for the exercise of discretion.
As Semaan confirmed, quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to
“intentional misconduct, such as self-dealing, that is not taken in the
receiver’s quasi-judicial capacity or in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” (Semaan, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) But Makkouk has
not shown a probability of prevailing on any such claim. While she offered the
declaration of an expert receiver who attested to excessive charges, the expert
did not find defendants engaged in intentional misconduct or self-dealing,
such as hiring related entities to do the renovation or sell the house.4
Repairing the house and selling it were expressly within defendants’
jurisdiction as receivers.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on
appeal.
4 We assume without deciding we can consider the expert’s
declaration, which was filed in the public nuisance abatement action before
being attached to counsel’s declaration in opposition to the anti-SLAPP
motion.
5
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, ACTING P. J.
SERVINO, J.
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