Lydon v. Mizrahi CA2/4

Filed 6/26/26 Lydon v. Mizrahi CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CATHY LYDON, B345396

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV45399)
v.

PARVAZ FARNAD MIZRAHI, DDS,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld, Judge. Affirmed.
Cathy Lydon, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hegeler & Anderson, Barton H. Hegeler and Storm P.
Anderson for Defendant and Respondent.
This is a dental malpractice case. Appellant Cathy Lydon
presented to respondent Parvaz Farnad Mizrahi, DDS, an oral
surgeon, for extraction of a tooth. Mizrahi allegedly failed to
notice that the tooth was connected to a bridge, causing damage
to the bridge and adjacent teeth during the extraction. After
Mizrahi’s demurrer to appellant’s fraudulent concealment causes
of action was sustained without leave to amend, Mizrahi moved
for summary judgment on the remaining cause of action for
medical negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment,
finding that appellant’s experts were not qualified to opine on the
standard of care for oral surgeons like Mizrahi. Appellant then
moved the trial judge for recusal, but the trial judge struck
appellant’s statement of disqualification. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I. The Incident
Appellant had a dental bridge installed in her mouth
sometime in 1994 or before. A dental bridge is “a partial denture
anchored to adjacent teeth.” (Merriam-Webster, at
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bridge> [as of May
15, 2026].) In 2014, Kourosh Maddahi, D.D.S., a general dentist,
and respondent Parvaz Farnad Mizrahi, D.D.S., an oral surgeon,
began providing dental consultation treatment to appellant,
including a bone graft and implants.
In July 2019, Maddahi, who is not a party to this appeal,
told appellant that she needed an extraction of tooth #13.
Appellant agreed to the extraction and requested Mizrahi, who
had previously successfully treated appellant with dental
implants. In September 2019, appellant presented to Mizrahi at

1 We deny respondent Mizrahi’s request for judicial notice as
unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. (Martinez v. San
Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1075.)

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Maddahi’s office for extraction, bone grafting, and potential
implant placement.
As alleged by appellant in the operative complaint,
Mizrahi failed to notice that tooth #13 was attached to the bridge,
to which the tooth was a critical anchor. When Mizrahi
attempted to extract the tooth, she dislodged the bridge, breaking
several prosthetic teeth.
II. Complaints and Demurrers
In November 2020, appellant commenced an action against
Maddahi and Mizrahi, asserting one cause of action for medical
negligence. Upon leave from the trial court, appellant added
causes of action for fraudulent concealment in two amended
complaints. Appellant alleged that defendants excluded
information concerning the extent of the damage caused by the
extraction, including communications between the defendants,
from her medical records. Appellant also maintained that
defendants did not provide complete information concerning the
risks and benefits of and alternatives to the extraction before the
procedure.
Mizrahi demurred twice to the fraudulent concealment
causes of action. Judge Craig D. Karlan sustained the first
demurrer with leave to amend. Judge Lisa K. Sepe-Wiesenfeld
sustained the second demurrer without leave to amend. For both
demurrers, the trial court determined that appellant failed to
allege how she relied on the alleged concealment. The operative
complaint thus had one surviving medical negligence cause of
action.
III. Summary Judgment
A. Motion
Mizrahi moved for summary judgment of the medical
negligence cause of action. Mizrahi argued that the undisputed
facts showed she complied with the standard of care of an oral
surgeon and that she did not cause appellant’s alleged harm.

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As recounted by Mizrahi in verified responses to discovery,
before the extraction, she heard from Maddahi’s staff that
appellant’s dental bridge had been cut to allow for the extraction.
During the procedure, Mizrahi observed that tooth #13 was
connected to the bridge. Upon Mizrahi’s request, Maddahi cut
the bridge to relieve tooth #13. Mizrahi then extracted the tooth.
In December 2019, appellant returned to Mizrahi to have an
implant placed at the tooth #13 site. Appellant recovered from
the implant placement with no complications.
To show her compliance with the standard of care, Mizrahi
provided the declaration of Adel Tawfilis, D.D.S., a board-
certified oral and maxillofacial surgeon. He averred that Mizrahi
was qualified to treat appellant as an oral and maxillofacial
surgeon. Dr. Tawfilis maintained that as an oral surgeon,
Mizrahi was not responsible for developing general dentistry
treatment plans or restoring appellant’s bridge.
Crediting Mizrahi’s verified discovery responses, Dr.
Tawfilis stated that Mizrahi reasonably believed that the bridge
had been cut based on the representation by Maddahi’s staff. He
stated that Mizrahi also obtained appellant’s informed consent to
the extraction and reviewed pre-operative imaging contained in
appellant’s medical records. However, it was “not apparent” from
the imaging whether the bridge had been cut. Based on
Mizrahi’s evaluation of appellant, review of imaging, the
informed consent, and the representation of Maddahi’s staff, Dr.
Tawfilis opined that Mizrahi reasonably proceeded with the
extraction attempt.
When Mizrahi discovered that tooth #13 had not been
separated from the bridge, she called Maddahi to cut the bridge.
According to Dr. Tawfilis, “Calling Dr. Maddahi into the
treatment room to cut the bridge was the appropriate response to
the circumstance and complied with the standard of care.” He
concluded that Mizrahi’s treatment of appellant during the
September 3, 2019 extraction, subsequent implant, and post-

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operative management accorded with the relevant standard of
care. He also determined that no act or omission by Mizrahi was
a substantial factor in causing appellant’s alleged injuries and
damages.
B. Opposition
To demonstrate that Mizrahi breached the standard of
care, appellant provided declarations from Jay Grossman, D.D.S.,
a general dentist, and Vicki Petropoulos, DMD, MS, FACP, a
prosthodontist
Dr. Grossman declared that he had “knowledge of the
accepted standards of care for dentists in the diagnosis, care, and
treatment of” appellant. Dr. Petropoulos declared that she was
“qualified by [her] education and experience with the standard of
care, methods, procedures and treatments relevant to the dental
treatment in the case.”
Both Dr. Grossman and Dr. Petropoulos opined that
Mizrahi should have evaluated tooth #13 herself to ascertain it
was part of a bridge, instead of relying on Maddahi, before
attempting the extraction.
Neither Dr. Grossman nor Dr. Petropoulos indicated any
training in oral or maxillofacial surgery or any familiarity with
the standard of care for oral surgeons. Mizrahi objected to both
declarations, asserting that neither declarant was competent to
address the standard of care for an oral surgeon.
C. Ruling
On January 30, 2025, the trial court (Judge Sepe-
Wiesenfeld) heard and granted Mizrahi’s summary judgment
motion. Through Dr. Tawfilis’s declaration, the court found
Mizrahi met her initial burden to show the absence of a triable
issue of material fact on the negligence claim. The court then
found that plaintiff did not meet her burden to show a triable
issue of material fact against Mizrahi. Sustaining Mizrahi’s
objections to appellant’s expert declarations on grounds that
neither expert was “directly engaged in the work of oral surgery,”

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the court determined that appellant’s experts were not qualified
to address the standard of care for oral surgeons.
IV. Post-Summary Judgment Hearing Proceedings and
Appeal
On February 18, 2025, appellant moved to recuse Judge
Sepe-Wiesenfeld on grounds of bias and prejudice, as evidenced
by her granting of summary judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.1. Three days later, the trial court struck
appellant’s statement of disqualification and noted that the
question of disqualification may be reviewed only by a writ of
mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision
(d).
The court entered judgment in favor of Mizrahi on
February 25, 2025. On March 28, 2025, appellant timely filed
her notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the standard of review employed for an
order granting summary judgment and an order sustaining a
demurrer. We then discuss appellant’s forfeiture of her claims of
error due to failure to cite to the record.
Even if appellant had not forfeited her arguments, we find
the merits of the appeal to be lacking.
I. Standard of Review
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo,
considering all evidence in the papers, except evidence to which
objections were made and sustained. (Johnson v. City of Loma
Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65.) We review evidentiary rulings,
including decisions to exclude expert testimony, for abuse of
discretion. (Ryder v. Lightstorm Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 1064, 1072; Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical
Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (Avivi).)
We consider the evidence in a light favorable to appellant
as the losing party, liberally construing her evidence while
strictly scrutinizing Mizrahi’s showing and resolving any

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evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in appellant’s favor. (Saelzler
v. Advanced Grp. 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768-769.)
We review orders sustaining demurrers without leave to
amend de novo as to sufficiency of the pleading. (California
Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242,
247.) We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of
discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
II. Forfeiture
It is axiomatic that the appellant has the burden to show
prejudicial error. (Conner v. Rose (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 327,
329.) Mizrahi argues that appellant forfeited her claim of error
by failing to cite to the record. We agree. California Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) states that each brief filed with the
Court of Appeal must “support any reference to a matter in the
record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record
where the matter appears.” (See also Cardenas v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. 120 Cal.App.5th 554, 556 [“[A]ppellate briefs
. . . must support factual assertions with record citations.”]
(Cardenas).)
On November 6, 2025, appellant’s opening brief was
rejected due to violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). The same
violation remains in appellant’s opening brief filed on February 2,
2026. Appellant’s “Statement of the Case” discusses factual
occurrences but contains only four citations to the record.
Appellant’s “Statement of Facts” contains no citations to the
record. Appellant’s “Argument” contains citations to her separate
statement in opposition to respondent’s summary judgment
motion, but appellant’s responses to respondent’s facts do not cite
any evidence, as required by California Rules of Court, rule
3.1350(h). Appellant’s reply brief also contains only one citation
to the record. By failing to cite the record, appellant forfeited her
argument that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment. (Cardenas, supra, at p. 556, citing Alki Partners, LP v.
DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590.)

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The same rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) defects extend to appellant’s
challenges to the other rulings on appeal. Appellant’s argument
that the order sustaining demurrers to the fraud claims conflicted
with prior orders consists largely of block-quoted text from trial-
court filings, with citations identifying only where that text
appears in the record rather than supporting the asserted
propositions. Appellant's challenge to the order striking her Code
of Civil Procedure section 170.1 statement asserts bias in
conclusory terms without record citations to supporting facts or
cogent legal argument. Appellant's indispensable-party
argument likewise lacks legal authority and cogent argument.
These defects forfeit the respective claims of error. (WFG
National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 881, 894.)
Application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic and there
are exceptions, such as a pure question of law, an important legal
issue, or due process concerns. (In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
728, 738.) Since forfeiture is a doctrine of largely judicial
creation, it should not apply when it would be incompatible with
the fundamental purposes of a statutory scheme. (Ibid.) Here,
none of the appellate issues presents a pure question of law or an
important legal issue warranting departure from the forfeiture
rule. The summary judgment ruling turned on the admissibility
of expert declarations under established standards. The
demurrer ruling turned on application of Lazar v. Superior Court
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 631 to a specific pleading. The “indispensable
party argument” involves application of well-settled doctrine to
undisputed facts. No due process concern appears as to any
issue; appellant had a full opportunity to litigate each below.
Appellant had an opportunity to correct her violation of
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) but did not. Similarly, her opposition to the
summary judgment motion did not comply with rule 3.1350(h).
The court is mindful that appellant is self-represented, but pro
per litigants are held to the same procedural standards as

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represented parties. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th
975, 984–985.) Self-representation does not excuse the rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) noncompliance described above, particularly where
appellant had notice and an opportunity to cure.
Due to appellant’s forfeiture, appellant fails to demonstrate
a basis for reversal. Even if we exercised our discretion to excuse
appellant’s forfeiture, appellant fails to demonstrate reversible
error on the merits, as discussed below.
III. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment must be granted where there is no
triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
A moving defendant meets their initial burden by showing that
one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established
or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present specific facts
demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact.
(Ibid.)
A. Mizrahi’s Initial Burden
“[I]n any medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must
establish: ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession
commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from
the professional's negligence.’ [Citation.]” (Gami v. Mullikin
Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 877; see also Willard
v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 413 [no legal
distinction between dental and medical malpractice].)
The allegations and claims in the operative complaint “set
the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary
judgment.” (See Oakland Raiders v. National Football League
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 648; Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 444.) In the
operative complaint, appellant seeks damages related to the

9
extraction of tooth #13 and resulting damage to her dental
bridge.
To establish the absence of breach, Mizrahi presented the
declaration of Dr. Tawfilis, a board-certified oral surgeon. Dr.
Tawfilis averred that an oral surgeon like Mizrahi had no duty to
develop general dentistry plans or restore the bridge. Her
responsibilities were to extract tooth #13 and place an implant.
Dr. Tawfilis opined that Mizrahi could reasonably rely on the
information from Maddahi’s staff that tooth #13 had been
separated from the bridge. He asserted that Mizrahi could not
discern from pre-operative imaging whether the bridge was
severed. He declared that Mizrahi did not cause appellant’s
alleged injuries.
The above averments were sufficient to demonstrate the
absence of a breach of duty and causation and to shift the burden
to appellant to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact.
B. Appellant’s Burden
To demonstrate the breach of duty and causation, appellant
presented the declarations of Dr. Grossman, a general dentist,
and Dr. Petropoulos, a prosthodontist. Both declarants averred
that Mizrahi should have personally examined the tooth and
ascertained that it was still connected to the bridge, instead of
relying on Maddahi.
However, the trial court sustained Mizrahi’s objections to
both declarations and excluded them from consideration,
reasoning that neither of the declarants had worked as an oral
surgeon. We do not endorse the trial court's reasoning that direct
engagement in the specialty is required. The question is whether
the proffered expert has, by education, training, or other means,
gained sufficient familiarity with the standard of care applicable
to the specialty in question. We apply that standard below.
Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a) states, “A person
is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him

10
as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” It is
unnecessary for the expert to have performed the same function
as the subject matter. (Jeffer, Mangels & Butler v. Glickman
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1432, 1442 (Jeffer).) Instead, the
proffering party has to show that the expert “(1) has the required
professional knowledge, learning and skill of the subject under
inquiry sufficient to qualify him to speak with authority on the
subject, and (2) is familiar with the standards required of
physicians under similar circumstances.” (Agnew v. City of Los
Angeles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 557, 565; Ammon v. Superior Court
(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 783, 791.) The determinative test
regarding expert qualification is “whether the witness has
sufficient skill or experience in the field so his testimony would
be likely to assist the jury in the search for the truth.” (Jeffer,
supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1442.)
The evaluation of the sufficiency of the expert’s
qualifications is “left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.”
(Ibid.) “While the qualification of an expert witness requires
exercise of trial court discretion, the court abuses its discretion by
denying qualification if the [expert] witness has demonstrated
sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his or her opinion to
go before the jury.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 472.)
A dentist may be competent to opine on a related specialty's
standard of care. “Where a duly licensed and practicing [dentist]
has gained knowledge of the standard of care applicable to a
specialty in which he [or she] is not directly engaged but as to
which he [or she] has an opinion based on education, experience,
observation or association with that specialty, his [or her] opinion
is competent.” (Evans v. Ohanesian (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 121,
128.) Indeed, Ammon expressly recognized that “in an
appropriate case concerning oral surgery, either a licensed
dentist or the holder of a physician’s and surgeon’s certificate
may be qualified to testify concerning the standard of care

11
applicable to the other.” (Ammon, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p.
792.)
Dr. Grossman, a general dentist, claimed “knowledge of the
accepted standards of care for dentists in the diagnosis, care,
and treatment of” appellant. Dr. Petropoulos, a prosthodontist,
stated her education and experience qualified her to opine on “the
standard of care, methods, procedures and treatments relevant to
the dental treatment in the case.” However, neither declarant
described the basis upon which they could opine on the standard
of care for oral surgeons. The proffered experts did not claim any
education or experience with oral and maxillofacial surgery,
specifically with the type of tooth extraction involved here. Dr.
Grossman practices as a general dentist. Dr. Petropoulos
practices as a prosthodontist, or someone who specializes in the
restoration of lost or missing teeth. (Merriam-Webster, at
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prosthodontics>
[as of May 15, 2026].)
The trial court could reasonably find that appellant’s
experts lacked sufficient knowledge to testify regarding the
standard of care for oral surgeons and therefore exclude their
declarations. Without any expert to rebut the determination by
Mizrahi’s expert that there was neither breach nor causation,
appellant failed to meet her burden to demonstrate a triable
issue of material fact. (See Munro v. Regents of University of
California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984-985.)
Appellant also contends that the trial court “failed to
provide equal consideration” to her experts. Because the trial
court properly sustained Mizrahi's objections to appellant's
expert declarations, those declarations were not part of the
evidentiary record for purposes of summary judgment. There
was no improper weighing of expert testimony.
Because we find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of
appellant’s experts, we affirm summary judgment in favor of
Mizrahi.

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C. Indispensable Party Argument
Appellant argues that Mizrahi is an indispensable party
because the codefendants blamed each other for causing
appellant’s injuries. On this theory, dismissing either defendant
would prevent effective relief. The argument does not preclude
Mizrahi’s dismissal on summary judgment. Code of Civil
Procedure section 389 allows a court to dismiss an action where
an indispensable party cannot be added to the action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 389, subd. (b).) Section 389 is inapplicable here; Mizrahi
was already joined.
IV. Demurrer to Fraudulent Concealment Causes of
Action
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer to her fraud-based causes of action because a
previous judge had determined their legal adequacy. For
Mizrahi’s first demurrer, Judge Karlan granted leave to plead
fraudulent concealment. Such leave did not preclude Mizrahi
from demurring to the subsequent complaint based on failure to
adequately allege the elements. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior
Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.)
Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld’s later ruling found the operative
complaint still failed to plead specific facts concerning how
appellant relied on the alleged concealment, one of the elements
of a fraudulent concealment cause of action. (Lazar v. Superior
Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638; Sevidal v. Target Corp. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 905, 928.) Granting leave to amend and later
finding the amended pleading deficient is not a conflict.
Appellant does not otherwise argue that she sufficiently
pled fraudulent concealment. Appellant thus fails to
demonstrate a basis for reversal of the order sustaining the
demurrer to the fraudulent concealment causes of action.
V. Motion for Recusal
After the order granting summary judgment, appellant
sought to disqualify Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld on grounds of bias

13
and prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1.
Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld found no legal grounds for
disqualification and struck appellant’s statement pursuant to
section 170.4, subdivision (b). Appellant maintains that any
reasonable person would conclude that Judge Sepe-Wiesenfeld
acted with bias and prejudice toward appellant.
An order striking a statement of disqualification is
reviewable only by writ of mandate, not appeal. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 275-276.)
Because appellant filed an appeal and not a petition for writ of
mandate, we decline to address appellant’s contentions
concerning her motion for recusal.
To the extent that appellant’s argument can be construed as a
claim of a due process violation, we would find such argument to
be unmeritorious. “The Due Process Clause entitles a person to
an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal
cases.” (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 242; Brown
v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665,
673.) Due process violations of this kind are generally confined to
“the exceptional case presenting extreme facts” demonstrating a
probability of actual bias. (Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 219.)
Appellate review of such claims is independent. (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589.)
Appellant’s principal argument is that Judge Sepe-
Wiesenfeld failed to consider the opposition papers, as evidenced
by the January 30, 2025 order granting summary judgment.
Adverse rulings, even erroneous ones, do not establish judicial
bias. (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC, supra, 224
Cal.App.4th at p. 674; Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at p. 589 [“Numerous and continuous rulings against
a party are not grounds for a finding of bias.”].) Appellant thus
fails to demonstrate any basis for reversal based on bias or
prejudice of the trial judge.

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On both forfeiture grounds and the merits, we find no basis
to reverse.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Parvaz Farnad
Mizrahi, DDS shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COGLIATI, J.*

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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