Filed 10/8/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LINDA LUNA et al., B347645
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV05929)
v.
TOP DAWG ENTERTAINMENT
LLC et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Horvitz & Levy, Jasjaap S. Sidhu, Jeremy B. Rosen; Lavely
& Singer; Singer Weinstein Wolf & Jonelis, Martin D. Singer and
Allison S. Hart for Defendants and Appellants.
Arns Davis Law, Shounak S. Dharap, Katherine A. Rabago,
Marissa M. Boling; Brandon Banks Law and Brandon Banks for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
______________________________
Plaintiffs Linda Luna and Ayah Altayri brought this action
against Defendants Top Dawg Entertainment, LLC (TDE),
Brandon Tiffith, Anthony Tiffith, Jr., and David Harrell.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s order denying their Code of
Civil Procedure1 section 425.16 special motion to strike Plaintiffs’
sixth cause of action for doxing under Civil Code section
1708.89.2
We conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion
because (1) the activity underlying the doxing cause of action, a
press release denying Plaintiffs’ allegations and disclosing their
full names, constitutes protected activity; and (2) the disclosure of
Plaintiffs’ names is protected by the fair report privilege in the
absence of a pending motion to seal. Accordingly, we reverse the
order denying the motion and remand for further proceedings as
directed below.
BACKGROUND
TDE is a renowned hip hop and R&B record label. The
Tiffiths are executives at TDE. Harrell is alleged to be a TDE
employee.
On December 6, 2024, Luna and Altayri commenced this
action using the pseudonyms Jane Doe and Jane Roe. As Jane
Doe, Luna alleged that while she performed services for TDE
from 2019 to 2024, Brandon Tiffith sexually battered her and
Anthony Tiffith, Jr. sexually harassed her. Luna further alleged
TDE did not pay her for her services. As Jane Roe, Altayri alleged
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 All Defendants jointly filed the motion and are appellants
in this appeal, but only TDE was sued for doxing. Thus, our
discussion of the cause of action will only refer to TDE.
2
that while she resided in a TDE-owned home between 2020 and
2021 to provide moral support to a new TDE artist, Harrell
sexually assaulted and harassed her.
When Plaintiffs commenced suit in December 2024, they
did not file a motion or otherwise seek a court order to proceed in
the trial court under pseudonyms. Nor did they make such a
request after serving Defendants in mid-January 2025.
On January 31, 2025, two days before the Grammy Awards,
Plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release regarding the lawsuit.
The press release, using the pseudonyms, summarized Plaintiffs’
allegations and then stated: “ ‘This lawsuit presents a glaring
example of the systemic abuse and exploitation in the
entertainment industry.’ . . . ‘Our clients trusted TDE to act with
integrity and professionalism. Instead, their trust was betrayed
in profoundly damaging ways. They’re bringing this lawsuit
because they refuse to be silenced, and because they intend to
hold TDE accountable in court.’ ”
On February 1, 2025, TDE responded with its own press
release, as follows: “ ‘This is a clear example of a shakedown
lawsuit by Linda Luna and Ayah Altayri who made a demand of
$48 million through their attorneys on fabricated claims, and
whose attorneys are looking for their ten minutes of fame.’ . . .
‘There are text messages and communications that totally refute
these baseless claims. Additionally, [Luna] and [Altayri] were
never employees of [TDE]. We are confident that we will prevail
in this action.’ ” At that time, Plaintiffs still had not requested
permission from the trial court to proceed anonymously.
On February 5, 2025, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to
add a cause of action for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89.
Plaintiffs alleged TDE doxed them by disclosing their names in
the February 1, 2025 press release.
3
On April 8, 2025, Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion
to strike the doxing cause of action. Plaintiffs filed an opposition,
conceding the doxing cause of action arose from protected activity
but contending they could show a probability of prevailing on the
merits.
On June 11, 2025, the trial court held a hearing and denied
the motion. The crux of the court’s ruling was that TDE’s press
release was not protected, whether by the anti-SLAPP statute or
relevant statutory privileges, because the disclosure of Plaintiffs’
names was not necessary to correct the narrative in the public
records. In so holding, the court relied on rule 3.6 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, even though no party cited the rule in their
briefing, to reason that the disclosure was an extrajudicial
statement that defense counsel knew or reasonably should have
known would be disseminated publicly and have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing the judicial proceedings.
Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We agree with Defendants that the trial court should have
granted the anti-SLAPP motion. Before delving into the anti-
SLAPP analysis, we briefly discuss the proper procedure to
proceed under a pseudonym.
I. The Procedure for a Party to Proceed Under a
Pseudonym
The right of the public to access civil proceedings is
guaranteed by the First Amendment (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-
TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1207–1208),
and this right “necessarily includes the right to know the identity
of the parties” (Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
Superior Court (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 105, 111 (Department of
Fair Employment & Housing)). Accordingly, “[t]he right of public
access to court proceedings is implicated when a party is allowed
4
to proceed anonymously.” (Roe v. Smith (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th
227, 237 (Roe).)
In light of these constitutional issues, absent a specific
statutory authorization, a plaintiff does not have an absolute
right to sue anonymously. (Roe, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at
p. 247.) Instead, they must “file the initial complaint or petition
conditionally under a pseudonym and then move for an order
granting permission to proceed that way.” (Department of Fair
Employment & Housing, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 111, fn. 1;
see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b) [procedure for
requesting that a record be filed under seal].) “[B]efore
authorizing a civil litigant to use a pseudonym, the trial court
must apply the ‘overriding interest test’ outlined in NBC
Subsidiary and . . . rule 2.550(d).” (Roe, at p. 238.) That test
requires the trial court to expressly find facts establishing that:
(1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of
public access to court records; (2) there is a substantial
probability that interest will be prejudiced if a pseudonym is not
used; (3) the use of the pseudonym is narrowly tailored to serve
the overriding interest; and (4) there is no less restrictive means
of achieving the overriding interest. (Id. at p. 247.)
II. The Trial Court Should Have Granted the Anti-
SLAPP Motion
A. Overview of Anti-SLAPP Principles and
Standard of Review
The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted (Baral).)
The trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion entails a
two-step procedure. First, the “moving defendant bears the
5
burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the
claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 396.) If the defendant makes such a showing, at the second
step the “burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each
challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient
and factually substantiated.” (Ibid.) Without resolving
evidentiary conflicts, the court determines “whether the
plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Ibid.) “In the second
prong of the analysis, where plaintiffs must demonstrate the
‘minimal merit’ of their claims, they must also show they can
overcome any affirmative defense defendant has raised.” (Dziubla
v. Piazza (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 154 (Dziubla).)
We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP
motion de novo and in so doing, conduct the same two-step
analysis. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
788.)
B. The Anti-SLAPP Statute Protects TDE’s Press
Release
We first conclude TDE’s press release constitutes protected
activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4).
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) applies to statements
“made in connection with an issue under consideration or review
by a . . . judicial body.” (Ibid.) A defendant’s public statement
addressing a plaintiff’s lawsuit, such as TDE’s press release here,
is protected under subdivision (e)(2). (See Dziubla, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149–150.)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) protects any
communication or conduct “in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
6
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (Ibid.) TDE, a renowned record label that has launched
the career of many famous artists, is an “entity in the public eye.”
(Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924.) And
Plaintiffs’ allegations of sexual misconduct by figures in the
music industry and TDE’s public statement addressing those
allegations concern an issue of public interest. (See Bernstein v.
LaBeouf (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 23 [public’s interest in life and
work of entertainers can create issue of public interest]; Terry v.
Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1547
[societal interest in protecting children from sexual predators can
create issue of public interest].) Thus, TDE’s press release
addressing serious allegations of sexual misconduct also satisfies
subdivision (e)(4).
To the extent that the trial court held the press release is
not protected because TDE inappropriately disclosed Plaintiffs’
names, that was in error. As discussed in part I., ante, plaintiffs,
absent a statutory authorization, may proceed anonymously only
after they file a motion with the trial court to find an overriding
interest supports their use of pseudonyms. Here, Plaintiffs never
filed such a motion, and TDE violated no court order or rule when
it disclosed Plaintiffs’ names.
We are, of course, sensitive to the nature of Plaintiffs’
allegations, and they may have had a strong argument to remain
anonymous. But it was incumbent on Plaintiffs to present their
request to the trial court as soon as possible. Absent filing such a
motion or a statutory basis, they simply had no “right” to remain
anonymous while suing in court. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
7
rule 2.551(b)(4) [pending determination of the motion, the lodged
record will be conditionally under seal].)
Notably, Plaintiffs conceded in the trial court that TDE’s
press release was protected. That concession was well made. On
appeal however, Plaintiffs contend the anti-SLAPP statute does
not protect the press release because “the gravamen of the
[doxing] claim is the electronic distribution of personally
identifying information, not the exercise of free speech or
petitioning rights.”
We disagree. The Supreme Court has cautioned that at the
first step, courts should not attempt to determine the gravamen
of a claim as it would risk “saddling courts with an obligation to
settle intractable, almost metaphysical problems about the
‘essence’ of a cause of action.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1011.) Instead, court should determine
whether a protected act “suppl[ies] the basis for any claims.” (Id.
at p. 1010.) As already explained, the press release, a
quintessential exercise of free speech or petitioning rights
(Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149–150), is the basis for
the doxing cause of action. And in the absence of any contention
that the conduct that occurred here was illegal as a matter of law
(see id. at pp. 150–153), whether the electronic distribution of
personally identifying information in this case is actionable
under the doxing statute is relevant only to the second prong (id.
at p. 154).
C. The Fair Report Privilege Protects the
Disclosure of Plaintiffs’ Names
We next conclude Plaintiffs cannot show a probability of
prevailing on the merits because the disclosure of their names is
protected by the fair report privilege.
8
Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), the fair report
privilege “protects a ‘fair and true report in, or a communication
to, a public journal, of . . . a judicial . . . proceeding, or anything
said in the course thereof.’ ” (Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 768, 787.) “ ‘Fair and true’ in this context does not
refer to the truth or accuracy of the matters asserted in the
judicial proceedings, but rather to the accuracy of the challenged
statements with respect to what occurred in the judicial
proceedings.” (Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016)
7 Cal.App.5th 416, 434 (Healthsmart).) The privilege is
absolute—“that is, it applies regardless of the defendants’ motive
for making the report—and forecloses a plaintiff from showing a
probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Argentieri, at p. 787.)
“Courts have construed the privilege broadly, ‘mindful of the
Legislature’s intent . . . “to preserve the scarce resources of
California’s courts [and] to avoid using the courts for satellite
litigation.” ’ ” (Healthsmart, at p. 431.) “Although the fair report
privilege is typically invoked by news media defendants, it also
protects those who communicate information to the media.”
(Ibid.) Whether the privilege applies is generally a question of
law for the court to decide. (Ibid.)
Here, the portion of the press release Plaintiffs challenge is
the disclosure of their names. That specific portion represented
the complaint as a “lawsuit by Linda Luna and Ayah Altayri.”
That statement easily qualifies for the fair report privilege: Luna
and Altayri are in fact the plaintiffs in this action. The fact they
unilaterally chose to use pseudonyms but had not yet requested
permission to do so does not alter this fact.
The trial court appeared to hold that the statement is not
protected because the fair report privilege does not apply when
9
the communication to a public journal violates rule 3.6 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. (See Civ. Code, § 47, subd.
(d)(2)(A).) But rule 3.6(b)(1) expressly allows lawyers to publicly
communicate the “identity of the persons involved.” And as
discussed in part II.B., ante, no court rule or order prohibited
TDE from doing that in this action because Plaintiffs had not
sought authorization from the court to proceed anonymously.
This is the critical distinction: TDE did not communicate their
identities while such a motion was pending. Thus, to the extent
the court found that there was an exception to the fair report
privilege, that was in error.
In addition to echoing the trial court’s concerns about rule
3.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Plaintiffs offer two other
reasons the fair report privilege does not apply. Neither is
persuasive.
First, Plaintiffs argue the disclosure of their names was not
a fair and true report because their names were never part of the
judicial record. The privilege, however, is not limited to fair and
true reports of statements made in the proceedings. It protects
statements “about the proceedings or of what was said in the
proceedings.” (Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 435,
original italics omitted, italics added.) The fact that Plaintiffs’
names were not yet part of the judicial record when TDE issued
its press release does not defeat the fair report privilege; it is still
an accurate report about the proceeding.
Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 226, supports our conclusion here. There, the
defendants reported that in a custody dispute between the
plaintiff, a nationally known political consultant, and his first
wife, his former wives testified that he had physically and
10
verbally abused them. (Id. at p. 230.) The defendants based their
assertion in part on depositions taken in the custody proceeding.
(Id. at pp. 231, 242.) On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
defendants’ reporting of the depositions should not be protected
because the depositions were never part of the judicial record. (Id.
at p. 242.) Another panel of our Division disagreed, explaining
“ ‘case law is clear that reports which comprise a history of the
proceeding come within the privilege, as do statements made
outside the courtroom and invoking no function of the court.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Second, Plaintiffs argue the fair report privilege does not
apply because the press release made factual assertions that
went beyond reporting about Plaintiffs’ complaint. For example,
Plaintiffs point to the press release’s representation that the
complaint “was a clear example of a shakedown” and had
“baseless claims.” But the fact that the press release also made
these assertions is immaterial. In assessing whether the privilege
applies, our focus is on “the accuracy of the challenged
statements.” (Healthsmart, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 434, italics
added.) Plaintiffs are not suing TDE for doxing because the
statement said the lawsuit was a “shakedown” or had “baseless
claims.” Instead, Plaintiffs challenge only the statement that
Luna and Altayri are the plaintiffs in the action. Because that
statement is unquestionably accurate, the privilege applies.
Because we conclude the doxing cause of action fails on this
basis, we do not reach Defendants’ alternative arguments that
the allegations do not constitute doxing as defined by Civil Code
section 1708.89 or that the First Amendment precludes its
application here.
11
DISPOSITION
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is reversed. On
remand, the trial court is directed to grant Defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion and strike Plaintiffs’ doxing cause of action.
Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
12