Filed 8/19/26 M.A. v. Superior Court CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
M.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE A176781
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, (San Francisco City and County
Super. Ct. No. JD-26-3062)
Respondent;
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.
M.A. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order
bypassing reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her infant son, A.R.1
Mother contends substantial evidence meeting the clear and convincing
standard of proof did not support the court’s finding that she failed to make a
reasonable effort to address the substance abuse problem that led to this and
two prior dependency cases involving A.R.’s siblings. Mother further argues
the court abused its discretion in concluding she did not demonstrate that
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to this code.
1
reunification services would be in A.R.’s best interest. We deny the petition
on the merits.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency Proceedings
Mother and W.R. (Father), presumed father of A.R., have two older
children, both of whom were previously removed from their care. In August
2020, E.R. was born testing positive for opiates, and Mother admitted to
using fentanyl and benzodiazepines just before E.R.’s birth. The parents
failed to reunify with E.R., and their parental rights were terminated in
February 2022.
Three months later in May 2022, M.R. was born testing positive for
fentanyl and methadone. During her pregnancy with M.R., Mother tested
positive for amphetamines and admitted using fentanyl. Reunification
services were terminated in June 2023, and parental rights as to M.R. were
terminated in October 2023.
Meanwhile, A.R. was born in August 2024 with opiates in his system.
He was detained in November 2024, and Mother entered inpatient treatment.
In January 2025, A.R. was returned to Mother’s care with family
maintenance services. In January 2026, the case was dismissed with full
legal and physical custody of A.R. to Mother.2 Mother later graduated from
family treatment court in March 2026.
B. Petition and Detention
Unless otherwise indicated, the events described from this point on
took place in 2026.
2 The custody order authorized no visitation for Father due to his failure
to participate in services to address his own substance abuse.
2
On April 1, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of
then-19-month-old A.R., alleging the minor was at substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness due to his parents’ domestic violence (count B-1),
Mother’s substance abuse (count B-2) and mental health issues (count B-3),
Father’s substance abuse (count B-4), and the parents’ refusal to make
themselves and A.R. available for assessment (count B-5). The petition
further alleged that the parents had previously lost custody and parental
rights over their two older children due to neglect and substance abuse.
In its detention report, the Agency described multiple incidents in
February and March in which neighbors reported hearing the parents yelling,
items banging and crashing, and a baby crying in Mother’s apartment. Nia
Orta, the coordinator at Mother’s housing program, visited Mother’s unit
several times and heard Father yelling and accusing Mother of using
methamphetamines. Mother did not permit a social worker and housing
program staff into the apartment, and “there was concern that the mother
was under the influence.” During one visit by the social worker in March,
Father answered the door and appeared to be under the influence. He did
not admit the social worker to the apartment and claimed the sounds of a
baby crying were coming from the television. In late March, the social
worker attempted a wellness check with police, but no one answered the door.
(CT21)~
A.R. was ordered detained on April 3, and a removal warrant was
executed the following day.
C. Jurisdiction
The Agency filed its jurisdiction report in April. Protective services
worker (PSW) Ja’Raya Martin spoke with Orta, who reported that Father
was present in the unit with Mother and A.R. during each of Orta’s weekly
3
checks in February; that he often appeared under the influence; and that
during an argument, he accused Mother of using drugs around their son.
Mother denied that she was in a relationship with Father and that he lived in
the unit, but she later acknowledged he came to the apartment often, kept his
belongings there, and was named on the lease.
On April 6, PSW Martin submitted a drug test referral for Mother and
asked her to test as soon as possible. As of the date of the jurisdiction report
(April 17), the Agency had not received any test results.
A contested jurisdiction hearing was held on April 23. The detention
and jurisdiction reports were admitted without objection, and the juvenile
court took judicial notice of “the entire case file” from the prior dependency
proceeding regarding A.R. PSW Sashell Yates testified as to her March visit
to Mother’s apartment during which Father appeared intoxicated and refused
to allow her in.
PSW Martin testified that she believed Father had a substance abuse
problem and was living with Mother, and that there was domestic violence
between them. Martin was “not 100 percent sure” whether Mother had a
substance abuse problem at the time of the hearing because Martin had not
received any test results. Martin confirmed she had received one “no-show”
notification regarding Mother from the drug testing site, dated April 22.
When asked about visitation, Martin testified that Mother “only had one . . .
visit due to Mom’s phone number . . . being switched and changed, and
because of that the agency was not able to contact Mom to set up visits.”
Martin said Mother was on a waiting list to receive more visits, and the
Agency was working with a visitation center to schedule them.
4
After argument, the juvenile court sustained an amended petition3 and
took jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), finding the
allegations of domestic violence and the parents’ substance abuse to be true.
The court set a contested disposition hearing for June 3. The court then
heard from the parties regarding visitation.
PSW Martin explained the Agency was not able to facilitate regular
visitation through normal channels because the visitation centers “only offer
visits to parents who have first-time cases,” and this was not Mother’s first
dependency case. Martin reported the Agency was committed to providing
Mother with a minimum of six hours per week of supervised visits. Mother’s
counsel argued it was “unacceptable” for the Agency to say “ ‘We are working
on it. We don’t know how we are going to do it, but we are working on it.’ ”
The court found the Agency had not deliberately failed to offer visits and was
not “at fault for not providing a certain number of visits given the unique
circumstances of this case.” The court ordered that both parents receive a
minimum six hours per week of supervised visitation, with Father’s visitation
rights conditioned on him presenting himself to the Agency for assessment.
D. Disposition
In the Agency’s May disposition report, PSW Martin reported she had
been unable to meet with Mother despite six attempts in April and May.
According to Martin, Mother “provided limited responses and has not
answered calls or met in person to provide additional information.” Martin
was also unable to obtain updated information from Mother about her
housing, parenting skills, social support system, physical and mental health,
3 Based on concessions by the Agency, the petition was amended to strike
(1) the last sentence of count B-1 regarding the Agency’s unsuccessful
attempts to meet with the parents; and (2) counts B-3 and B-5 in their
entirety.
5
current substance abuse, or domestic violence. Martin reminded Mother on
April 16, 20, and 24 about the pending drug test referral, but Mother had not
completed a test as of the report date.
Regarding visitation, Martin reported the Agency had originally set up
visits at Alternative Family Services (AFS) in San Francisco on Tuesdays and
Thursdays for three hours each day, but Mother missed her visits on April 28
and 30.4 She was on a waitlist for East Bay Seneca Visitation Center. A.R.
had been moved to a placement with his paternal great aunt, who had
previously adopted A.R.’s older brother, M.R., and “expressed a strong desire
to adopt” A.R. as well. The great aunt reportedly “maintained a comfortable
environment for the minor and is able to meet his overall needs. In addition,
the minor has been growing and thriving in this home.”
At an interim hearing on May 14, Mother’s counsel reported that
Mother had drug tested on May 8 and 12, and the results were pending.
Father appeared at the hearing and stated his intention to test the following
day.
In late May, the Agency filed an addendum report indicating that
Mother’s May 8 and 12 tests were “Confirmed Positive” for fentanyl. The
toxicologist opined that although the second sample was more dilute, the
levels were “consistent with active fentanyl use occurring during the days
between the two tests.” And while a subsequent May 18 test returned
negative, the toxicologist explained the sample had been collected six days
after the May 12 test, by which time fentanyl was no longer detectable. In a
May 19 phone call with PSW Martin, Mother claimed the test results were
4 As the Agency explained, A.R. was subsequently moved from an AFS
home, and therefore, “AFS [was] no longer able to support visitation
planning.”
6
false positives and blamed the test service, Accurate C&S Services
(Accurate), for the inaccurate results. Father tested positive for fentanyl on
May 18.
Regarding visitation, Martin reported that Mother was offered virtual
visitation facilitated by the great aunt. Mother attended one virtual visit on
May 12, but had not participated since. The Agency was still attempting to
arrange in-person visitation.
The contested disposition hearing was held on June 3. PSW Martin
testified that the Agency recommended denial of reunification services to
both parents and out-of-home placement for A.R. Martin had had no in-
person contact with Father because he missed a scheduled appointment.
Martin believed Father was not in a substance abuse treatment program
even though he told her he would enter one.5 As to Mother, Martin testified
she was not enrolled in a substance abuse program as of the hearing, even
though Mother said she would enter Women’s HOPE on June 1. Martin
explained that parents must enroll themselves into a residential treatment
program. To that end, Martin had contacted Women’s HOPE, confirmed a
bed was available, and encouraged Mother to enroll, but enrollment required
first detoxing at a separate facility. Martin testified that Mother attributed
her positive tests to inaccuracies at the Accurate testing site, and that the
Agency had had Mother test at both Women’s HOPE and Accurate to
compare the results—an arrangement dating back to Mother’s prior
dependency case, when she had tested positive for substances at Women’s
HOPE in 2024.
5 During Martin’s testimony, the juvenile court clerk received a message
that Father had checked into a seven-day detox program.
7
Regarding visitation, Martin testified the Agency had arranged twice-
weekly visits for Mother, but she missed a visit on April 28, and then failed to
appear on April 30 after confirming she would attend. Since A.R.’s placement
with the great aunt, Mother had had no in-person visits and had only a
weekly video visit every Tuesday for approximately one hour. Both parents
remained on a waiting list for a visitation center.
Mother gave testimony by video from HealthRIGHT 360’s Walden
House facility. She testified that after A.R.’s removal from her home in April,
she “tried to” keep in contact with Martin and only “found out that she had
been trying to get a hold of me from just listening from today.” Mother
explained that A.R.’s removal “was a very, very traumatic experience for me,”
and she sought to take care of her mental health first so that she could take
of her son afterwards. Specifically Mother sought therapy to protect her
mental health and avoid relapse and continued with an outpatient program
at Mission Council. Mother reportedly drug tested at Mission Council and
signed a release so that the results could be sent to PSW Martin.
Mother claimed that she, not Martin, had proposed residential
treatment and called Women’s HOPE to reserve a bed. In the two days prior
to the disposition hearing, Mother completed the intake prerequisites,
including methadone maintenance, a physical, and tuberculosis and COVID-
19 testing. Before she could transfer to Women’s HOPE, Mother had to check
into the HealthRIGHT 360 facility to detox.
Mother further testified that she had had no in-person visits with A.R.,
and that she went to the great aunt to arrange weekly video visits. Mother
further explained that an out-of-county visit had been cancelled and then
uncancelled, causing her to miss it. Mother said she wanted A.R. to live with
her at Women’s HOPE and thereafter move with him to her mother’s home in
8
Arizona. She confirmed she and Father remained a couple but said he was
not living with her.
After argument, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother and Father’s parental rights had been terminated as to
A.R.’s siblings in two prior cases, and that the problem that led to the
siblings’ removal was the same as in A.R.’s case, namely, the parents’
substance abuse. The court further found that neither parent had made
reasonable efforts to treat those problems; Father had made “no efforts,” and
Mother’s efforts were “minimal,” “temporary,” and “not reasonable” given her
inability to maintain sobriety. To the extent the testimony of Mother and
PSW Martin conflicted, the court found Martin to be the more credible
witness and further found it would have reached the same result even
accepting Mother’s testimony.
The juvenile court further remarked that the Agency’s practice of
identifying residential treatment programs and confirming availability,
rather than making a formal residential referral on the parent’s behalf, was
reasonable, and that the Agency’s failure to give Mother an explicit
advisement about what she needed to do to avoid bypass did not render the
services unreasonable given Mother’s experience with prior dependencies and
her representation by counsel. In the court’s view, it “defies logic and
common sense” that Mother would wait until the day of the disposition
hearing to enter treatment if she believed she needed it. The court also
emphasized that Mother “repeatedly refused to test,” missed tests, and tested
positive twice in May, all while denying drug use and attempting to cast
doubt on the accuracy of the test results, which the court found to be
unpersuasive.
9
With regard to visitation, the juvenile court found that any failure to
provide in-person visitation was due to Mother’s failure to attend visits and
was not a reflection on the reasonableness of the services. The court noted
that the Agency had offered virtual visits and that Mother had attended only
one.
The juvenile court declined to exercise its discretion to offer services to
Mother notwithstanding her lack of reasonable efforts, finding that “neither
reunification nor reunification services are in the child’s best interests.”
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court ordered that reunification
services be bypassed for both parents. The court approved A.R.’s placement
with his paternal great aunt, ordered supervised visitation for the parents
once per month, and scheduled the permanency planning hearing for
September 30, 2026.
E. Petition for Extraordinary Relief
Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a petition for extraordinary
writ relief and subsequently filed her petition challenging the juvenile court’s
June 3 order bypassing reunification services and setting the section 366.26
hearing.6 On July 15, we issued an order to show cause why relief should not
be granted.
DISCUSSION
Reunification services are normally provided to the parents of
dependent children. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 166, 174–175.) However, services “need not be provided to a
parent or guardian described in [section 361.5, subdivision (b)] when the
6 In her petition, Mother checked a box requesting a temporary stay of a
hearing dated “JUNE 3, 2026.” This appears to be a mistake, as that was the
date of the disposition hearing. We reasonably construe Mother’s request as
seeking a stay of the September 30, 2026 permanency planning hearing.
10
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” any of several statutorily-
enumerated circumstances. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1)–(17).) Relevant here are
the circumstances set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11),
which concern prior dependency proceedings involving a sibling or half
sibling of a child currently before the juvenile court.
Under these provisions, reunification services may be bypassed where
clear and convincing evidence shows that a juvenile court previously either
terminated reunification services (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A)) or “permanently
severed” the parental rights (id., subd. (b)(11)) of the same parent as to any
sibling or half sibling of the child currently before the court, and that this
parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to the removal of the sibling or half sibling.” (Id., subd. (b)(10)(A),
(11)(A).) Where a bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3),
(4), or (6) through (17), applies, the juvenile court “shall not order
reunification” for the parent “unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).)
On review from an order bypassing reunification services, we
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that a bypass
provision applies. (See In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.)
“Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the
evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (Ibid.; see
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996 (O.B.).) “[I]n making
this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the
trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts
11
in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B.,
at p. 996.)
We review a juvenile court’s assessment of what is in the child’s best
interest for an abuse of discretion. (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th
1261, 1273 (Jayden M.).)
A. Finding that Mother Did Not Make Reasonable Effort to
Treat Her Substance Abuse Problems
Pursuant to section 361.5, the child welfare agency bears the initial
“burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the juvenile
court had ordered termination of reunification services (under § 361.5,
subd. (b)(10)) or had severed parental rights (under § 361.5, subd. (b)(11)) in a
prior case involving a sibling or half sibling of the child in the current case;
(2) the ‘problem[] that led to removal’ of the sibling or half sibling is the same
problem at issue in the current case, insofar as the problem involves the
same ‘theme’ even if it is not identical; and (3) the parent has ‘not
subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat th[at] problem[].’ ” (Jayden
M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.)
There is no dispute the record contains substantial evidence meeting
the clear and convincing standard of proof that Mother failed to reunify with
and lost parental rights over A.R.’s siblings in prior dependency proceedings.
It is likewise undisputed the problem that led to the removal of the siblings—
Mother’s abuse of substances, e.g., opioids—is the identical problem at issue
here.
Mother’s challenge involves the third element of the Agency’s burden:
whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not
make a reasonable effort to treat her substance abuse problem. (Jayden M.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272–1273.) On this score, Mother emphasizes
that during the prior dependency case involving A.R., she successfully
12
completed inpatient programming and achieved 14 months of verified
sobriety, resulting in A.R.’s return to her custody and dismissal of the case.
She further argues that despite a “brief relapse” during the current case, she
undertook reasonable efforts to treat her drug addiction by proactively
engaging in detox services and making arrangements to enter residential
treatment. We find these points unpersuasive and conclude the record
contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could find by
clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not make a reasonable effort
to treat her drug addiction.
“[I]n assessing whether a parent made a reasonable effort to address a
problem from a prior dependency case involving the current child’s sibling or
half sibling and where reunification services or parental rights were
terminated under subdivision (b)(10) or (11) of section 361.5, the juvenile
court should consider the entire time span between, at the one end, the
earliest time a sibling or half sibling was removed from the parent’s custody
due to that problem and, at the other end, the dispositional hearing in the
current case.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) “The question
is not whether the parent has ‘ “ ‘cure[d]’ ” ’ or ‘ “abolished” ’ the problem
[citations], or whether the parent has ‘attained’ a ‘ “certain level of progress” ’
[citation]. Instead, the focus is on the parent’s effort. It is not enough to
show ‘any’ effort, even a genuine one. [Citation.] ‘[L]ackadaisical or half-
hearted efforts’ will also not do. [Citation.] Instead, the effort must be
reasonable, and reasonableness is assessed by looking to (1) the duration of
the parent’s effort, (2) the ‘extent and context’ of the parent’s effort, and
(3) other factors related to the ‘quality and quantity of those efforts.’
[Citation.] The parent’s progress, or lack thereof, ‘both in the short and long
13
term’—while not dispositive—is nevertheless relevant ‘to the extent it bears
on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Id. at p. 1276, italics omitted.)
Here, the relevant time span for assessing Mother’s progress is from
August 2020, when sibling E.R. was removed, to June 2026, when the
juvenile court bypassed reunification services as to A.R. (Jayden M., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) As Mother emphasizes, this time frame included
a 14-month period of sobriety during the first dependency proceeding
involving A.R. We acknowledge this was not a fleeting moment, and we
applaud Mother for having taken steps in the right direction. That said, it
was still a fraction of the almost six-year time frame as a whole, which
included four nearly consecutive dependency proceedings stemming from
Mother’s substance abuse. Furthermore, once Agency involvement ended in
January 2026, Mother’s sobriety became short-lived, as she tested positive for
fentanyl just four months after regaining full custody of A.R. and two months
after graduating from family treatment court. On this record, the juvenile
court could permissibly conclude, and substantial evidence would support,
that Mother’s effort to maintain sobriety “was not reasonable against the
backdrop of her entire drug history dating back to” 2020. (Jayden M., at
p. 1276.)
Mother’s attempt to downplay her drug use in May 2026 as “a brief
relapse following the trauma of [A.R.’s] re-removal” is unavailing. The
juvenile court could reasonably reject this self-interested characterization of
the record, and substantial evidence would support a finding that Mother’s
drug use was more sustained. As the record reflects, the staff at Mother’s
housing program heard Father accusing Mother of substance abuse in
February and March 2026, and the Agency documented the staff members’
“concern that the mother was under the influence.” Upon A.R.’s removal in
14
April 2026, Mother failed to drug test despite multiple referrals and
reminders, and it was reasonable to infer that Mother was refusing to test in
order to conceal her continued drug use. (See, e.g., In re Kadence P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [avoiding or refusing to take drug tests without
adequate justification, is “ ‘properly considered the equivalent of a positive
test result’ ”], disapproved on other grounds in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 560.) Meanwhile, Mother continued to live with Father despite his own
unresolved substance abuse problems, and she tested positive for fentanyl
twice in May 2026, with levels consistent with active use. On this record, the
court could reasonably conclude the positive tests in May were not a brief,
isolated relapse, but were consistent with persistent drug use both before and
after A.R.’s second removal.
In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373 (Z.G.) does not compel a contrary
conclusion. There, the Supreme Court held the mother’s purported relapse7
would not preclude a finding of reasonable effort given the specific timeline
and facts of that case. (Id. at p. 390.) Viewing the mother’s conduct over the
two-and-a-half-year span of the dependency case, the Supreme Court
concluded her efforts “were not ‘lackadaisical or half-hearted’ ” because “[s]he
was demonstrably sober for over a year and a half; she completed her initial
case plan, including participating in all mandated substance abuse treatment
services; and she had custody of Z.G. and safely cared for her for over 18
months.” (Ibid.) The same cannot be said here, as Mother’s performance
over the six-year span applicable here was not largely positive. She failed to
reunify with both of A.R.’s siblings, resisted meaningful contact with the
7 The record in Z.G. was “mixed on whether Mother began to abuse
alcohol or substances again.” (Z.G., supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 389.) Although
Mother initially disputed the accuracy of the May 2026 test results, she no
longer does so in her petition papers.
15
Agency in this case, refused to initially drug test and then tested positive
twice (while continuing to deny use), and then hurriedly entered detox
treatment on the eve of the disposition hearing. On this record, the juvenile
court could reasonably conclude Mother’s positive tests in May 2026 were not
merely isolated “ ‘slip[] up[s] on the road to recovery’ ” (Z.G., at p. 390), but
were reflective of ongoing and unresolved struggles with substance abuse.
Mother nevertheless maintains her response to the May 2026 relapse
reflected a reasonable effort to achieve sobriety because she “took immediate,
proactive, and independent action.” As Mother sees it, she “[r]ecogniz[ed] her
misstep,” and “independently contacted the director of Women’s HOPE to
secure a bed for readmission,” “voluntarily checked herself into HealthRIGHT
360 (Walden House) for a multi-day detox process so she could transition
directly back into the inpatient program,” and then testified at the
disposition hearing from the facility, “proving she had already taken concrete
steps to treat her relapse without waiting for an Agency mandate or court
order.” We are unpersuaded by these points. Mother’s immediate response
to the positive tests was not to acknowledge her mistake and undertake
efforts to address it, but to dispute the accuracy of the results. We are not
aware of any evidence in the record substantiating her claims of inaccuracies
(e.g., the results of comparator tests taken at Women’s HOPE), and notably,
Mother no longer takes the position that the May 2026 results were, in fact,
false positives. On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
Mother’s denial of drug use in the face of two positive tests raised concerns
over her lack of self-awareness of the problem that led to this and the prior
dependency proceedings.
Equally unavailing is Mother’s claim that she undertook “immediate,
proactive, and independent” steps to achieve sobriety. PSW Martin testified
16
it was she, not Mother, who contacted a residential treatment facility and
confirmed availability for Mother before repeatedly encouraging Mother to
enroll. We defer to the juvenile court’s express finding that Martin was more
credible on this score. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996.) Meanwhile,
throughout April and May 2026, Mother was evasive with Martin and did not
provide updated information about her housing, social support system, and
current substance use. Nor did she take preliminary steps to enter
residential treatment until just days before the June 3 disposition hearing.
On this record, the court reasonably concluded Mother’s eleventh-hour
attempt at treatment was not a genuine effort to confront her long history of
drug addiction. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1276.)
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in concluding the
Agency carried its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the
removals of A.R. and his siblings. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A), (11)(A).)8
B. Finding that Reunification Services Are Not in A.R.’s Best
Interest
Once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a
bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, “the general
rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that
reunification services would be ‘ “an unwise use of governmental
resources.” ’ ” (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112.) To
overcome this presumption, an affected parent must make an appropriate
8 In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address Mother’s
additional contention that the juvenile court erred in relying on section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(12), as an alternative basis for bypassing reunification
services.
17
showing “by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
In exercising its discretion to order reunification services in the child’s
best interest, a juvenile court may consider “a variety of factors, . . . including
(1) the parent’s ‘ “ ‘current efforts and fitness,’ ” ’ (2) the parent’s
‘ “ ‘history,’ ” ’ (3) the ‘ “ ‘gravity of the problem’ ” ’ that led to the assertion of
dependency, (4) the ‘ “strength of the bonds” ’ between the child and the
parent and between the child and the current caregiver, and (5) the ‘ “ ‘child’s
need for stability and continuity.’ ” ’ [Citation.] One factor that is essential—
and hence necessary—to the assessment of a child’s best interest is whether
there is ‘ “some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’ ” ’ that reunification is possible;
if it is not, offering reunification services that are destined to fail is not in the
child’s best interest.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272–1273.)
On the record before us, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding Mother failed to carry her burden to show
reunification services were in A.R.’s best interest. The court could reasonably
base its decision on numerous relevant factors, including Mother’s
unsatisfactory efforts at treating her drug addiction, the gravity and
extensive history of her substance abuse, A.R.’s need for stability and
continuity (especially given his young age), and the fact he was thriving in
his placement with his great aunt and older brother. Furthermore, because
this was the third of Mother’s children removed due to her ongoing substance
abuse problems, and she remained in an abusive relationship with Father,
who had unresolved substance abuse problems of his own, the court could
reasonably conclude reunification was not possible and, thus, continued
services were not in A.R.’s best interest. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1272–1273.)
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Mother insists the juvenile court erred by failing to recognize the
strong bond that existed between her and A.R. after she had parented him for
the majority of his life. In support, Mother appears to rely on portions of the
record from the prior dependency case involving A.R., specifically, a status
report in which the Agency purportedly acknowledged Mother’s “ ‘legitimate
behavior change’ ” and “strong parenting skills.” We find this argument
unavailing for several reasons. First, it appears the cited report from A.R.’s
prior dependency case was not included in the record before us. It is Mother’s
burden as the petitioner seeking extraordinary relief to support the
substantive issues raised in the petition with an adequate record. (Glen C. v.
Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 582.) Second, even assuming
Mother’s summary of the record is accurate, Mother fails to demonstrate the
juvenile court failed to consider it. The court expressly took judicial notice of
the entire file from A.R.’s prior dependency case, and we may thus infer the
court considered the Agency’s report of Mother’s progress in her behavior and
parenting skills but concluded numerous other factors outweighed it. Finally,
the Agency’s one-time acknowledgment of Mother’s improved behavior and
parenting skills does not compel the conclusion that she and A.R. shared such
a strong bond that reunification services were necessarily in the child’s best
interest.
Mother next contends she was “severely prejudiced” in her ability to
demonstrate her bond with A.R. by the Agency’s failure to implement in-
person visitation. According to Mother, the juvenile court’s finding that
Mother was to blame for the lack of in-person visits was “completely
unsupported by substantial evidence” and “flatly contradicted by the record,”
as PSW Martin admitted at the disposition hearing that Mother was
permitted only a single one-hour video call per week while she was on a
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waiting list for a visitation center. We cannot agree. While it is true the
Agency was unable to fully implement in-person visitation due to visitation
center policies and a long waitlist, the record demonstrates that Mother
failed to take advantage of the Agency’s other efforts to facilitate visitation.
For instance, when A.R. was in an AFS home, the Agency arranged twice-
weekly in-person visits in late April 2026, but Mother missed the first
appointment and failed to appear for the second despite confirming she would
attend. Mother was also offered virtual visits by the great aunt in May 2026
but attended only one. On this record, substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding that Mother did not take advantage of the visitation
opportunities offered to her.
Furthermore, in-person visitation was not the only means by which
Mother could have demonstrated a strong parent-child bond. Though Mother
could have discussed her relationship with A.R. during her testimony at the
disposition hearing, she did not. Nor did she offer the testimony of any other
witness who could attest to the strength of their relationship. Mother
provides no reason why she could not have offered such evidence in lieu of in-
person visitation logs to demonstrate a strong parent-child bond. As such, we
cannot accept Mother’s contention that she was severely prejudiced by the
lack of in-person visitation in this case.9
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).) The request to stay the permanency
9 Our decision is based solely on the current record in relation to the
juvenile court’s discretionary decision whether to order reunification services
in the child’s best interest under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2). Our
opinion should not be read as expressing any views on Mother’s bond with
A.R. or her ability to prove a beneficial relationship for other purposes.
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planning hearing set for September 30, 2026, is denied. Our decision is final
as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i),
8.490(b)(2)(A).)
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J. *
M.A. v. San Francisco City & CO Sup. Ct. (A176781)
* Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One,
sitting by assignment pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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